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Analysis of the Tank 5f Final Characterization Samples-2011

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by SRR to provide sample preparation and analysis of the Tank 5F final characterization samples to determine the residual tank inventory prior to grouting. Two types of samples were collected and delivered to SRNL: floor samples across the tank and subsurface samples from mounds near risers 1 and 5 of Tank 5F. These samples were taken from Tank 5F between January and March 2011. These samples from individual locations in the tank (nine floor samples and six mound Tank 5F samples) were each homogenized and combined in a given proportion into 3 distinct composite samples to mimic the average composition in the entire tank. These Tank 5F composite samples were analyzed for radiological, chemical and elemental components. Additional measurements performed on the Tank 5F composite samples include bulk density and water leaching of the solids to account for water soluble species. With analyses for certain challenging radionuclides as the exception, all composite Tank 5F samples were analyzed and reported in triplicate. The target detection limits for isotopes analyzed were based on customer desired detection limits as specified in the technical task request documents. SRNL developed new methodologies to meet these target detection limits and provide data for the extensive suite of components. While many of the target detection limits were met for the species characterized for Tank 5F, as specified in the technical task request, some were not met. In a few cases, the relatively high levels of radioactive species of the same element or a chemically similar element precluded the ability to measure some isotopes to low levels. The Technical Task Request allows that while the analyses of these isotopes is needed, meeting the detection limits for these isotopes is a lower priority than meeting detection limits for the other specified isotopes. The isotopes whose detection limits were not met in all cases included the following: Al-26, Sn-126, Sb-126, Sb-126m, Eu-152 and Cf-249. SRNL, in conjunction with the plant customer, reviewed all these cases and determined that the impacts were negligible.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of the Tank 5F Final Characterization Samples-2011 (U)

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by SRR to provide sample preparation and analysis of the Tank 5F final characterization samples to determine the residual tank inventory prior to grouting. Two types of samples were collected and delivered to SRNL: floor samples across the tank and subsurface samples from mounds near risers 1 and 5 of Tank 5F. These samples were taken from Tank 5F between January and March 2011. These samples from individual locations in the tank (nine floor samples and six mound Tank 5F samples) were each homogenized and combined in a given proportion into 3 distinct composite samples to mimic the average composition in the entire tank. These Tank 5F composite samples were analyzed for radiological, chemical and elemental components. Additional measurements performed on the Tank 5F composite samples include bulk density and water leaching of the solids to account for water soluble species. With analyses for certain challenging radionuclides as the exception, all composite Tank 5F samples were analyzed and reported in triplicate. The target detection limits for isotopes analyzed were based on customer desired detection limits as specified in the technical task request documents. SRNL developed new methodologies to meet these target detection limits and provide data for the extensive suite of components. While many of the target detection limits were met for the species characterized for Tank 5F, as specified in the technical task request, some were not met. In a few cases, the relatively high levels of radioactive species of the same element or a chemically similar element precluded the ability to measure some isotopes to low levels. The Technical Task Request allows that while the analyses of these isotopes is needed, meeting the detection limits for these isotopes is a lower priority than meeting detection limits for the other specified isotopes. The isotopes whose detection limits were not met in all cases included the following: Al-26, Sn-126, Sb-126, Sb-126m, Eu-152 and Cf-249. SRNL, in conjunction with the plant customer, reviewed all these cases and determined that the impacts were negligible.

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Appurtenance Influence on Type III Hanford Single-Shell Tank Structural Integrity

The interim stabilized Hanford Single Shell Tanks (SSTs) are currently undergoing a state of the art analysis to assess the structural integrity of the waste storage tanks, for cleanup and closure operations, considering their adverse thermal histories and an updated seismic hazard for the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington. The SSTs contain a variety of ancillary pits, piping, piping supports, risers, equipment, and penetrations known as appurtenances. These appurtenances may alter the structural response and ultimately could affect the structural integrity of the SSTs. An important challenge to the structural analysis of the SSTs is determining the impact of these appurtenances on structural integrity. To achieve this, the various appurtenances were reviewed and bounding appurtenance configurations for SST Types II and III tank designs were analyzed using finite element software. The bounding configurations for the Type II tanks considered four heavy offset pits with a central pit with and without a 36-inch diameter central post-construction penetration and four 42-inch diameter offset penetrations. The bounding configuration for the Type III tanks is a tank with two heavy offset pits and one heavy central pit. For each bounding configuration two finite element models are developed: a seismic analysis model and a thermal and operating loads analysis (TOLA) model. The TOLA models include a Type II or III thermal history, concrete cracking and thermal degradation, reinforcement yielding, and soil plasticity. Additionally, operating loads such as internal waste pressure and concentrated and distributed soil surface loads are applied to the TOLA model. The seismic model treats the tank concrete as linear elastic based on the present day degraded concrete properties. Also, in the seismic model the soil is treated as linear elastic while special techniques are used in the soil above the tank dome and along the tank wall to avoid soil arching and achieve the proper soil pressure on the tank walls. Seismic time histories (in the horizontal and vertical directions) are applied to the seismic model. The American Concrete Institute (ACI) has code requirements for nuclear safety-related concrete structures (ACI-349-06) that are used to evaluate the structural integrity of the SSTs. ACI-349-06 recommends evaluating factored load combinations against reduced tank section capacities to account for both loading and material uncertainties. From both the TOLA and seismic models the structural demands (forces and moments) are extracted from sections throughout the tank under the appropriate load combinations. These demands are compared against the ACI-349-06 capacities at each of the sections. This ratio of demand to capacity is reported as a measure of structural integrity. The Type II and Type III appurtenances configurations are found to increase the demand to capacity ratios in local regions near the appurtenances. Away from the appurtenances the influence on structural integrity is minor. A comparison of the Type II and III results show that even though the Type II offset pits weight less, they have a larger impact on the structural integrity of the tanks due to their locations. Finally, lessons learned from the Type II and Type III appurtenance analysis, and their application to the more complex Type IV structural integrity analysis, will be discussed.

appurtenances↗

Synthesis of Post-fire Monitoring Activities in the Great Basin Desert, Mojave Desert, and Transition Zones

In the deserts of the American Southwest, fire return intervals of centuries to millennia are being replaced by fire return intervals of decades. This increased burn frequency has implications for post-closure management and long-term stewardship for Soils Corrective Action Units (CAUs) and Corrective Action Sites (CASs) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Tonopah Test Range, and Nevada Test and Training Range for which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management-Nevada (EM-NV) is responsible. For many CAUs and CASs, where closure-in-place alternatives were implemented or are being considered, there is a chance that these sites could burn over while they still pose a risk to the environment or human health given the long half-lives of some of the radionuclide contaminants of concern (COCs) (Shafer et al., 2007; Shafer and Gomes, 2009). Although it would have been ideal to conduct a fire-related study at a radionuclide contaminated site on the NNSS to determine how contaminated soils are transported post-fire, it was more practical to examine fires in environments analogous to where Soils Activity CAUs and CASs exist. Therefore, a series of studies were initiated at three radiologically uncontaminated analog sites to better understand the possible effects of wildfire on erosion and sediment transport by wind and water should vegetation at contaminated sites burn at the NNSS. The studies took place at the sites of the Gleason Fire, a prescribed burn that occurred near Ely, Nevada, which is in the Great Basin ecoregion; the White Rock Fire that occurred near Mesquite, Nevada, which is in the Mojave Desert ecoregion; and the Jacob Fire that occurred near Hiko, Nevada, in the transitional zone between the Great Basin Desert and the Mojave Desert. Each site was representative of one of the three ecoregions found on the NNSS. Erosion and vegetation characteristics were measured multiple times post-fire on both burned and unburned test plots at these study sites to compare and monitor the effects of fire over time. However, at the Mojave Desert site, there was an additional burn from nearly 25 years ago that was also compared with the more recent burned areas from 2013. Also, the time elapsed after the fire and the time when sampling began differed among the ecoregions. For example, at the Great Basin site, samples were collected prior to the fire and less than one month after the fire, whereas data collected at the Mojave Desert site did not occur until 22 months after the fire. The differences between the sample measurements and the time that elapsed after the fire may contribute to the variability in the data and the interpretations of the data. Runoff and water erosion were quantified through a series of rainfall and runoff simulation tests in which controlled amounts of water were delivered to the soil surface. Runoff data were collected from different microhabitats (e.g., undercanopies, interspace soils, ridges, and drainage areas). The data showed soil hydrophobicity (i.e., water repellency) on the Great Basin site for up to 12 months after the fire. The soil structure remained changed and weaker on the burned areas compared with the unburned areas for the three-year study period. Although runoff data at both the Great Basin site and transition zone site were highly variable, the post-fire runoff potential did not generally increase at either location after three years of monitoring. Mojave runoff did not differ much between fire ages or between burned and unburned areas, possibly because of the amount of vegetation growing on all three surfaces and because the fire intensity was likely lower relative to other ecoregions due to the amount of space between plants. Additionally, the measurements conducted on the Mojave fire occurred several years after the fire had burned and not within several months of the burn, which may also account for the lack of differences in runoff between burned and unburned locations. Wind erosion was assessed and quantified with a Portable In-Situ Wind ERosion Lab (PI-SWERL) on both the burned and unburned soils of different microhabitats (e.g., ridges, drainages, interspaces between plants, and plant undercanopies). Estimates of emissions (e.g., particulate matter with aerodynamic diameters less than or equal to 10 micrometers, or PM10) at different wind speeds were collected and filter samples were analyzed for chemical composition. The measurements among the fires were similar and the results of the wind erosion measurements indicate that there were seasonal influences on many parameters, but the potential for PM10 windblown dust emissions was higher on burned areas compared with unburned areas. Among the burned areas, drainages produced the most dust emissions, whereas burned ridges were the least emissive. Emissions at the Mojave site and transition zone site were similar between burned and unburned areas approximately three years after the respective fires. Emissions remained much greater on burned soils at the Great Basin site. However, site selection may have also contributed to the differences of emissions among the three study locations. Post-fire vegetation responses were documented for three years following each fire in different microhabitats (e.g., ridge, drainage, undercanopy, and interspace) at the Great Basin and transition zone sites. In 2013, at the Mojave fire site, random permanent plots were established in newly burned areas, areas that burned approximately 25 years ago, and an unburned control area. At each fire site, the regeneration of native plant species dominated the burned areas, but invasive annual grasses were present at each fire site. During the course of each three-year study, the invasive annual grasses increased in density or percentage at both the Great Basin and transition fire sites but not at the Mojave site, where annual invasive grasses remained high throughout the study period. However, the chronosequence data from the Mojave site indicate a transition to different invasive grass species with time. The post-burn vegetation at all three ecoregions is still in the early stages of succession, and shrub size should increase over time and shrub density should decrease over time. However, the recovery of the plant communities to pre-burn compositions may not occur for decades or centuries, or may not occur because of changes in climate and the presence of invasive annual grasses. Results from the three study locations suggested that contaminated soils on the NNSS that experienced wildfire had the potential for soil erosion and transport of contaminated soils. Both wind and soil runoff studies indicated that locations in the Great Basin and transition zone ecoregions were more susceptible to erosion than the Mojave Desert ecoregion, but the highest levels of erosion occurred during the early portions of the study (the first 24 months) and the Mojave Desert was not measured until 22 months after the burn. Additionally, data from the Great Basin indicated deeper soils may increase susceptibility to wind erosion. Historically, the Great Basin and transition zone ecoregions burned more frequently than the Mojave Desert because of fuel abundance and connectivity—and they continue to burn more frequently, particularly after the introduction of invasive grasses (Davies and Nafus, 2013). However, both ecoregions and the transition zone have burned with extensive, high-severity fires when certain weather and fuel conditions are met. For example, the high abundance and productivity of annual grasses and forbs—which are usually produced by above average winter precipitation—combined with early spring and summer warm, dry conditions. Future climate scenarios predict increased temperatures, variable to reduced precipitation, and larger, more extreme wildfires throughout western North America. These predictions suggest that future fires on the NNSS could increase in frequency, intensity, and severity similar to their analog ecosystems throughout the Great Basin and Mojave Desert (Dennison et al., 2014; Abatzoglou andWilliams, 2016; Westerling, 2016).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Saltstone SDU6 Modeling Study

A new disposal unit, designated as Saltstone Disposal Unit 6 (SDU6), is being designed for support of site accelerated closure goals and salt waste projections identified in the new Liquid Waste System Plan. The unit is a cylindrical disposal cell of 375 ft in diameter and 43 ft in height, and it has a minimum 30 million gallons of capacity. SRNL was requested to evaluate the impact of an increased grout placement height on the flow patterns radially spread on the floor and to determine whether grout quality is impacted by the height. The primary goals of the work are to develop the baseline Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model and to perform the evaluations for the flow patterns of grout material in SDU6 as a function of elevation of grout discharge port and grout rheology. Two transient grout models have been developed by taking a three-dimensional multiphase CFD approach to estimate the domain size of the grout materials radially spread on the facility floor and to perform the sensitivity analysis with respect to the baseline design and operating conditions such as elevation height of the discharge port and fresh grout properties. For the CFD modeling calculations, air-grout Volume of Fluid (VOF) method combined with Bingham plastic and time-dependent grout models were used for examining the impact of fluid spread performance for the initial baseline configurations and to evaluate the impact of grout pouring height on grout quality. The grout quality was estimated in terms of the air volume fraction for the grout layer formed on the SDU6 floor, resulting in the change of grout density. The study results should be considered as preliminary scoping analyses since benchmarking analysis is not included in this task scope. Transient analyses with the Bingham plastic model were performed with the FLUENT TM code on the high performance parallel computing platform in SRNL. The analysis coupled with a transient grout aging model was performed by using ANSYS-CFX code in the parallel computing platform in Mercer University. Recommended operational guidance was developed assuming that local shear rates and flow patterns related to radial spread along the SDU floor can be used as a measure of grout performance and spatial dispersion affected by the grout height and viscosity. The main conclusions drawn from the grout modeling and calculations are as follows: • The 5 ft height baseline results show that when the 150 gpm grout flow with a 5 Pa yield stress and a 60 cp viscosity is poured down through a 3 inch discharge port, the grout is spread radially up to about 64 ft distance from the pouring center after 2 hours’ pouring time. The air volume fraction of the grout layer is about 29% at 5 minutes’ transient time, and it is reduced by about 9% in 2 hours’ pouring time, resulting in the grout density consisting of about 80% grout and 20% air volume fractions. • The sensitivity results show that when the discharge port is located at a higher position, a larger amount of air is trapped inside the layer formed below the discharge port at the early transient time of less than 30 minutes because of the higher impinging momentum of the grout flow on the floor, resulting in the formation of less smooth layer. • The results clearly indicate that the radial spread for the 43 ft discharge port is about 10% faster than that of the 5 ft discharge port for the early transient period of 5 minutes. However, for the pouring time longer than half an hour, the discharge port height does not affect the radial distance spread on the disposal floor. • When grout quality is related to grout volume fraction, the grout volume fraction for the 43 ft discharge port has lower volume fraction than the 5 ft discharge port for the transient period of the first 5 minutes. However, for the pouring time longer than half an hour, the discharge port height does not affect the grout volume fraction for the layer accumulated on the disposal floor. • A modified Bingham plastic model coupled with time-dependent viscosity behavior was developed for conducting the initial scoping calculations to assess the impact of fluid residence time on radial spreading and basic flow patterns. • The results for the transient viscosity model show that when grout material becomes more viscous, the thickness of the grout layer accumulated on the floor becomes higher, but the radial distance spread on the horizontal floor becomes smaller. The early transient results for the grout density with about 32% air volume fractions are in reasonable agreement with those of the idealized Bingham plastic model. • It is recommended that the current models developed here be benchmarked against the experimental results for critical applications of the modeling results.

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THREE-DIMENSIONAL THERMAL MODELING ANALYSIS OF CST MEDIA FOR THE SMALL ION EXCHANGE PROJECT

The Small Column Ion Exchange (SCIX) project is designed to accelerate closure of High Level Waste (HLW) tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The SRS tanks store HLW in three forms: sludge, saltcake, and supernate. An in-tank ion exchange process is being designed to treat supernate and dissolved saltcake waste. Through this process, radioactive cesium from the salt solution is adsorbed into Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange media packed within a flow-through column. A packed column loaded with radioactive cesium generates significant heat from radiolytic decay. The waste supernate solution within the ion exchange bed will boil around 120 C. Solution superheating above the boiling point within the column could lead to violent hazardous energy releases. System heating from loaded CST is also of concern in other process modules, such as the waste tank. Due to tank structural integrity concerns, the wall temperature limit for the SRS waste tanks is 100 C. The transfer of cesium-loaded CST to the tank could result in localized hot spots on the tank floor and walls which may exceed this limit. As a result, thermal modeling calculations have been conducted to predict the maximum temperatures achievable both in the column and in the waste tank. As specified in the associated Technical Task Plan, one objective of the present work was to compute temperature distributions within the ion exchange column module under accident scenarios including loss of salt solution flow through the bed and loss of coolant system flow. The column modeling domain and the scope of the calculations in this case were broadened relative to previous two-dimensional calculations to include vertical temperature distributions within the packed bed of ion exchange media as well as the upper column plenum region containing only fluid. The baseline design conditions and in-column modeling domain for the ion-exchange column module are shown in Figure 1. These evaluations assumed the maximum bounding cesium loading considered possible based on current knowledge regarding CST media and the anticipated feed compositions. Since this cesium loading was considerably higher than the nominal loading conditions in SRS waste, cases with lower loading were also evaluated. Modeling parameters were the same as those used previously unless otherwise indicated. The current model does not capture multi-phase cooling mechanisms operative when solution boiling occurs. This feature is conservative in the sense that it does not account for the large cooling effects associated with phase transfer. However, the potential transfer of heat to the plenum region associated with vertical bubble ascension through the column during boiling is also neglected. Thermal modeling calculations were also performed for the entire waste storage tank for the case where loaded and ground CST was transferred to the tank. The modeling domain used for the in-tank calculations is provided in Figure 2. The in-tank domain is based on SRS Tank 41, which is a Type-IIIA tank. Temperature distributions were evaluated for cylindrical, ground CST mounds located on the tank floor. Media grinding is required prior to vitrification processing of the CST in the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The location of the heat source region on the tank floor due to the accumulation of CST material was assumed to be just under the grinder. The shape of the CST mound was assumed to be cylindrical. This shape is believed to be most representative of the actual mound shape formed in the tank, given that submersible mixing pumps will be available for media dispersion. Alternative configurations involving other geometrical shapes for the CST mound were evaluated in the previous work. Sensitivity analysis for the in-tank region was performed for different amounts of CST media. As was the case for the in-column model, the in-tank model does not include multi-phase cooling mechanisms operative when solution boiling occurs. The in-column and the in-tank evaluations incorporated recently updated maximum cesium loading levels calculated using the current SCIX feed compositions, which resulted in significantly higher cesium loading than previously calculated. The calculations were conducted to ensure conservative predictions for the maximum temperatures achievable using the current baseline design. The degree of conservatism was reduced for in-column calculations relative to the previous work by using a three-dimensional modeling approach and selecting parameters which were nearer to expected conditions. The degree of conservatism for the in-tank calculations was also reduced by lowering the soil penetration depth below the tank from 150 to 20 feet. The primary goals of the extended thermal modeling effort were to determine whether fluid boiling or superheating are possible within the column module and to determine the maximum floor temperatures within the tank loaded with spent CST.

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Managing Low-Level Waste at Dounreay - 16269

Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) is the site licence company responsible for the clean-up and demolition of Britain's former centre of fast reactor research and development. The Dounreay site requires facilities to dispose of up to 175,000 cubic metres of low level waste (LLW) that has been and will continue to be generated during the decommissioning and restoration of the site. In May 2014, construction of two new vaults for the disposal of LLW at Dounreay was completed, including the necessary roads, infrastructures and services, followed by an encapsulation plant in September 2014. The vaults are located immediately to the northeast of the Dounreay licensed site, on NDA-owned land. The facilities are for disposal of the solid LLW generated at Dounreay and the adjacent Vulcan site only. In 2004, following consultation with stakeholders and members of the public, Dounreay issued the 'Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) Report' on the management of Dounreay LLW. This report assessed potential management options for LLW against a range of criteria, including technical, environmental, cost, health and safety issues. The study was conducted in line with best practice and involved consultation with a range of people, including the local community and organisations with an interest in radioactive waste management. The recommendations and conclusions from the study provided the basis for the 'Dounreay Solid LLW Overall Strategy', which was published in March 2005. A fundamental component of this strategy was the development of new below-ground disposal vaults for LLW at Dounreay. Siting the vaults on land at Dounreay avoids any need to transport the LLW away from Dounreay on public roads. Disposal at Dounreay therefore satisfies the proximity principle of managing the waste at source. Disposal at Dounreay is also consistent with UK Government Policy on LLW management, the Scottish Government's Radioactive Waste Management Policy and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's (NDA's) strategy on management of LLW from the UK nuclear industry. A planning application was initially lodged with the Highland Council in June 2006. The period for the determination of this application was extended to allow the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) sufficient time to assess fully the supporting Environmental Safety Case (ESC). The planning application was re-activated in May 2008, and planning permission was granted by Highland Council in April 2009. The planning permission included 26 conditions on DSRL, covering a wide range of environmental issues such as construction noise/dust, traffic, visual impact and also a condition to develop a community fund aimed at socio-economic development of the area around the Dounreay site. After undertaking the necessary detailed design work, construction of the phase one vaults commenced in November 2011 by principal contractor, Graham Construction. Work was undertaken on both vaults simultaneously, excavating around 243,000 m{sup 3} of rock. When excavation was complete, steel reinforcement was placed and concrete poured to construct the floor slabs. This was followed by the construction of the reinforced walls and then the installation of the steel support structure and materials that form the roof. Mechanical and electrical installation then followed, in parallel with the construction of the vault apron, ramps and access roads. A pumping system and control building was also constructed to remove groundwater from around the vaults to allow the vaults to be kept dry while they are being filled with waste. A layer of excavated material, approximately 3 m thick, was placed across the existing ground surface between the vaults and the coast, to ensure the water table lies well below the new ground surface after closure of the vaults, and that any future trace contaminated groundwater flows out to the sea rather than to the soil zone. This layer is referred to in project documents as the 'enhanced geosphere'. After disposals are completed and the vaults are closed, this layer will be joined to the capping over the vaults so that the ensemble merges visually with the surrounding landscape. The original vegetation and soil mix will be returned as far as is practicable. An encapsulation plant has been constructed to fill the LLW containers with grout prior to disposal in the vault, similar to the process used at the national Low-Level Waste Repository facility (LLWR), near Drigg in Cumbria. The plant has the capacity to grout up to four containers per day. The grout fills voids in the container and helps provide chemical conditions in the vault that limit the release of radionuclides in the far future, after the vault has been penetrated by groundwater. On April 24 2015, active commissioning began at the Encapsulation Plant and LLW Vaults. Half-height ISO containers packed with low level waste are currently being filled with grout and disposed of in the LLW Vault. Also packaged Demolition Low Level Waste (DLLW) is being processed and disposed of in the Demolition Low Level Waste Vault. To date over 2500 packages of DLLW and 70 containers LLW have been disposed of. Completion of construction and the start of operating the Phase One vaults and encapsulation plant are fundamental to the successful and efficient decommissioning of the Dounreay site, upon which many millions of pounds of investment and hundreds of jobs rely.

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U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management Legacy Uranium Mine Site Reclamation - Lessons Learned - 12384

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management is responsible for administering the DOE Uranium Leasing Program (ULP) and its 31 uranium lease tracts located in the Uravan Mineral Belt of southwestern Colorado (see Figure 1). In addition to administering the ULP for the last six decades, DOE has also undertaken the significant task of reclaiming a large number of abandoned uranium (legacy) mine sites and associated features located throughout the Uravan Mineral Belt. In 1995, DOE initiated a 3-year reconnaissance program to locate and delineate (through extensive on-the-ground mapping) the legacy mine sites and associated features contained within the historically defined boundaries of its uranium lease tracts. During that same time frame, DOE recognized the lack of regulations pertaining to the reclamation of legacy mine sites and contacted the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) concerning the reclamation of legacy mine sites. In November 1995, The BLM Colorado State Office formally issued the United States Department of the Interior, Colorado Bureau of Land Management, Closure/Reclamation Guidelines, Abandoned Uranium Mine Sites as a supplement to its Solid Minerals Reclamation Handbook (H-3042-1). Over the next five-and-one-half years, DOE reclaimed the 161 legacy mine sites that had been identified on DOE withdrawn lands. By the late 1990's, the various BLM field offices in southwestern Colorado began to recognize DOE's experience and expertise in reclaiming legacy mine sites. During the ensuing 8 years, BLM funded DOE (through a series of task orders) to perform reclamation activities at 182 BLM mine sites. To date, DOE has reclaimed 372 separate and distinct legacy mine sites. During this process, DOE has learned many lessons and is willing to share those lessons with others in the reclamation industry because there are still many legacy mine sites not yet reclaimed. DOE currently administers 31 lease tracts (11,017 ha) that collectively contain over 220 legacy (abandoned) uranium mine sites. This contrasts to the millions of hectares administered by the BLM, the U.S. Forest Service, and other federal, tribal, and state agencies that contain thousands of such sites. DOE believes that the processes it has used provide a practical and cost-effective approach to abandoned uranium mine-site reclamation. Although the Federal Acquisition Regulations preclude DOE from competing with private industry, DOE is available to assist other governmental and tribal agencies in their reclamation efforts. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DECOVALEX-2023: Task F1 Final Report

DECOVALEX-2023 Task F is a comparison of models and methods for post-closure performance assessment (PA) of a deep geologic repository for radioactive waste. The general aims of Task F are to build confidence in the models, methods, and software used for PA and to stimulate additional research and development in PA methodologies. The task objectives are to motivate development of PA modelling skills and capabilities, to examine the influence of model choices on calculated repository performance, and to compare the uncertainties introduced by model choices to other sources of uncertainty. Task F involves no actual experiment or site. It is a PA modelling exercise that requires the conceptual development of hypothetical repository designs and geologic settings. Because three of the teams were interested in salt and the rest of the teams were interested in crystalline rock, Task F was split into two branches: Task F1 for crystalline rock and Task F2 for salt. This report is for Task F1, crystalline rock. Teams from seven countries (Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and United States) participated in Task F1. The teams worked together to define the features, events, and processes of the reference case repository and established a set of performance measures. In addition, they defined a set of benchmark problems designed to test and compare modelling capabilities for fracture flow and transport at different scales. The repository design and benchmark problems are documented in a Task Specification that evolved over time as the group honed the specifications. The benchmark problems verified that each team can aptly model flow and transport in fractured media in 1-, 2-, and 3-dimensions. Two general approaches were used for the 3-dimensional benchmarks: discrete fracture network (DFN) and equivalent continuous porous medium (ECPM). DFN modelling involves explicit meshing of each fracture while ECPM modelling aims to capture the effective porosity and directional permeability of each cell in a space-filling mesh as affected by intersecting fractures. In some models, a combination of the two is used, i.e., DFN for large known fractures and ECPM for the rest of the domain. Transport is solved by using either the advection-dispersion equation or particle tracking. Although some variation is observed among model breakthrough curves in the benchmark problems, there is strong agreement in breakthrough behaviour up to at least the 75 th percentile for all benchmarks. At the 90 th percentile, breakthrough results show larger differences, suggesting several models retain substantially higher fractions of tracer in regions of slower moving water. In addition to the flow and transport benchmarks, several teams completed the source term benchmark, verifying capabilities for modelling radionuclide decay and ingrowth, waste package breach, instant release fractions, fuel matrix degradation rates, and radionuclide solubility limitations. The reference case is conceptualized as a generic spent fuel repository at a depth of 450 m in fractured crystalline rock. The repository has 50 parallel backfilled drifts, each with 50 deposition holes 6 m apart. Each deposition hole contains a 4-PWR waste package and bentonite buffer. The rock domain is 5 km in length, 2 km in width, and 1 km in depth. It has 6 deterministic fractured deformation zones and a multitude of stochastic fractures. Teams generally used the ECPM approach for the entire rock or a hybrid approach in which the deterministic fracture zones are modelled with a DFN and the rest of the rock is modelled by ECPM. Of the reference case problems specified, only the results of the initial reference case problem are compared in this report. The initial problem focuses on transport from the deposition holes to the surface, i.e., it neglects waste package performance. Tracers are released at all waste package locations at time zero and tracked for their releases to the near field and ground surface. The water fluxes calculated at the ground surface entry and exit regions of the domain are similar for all models except for two that have considerably lower fluxes. For tracer transport, large differences are observed among models in the magnitude of tracer transported. Much of the difference appears to be due to how the repository is implemented and hence the different degrees of repository simplification. Models that exclude the drifts, buffer, and backfill from the domain tend to show greater release of tracers and radionuclides from the repository. The initial study presented here indicates that major differences in modelling important processes within the repository (e.g., diffusion through buffer and backfill) can produce broadly different release and transport results, especially when those processes are excluded. Even for the models that included all specified features, events, and processes, the results show significant differences and demonstrate the importance of examining multiple modelling approaches in performance assessment. The differences in results observed in this study are expected to motivate teams to either increase complexity in future versions of the reference case models or to improve methods to account for the effects of simplified features and processes. Either way, future improvements in these models are expected to produce results that more closely agree.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tonopah Test Range Air Monitoring: CY2018 Meteorological, Radiological, and Wind Transported Particulate Observations

In 1963, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]), implemented Operation Roller Coaster on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and an adjacent area of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range). This operation resulted in radionuclide-contaminated soils at the Double Tracks site and Clean Slate I, II, and III sites. This report documents observations made during ongoing monitoring of radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions at stations installed adjacent to the Clean Slate sites and at the TTR Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Range Operations Center (ROC). The primary objective of the monitoring effort is to support the DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) in the safe remediation of the environmental legacy of nuclear device development and testing by determining if wind blowing across the Clean Slate sites is transporting particles of radionuclide-contaminated soil beyond the physical and administrative boundaries of the sites, and to provide information for designing long-term monitoring of the sites. The monitoring program in 2018 included five stations. Station 400, located within TTR Area 3 and near the ROC, monitors conditions near the local workforce center. Stations 401 and 403 are located on the northern and southeastern perimeter fence lines, respectively, of the Clean Slate III site. Stations 404 and 405 are along the northern and eastern boundary fence, respectively, at Clean Slate II. The stations are generally downwind of the contaminated areas during either northwesterly or southerly winds, which are the predominant wind directions. The stations—which are similar in design to the Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations operating at locations surrounding the Nevada National Security Site and TTR—include meteorological instruments and continuous-flow, low-volume air samplers. Three pressurized ionization chambers for measuring gamma energy are in use at Stations 400, 401, and 403. Saltation sensors and saltation traps are deployed at the stations adjacent to the Clean Slate sites. Detailed meteorological data are recorded on data loggers, with periodic uploads via a satellite system to the Western Regional Climate Center (WRCC) at Desert Research Institute (DRI), to monitor instrument and site conditions. Air filter samples are collected every two weeks and the deposits in the saltation traps are collected when a sufficient sample mass for analysis has accumulated (generally a six- to eight-month interval). Monitoring at TTR in calendar year (CY) 2018 provided surveillance of both ambient conditions, and ground disturbance associated with remediation activities at Clean Slate II and III. The first half of CY2018 data from Stations 404 and 405 at Clean Slate II were collected during remediation activities at that site, and data collected during the final third of the year at Stations 401 and 403 at Clean Slate III coincided with remediation work at the site. Ambient conditions prevailed at Station 400 throughout the year. Dust transport by suspension and saltation is strongly dependent on wind speed. Concentrations of PM 10 (particulate matter of aerodynamic diameter ≤10 micrometers [μm], a size fraction of small particles that are suspended in the air and can be easily inhaled) remain low until winds exceed approximately 32 kilometers per hour (km/hr) (20 miles per hour [mph]). Saltation particle counts also increase above the same general threshold wind speed. Wind speeds in excess of 32 km/hr (20 mph) occur less than three percent of the time at the sites. Ground disturbing remediation activities were carried out at Clean Slate II from October 31, 2017, until July 26, 2018. Station 404 is located closest to the remediation area and is downwind of the area when winds are from the south. By late November, analysis of dust from the air sampler at Station 404 registered increases in plutonium-239+240 ( 239+240 Pu) concentrations. Peak plutonium concentrations, accompanied by elevated gross alpha concentrations and the detection of americium-241 ( 241 Am) by gamma spectroscopy, occurred between March and May 2018. During spring and early summer of 2018, elevated radionuclide concentrations were also measured in dust collected from the air sampler at Station 405, which is more than twice the distance from the remediation activity as Station 404. A minor but sustained increase in gross alpha concentration of suspended dust collected at Stations 400, 401, and 403 was also observed starting in May 2018 and continuing into August. Stations 401 and 403 are approximately 4.8 to 6.4 km (three to four miles) from Clean Slate II and Station 400 is approximately 13 km (eight miles) from that site. The radionuclide content of material that saltated into the passive Big Spring Number Eight (BSNE) traps during the Clean Slate II remediation period increased in both the traps facing toward and away from the fenced contamination area at Station 404, with the largest increases in concentration (almost five times the previous 239+240 Pu concentration) observed in the traps facing the fenced area. The radionuclide concentration in material in the trap facing away from the fence more than doubled from that measured in 2017. A similar increase was observed for the saltation trap facing away from the fenced area at Station 405, although no increase was observed for material captured in the trap facing the fenced area. Particles ranging in size from 50 to 500 µm generally move by saltation processes and are not expected to significantly contribute to dose for someone breathing in the standard respiratory zone for adult humans (1.5 to 1.7 m [4.9 to 5.6 ft] above ground level) because they are too large to be entrained in the air as suspended dust. Remediation activities at Clean Slate III began on September 5, 2018, and continued until a brief hiatus started on December 20, 2018. Although Station 401 is much closer to the remediation area than Station 403, the first increase in gross alpha and 239+240 Pu concentrations was noted in dust from filters collected at Station 403 in early November 2018. The highest radionuclide concentrations of 2018 at the Clean Slate III stations were recorded in air samples taken from Stations 401 and 403 in late December 2018 and these concentrations were comparable between the two station locations. Gamma rate data measured by the PICs was slightly higher than the annual average at Stations 401 and 403 after remediation activities began, but no single measurement was outside of the range observed in 2018 prior to remediation activities. No increase in radionuclide concentration was observed for the Clean Slate III remediation time period on air filters collected from the other stations. Radiological monitoring at Station 400—which is located at the ROC, and therefore the closest regularly staffed work location to the Clean Slate sites—recorded a higher mean gross alpha activity from dust collected on air sampler filters than in previous years. The individual biweekly air filters yielded measurements of gross alpha that were at or below the mean plus one standard deviation measured in CY2017, except for the period from April 25, 2018, through September 12, 2018. Nonetheless, gamma spectroscopy of all air filters from Station 400 identified only naturally occurring radionuclides, with no detection of americium-241 ( 241 Am) (which is used as an indicator of plutonium-241[ 241 Pu]). Alpha spectroscopy of selected air filters collected at Station 400 did not detect plutonium-238 ( 238 Pu) or 239+240 Pu above the analytical detection limit. Gross beta and gamma exposure rate data were comparable to data from regional CEMP stations. No saltation traps are deployed at Station 400. Considering the ambient monitoring periods during CY2018, the monitoring stations adjacent to the Clean Slate sites recorded above-background 238 Pu and 239+240 Pu concentrations (SNL, 1998; Turner et al., 2003) in samples collected by passive saltation traps and on selected air filters. These observations were consistent with previous years and indicated that radionuclide movement occurred under ambient conditions by processes of both saltation and suspension. The presence of radionuclides in all saltation traps, both upwind and downwind of the fenced contamination areas, was consistent with previous radiological survey results (EG&G, 1979) that show lower concentration radiologically contaminated material dispersed outside the fenced area. Although 239+240 Pu concentrations in the air filter samples were sometimes orders of magnitude higher than background, the concentrations were below risk-based action levels defined for an industrial area worker scenario (U.S. DOE, 2014). The interception of airborne dust with above-background radionuclide concentrations demonstrates that dispersal processes are continuing. Strong winds are the driver for both suspension and saltation of dust and soil. The recorded wind speed and PM10 during remediation activities at Clean Slate II and III identified discrete wind events lasting approximately five to eight hours each, which accounted for the greatest PM 10 concentrations at the monitoring stations. These events captured the effect of winds from the northwest and from the south. The observed differences in dust loading and radionuclide concentrations for the monitoring stations when they were either upwind or downwind of the contamination area identify the remediation area as a source of plutonium contaminated dust. The increase in concentration of radionuclides in airborne dust during the remediation activities, compared with measurements under previous ambient conditions (mean 239+240 Pu concentrations during remediation activities are approximately nine to 40 times higher compared to pre-remediation concentrations, depending on monitoring station), highlights the impact of land disturbance on wind-borne contaminant transport from the Clean Slate test areas. The meteorological and particulate matter monitoring indicated that conditions for wind-borne contaminant movement exist at the Clean Slate sites, and that transport of radionuclide-contaminated soil by both suspension and saltation occurred under ambient conditions and accelerated when the sites were disturbed. The 239+240 Pu alpha spectroscopy results indicated that airborne concentrations during remediation activities ranged from 2 × 10-16 to 380 × 10-16 µCi/ml. These results can be compared to the derived air concentration limit for 239 Pu of 6 × 10-11 µCi/ml for occupational workers contained in Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection. Even though the air sampling results document an increase in concentration during remediation activities, the observed concentrations are less than 0.06 percent of the occupational limit. The Corrective Action Unit (CAU) closure strategy uses a risk-based approach, whereby acceptable contaminant concentrations are determined as a function of anticipated human exposure.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAMPLING OF TANK 18 IN F TANK FARM

Representative sampling is required for characterization of the residual floor material in Tank 18 prior to operational closure. Tank 18 is an 85-foot diameter, 34-foot high carbon steel tank with nominal operating volume of 1,300,000 gallons. It is a Type IV tank, and has been in service storing radioactive materials since 1959. Recent mechanical cleaning of the tank removed all mounds of material. Anticipating a low level of solids in the residual material, Huff and Thaxton [2009] developed a plan to sample the material during the final clean-up process while it would still be resident in sufficient quantities to support analytical determinations in four quadrants of the tank. Execution of the plan produced fewer solids than expected to support analytical determinations in all four quadrants. Huff and Thaxton [2009] then restructured the plan to characterize the residual floor material separately in the North and the South regions: two 'hemispheres.' This document provides sampling recommendations to complete the characterization of the residual material on the tank bottom following the guidance in Huff and Thaxton [2009] to split the tank floor into a North and a South hemisphere. The number of samples is determined from a modification of the formula previously published in Edwards [2001] and the sample characterization data for previous sampling of Tank 18 described by Oji [2009]. The uncertainty is quantified by an upper 95% confidence limit (UCL95%) on each analyte's mean concentration in Tank 18. The procedure computes the uncertainty in analyte concentration as a function of the number of samples, and the final number of samples is determined when the reduction in the uncertainty from an additional sample no longer has a practical impact on results. The characterization of the full suite of analytes in the North hemisphere is currently supported by a single Mantis rover sample obtained from a compact region near the center riser. A floor scrape sample was obtained from a compact region near the northeast riser and has been analyzed for a shortened list of key analytes. Since the unused portion of the floor scrape sample material is archived and available in sufficient quantity, additional analyses need to be performed to complete results for the full suite of constituents. The characterization of the full suite of analytes in the South hemisphere is currently supported by a single Mantis rover sample; there have been no floor scrape samples previously taken from the South hemisphere. The criterion to determine the number of additional samples was based on the practical reduction in the uncertainty when a new sample is added. This was achieved when five additional samples are obtained. In addition, two archived samples will be used if a contingency such as failing to demonstrate the comparability of the Mantis samples to the floor scrape samples occurs. To complete sampling of the Tank 18 residual floor material, three additional samples should be taken from the North hemisphere and four additional samples should be taken from the South hemisphere. One of the samples from each hemisphere will be archived in case of need. Two of the three additional samples from the North hemisphere and three of the four additional samples from the South hemisphere will be analyzed. Once the results are available, differences between the Mantis and three floor scrape samples (the sample previously obtained near NE riser plus the two additional samples that will be analyzed) results will be evaluated. If there are no statistically significant analyte concentration differences between the Mantis and floor scrape samples, those results will be combined and then UCL95%s will be calculated. If the analyte concentration differences between the Mantis and floor scrape samples are statistically significant, the UCL95%s will be calculated without the Mantis sample results. If further reduction in the upper confidence limits is needed and can be achieved by the addition of the archived samples, they will be analyzed and included in the statistical computations. Initially, the analyte concentrations in the residual material on the floor of Tank 18 will be determined separately in the North and the South hemispheres. However, if final sampling results show that differences between the North and South samples are consistent within sampling variation, then the final computations can be based on consolidating all sample results from the tank floor. Recommended locations may be subject to physical tank access and sampling constraints for the additional samples. The recommendations have been discussed in Section 4 and are based on partitioning the Tank 18 floor into an inner and an outer ring and six 60{sup o} sectors depicted in Figure 1. The location of the border between the inner and outer rings is based on dividing the residual material into two approximately equal volumes.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗