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Multi-Target Camera Tracking, Hand-off and Display LDRD 158819 Final Report

Modern security control rooms gather video and sensor feeds from tens to hundreds of cameras. Advanced camera analytics can detect motion from individual video streams and convert unexpected motion into alarms, but the interpretation of these alarms depends heavily upon human operators. Unfortunately, these operators can be overwhelmed when a large number of events happen simultaneously, or lulled into complacency due to frequent false alarms. This LDRD project has focused on improving video surveillance-based security systems by changing the fundamental focus from the cameras to the targets being tracked. If properly integrated, more cameras shouldn’t lead to more alarms, more monitors, more operators, and increased response latency but instead should lead to better information and more rapid response times. For the course of the LDRD we have been developing algorithms that take live video imagery from multiple video cameras, identify individual moving targets from the background imagery, and then display the results in a single 3D interactive video. In this document we summarize the work in developing this multi-camera, multi-target system, including lessons learned, tools developed, technologies explored, and a description of current capability.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems for Post-closure Waste Site Maintenance and Surveillance - 20143

The P- and R-Area Reactor buildings, located at SRS near Aiken, SC, were in-situ decommissioned by grouting below-grade portions of the buildings and demolishing some above-grade structures to grade level. Other reactor building structures were left above-grade and sealed to prevent human or animal access. Because the above grade-structures are expected to continue in their present state for hundreds of years, the condition of the building roofs is critical to mitigate rainwater intrusion. For this reason, building roof areas were strengthened with high strength concrete to ensure the long-term integrity of the roof structure. Periodic inspections of the roof structures are required to ensure that the roofs are functioning properly and to identify damage areas. The traditional method of inspecting closed reactor buildings requires the use of a helicopter and photographer to generate photographs and videos for review. This method proved sufficient but lacked the resolution and clarity that is required for a thorough inspection of the building structure. Fortunately, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has established a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) program using commercially available and custom-built remote-controlled aircraft. EC and ACP contacted the SRNL program to evaluate whether the sUAS technology could be employed for periodic reactor building inspections. The sUAS can fly within a few meters of the reactor buildings and hover, allowing for a more thorough aerial inspection. The initial sUAS inspection of the P-Area Reactor building was completed in February 2018 and at the R-Area Reactor building in August 2018 and were successful in providing higher resolution photos and videos. The sUAS inspections also revealed that vegetation had begun to grow on the roofs that could potentially damage the structure integrity. SRNL partnered with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University to build a custom heavy lift sUAS that could be equipped with herbicides to remotely treat the vegetative growth. Herbicides were successfully applied to the R-Area Reactor building roof using the custom sUAS in September 2018. The use of unmanned aircraft systems at SRS to perform aerial inspections and herbicide treatment in otherwise inaccessible areas has proven to be an efficient and cost-effective technology that provides high value, increases knowledge of facility conditions, and provides for early detection of damage. Periodic inspections of the reactor building roofs using sUAS technology are performed safely, efficiently, and at a significant cost and schedule savings while reducing emissions, noise, and fossil fuel use. The use of sUAS equipment for building inspections and herbicide application at SRS is unique within the DOE complex. The goal of SRS is to apply this remote technology to other waste unit operations and maintenance activities in the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada Test Site 2007 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data were collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada Test Site. These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, vadose zone, subsidence, and biota. This report summarizes the 2007 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2007a; 2008; Warren and Grossman, 2008). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are at background levels. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs indicate that tritium concentrations are slightly above background levels. A single gamma spectroscopy measurement for cesium was slightly above the minimum detectable concentration, and concentrations of americium and plutonium are only slightly above detection limits at the Area 3 RWMS. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates are below derived concentration guides for these radionuclides. Radon flux from waste covers is well below regulatory limits. Groundwater monitoring data indicate that the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by facility operations. The 136.8 millimeters (mm) (5.39 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2007 is 13 percent below the average of 158.1 mm (6.22 in.), and the 123.8 mm (4.87 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2007 is 6 percent below the average of 130.7 mm (5.15 in.). Soil-gas tritium monitoring at borehole GCD-05U continues to show slow subsurface migration consistent with previous results. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward movement percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Data from the automated vadose zone monitoring system for the operational waste pit covers show that evaporation continues to slowly remove soil moisture that came from the heavy precipitation in the fall of 2004 and the spring of 2005. The vegetated final mono-layer cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS effectively removes moisture from the cover by evapotranspiration. During 2007, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 feet) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation or were vegetated but water drained from the bare-soil Area 3 drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. Elevated tritium levels in plants and animals sampled from the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show tritium uptake by the biota, but the low levels of other radionuclides do not suggest that there has been intrusion into the waste. All 2007 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

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Nevada Test Site 2009 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data were collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, vadose zone, subsidence, and biota. This report summarizes the 2009 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NTS. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs indicate that tritium concentrations are slightly above background levels. All gamma spectroscopy results for air particulates collected at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS were below the minimum detectable concentrations, and concentrations of americium and plutonium are only slightly above detection limits. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below derived concentration guides for these radionuclides. Radon flux from waste covers is well below regulatory limits. Groundwater monitoring data indicate that the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by facility operations. The 87.6 millimeters (mm) (3.45 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2009 is 43 percent below the average of 152.4 mm (6.00 in.), and the 62.7 mm (2.47 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2009 is 49 percent below the average of 122.5 mm (4.82 in.). Soil-gas tritium monitoring at borehole GCD-05 continues to show slow subsurface migration consistent with previous results. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Data from the automated vadose zone monitoring system for the operational waste pit covers show that moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 90 centimeters (cm) (3 feet [ft]) before being removed by evaporation. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 30 cm (1 ft) in the vegetated final mono-layer cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS before being removed by evapotranspiration. During 2009, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation or were vegetated, but water drained from the bare-soil Area 3 drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. Elevated tritium levels in plants and animals sampled from the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show tritium uptake by the biota, but the low levels of other radionuclides do not indicate that there has been biota intrusion into the waste. All 2009 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

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Lunar Impact Melt Crystallization Produces Reflectance Spectra Dominated By Clinopyroxene Signatures: Implications for the Origin of Pink Spinel Anorthosite

Magma-wallrock interaction and impact melt crystallization are the two leading hypotheses for the formation of orbitally detected lunar “pink” spinel anorthosite (PSA) [1-3]. Distinguishing among hypotheses is complicated because both require mixing of anorthositic crust and MgO-rich ultramafic components. Models for PSA formation need to account for either the thermodynamic hurdles of crustal assimilation, or the size of impactor and composition of target material needed to generate spinel during crater and basin formation. Determining whether the energy source is endogenic or exogenic is important for understanding the thermal and chemical evolution of the lunar crust. Here we test the impact melt hypothesis by performing controlled cooling experiments on two hypothetical impact melt compositions. The compositions represent mixing of ultramafic magma and anorthositic crust in molar ratios of approximately 50:50 and 25:75. Synthetic crystallized assemblages were prepared for chemical analysis and bidirectional reflectance spectroscopy in the visible to near-infrared wavelengths. All crystallization experiments contained plagioclase, olivine, and clinopyroxene, but trace amounts of spinel were only observed in the 50:50 mix. The experimental spinel is similar to the compositions inferred from remote observations. However, the high-Ca pyroxene in our experimental assemblages (9 – 18 wt.%) resulted in 1 and 2 µm absorption band center positions consistent with synthetic clinopyroxene. The clinopyroxene absorptions are present regardless of specific mineral modes and the presence of either olivine or spinel. These results suggest that impact melt crystallization will produce clinopyroxene-bearing lithologies, the presence of which masks spectral contributions from coexisting spinel and olivine. Assuming that the trace amounts of spinel observed in our experiments could be concentrated and isolated from the mafic silicates by convection or density settling in the impact melt sheet, the spinel-rich areas would still be proximally associated with the remaining silicate-dominated assemblage exhibiting strong clinopyroxene spectral signatures. We conclude that impact melting of the lunar crust can explain rare cases of PSA in association with clinopyroxene. Previous investigations of magma-wallrock interactions [2] demonstrate that small plagioclase-contaminated regions of an ultramafic intrusion can concentrate spinel whereas larger portions of the same intrusion remain relatively uncontaminated and yield olivine and orthopyroxene, consistent with the more common occurrence of PSAs in association with orthopyroxene ±olivine in the remote sensing database (e.g., Moscoviense Basin) [4].

petrology↗

Ultrasonic, Non-Invasive Classification/Discrimination of Liquid Explosives (LEs) and Threat Liquids from Non-Threat Liquids in Sealed Containers

Government agencies and homeland security organizations are searching for more effective approaches for dealing with the increasing demand for inspections involving potential threat liquids and hazardous chemicals, including liquid explosives (LEs). The quantity and variability of hand-held and cargo-sized containers being shipped worldwide drives the need for rapid and effective ways for conducting non-intrusive inspections of liquid-filled containers of a diverse range of types, shapes and sizes. Such inspections need to quickly classify/discriminate between liquids within containers and also ascertain the presence of unexpected objects within a container. The science base, methodology and prototype device for classification/discrimination between classes of liquids has been developed. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has developed a methodology and prototype device for classification/discrimination of a wide variety of liquids (including threat liquids and their precursors), providing noninvasive liquid classification/discrimination capabilities using a nondestructive ultrasonic measurement approach for inspecting sealed containers. The Container Screening Device (CSD) employs frequency-modulated (FM) chirp excitation and pulse-compression signal processing techniques to measure ultrasonic velocity and a relative attenuation value for liquids within a container, and is capable of determining other acoustic properties from through-transmission, contact measurements over a wide frequency range. Recent algorithm developments are beginning to address the issues of container wall variations and thickness. A description of the basic science, measurement approach and sources of variability in the measurement will be presented and laboratory measurements acquired from a suite of commercial products and precursor liquids used in the manufacturing of Homemade Explosives (HMEs) will be given.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Spectral Induced Polarization-Biogeochemical Relationships for Remediation Amendment Monitoring

Geophysical tools such as electrical resistivity (ER) can indirectly monitor subsurface changes in response to remedial injections. These methods exhibit relatively low spatial resolution compared to sediment core characterization but are advantageous due to the ability to collect measurements non-intrusively over time across large volumes of the subsurface. Moreover, along with confirmatory groundwater or core sampling, geophysical methods can be used during active biogeochemical remedies to monitor short-term contaminant transformations and mobility, as well as part of an overall strategy for long-term monitoring of subsurface contaminated sites. The use of alternating current spectral induced polarization (SIP) provides significantly more information than conventional geophysical methods like direct current ER. SIP allows for monitoring changes in both solution and surface conductivity by separation of real and imaginary conductivity, respectively, as well as surface capacitance. In principle, SIP can measure indicators of remedy progression such as precipitation reactions that sequester contaminants, potentially providing a better indication of amendment delivery and reactivity as compared to conventional ER methods. However, multiple processes and material properties have overlapping (interacting) electrical responses across a range of frequencies. Hence, the purpose of this scoping study was to evaluate if SIP can be used to monitor (a) amendment delivery and (b) precipitation and reactivity of amendments under consideration at Hanford. SIP measurements were collected in fully saturated columns packed with sand and Hanford formation sediments containing (a) amendments that were highly conductive with significant capacitance (zero valent iron – ZVI, sulfur modified iron – SMI) and (b) amendments that exhibited low electrical conductivity with a small capacitance (calcite, apatite, bismuth). The sand was a quartz material with homogenous particle size that exhibited a relatively low surface conductivity. It was used as a control for comparison with the sediments from the Hanford Site, which have a greater surface conductivity because of their complex mineralogy and heterogeneous particle size distribution and may have complex interactions with amendments. The amendment mass fraction was varied to represent the different stages and subsurface locations associated with the delivery of a remedy. The primary objective was to identify the solution and solid surface changes associated with the delivery amendments and their secondary reactions within the subsurface. The figure below summarizes results for the amendments tested through this project. The SIP phase shift or imaginary conductivity change for the high conductivity amendments was more than 10 times that of the low conductivity amendments, highlighting the relative ease of detection of ZVI and SMI independent of the background signal from sand or Hanford sediments. The ZVI phase shift and imaginary conductivity changes occur primarily at high frequency (> 100 Hz) whereas SMI changes were at low frequency (0.01 to 10 Hz). SIP signals of SMI also increased over time and the maximum shifted to lower frequencies. The low conductivity amendments (calcite, abiotic and biotic apatite, bismuth subnitrate) exhibited relatively small phase and imaginary conductivity changes when added to sediments. The changes were above minimum detection limits (0.5 mrad for phase shift, 0.03 µS/cm for imaginary conductivity) for the highest concentration except for the commercial bismuth material. The lowest amendment concentration that can be detected is likely sediment specific, as minerals in sediments (clays, magnetite, Fe-oxides) have some capacitance and, therefore, exhibit a variable phase shift.

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Primer on Use of Multi-Spectral and Infra Red Imaging for On-Site Inspections

The purpose of an On-Site Inspection (OSI) is to determine whether a nuclear explosion has occurred in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to gather information which might assist in identifying the violator (CTBT, Article IV, Paragraph 35) Multi-Spectral and Infra Red Imaging (MSIR) is allowed by the treaty to detect observables which might help reduce the search area and thus expedite an OSI and make it more effective. MSIR is permitted from airborne measurements, and at and below the surface to search for anomalies and artifacts (CTBT, Protocol, Part II, Paragraph 69b). The three broad types of anomalies and artifacts MSIR is expected to be capable of observing are surface disturbances (disturbed earth, plant stress or anomalous surface materials), human artifacts (man-made roads, buildings and features), and thermal anomalies. The purpose of this Primer is to provide technical information on MSIR relevant to its use for OSI. It is expected that this information may be used for general background information, to inform decisions about the selection and testing of MSIR equipment, to develop operational guidance for MSIR use during an OSI, and to support the development of a training program for OSI Inspectors. References are provided so readers can pursue a topic in more detail than the summary information provided here. The following chapters will provide more information on how MSIR can support an OSI (Section 2), a short summary what Multi-Spectral Imaging and Infra Red Imaging is (Section 3), guidance from the CTBT regarding the use of MSIR (Section 4), and a description of several nuclear explosion scenarios (Section 5) and consequent observables (Section 6). The remaining sections focus on practical aspects of using MSIR for an OSI, such as specification and selection of MSIR equipment, operational considerations for deployment of MISR equipment from an aircraft, and the conduct of field exercises to mature MSIR for an OSI. Finally, an appendix provides detail describing the magnitude and spatial extent of the surface shock expected from an underground nuclear explosion. If there is a seismic event or other data to suggest there has been a nuclear explosion in violation of the CTBT, an OSI may be conducted to determine whether a nuclear explosion has occurred and to gather information which may be useful in identifying the party responsible for conducting the explosion. The OSI must be conducted in the area where the event that triggered the inspection request occurred, and the inspected area must not exceed 1,000 square kilometers, or be more than 50 km on aside (CTBT Protocol, Part II, Paragraphs 2 and 3). One of the guiding principles for an inspection is that it be effective, minimally intrusive, timely, and cost-effective [Hawkins, Feb 1998]. In that context, MSIR is one of several technologies that can be used during an aircraft overflight to identify ground regions of high interest in a timely and cost-effective manner. This allows for an optimized inspection on the ground. The primary purpose for MSIR is to identify artifacts and anomalies that might be associated with a nuclear explosion, and to use the location of those artifacts and anomalies to reduce the search area that must be inspected from the ground. The MSIR measurements can have additional utility. The multi-spectral measurements of the ground can be used for terrain classification, which can aid in geological characterization of the Inspected Area. In conditions of where light smoke or haze is present, long-wave infrared imaging can provide better imaging of the ground than is possible with standard visible imagery.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗