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545 records · Page 31

High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Map - An Avoidance Approach for UAM, AAM, and UAS Vehicles

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Urban Air Mobility (UAM), and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) vehicles will fly in similar airspace to Transport Category Rotorcraft, thereby requiring them to meet the most severe requirements for HighIntensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) certification. The environment is severe for rotorcraft, much more so than for fixed-wing aircraft, due to lower altitude operations, potentially exposing the vehicles to close and direct view of high-power transmitters on the ground. High-level HIRF exposure potentially leads to avionic system upsets, interference, and undesirable effects. Shielding and circuit protection against HIRF will be a significant barrier to size, weight, and cost, especially for emerging electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) and electric short take-off and landing (eSTOL) vehicles. This paper proposes a novel approach to HIRF protection, which reduces costs by testing and certifying vehicles to a “vehicle tolerance level” that is lower than required for Transport Category Rotorcraft. The remaining protection is achieved by maintaining a safe distance from known HIRF sources, calculated based on the vehicle's tolerance level and transmitter characteristics such as transmit power, antenna beamwidth, and direction. Tailored maps are developed, identifying transmitters and avoidance zones within an operating area or along a flight path, allowing for restricted vehicle operations. The HIRF avoidance zones could be smaller for vehicles with higher tolerance levels, enabling them to operate closer to transmitters. Transmitter data can be extracted from regulatory databases like the FCC and NOAA. A map tool is developed in Matlab to calculate and plot HIRF avoidance zones from transmitters in FCC and NOAA databases as proof of concept. Illustrations are presented for AM/FM/TV transmitters, communication satellite dishes, and weather radars. Also illustrated are HIRF zones for smaller transmitters, including land-mobile radios, pagers, microwave links, and cellular towers. An example of flight planning around the transmitters is presented. This method is a substantial deviation from the standard approach and involves slightly higher flight-planning complexity, but the potential cost savings are significant. Future AAM/UAM/UAS aeronautical charts could include these new HIRF avoidance zones.

HIRF↗

High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Map - An Avoidance Approach for UAM, AAM, and UAS Vehicles

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Urban Air Mobility (UAM), and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) vehicles will fly in similar airspace to Transport Category Rotorcraft, thereby requiring them to meet the most severe requirements for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) certification. The environment is severe for rotorcraft, much more so than for fixed-wing aircraft, due to lower altitude operations, potentially exposing the vehicles to close and direct view of high-power transmitters on the ground. High-level HIRF exposure potentially leads to avionic system upsets, interference, and undesirable effects. Shielding and circuit protection against HIRF will be a significant barrier to size, weight, and cost, especially for emerging electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) and electric short take-off and landing (eSTOL) vehicles. This paper proposes a novel approach to HIRF protection, which reduces costs by testing and certifying vehicles to a “vehicle tolerance level” that is lower than required for Transport Category Rotorcraft. The remaining protection is achieved by maintaining a safe distance from known HIRF sources, calculated based on the vehicle's tolerance level and transmitter characteristics such as transmit power, antenna beamwidth, and direction. Tailored maps are developed, identifying transmitters and avoidance zones within an operating area or along a flight path, allowing for restricted vehicle operations. The HIRF avoidance zones could be smaller for vehicles with higher tolerance levels, enabling them to operate closer to transmitters. Transmitter data can be extracted from regulatory databases like the FCC and NOAA. A map tool is developed in Matlab to calculate and plot HIRF avoidance zones from transmitters in FCC and NOAA databases as proof of concept. Illustrations are presented for AM/FM/TV transmitters, communication satellite dishes, and weather radars. Also illustrated are HIRF zones for smaller transmitters, including land-mobile radios, pagers, microwave links, and cellular towers. An example of flight planning around the transmitters is presented. This method is a substantial deviation from the standard approach and involves slightly higher flight-planning complexity, but the potential cost savings are significant. Future AAM/UAM/UAS aeronautical charts could include these new HIRF avoidance zones.

HIRF↗

Magnetic Compensation for Second-Order Doppler Shift in LITS

The uncertainty in the frequency of a linear-ion-trap frequency standard (LITS) can be reduced substantially by use of a very small magnetic inhomogeneity tailored to compensate for the residual second-order Doppler shift. An effect associated with the relativistic time dilatation, one cause of the second-order Doppler shift, is ion motion that is attributable to the trapping radio-frequency (RF)electromagnetic field used to trap ions. The second-order Doppler shift is reduced by using a multi-pole trap; however it is still the largest source of systematic frequency shift in the latest generation of LITSs, which are among the most stable clocks in the world. The present compensation scheme reduces the frequency instability of the affected LITS to about a tenth of its previous value. The basic principles of prior generation LITSs were discussed in several prior NASA Tech Briefs articles. Below are recapitulated only those items of basic information necessary to place the present development in context. A LITS includes a microwave local oscillator, the frequency of which is stabilized by comparison with the frequency of the ground state hyperfine transition of 199Hg+ ions. The comparison involves a combination of optical and microwave excitation and interrogation of the ions in a linear ion trap in the presence of a nominally uniform magnetic field. In the current version of the LITS, there are two connected traps (see figure): (1) a quadrupole trap wherein the optical excitation and measurement take place and (2) a 12-pole trap (denoted the resonance trap), wherein the microwave interrogation takes place. The ions are initially loaded into the quadrupole trap and are thereafter shuttled between the two traps. Shuttling ions into the resonance trap allows sensitive microwave interrogation to take place well away from loading interference. The axial magnetic field for the resonance trap is generated by an electric current in a finely wound wire coil surrounded by magnetic shields. In the quadrupole and 12-pole traps, the potentials are produced by RF voltages applied to even numbers (4 and 12, respectively) of parallel rods equally spaced around a circle. The polarity of the voltage on each rod is opposite that of the voltage on the adjacent rod. As a result, the amplitude of the RF trapping field is zero along the centerline and increases, with radius, to a maximum value near the rods.

Burt, Eric↗

A HIRF-Map Certification Approach for UAM, AAM, and UAS Vehicles

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Urban Air Mobility (UAM), and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) vehicles will fly in airspace similar to Transport Category Rotorcraft, requiring them to meet stringent requirements for High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) certification. The environment is notably severe, particularly compared to fixed-wing aircraft, due to operations at lower altitudes. This potentially exposes the vehicles to high-power transmitters on the ground, leading to significant challenges. High-level HIRF exposure can result in avionic system upsets, interference, and undesirable effects. Shielding and circuit protection against HIRF pose significant barriers concerning size, weight, and cost, especially for emerging electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) and electric short take-off and landing (eSTOL) vehicles. This paper proposes a novel HIRF protection approach, aiming to reduce costs by certifying vehicles to a "vehicle tolerance level" lower than that required for Transport Category Rotorcraft. The remaining protection is achieved by maintaining a safe distance from known HIRF sources. This distance is calculated based on the vehicle's tolerance level and transmitter characteristics, such as transmit power, antenna beamwidth, and direction. Tailored flight maps are developed to identify transmitters and avoidance zones within an operating area or along a flight path, enabling restricted vehicle operations. Vehicles with higher tolerance levels could have smaller HIRF avoidance zones, allowing them to operate closer to transmitters. Transmitter data are sourced from government databases, such as those of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). A map tool is developed using Matlab to calculate and visualize HIRF avoidance zones based on available databases. The tool determines stand-off distances based on input vehicle tolerance levels, displaying results on various base maps depicting HIRF-restricted areas. Illustrations cover various FCC transmitters, including AM/FM/TV transmitters, satellite earth stations, and NOAA weather radars. The HIRF zones of smaller transmitters, such as land-mobile radios, pagers, microwave links, and cellular towers, are also illustrated. An example of flight planning around transmitters is provided. For now, airports and government-owned lands are excluded due to limited access to sensitive transmitter data. Despite this approach, a minimum HIRF tolerance level for vehicles may still be necessary to cover mobile devices, cellular base stations, transmitters on other AAM vehicles, and other small power devices not included in the FCC databases. The paper discusses findings and areas for improving existing databases and suggests an approach for better access to sanitized data in more restricted government databases. This method significantly deviates from the standard approach and introduces slightly higher flight-planning complexity. However, the potential cost savings are considerable. Future AAM/UAM/UAS aeronautical charts could potentially incorporate these new HIRF avoidance zones. Keywords—HIRF; Map; AAM; UAM; UAS; Advanced Air Mobility; Urban Air Mobility; Unmanned Aerial Systems; Certification.

HIRF↗

Localization of Ad-Hoc Lunar Constellations in Communication Failure Modes for Distributed Spacecraft Autonomy

As lunar missions increase in complexity inspired by NASA’s Artemis Program, they will require reliable and sufficient capability of the Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) system to support their scientific objectives. In addition, NASA's Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program initiates the proliferation of public and private exploration partnerships using small satellites from commercial and private organizations, expanding traditionally confined low Earth orbit to be used for missions beyond geosynchronous orbit (Zucherman et al., 2022). Therefore, the Lunar PNT system is also required to provide navigation services compatible with the smaller platforms being sent by the public and private sectors, like CubeSats. However, traditional approaches to deep space missions’ navigation based on ground radio facilities have difficulties in providing sufficient support for the increasing number of users and communication at a distance from the Earth (Kaplev et al., 2022). In particular, the existing Lunar navigation technologies such as weak signal global positioning system (GPS) and deep space network (DSN) are not able to ensure operations of the upcoming small-scale Lunar missions due to their limitations in localization performance as well as capacity aspects. Another way to provide Lunar PNT service is to create a dedicated Lunar global navigation satellite system (GNSS) constellation, like GNSS systems on Earth. Space agencies like NASA, ESA, and JAXA are now developing the lunar communications relay and navigation systems (LCRNS) and Lunar navigation satellite systems (LNSS). In their systems, satellites will be deployed in moon orbits to provide the communication, positioning, navigation, and timing (CPNT) service at the lunar south pole region where the Artemis base camp will be expected (Murata et al., 2022). Meanwhile, common challenges considered in lunar PNT research arise from poor geometry of the terrestrial GNSS satellites when seen from the lunar user, highly perturbed lunar orbits, and limitations in power, size, and cost of the equipment on lunar satellites (Iiyama et al., 2023). It is also not clear if there will be enough Lunar users to support the cost and resources this would require as the Low-cost surface missions may not be able to support the large power, mass, and weight requirements that these navigation solutions entail (Niemoeller et al., 2022). As an alternative, existing Lunar science and exploration assets could be used to create a low-cost, autonomous, ad-hoc, and on-demand mission-centric Lunar PNT swarm capable of providing PNT services to these low-cost lunar missions (Hagenau et al., 2021). Introducing the non-dedicated and ad-hoc Lunar navigation constellation gives a way to provide PNT services on-demand. The non-dedicated swarm assets of Lunar constellations are designed to localize themselves with minimal interaction with Earth by adding cooperative autonomous localization to lunar missions, freeing up valuable bandwidth and ground segment resources. An autonomous localization of Lunar constellations is based on the concept of the decentralized PNT system with a distributed extended Kalman filter (DEKF) approach to state estimation for minimal onboard operating costs. In the distributed data processing algorithm, computation is broken down and assigned to each satellite, resulting in a considerably decreased computational amount while maintaining the accuracy of the orbit ephemeris and clock offsets as the result of centralized data processing (Wen et al., 2019). The DEKF requires spacecraft to perform two-way ranging operations with each other to communicate simultaneously, leveraging neighbor two-way intersatellite link (ISL) measurements such as pseudoranges to, and relative velocities between, visible satellites as sensor values (Frank et al., 2021). The Lunar autonomous PNT simulation (LAPS) demonstrated the feasibility of orbital asset localization among ad-hoc Lunar small-sat constellations based on the DEKF in Hagenau et al. (2021) and evaluated the matching algorithm proposed by Frank et al. (2021) in scheduling position estimation updates. In previous papers, all assets and measurements are assumed to be always available without consideration of the impact of intermittent and permanent communication failure. This study presents localization performance with increasing levels of network degradation for swarm assets and users to demonstrate the robustness of the decentralized Lunar PNT service in more realistic scenarios. Main issues arising from communication failure include spacecraft permanent or transient loss, antenna failures, message delays, etc. We tested four possible reasons for network degradation for 7 days in 21 satellites frozen with an altitude of 5500 km, evenly spaced around 3 circular, 40 inclination orbital planes where each spacecraft has two directional antennas. As anchor nodes with an independent estimate of their position are required in the DEKF approach, two ground nodes in each pole and one node in the gateway were implemented in the simulation. First, the most probable failure scenario involves the loss of a single spacecraft due to solar interference and technical malfunctions of the assets. Losing the availability of a single spacecraft means losing the two-way ISL measurement of the asset in the DEKF update. In order to provide the best possible quality of PNT service with limited time and resources, the distributed Lunar constellations must schedule the communication activities. The scheduler leverages mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) for the coordination and scheduling of the desired “as-needed” localization service (Niemoeller et al., 2022). We assume the scheduler has completely excluded the spacecraft information before the DEKF update in the failure scenario. When a random spacecraft has been turned off at a specific time, the robustness of the autonomous Lunar PNT system is evaluated. The simulation results give an 11.5% degradation in median position accuracy compared to the idealized performance excluding the asset loss. Second, a large number of assets may vanish due to major hardware problems or meteor strikes around the moon. A multiple spacecraft loss can degrade the localization performance very fast by losing the communication ability to do cross-plane measurements and in-plane measurements in a 3-plane constellation. When the matching-based scheduler is aware of ISL availability, we investigate a large number of in-plane and cross-plane asset vanishments both in close proximity and equally spaced throughout the orbital plane. According to the simulations, the loss of in-plane measurements gives 40.2% degradation while cross-plane measurements degrade 50.5% of asset localization performance among available assets. Therefore, it is concluded that cross-plane measurements are more important in improving the position estimation accuracy. Third, spacecraft failure information can be lost due to the internal message delay, resulting in the DEKF update scheduler to solve the matching problem with unavailable assets. The DEKF update cycle is comprised of network setup, communication, and computations where a global broadcast network and a 2-way ISL network setup take 6 minutes in total (Frank et al., 2021). Once the broadcast network successfully transmits and receives information, a random spacecraft may lose its availability right before solving the matching problem. This means the matching solution is no longer optimal, resulting in degradation in the localization performance. A numerical assessment shows the matching-based scheduler with knowing failure holds 11.5% of position accuracy degradation, whereas the scheduler without knowing failure gives 34% degraded localization performance without asset loss. Fourth, a transient loss of a single or multiple spacecraft may occur due to their antenna outages. After losing the two-way ISL availability for a few DEKF update cycles, the availability of spacecraft can easily be recovered as their states have been independently updated using measurements from anchor nodes. It is likely that the longer failure will result in worse localization performance. We have tested the transient failure of a random single asset for 30 min in the simulation, which is losing 3 update cycles in the DEKF system. From the simulation results, the position accuracy has been degraded to 4.84% which is better than the degraded localization performance of 11.5% from the permanent loss scenario among available assets. In conclusion, the autonomous Lunar PNT system based on the DEKF approach shows the ability to maintain resilience and robustness in the possible communication failure scenarios, ensuring that localization accuracy is preserved across various network degradation and outages. Future studies on investigating user localization performance near the South Pole and the broadcast network system will be continued in the following months.

Yeji Kim↗