Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “NONPROLIFERATION”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 559 records · Page 31

Transition of Iodine Analysis to Accelerator Mass Spectrometry

The goal of the project, New Paradigms for Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry: Raising the Scientific Profile and Improved Performance for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) and Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS), is to ensure that the ongoing isotope ratio determination capability within the U.S. Department of Energy complex is the world’s best for application to nonproliferation. This report spells out the progress of Task 4, Transition of TIMS to AMS for Iodine Analysis, of the larger project. The subtasks under Task 4 and the accomplishments throughout the three year project life cycle are presented in this report. Progress was made in optimization of chemical extraction, determination of a detection limit for 127Iodine, production of standard materials for AMS analysis quality assurance, facilitation of knowledge exchange with respect to analyzing iodine on an AMS, cross comparison with a world-leading AMS laboratory, supercritical fluid extraction of iodine for AMS analysis and electrodeposition of seawater as a direct method of preparation for iodine analysis by AMS--all with the goal of minimizing the time required to stand up an AMS capability for iodine analysis of exposed air filters at INL. An effective extraction method has been developed and demonstrated for iodine analysis of exposed air filters. Innovative techniques to accomplish the cathode preparation for AMS analysis were developed and demonstrated and published. The known gap of a lack of available materials for reference standards in the analysis of iodine by AMS was filled by the preparation of homogenous materials that were calibrated against NIST materials. A minimum limit on the amount of abundant isotope in a sample was determined for AMS analysis. The knowledge exchange occurred with fantastic success. Scientists engaged the international AMS community at conferences, as well as in their laboratories for collaborative work. The supercritical fluid extraction work has positive data, but is not a replacement for leaching yet. The added seawater work has led to a good method and a possible publication. The focus of this project was to minimize the time to stand up the AMS capability, by having all the preparation and supporting functions worked out ahead of the instrument arrival. Due to all the preparatory work and its success, the instrument was delivered and turned over to the INL in February 2015. Since then, INL scientists have been successfully vetting the capabilities and accomplishing their own measurements that agree well with the leading laboratories of the world for iodine analysis by AMS. Initially, all AMS data was gathered on other laboratories instruments, but during the last six months data for this project has come from INL’s AMS.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Science & Technology Review July/August 2016

At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, we focus on science and technology research to ensure our nation’s security. We also apply that expertise to solve other important national problems in energy, bioscience, and the environment. Science & Technology Review is published eight times a year to communicate, to a broad audience, the Laboratory’s scientific and technological accomplishments in fulfilling its primary missions. The publication’s goal is to help readers understand these accomplishments and appreciate their value to the individual citizen, the nation, and the world. In this issue for the months of July and August 2016, there are two features: one on Science and Technology in Support of Nuclear Nonproliferation, and another on Seeking Out Hidden Radioactive Materials. Then there are highlights are three research projects--on optics, plasma science, and the nature of neutrinos--along with a news section and patents and awards.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear energy related capabilities at Sandia National Laboratories

Sandia National Laboratories' technology solutions are depended on to solve national and global threats to peace and freedom. Through science and technology, people, infrastructure, and partnerships, part of Sandia's mission is to meet the national needs in the areas of energy, climate and infrastructure security. Within this mission to ensure clean, abundant, and affordable energy and water is the Nuclear Energy and Fuel Cycle Programs. The Nuclear Energy and Fuel Cycle Programs have a broad range of capabilities, with both physical facilities and intellectual expertise. These resources are brought to bear upon the key scientific and engineering challenges facing the nation and can be made available to address the research needs of others. Sandia can support the safe, secure, reliable, and sustainable use of nuclear power worldwide by incorporating state-of-the-art technologies in safety, security, nonproliferation, transportation, modeling, repository science, and system demonstrations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safeguards by Design Challenge

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Report on July 2015 Additional Protocol Coordinators Best Practices Workshop

After 10 years of implementation experience, the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) within the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) conducted the Additional Protocol (AP) Coordinators Best Practices Workshop at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from July 29-30, 2015. The goal of this workshop was to identify implementation best practices, lessons learned, and compliance challenges from the various Additional Protocol Coordinators (APCs) at each laboratory in the DOE/NNSA complex and associated sites. The workshop provided the opportunity for participants to share their insights and establish networks that APCs can utilize to continue to discuss challenges (new and old), identify best practices, and enhance communication and coordination for reporting multi-lab research projects during review activities. Workshop participants included DOE/NNSA HQ, laboratory and site APCs, seasoned experts, members of the original implementation outreach team, and Field Element and site security representatives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Walk the Talk: Progress in Building a Supply Chain Security Culture

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” for over a decade in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices to understand their business and to build awareness around best practices to ensure security of goods, technology, and information along their supply chains. From conducting this work, PNNL identified indicators that a company can adopt as part of its commitment to nonproliferation ideals with a focus on supply chain security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gary Laughlin IHNS Intro to 2015 HPC Annual Report

The International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security (IHNS) Program Management Unit (PMU) oversees a broad portfolio of Sandia’s programs in areas ranging from global nuclear security to critical asset protection. We use science and technology, innovative research, and global engagement to counter threats, reduce dangers, and respond to disasters. The PMU draws on the skills of scientists and engineers from across Sandia. Our programs focus on protecting US government installations, safeguarding nuclear weapons and materials, facilitating nonproliferation activities, securing infrastructures, countering chemical and biological dangers, and reducing the risk of terrorist threats. We conduct research in risk and threat analysis, monitoring and detection, decontamination and recovery, and situational awareness. We develop technologies for verifying arms control agreements, neutralizing dangerous materials, detecting intruders, and strengthening resiliency. Our programs use Sandia’s High-Performance Computing resources for predictive modeling and simulation of interdependent systems, for modeling dynamic threats and forecasting adaptive behavior, and for enabling decision support and processing large cyber data streams. In this report, we highlight four advanced computation projects that illustrate the breadth of the IHNS mission space.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Estimating the AmLi Neutron Spectrum from Measured Ring Ratios

These are a set of slides on estimating the AmLi neutron spectrum from measured ring ratios. The IAEA uses an AmLi source in the Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL) to verify compliance with nonproliferation treaties. The UNCL requires calibration with known uranium samples. The AmLi spectrum isn’t known well enough to allow simulated calibrations. Alphas lose energy traveling through AmO 2 particle of unknown size. Energy reduction below Li threshold enhances O contribution. Unknown Li matrix material affects neutron production and thermalization. There is large variation in spectra from each element. Other topics covered include: applications, physics considerations, current spectra, measurement overview, measurement results - variation between sources, simulations, spectra fitting, other simulations, and conclusions.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Ceramic Seal.

Containment/Surveillance (C/S) measures are critical to any verification regime in order to maintain Continuity of Knowledge (CoK). The Ceramic Seal project is research into the next generation technologies to advance C/S, in particular improving security and efficiency. The Ceramic Seal is a small form factor loop seal with improved tamper-indication including a frangible seal body, tamper planes, external coatings, and electronic monitoring of the seal body integrity. It improves efficiency through a self-securing wire and in-situ verification with a handheld reader. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), under sponsorship from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D), have previously designed and have now fabricated and tested Ceramic Seals. Tests have occurred at both SNL and SRNL, with different types of tests occurring at each facility. This interim report will describe the Ceramic Seal prototype, the design and development of a handheld standalone reader and an interface to a data acquisition system, fabrication of the seals, and results of initial testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NGSPN @ BNL

Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department hosted the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN) at BNL September 6-9, 2016. Thirteen representatives from seven Department of Energy National Laboratories, including two from BNL, participated in the four-day meeting. The NGSPN meeting was sponsored by the Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which provided funding for BNL’s development and conduct of the meeting program and the participant’s labor and travel. NGSPN meetings were previously held at Savannah River National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. The purpose of NGSPN is to provide a forum for early-career international safeguards practitioners to network with their peers, to meet international safeguards experts from other institutions and to learn about organizations other than their employers who contribute to international safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

CGMF & FREYA Verification in MCNP6

At the present time, the new and updated fission event generators included in MCNP6.2 have been verified to be functioning properly through a variety of detailed tests. This work describes the detailed verification steps taken to ensure these complicated fission event generators, FREYA and CGMF, are integrated into MCNP6 properly. Ultimately, with the knowledge that MCNP6 is making use of these models appropriately, we can now begin to validate the models against benchmarked experiments. Some benchmarks, including criticality and subcritical experiments interested in multiplication and bulk counting rates, are easy to model and understand but are likely insensitive to the detailed nature of these models. It will take some new measurements with coincidence detection capabilities to be able to stress the physics within each of these fission event generator models. Once the models are validated and it is understood where the models can truly be predictive, then we can study what SNM observables can be characterized for nonproliferation applications.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Nominations for the 2017 NNSA Pollution Prevention Awards

In the field of nuclear forensics, one of the biggest challenges is to dissolve postdetonation debris for analysis. Debris generated after a nuclear detonation is a glassy material that is difficult to dissolve with chemicals. Traditionally, concentrated nitric acid, hydrofluoric acid, or sulfuric acid are employed during the dissolution. These acids, due to their corrosive nature, are not suitable for in-field/on-site sample preparations. Uranium oxides are commonly present in nuclear fuel processing plants and nuclear research facilities. In uranium oxides, the level of uranium isotope enrichment is a sensitive indicator for nuclear nonproliferation and is monitored closely by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure there is no misuse of nuclear material or technology for nuclear weapons. During an IAEA on-site inspection at a facility, environmental surface swipe samples are collected and transported to the IAEA headquarters or network of analytical laboratories for further processing. Uranium oxide particles collected on the swipe medium are typically dissolved with inorganic acids and are then analyzed for uranium isotopic compositions. To improve the responsiveness of on-site inspections, in-field detection techniques have been recently explored. However, in-field analysis is bottlenecked by time-consuming and hazardous dissolution procedures, as corrosive inorganic acids must be used. Corrosive chemicals are difficult to use in the field due to personnel safety considerations, and the transportation of such chemicals is highly regulated. It was therefore necessary to develop fast uranium oxide dissolution methods using less hazardous chemicals in support of the rapid infield detection of anomalies in declared nuclear processes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Uranium Conversion & Enrichment

The isotopes of uranium that are found in nature, and hence in ‘fresh’ Yellowcake’, are not in relative proportions that are suitable for power or weapons applications. The goal of conversion then is to transform the U 3 O 8 yellowcake into UF 6 . Conversion and enrichment of uranium is usually required to obtain material with enough 235 U to be usable as fuel in a reactor or weapon. The cost, size, and complexity of practical conversion and enrichment facilities aid in nonproliferation by design.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY 2016 Data Analysis Annual Report

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,500 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 606 sites in 56 countries worldwide. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element in the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings. NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 56 countries around the world. Thirty-seven of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year 2016. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in fiscal year 2016. The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of approximately six from site to site. Some lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have approximately 8,000 occupancies per day and the different types of cargo that travel through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was above 96% for fiscal year 2016. NSDD takes all of these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Safeguards as a Career Path

Presenting along with Introductory Nonproliferation Teaching and Learning Module to provide an intro to working at LANL at Utah State on February 21, 2017.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The European Expression Of Interest For High Purity U-233 Materials

The purpose of this letter report is to document the response for an Expression of Interest (EOI) sent to the European Safeguards and research and development (R&D) scientific communities for the distribution of small amounts of high purity 233 U materials for use in safeguards, nonproliferation, and basic R&D in the nuclear disciplines. The intent for the EOI was to gauge the level of international interest for these materials from government and research institutions with programmatic missions in the nuclear security or nuclear R&D arena. The information contained herein is intended to provide information to assist key decision makers in DOE as to the ultimate disposition path for the high purity materials currently being recovered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and only those items for which there is no United States (U.S.) sponsor identified.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Scalable Metadata Management for a Large Multi-Source Seismic Data Repository

In this work, we implemented the key metadata management components of a scalable seismic data ingestion framework to address limitations in our existing system, and to position it for anticipated growth in volume and complexity. We began the effort with an assessment of open source data flow tools from the Hadoop ecosystem. We then began the construction of a layered architecture that is specifically designed to address many of the scalability and data quality issues we experience with our current pipeline. This included implementing basic functionality in each of the layers, such as establishing a data lake, designing a unified metadata schema, tracking provenance, and calculating data quality metrics. Our original intent was to test and validate the new ingestion framework with data from a large-scale field deployment in a temporary network. This delivered somewhat unsatisfying results, since the new system immediately identified fatal flaws in the data relatively early in the pipeline. Although this is a correct result it did not allow us to sufficiently exercise the whole framework. We then widened our scope to process all available metadata from over a dozen online seismic data sources to further test the implementation and validate the design. This experiment also uncovered a higher than expected frequency of certain types of metadata issues that challenged us to further tune our data management strategy to handle them. Our result from this project is a greatly improved understanding of real world data issues, a validated design, and prototype implementations of major components of an eventual production framework. This successfully forms the basis of future development for the Geophysical Monitoring Program data pipeline, which is a critical asset supporting multiple programs. It also positions us very well to deliver valuable metadata management expertise to our sponsors, and has already resulted in an NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation commitment to a multi-year project for follow-on work.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗