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At least 559 records · Page 31

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Proton beam therapy control system

A tiered communications architecture for managing network traffic in a distributed system. Communication between client or control computers and a plurality of hardware devices is administered by agent and monitor devices whose activities are coordinated to reduce the number of open channels or sockets. The communications architecture also improves the transparency and scalability of the distributed system by reducing network mapping dependence. The architecture is desirably implemented in a proton beam therapy system to provide flexible security policies which improve patent safety and facilitate system maintenance and development.

Baumann, Michael A↗

Proton beam therapy control system

A tiered communications architecture for managing network traffic in a distributed system. Communication between client or control computers and a plurality of hardware devices is administered by agent and monitor devices whose activities are coordinated to reduce the number of open channels or sockets. The communications architecture also improves the transparency and scalability of the distributed system by reducing network mapping dependence. The architecture is desirably implemented in a proton beam therapy system to provide flexible security policies which improve patent safety and facilitate system maintenance and development.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Proton beam therapy control system

A tiered communications architecture for managing network traffic in a distributed system. Communication between client or control computers and a plurality of hardware devices is administered by agent and monitor devices whose activities are coordinated to reduce the number of open channels or sockets. The communications architecture also improves the transparency and scalability of the distributed system by reducing network mapping dependence. The architecture is desirably implemented in a proton beam therapy system to provide flexible security policies which improve patent safety and facilitate system maintenance and development.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Proton beam therapy control system

A tiered communications architecture for managing network traffic in a distributed system. Communication between client or control computers and a plurality of hardware devices is administered by agent and monitor devices whose activities are coordinated to reduce the number of open channels or sockets. The communications architecture also improves the transparency and scalability of the distributed system by reducing network mapping dependence. The architecture is desirably implemented in a proton beam therapy system to provide flexible security policies which improve patent safety and facilitate system maintenance and development.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Grid-Friendly Renewable Energy: Solar and Wind Participation in Automatic Generation Control Systems

This paper focuses on emerging technological and regulatory considerations of using solar and wind generators to provide essential reliability services through participation in area-wide automatic generation control (AGC) systems. AGC systems enable a grid operator to centrally and automatically manage the output of interconnected generators, storage devices, and controllable loads to maintain reliable and safe system operations. The paper highlights recent experiences of solar and wind on AGC, as well as recent developments that may enable VRE to participate in AGC in the near future.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Comparison of Reactivity Control Systems for the Submersion Subcritical Safe Space (S and 4) Reactor

This paper compares the effectiveness of two control mechanisms for the S and 4 reactor, namely: (a) rotating BeO drums with 120 deg. thin segments of enriched B{sub 4}C in the radial reflector; and (b) sliding windows in the radial reflector. Investigated are the effects of using these control mechanisms on the differential reactor control worth, power generation profiles, and spatial neutrons flux distributions is the S and 4 reactor. For both control mechanism, the radial reflector has the same dimensions and volume. Results show that the difference in reactor performance with the two control mechanisms is small. The sliding reflector configuration features slightly lower mass and power peaking, and relatively more even fission power profiles in the core. The differential control worth for the sliding reflector segments is almost constant compared to that using rotating control drums, potentially simplifying the reactor control operation. The presence of a strong neutron absorber in the rotating drums slightly decreases the amount of excess reactivity at BOL compared with the sliding reflector configuration. However, the higher rate of reactivity depletion in the S and 4 reactor with the latter may negate this advantage.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Speed control system for an access gate

An access control apparatus for an access gate. The access gate typically has a rotator that is configured to rotate around a rotator axis at a first variable speed in a forward direction. The access control apparatus may include a transmission that typically has an input element that is operatively connected to the rotator. The input element is generally configured to rotate at an input speed that is proportional to the first variable speed. The transmission typically also has an output element that has an output speed that is higher than the input speed. The input element and the output element may rotate around a common transmission axis. A retardation mechanism may be employed. The retardation mechanism is typically configured to rotate around a retardation mechanism axis. Generally the retardation mechanism is operatively connected to the output element of the transmission and is configured to retard motion of the access gate in the forward direction when the first variable speed is above a control-limit speed. In many embodiments the transmission axis and the retardation mechanism axis are substantially co-axial. Some embodiments include a freewheel/catch mechanism that has an input connection that is operatively connected to the rotator. The input connection may be configured to engage an output connection when the rotator is rotated at the first variable speed in a forward direction and configured for substantially unrestricted rotation when the rotator is rotated in a reverse direction opposite the forward direction. The input element of the transmission is typically operatively connected to the output connection of the freewheel/catch mechanism.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology and Demonstration

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the risk impact of plant modernization, considering the introduction of high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cyber Security Analysis for Nuclear Reactor Control Systems (Final Technical Report)

This project investigated the cyber-security impacts of moving from an all analog, point-to-point, instrumentation and control (I&C) system to a digital I&C system based on Modbus and a shared communication medium. A formalism called a hybrid attack graph was expanded to support the nuclear research reactor system. The hybrid attack graph allows one to check a system for vulnerabilities, in this case cyber-security vulnerabilities, and to document the attack vectors (scenarios) causing those vulnerabilities. In parallel, a simulation of the system was developed to model both the physical reactor parameters and operations, as well as the network interconnects and communications. This simulation platform was modeled on the nuclear research reactor located at Washington State University. The simulation platform provided a sandbox to evaluate and quantify the impact of identified and proposed vulnerabilities in the system and to determine the effectiveness of countermeasures at stopping these attacks. The simulation and hybrid attack graph tools were integrated to provide a streamlined process of generating attack scenarios, playing those scenarios out in the simulation, and then analyzing the results to correlate system state to states in the hybrid attack graph. This process was used to (1) quantify the impact of attack scenarios and (2) to determine if the system moved through the hybrid attack graph as anticipated. The hybrid attack graph tool was extended and customized to produce a tool to automatically identify critical assets (CAs) and critical digital assets (CDAs) as defined by NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71. This tool was verified using the nuclear research reactor at Washington State University. Finally, a series of educational modules covering the findings of the different aspects of this research have been created.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Analyzing Hardware and Software Common Cause Failures in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using Dual Error Propagation Method

This paper develops a methodology for quantifying software common cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. To support the transition of analog I&C systems to digital in nuclear power plants, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are used. The hardware components of the I&C systems have reliability databases that can be used in the PRA studies. However, the failure data for redundant software components of the systems is sparse. Failure of components constitutes a CCF, wherein two or more components or systems fail due to a single shared cause and coupling mechanism. This paper proposes a quantification approach that can simultaneously model hardware and software components, incorporate the CCFs of software systems in the models, and bridge the gap between the failure quantification of models and the development of CCF parametric databases. We demonstrate the dual error propagation method (DEPM) by developing I&C systems failure models for a representative digital reactor trip system. The DEPM models are built to simulate the control and data flows within the systems and can accommodate failure states. By expanding DEPM to software CCFs, we generated alpha factor parameter estimates for each of the modeled error propagation mechanisms.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Upgrade of Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility Control System

The CCCTF was designed and installed at ORNL in the 1990s for high-temperature gas-cooled reactor accident simulation. It is located within a modular hot cell housed in the IFEL facility. In 2008 and 2009, modifications were made to the CCCTF in preparation for AGR safety testing. A new airlock was designed and installed to better support periodic exchange of the fission product deposition cups while maintaining the fuel at safety test temperature, and modifications were made to add routines to the existing user interface software for computer-controlled automation of the He sweep gas flow and liquid nitrogen supply to the 85Kr cold traps. However, the furnace control hardware and software remained essentially unchanged. At the conclusion of the AGR-1 and AGR-2 PIE campaigns, continued use of the CCCTF was in question because of the gradual obsolescence of the hardware and software used to control the furnace and ancillary systems that make up the CCCTF. Therefore, an effort was undertaken to replace all the obsolete components with new hardware and update the software to increase system reliability and ensure this capability’s maintenance for future research and fuel qualification efforts. The modifications included creating a new National Instruments (NI) LabVIEW-based control system with a graphical user interface (GUI).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dependability Assessment of Software for Safety Instrumentation and Control Systems

In its 2013 recommendations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control (TWG-NPPIC) identified assessment and evaluation of software dependability as a topic of interest for IAEA Member States. To implement the recommendation of the TWG-NPPIC, the IAEA Scientific Secretary for the TWG initiated a consultancy activity in 2014 to develop a technical report describing a dependability assessment framework suitable for safety instrumentation and control (I and C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The development of the software dependability assessment report has involved three consultancy meetings at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The conduct of these meetings allowed consultation among subject matter experts to generate consensus technical information that serves as the content of the report. The technical contributors consist of international experts from academia, industry, regulatory bodies and research organizations. In September 2014, a technical meeting was held in Daejeon, Republic of Korea, to present interim findings of the consultancy effort and to solicit input from representatives of IAEA Member States. The information and technical comments contributed during the technical meeting were addressed in subsequent development of the report. This paper gives an overview of key technical elements of the IAEA report. The IAEA report presents a framework by which a dependability assessment of safety software can be performed. The specified guiding principles provide the basis for establishing an assessment strategy and implementing the assessment process. The assessment framework provides a systematic, coherent structure within which to organize technical and process evidence to satisfy arguments in support of claims about software dependability properties. During the consultancy activity, the participating subject matter experts focused on high level principles, a structured approach, and identification of suitable methods and techniques. However, it was recognized that what remains is to concretize the framework through specific examples and usage experience. Thus, following publication of the report, it is recommended that case studies be performed to illustrate and more precisely define specific phases and elements of the assessment framework. For example, current national assessment approaches could be mapped into the assessment framework to serve as case studies and help to identify any aspects of the assessment framework that needs further definition or adjustment. Additionally, a challenge problem could be defined to engage stakeholders to apply the assessment framework with a common focus. This could help to better illustrate strategic options and approaches to the assessment phases. It also could serve to suggest other considerations and potential sources of evidence not fully covered in the report. Based on findings from case studies, challenge problems and country experience, it should be possible to develop generalized templates to support application of the assessment framework. These findings can be collected to serve as the basis for a User's Guide on dependability assessment of safety software. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Long-Term Instrumentation, Information, and Control Systems (II&C) Modernization Future Vision and Strategy (Revision 1)

Life extension beyond 60 years for the U.S operating nuclear fleet requires that instrumentation and control (I&C) systems be upgraded to address aging and reliability concerns. It is impractical for the legacy systems based on 1970's vintage technology operate over this extended time period. Indeed, utilities have successfully engaged in such replacements when dictated by these operational concerns. However, the replacements have been approached in a like-for-like manner, meaning that they do not take advantage of the inherent capabilities of digital technology to improve business functions. And so, the improvement in I&C system performance has not translated to bottom-line performance improvement for the fleet. Therefore, wide-scale modernization of the legacy I&C systems could prove to be cost-prohibitive unless the technology is implemented in a manner to enable significant business innovation as a means of off-setting the cost of upgrades. A Future Vision of a transformed nuclear plant operating model based on an integrated digital environment has been developed as part of the Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) research pathway, under the Light Water Reactor (LWR) Sustainability Program. This is a research and development program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), performed in close collaboration with the nuclear utility industry, to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. DOE's program focus is on longer-term and higher-risk/reward research that contributes to the national policy objectives of energy security and environmental security. The Advanced II&C research pathway is being conducted by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The Future Vision is based on a digital architecture that encompasses all aspects of plant operations and support, integrating plant systems, plant work processes, and plant workers in a seamless digital environment to enhance nuclear safety, increase productivity, and improve overall plant performance. The long-term goal is to transform the operating model of the nuclear power plants (NPP)s from one that is highly reliant on a large staff performing mostly manual activities to an operating model based on highly integrated technology with a smaller staff. This digital transformation is critical to addressing an array of issues facing the plants, including aging of legacy analog systems, potential shortage of technical workers, ever-increasing expectations for nuclear safety improvement, and relentless pressure to reduce cost. The Future Vision is based on research is being conducted in the following major areas of plant function: (1) Highly integrated control rooms; (2) Highly automated plant; (3) Integrated operations; (4) Human performance improvement for field workers; and (5) Outage safety and efficiency. Pilot projects will be conducted in each of these areas as the means for industry to collectively integrate these new technologies into nuclear plant work activities. The pilot projects introduce new digital technologies into the nuclear plant operating environment at host operating plants to demonstrate and validate them for production usage. In turn, the pilot project technologies serve as the stepping stones to the eventual seamless digital environment as described in the Future Vision.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

SoW for KDP Precision Cleaning System Control Sys Refurbishment

The KDP Optic Precision Cleaning System (PCS) is used is a standalone batch-process system used to clean Potassium di-Hydrogen Phosphate (KDP) optics required for the National Ignition Facility (NIF). There are two nearly identical machines owned by the US government, as provided by Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS). One machine is located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, CA in a Class 100 cleanroom and the other is located at the Gooch & Housego (G&H) facility in Highland Heights, OH in a Class 1,000 cleanroom.

42 ENGINEERING↗