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DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Pressurizing Hagan and SAVY containers to 30-psig (air) to measure the release of analytical cerium oxide test powder

In response to an ESS surrounding the storage of sealed sources at TA-55, personnel from RP-SVS (Radiation Protection Services) and ORI-2 (Operational Readiness & Execution) were approached by ES-55 (Facility System Engineering) to provide technical testing of known nuclear material storage containers. Testing criteria were determined by SB-PF (Safety Basis for Plutonium Facilities). Tests were conducted in conjunction with multiple related projects at the Aerosol Sciences Laboratory (TA-03-0130-0103). An experimental system was quickly developed to deliver a pressure pulse (30-psig) that mimics a sealed source burst scenario. A series of twelve tests was conducted. Six tests were done with two different 5QT SAVY-4000 containers, where each SAVY filter-lid combination was subjected to three successive test insults. Three tests were done with a (0.375" diameter filter) 8Q.T Hagan container, and three tests with a (0.625" diameter filter) 8QT Hagan container. An unused, fresh container filter was used for each tested Hagan container, each receiving only one test insult per filter. Cerium oxide (CeO 2 ) powder was loaded (100 grams per test) into a nozzle in the tested Hagan and SAVY containers, and the nozzle was hard-plumbed to a ball valve and a pressure source. This system was installed into the Los Alamos RRFMC (Respirable Release Measurement Chamber), which is an integrated multipurpose aerosol wind tunnel that satisfies NQA-1 subpart 2.4 for R&D work. The ball valve was fitted with a mechanical linkage for operation from outside the wind tunnel. An aerodynamic particle sizer counted the particle concentrations and size distributions of released aerosol. Respirable aerosol released during the tests was measured and a correction factor for wind tunnel flowrate and internal duct deposition was applied.

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DOE OSTI2020

Transfer and Flushing Evaluation for Potential Precipitated Solids in the 241-AP-106 to EMF Transfer Pipeline for DFLAW

Waste transfer pipeline flushing is necessary to maintain pipeline performance, but added flush fluid increases the nuclear waste inventory. During the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) mission, waste transfer lines from the Interim Low-Activity Waste Storage Tank (i.e., 241-AP-106) to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility must have the capability of being flushed to prevent accumulation of solids and to mitigate corrosion concerns. Operational experience at Hanford has shown that the solids precipitation occurs during processing operations from dilute Hanford liquids. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was requested to evaluate the potential precipitated solid particle transport and flushing operational capabilities of the AP-106 through the Effluent Management Facility (EMF) low-point drain LAW feed pipeline. The evaluation results do not provide operational requirements, but rather provide a scoping basis for understanding the potential operational significance of solids precipitation in the pipeline. The salt and aluminum phase solids most likely to precipitate from the LAW feeds during cooling, evaporation, or mixing have particle densities that are estimated to range from 1.62 to 2.78 g/mL and a spherical particle size range of 8 to 2100 μm, depending on the solid phase considered. Application of the method to calculate the critical deposition velocity required by TFC-ENG-STD-26 at conservatively bounding estimates for the solids concentrations demonstrates that potentially precipitated solids may deposit on the bottom of the transfer pipe invert at the lower LAW feed pipeline flow rate, but the upper LAW feed pipeline flow rate will likely prevent deposition. The system pressure limit for the AP-106 through the EMF low-point drain LAW feed pipeline likely exceeds any pressure loss at a calculated critical deposition velocity even for the most adverse potential precipitated solid. However, should solids settle as a result of no-flow conditions, the flow capabilities of the AP-106 through the EMF low-point drain LAW feed pipeline are shown, based on the available literature, to be potentially inadequate for effective flushing operations to remove solids, even at solids concentrations below the maximum specified for LAW feed. Thus, stepwise solids accumulations over multiple transfers may be an issue, and eventual line plugging may occur. Further inadequacies may potentially be realized should the cohesive nature of certain precipitates be accounted for.

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DOE OSTI2021

Engineering Scale Drying of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel: Experiment Report

Engineering-scale tests were performed to evaluate the relative effectiveness of forced gas and vacuum-drying processes on aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) in preparation for extended dry storage. Drying models were developed to improve confidence in the likely range of conditions at the start of dry storage and to understand the factors most significant to each process. Testing was performed at the Holtec International Forced Helium Dehydration training facility in Camden, New Jersey, by students from the University of South Carolina in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratory. A full-size Type 1a basket, with a full-diameter vessel configuration (based on the Department of Energy standardized canister design), was used in combination with a 10 assembly surrogate ASNF arrangement to provide a proxy for geometry. A resistance heater incorporated in one assembly simulated the influence of 100 W decay heat. This instrumented chamber allowed testing of the removal of bulk water, physisorbed water, and chemisorbed water over a range of operating parameters with either drying process. Thick oxide films were grown on aluminum test plates to mimic the ASNF surface chemistry. These one-use test plates were housed within select assemblies during drying. Post-test analysis of these plates gave a measure of the moisture removed during each test, which was compared to a control. Instrumentation provided detailed thermal, humidity, and gas or pressure data relevant to each test. Model simulations generally compared favorably to instrument data for the tests. While both processes were able to remove bulk water, removal of chemisorbed water was shown to depend heavily on local temperature. To the disadvantage of vacuum drying, operations approaching or exceeding 220°C achieved consistently more dehydroxylation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Effect of thermal aging on microstructure and crack growth response of Alloy 152 weld

Nickel-based Alloy 690 and the associated weld Alloys 52 and 152 are typically used for nozzle penetrations in replacement heads for pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessels, because of their excellent overall resistance to general corrosion and environmental degradation, primarily stress corrosion cracking (SCC). However, many of the existing PWRs are expected to operate for 40-80 years. Likewise, advanced water-cooled small modular reactors (SMRs) will use Ni-Cr alloys and are expected to receive initial operating licenses for 60 years. Hence, the thermal stability of Ni-Cr alloys is a potential concern for the long-term performance of both existing and advanced nuclear power plants, and possibly spent fuel storage containers. The objective of this research is to understand the microstructural changes occurring in high-Cr, Ni-based Alloy 152 weldments during long time exposure to the reactor operating temperatures, and the effect of these changes on the service performance. One area of particular concern is the potential for long range ordering (LRO), i.e. formation of the intermetallic Ni2Cr phase under prolonged exposure to reactor temperatures and/or irradiation, which can increase strength, decrease ductility, and cause dimensional changes or lead to in-service embrittlement of components made with these alloys. Hence, this research focused on the microstructural evolution and the SCC response of Alloy 152 under accelerated thermal aging. The materials studied involved three heats of Alloy 152 used to produce a dissimilar metal weld (DMW) joining an Alloy 690 plate to an Alloy 533 low alloy steel (LAS) plate, thermally aged at three different temperatures (370°C, 400°C and 450°C) for up to 75,000h (equivalent to 60 years of service). The microstructural characterization by means of synchrotron X-ray did not find evidence of LRO in any of the three heats aged to an equivalent of 60 years of service. Testing in a primary water environment of a heat of Alloy 152 aged at 370°C to a 60-year service equivalent revealed a fatigue and corrosion fatigue crack growth responses similar to those measured on the un-aged alloy. However, the SCC CGR response of the aged sample appears to show a deterioration in performance.

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DOE OSTI2022

Quantification of Aerosol Transmission through Stress Corrosion Crack-Like Geometries

The formation of a stress corrosion crack (SCC) in the canister wall of a dry cask storage system (DCSS) has been identified as a potential issue for the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel. The presence of an SCC in a storage system could represent a through-wall flow path from the canister interior to the environment. Modern, vertical DCSSs are of particular interest due to the commercial practice of using more significant backfill pressures in the canister, up to approximately 800 kPa. This pressure differential offers a relatively high driving potential for blowdown of any particulates that might be present in the canister. In this study, the rates of gas flow and aerosol transmission of a spent fuel surrogate through an engineered microchannel with dimensions representative of an SCC were evaluated experimentally using coupled mass flow and aerosol analyzers. The microchannel was formed by mating two gage blocks with a linearly tapering slot orifice nominally 13 μm (0.005 in.) tall on the upstream side and 25 μm (0.0010 in.) tall on the downstream side. The orifice is 12.7 mm (0.500 in.) wide by 8.86 mm (0.349 in.) long (flow length). Surrogate aerosols of cerium oxide, CeO 2 , were seeded and mixed with either helium or air inside a pressurized tank. The aerosol characteristics were measured immediately upstream and downstream of the simulated SCC at elevated and ambient pressures, respectively. These data sets are intended to add to previous testing that characterized SCCs under well-controlled boundary conditions through the inclusion of testing improvements that establish initial conditions in a more consistent way. These ongoing testing efforts are focused on understanding the evolution in both size and quantity of a hypothetical release of aerosolized spent fuel particles from failed fuel to the canister interior and ultimately through an SCC.

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DOE OSTI2020

Advancement of Commercial Intumescent Expanding Foams for Deactivation and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Sector - 20198

Florida International University (FIU), in collaboration with The Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and sites across the Savannah River complex, have identified an operational requirement for a fixative technology that is intended to immobilize and/or isolate residual contamination within a 3-dimensional space. Fixation of radiological contamination can reduce worker risk and mitigate potentially hazardous conditions, however nearly every marketed contamination fixative has been found to be flammable; a significant concern in radiological facilities. Coupled with this, industry fixatives are normally used as a thin coating which can present problems when attempting to stabilize irregular geometry or areas that are difficult to access whilst ensuring full coverage. The technical evaluation and advancement of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) polyurethane foams has yielded a down-selected candidate that shows potential in meeting the requirements to support deactivation and decommissioning activities. Several performance criteria have been established and tested to progress the technology readiness level towards an active field demonstration (TRL-7). Such criteria include: mechanical failure limits, adhesive and cohesive properties, thermal/fire resilience, determining thermal behavior, ability to immobilize contamination, and a means of non-destructive evaluation of applications. The test scenario examined was targeted towards an application for decommissioning nuclear pipework, in which the down-selected polyurethane foam would act as a barrier to segregate pipework and mitigate the potential for release during cutting, packaging, and storage operations. Testing carried out at SRNL included: mechanical evaluation of tensile, compressive, and adhesion strength by dynamic mechanical analysis (DMA), as well as thermogravimetric analysis (TGA). FIU examined the foam's fixative properties by utilizing phosphorescent europium-dysprosium doped strontium aluminate powder to investigating the extent to which contamination can be immobilized. FIU has also exploited previous successes in the field of intumescent technologies to assess the down-selected foam's tolerance to an extreme fire scenario, while maintaining the ability to effectively mitigate a contamination release. Parallel to this, extensive thermal investigations were carried out to determine the upper boundary of anticipated heat generation during the curing process as heat generation has the potential to compromise rubber parts of contaminated enclosures. These investigations subsequently yielded a promising method for a non-destructive application evaluation by means of infrared thermography. Utilizing the high sensitivity of modern IR cameras, coupled with the heat generated during the curing process of the polyurethane foam, FIU has been exploring the concept of monitoring the external pipe surface for indications of an irregular or abnormal application, thus informing operational decision making. The testing carried out utilized several current 'best fit' ASTM standards, which serve as helpful guidelines for testing, however, a precise definition of the operational parameters and requirements is still necessary. With continued collaboration with SRNL, FIU aims refine said definitions and develop new standards by which this, and other decommissioning technologies, can be accredited by relevant standards based testing. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2024

FY24 Progress Report: Disposition of Cracks & Features Observed in the Inner Can Closure Weld Region (ICCWR) of the 3013 Package

The long-term integrity of the 3013 containers is of interest for the safe storage of Pu materials. Although the 3013 standard embodies multiple barrier concept, the integrity of the inner container is considered to be crucial since it protects the Safety Class outer container from its contents. The container is designed to withstand high pressures that could result from the complete radiolysis of the maximum water content permissible by the 3013 standard. Shelf-life studies and destructive examination have not found high gas pressures but have found that corrosive gases are generated. Pitting and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) are considered to be critical corrosion modes for the performance of the inner container and have been observed during destructive examinations. Considerable research has been conducted on the possibility of aqueous electrolytes condensing on the inner container that can promote SCC. These studies indicate the uncertainties surrounding the formation of corrosive environments and the corrosion behavior of container materials. In this initial report, a Bayesian network (BN) model is described that can consider the uncertainties and the causal connections between various factors influencing the corrosion modes of the inner container. The BN model is preliminary and provides an initial framework to identify the necessary information. The report also provides initial experimental results on the electrochemical behavior of stainless steels in anticipated condensed environments from gas phase migration of acidic gases. The experimental results are consistent with the corrosion model. Recommendation for further work on the BN model include assembling an expert group to provide input to the BN structure and quantification of the conditional probability matrix, experimental studies to characterize the microstructure of the container, electrochemical studies to identify critical potentials for localized corrosion and SCC, and crack growth rate studies

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DOE OSTI2022

CFD-Chemical Model of One-Third Scale Demonstration of DOE Sealed Canister with ATR Fuel

Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel currently specifies storage within helium backfilled DOE sealed standard canisters. The aluminum cladding of the ATR fuel contains an oxyhydroxide layer of boehmite/bayerite that generates hydrogen when subjected to irradiation. Understanding the effect of this hydrogen buildup over time to important for long term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have built a coupled CFD-chemical model to simulate the temperature gas phase concentrations within the DOE sealed standard canisters. A demonstration case for these DOE sealed canisters will be eventually performed with a one-third scale mockup that has been instrumented with thermocouples and gas concentration probes. This study seeks to model the planned canister for validation of the previously developed model, such that confidence in its long-term prediction can be increased. The deployment of the instrumented lid for online monitoring in intended for a period of 10+ years based on previous monitoring of commercial fuel storage; however, the model is still run for the previously used 50-year storage periods. This case is modeled with a G-value using a bi-linear function such that it decreases at higher dose rates to be consistent with experiments. Validation efforts of the model would likely revolve around the results for the 1st year, so the results of this timeframe are also highlighted. For dried fuel of the nominal decay heat (18W), the predicted hydrogen concentration is 0.19% after 1 year, 0.91% after 10 years, and 2.8% after 50 years, with a maximum pressure of 1.26 atm. Consistent with previous modeling, the decay heat of the fuel is the main factor that influences the results. For undried fuel in pure helium, the hydrogen concentration ranges from 0.23 to 1.2% after 1 year, 1.25-6.2% after 10 years and 8.8 to 18.84% after 50 years. For dried fuel in pure helium the hydrogen concentration ranges from 0.06% to 0.34% after 1 year, 0.35-2.11% after 10 years and 0.95 to 6.6% after 50 years. While long-term results in the presence of residual air are mostly the same, early reactions with O 2 can delay significant production of H 2 until it is consumed to form more water vapor, lowering the range to 0.14 to 1.0% after 1 year. The maximum absolute pressure that is reached across any scenario is 2.06 atm. In the event of residual air, the presence of nitric acid is possible in the range of 18-131 ppm after 1 year, 174-1180 ppm after 10 years, and 586-3500 ppm after 50 years. As long as the fuel is sufficiently dried, or of nominal decay heat, a 4% lower flammability limit of hydrogen will not be reached within a 10-year monitoring period.

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DOE OSTI2024

Study of Mechanical Properties, Microstructure, and Residual Stresses of AISI 304/304L Stainless Steel Submerged Arc Weld for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems

The confinement boundaries of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters are typically fusion welded. Welded microstructures, strain hardening, and residual stresses combined with a chemically aggressive, chloride-rich environment led to concerns that the welded canister may be susceptible to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC). A comprehensive understanding of the modification of stainless steel (SS) metallurgical and mechanical properties by fusion welding could accelerate the predictive analysis of CISCC susceptibility. This paper describes a submerged arc welding (SAW) procedure that was developed and qualified on 12.7 mm (0.5 in.) thick AISI 304/304L SS to produce joints in a way similar to actual SNF canister manufacturing. This procedure has the potential to reduce the production cost and weld CISCC susceptibility by using fewer welding passes and lower heat input than current industrial applications. Global and local mechanical behaviors and properties, as well as residual stress distributions on the welded joint, were studied. The results indicate that hardness values in the fusion zone (FZ) and heat-affected zone (HAZ) are slightly higher than that of the base metal. Strain localization was presented in the HAZ before the tensile stress reached its maximum value, and then it shifted to the FZ. The specimen finally broke in the FZ. High tensile residual stresses exhibited in the FZ and the nearby HAZ suggest the highest CISCC-susceptible spots. The maximum tensile residual stresses were along the welding direction, indicating that if cracks occur, they would be perpendicular to the welding direction. This study involved developing and qualifying a SAW procedure for SNF canister production. The new procedure yielded cost savings (SAW working efficiency increased by about 80%), improved mechanical properties, and presented moderate residual stresses. Analysis revealed that the welded joint’s low-stress and high-stress damage assessments may be affected by shifts in the strain localization spot under loading.

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DOE OSTI2020

Status Update on the High Precision Isotopic Measurements on High Burnup LWR Fuel in 2020

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is currently investigating the feasibility of directly disposing dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs) in a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) repository. Criticality during the repository performance period (10,000 years or more) is one of the major concerns related to direct disposal of DPCs, specifically as the system undergoes degradation in the repository environment and timeframe. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is developing an as-loaded criticality analysis methodology using full (actinides + fission products) burnup credit that exploits the inherent criticality margin associated with actual canister-specific loading configuration. Burnup credit criticality analysis requires validation of the depletion/decay codes used to generate the burned isotopic inventory of an assembly by comparing the code-predicted inventory with experimentally determined isotopic data. Currently, isotopic measurement data for boiling water reactors (BWR) SNF are limited, and additional measurements will be highly beneficial for BWR burnup credit analysis, which is essential to demonstrate disposability of BWR DPCs. Moreover, new pressurized water reactor (PWR) samples of isotopic measurements will expand the PWR sample population and consequently will greatly improve sample statistics. In turn, this will reduce uncertainty in the computational determination of the isotopic composition of commercial SNF and eliminate additional penalties currently used for lack of data. As part of the isotopic analysis task, eight diverse, high burnup (HBU) samples from several PWR rods are being dissolved and isotopically analyzed to provide high-quality measurement data for PWR SNF to reducing the uncertainties associated with PWR isotopic depletion validation. The isotopics of interest focus on nuclides important to burnup credit, shielding, and decay heat in PWR SNF. Additionally, eight high burnup BWR fuel samples from the Limerick nuclear power plant have been identified for measurement to support reducing uncertainties associated with BWR isotopic depletion validation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

SNF Canister Coatings for Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation (FY21 Status Report)

This report summarizes the current actives in FY21 related to the effort by Sandia National Laboratories to identify and test coating materials for the prevention, mitigation, and repair of spent nuclear fuel dry storage canisters against potential chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking. This work follows up on the details provided in Sandia National Laboratories FY20 report on the same topic, which provided a detailed description of the specific coating properties desired for application and implementation on spent nuclear fuel canisters, as well as provided detail into several different coatings and their applicability to coat spent nuclear fuel canisters. In FY21, Sandia National Laboratories has engaged with private industry to create a Memorandum of Understanding and established a collaborative R&D program building off the analytical and laboratory capabilities at Sandia National Laboratories and the material design and synthesis capabilities of private industry. The resulting Memorandum of Understanding included four companies to date (Oxford Performance Materials, White Horse R&D, Luna Innovations, and Flora Coating) proposing six different coating technologies (polyetherketoneketone, modified polyimide/polyurea, modified phenolic resin, silane-based polyurethane hybrid with and without a Znrich primer, and a quasi-ceramic sol-gel polyurethane hybrid) to be tested, evaluated, and optimized for their potential use for this application. This report provides a detailed description of each of the coating systems proposed by the participating industry partners. It also provides a description of the planned experimental actives to be performed by Sandia National Laboratories including physical tests, electrochemical tests, and characterization methods. These analyses will be used to identify specific ways to further improve coating technologies toward their application and implementation on spent nuclear fuel canisters. In FY21, Sandia National Laboratories began baseline testing of the base metal material in according with activities of the Memorandum of Understanding. In FY22, Sandia National Laboratories will receive coated coupons from each of the participating industry partners and begin characterization, physical, and electrochemical testing following the test plan described herein.

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DOE OSTI2022

Tank Waste LDR Organics Data Summary for Sample-and-Send (Rev.1A)

The presence of organic chemicals regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) adds complexity to treating and disposing of the low activity fraction of Hanford tank waste if a low temperature treatment method such as grouting is used (SRNL-STI-2020-00228). The complexity arises from the fact that the baseline vitrification method is considered by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) as providing adequate thermal treatment for organics; a status not automatically extended to a lowtemperature process, such as solidifying the waste in a cementitious waste form. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) LDR program is intended to ensure that wastes are properly treated prior to disposal. Proper treatment makes hazardous waste less harmful to groundwater by reducing the mobility and/or toxicity of the hazardous constituents in the waste. EPA guidance indicates that stabilization/solidification of waste for organics could be considered impermissible dilution under the LDR dilution prohibition. In addition, waste storage activities at Hanford have required transferring and blending waste within the tank system and these activities have potentially altered the concentrations of the hazardous constituents. The LDR dilution prohibition found in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.3 states that “… no generator, transporter, handler, or owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility shall in any way dilute a restricted waste or the residual from treatment of a restricted waste as a substitute for adequate treatment …”. Hence, if LAW is to be treated using low temperature stabilization (such as cementation), then it is important to demonstrate both how past storage activities have contributed to the removal (by vacuum evaporation), or destruction (by in situ decomposition) of the LDR organics and how future retrieval and waste feed preparation will contribute to their removal (by filtration and ion exchange). Demonstrating these processes helps validate that cementation without additional organic treatment does not necessarily represent impermissible dilution. To aid in implementing cementitious solidification of Low Activity Waste (LAW), WRPS has been developing a regulatory and processing LDR treatment variance strategy termed “Sampleand-Send” that relies, in part, on demonstrating that in situ decomposition reactions along with historic evaporation of tank waste has destroyed or removed most of the LDR organics possibly associated with Hanford Tank Waste (SRNL-STI-2020-00582, SRNL-STI-2021-00453, SRNL-STI-2022-00391). Under the Sample-and-Send concept, Hanford tank waste would be retrieved, processed through a Tank-Side Cesium Removal-like system, and staged as a candidate feed that would then be sampled to confirm the waste acceptance criteria is met for solidification in an LAW cementitious treatment facility. If it can be shown that LDR organics are at concentrations below the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) for cementitious stabilization and have been sufficiently removed (by historic evaporation or by filtration and ion exchange during Cs removal), destroyed (by historic in situ decomposition), or are not soluble in LAW above the WAC then additional organic treatment is not needed prior to creating a cementitious final waste form and the concept of Sample-and-Send would be proposed to establish a non-rulemaking site-specific treatment variance using the specified method of treatment “STABL” to remove sampling requirements of the waste form after treatment. Waste not meeting the WAC could either be routed to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant for LAW vitrification, or further processed by evaporation or chemical oxidation before solidifying in a cementitious waste form. A key component in implementing the Sample-and-Send strategy is identifying which of the 207 LDR organic compounds associated with the RCRA Part A permit application waste codes for the Double Shell Tanks (DSTs) and Single Shell Tanks (SSTs) and any applicable Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs) from 40 CFR 268.48 should be considered as potentially present and thus subject to regulation. In addition, it is also necessary to understand the solubility volatility, and reactivity of these compounds in LAW to identify which of the potentially present LDR organic compounds are not soluble above regulatory levels or are likely to have been removed by historic evaporation or destroyed by in situ decomposition reactions. If there are potentially present LDR organic compounds that have not been removed or destroyed and are soluble above regulatorily significant concentrations then a treatability variance may be needed for these species to eliminate any concerns pertaining to impermissible dilution. The spreadsheet accompanying this calculation report contains the data and logic computations needed to screen the list of 207 LDR organics associated with Hanford tank waste to identify those potentially present and to indicate which compounds may need to be included in a treatability variance.

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DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Sensor Development for Liquid Water Detection in Dry Storage Casks: FY 2023 Status

Modeling efforts were undertaken in fiscal year (FY) 2023 to evaluate the feasibility and capability for sensing of liquid water inside canister-based dry cask storage systems (DCSSs). The focus was on the development of full-scale finite element models (FEMs) of ultrasound propagation through DCSS canister components. For these initial investigations, simulation of the baseplate component was targeted, envisioning water collection at the bottom of a vertically oriented canister. The effects of internal canister components (i.e., fuel basket, fuel assemblies) on ultrasound propagation in the baseplate component were evaluated in these efforts. The environment inside a DCSS confinement is intended to be inert and free of water to prevent potential corrosion of used fuel cladding or other internal hardware. Spent fuel assemblies are dried, after storage in water pools, to make sure water has been removed from assembly cavities. However, there is some uncertainty about the amount of residual water potentially left behind in a DCSS after drying processes, because water can become trapped in cavities or other small crevices in the surfaces formed by the fuel cladding, fuel assemblies, and other internal hardware components. Considering the complex space- and time-dependent temperature profiles in DCSSs, water may be in a liquid or gas phase depending on its location in the cask and how long the cask has been in storage. Evacuating most water and oxidizing agents contained within a canister is recommended by NUREG-1536 (NRC 2010), which covers DCSSs. As summarized by Salazar et al. (2020), existing guidance typically relies on achievable vacuum pumping pressures sustained over a hold period as a signal of dryness and water removal. However, time series data about water removal from full-scale commercial drying procedures are lacking (Hanson and Alsaed 2019). A review of drying specifications from several vendors led to the conclusion that if the specifications are followed correctly, the residual moisture in DCSSs should present an insignificant risk of cladding degradation (Knoll and Gilbert 1987). A more recent analysis concluded that much larger quantities of residual water could remain in DCSSs, but the amount would still not be expected to lead to significant corrosion of fuel cladding or other internal components (Jung et al. 2013). Industry drying procedures are mostly prescriptive in nature, and operational issues arising during the process could result in incomplete drying. A summary of operational issues and potential negative effects of residual water is provided by Salazar et al. (2019). Experimental efforts are ongoing to validate the extent of water removal in a DCSS based on drying procedures used at nuclear power plants through well-designed investigations of drying process efficacy and water retention (Durbin et al. 2021; Pulido et al. 2022a, Pulido et al. 2022b). This has been approached by simulating limited portions of a DCSS internal volume and fuel assemblies. So far, these efforts have focused on the effects of potential water trapping in the dashpot region of control rod guide tubes but are expected to be expanded to include the effects of other internal hardware features and failed fuel rod cladding. A method for detection and measurement of liquid water (Meyer et al. 2022; Meyer et al. 2021), in tandem with the drying information gained through experimental investigations, provides comprehensive bases for understanding the internal conditions of DCSSs and provides technical information to support licensing decisions.

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DOE OSTI2020

The Impact of Ethylenediaminetetraacetic Acid (EDTA) on the Sorption of Nd(III), Th{sup (IV)}, and U(VI) onto Dolomite in WIPP-Relevant Brines, GWB and ERDA-6 - 20356

Storage of legacy, transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) requires accurate risk models for performance assessments. These models must predict the long-term fate and transport of contaminants in the WIPP and surrounding environment. Laboratory support is necessary for the development of an accurate model through better understanding of contaminant behavior in the WIPP. The WIPP is a deep geologic repository that is characterized by high ionic strength due to evaporite deposits in the Salado formation (porewaters up to 7.4 M). High concentrations of sodium chloride (NaCl), calcium chloride (CaCl{sub 2}), and magnesium chloride (MgCl{sub 2}) are particularly of concern due to their potential impact on solubility and ultimately transport of contaminants of concern. Additionally, ligands capable of forming strong complexes with metals are found in significant concentrations in the WIPP environment due to their disposal from waste processing and formation during degradation of repository components (e.g. cellulose degradation by calcium hydroxide in cement). Consequently, there is a need to investigate the fate and transport of contaminants in the WIPP environment with a focus on the effects of high ionic strength and strongly coordinating ligands. Contaminants of high concern include the actinides (U(VI), Pu(IV), and Am(III)). Laboratory support of the WIPP modeling efforts was provided by this research. A series of batch experiments were utilized to study the impact of ionic strength, contaminant concentration, and the presence of ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) on the sorption of Nd(III), Th(IV), and U(VI) onto dolomite, a carbonate mineral found within the Culebra formation. The Culebra formation is the most transmissive layer above the WIPP, making transport of contaminants the most likely route in previous risk assessments. Two brines specifically designed to imitate conditions within the WIPP environment were used in these experiments. The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration Well 6 (ERDA-6, 95%) brine simulates a low Mg environment, while the generic weep brine (GWB, 95%) simulates the WIPP environment with a high Mg concentration. Mg is added to the repository in the form of MgO as an engineered barrier and is naturally present in some formations. It is expected to scavenge carbonate from solutions decreasing formation of the highly soluble and competitive uranium-carbonate complexes. EDTA is used during manipulations of nuclear materials due to its ability to form strong, stable complexes with the actinides and may be found in high concentrations (up to 0.08 mM) within the WIPP as waste canisters degrade. Further, it may provide additional avenues for unwanted transport of contaminants. Nd(III) and Th(IV) were used as stable analogues of Am(III) and Pu(IV), respectively, to represent the most common oxidation states of actinides in the WIPP environment in addition to U(VI). The potential for colloid formation was also investigated with low and high concentrations of contaminants (10 and 1000 μg/L) using three size-dependent particle separation steps. The results of this research provide a better understanding of potential behavior of actinides in the presence of EDTA and within WIPP-relevant brines. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

Modeling DOE Standard Canister Configurations with Updated Surface Chemistry

Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel currently specifies storage within helium backfilled DOE sealed standard canisters. The aluminum cladding of the ATR fuel contains an oxyhydroxide layer of boehmite/bayerite that generates hydrogen when subjected to irradiation. Understanding the effect of this hydrogen buildup over time to important for long term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have built a coupled CFD-chemical model to simulate the temperature gas phase concentrations within the DOE sealed standard canisters. These models have coupled the temperature conditions to both the gas phase radiolysis chemistry and the surface chemistry associated with the oxyhydroxide layer. Continued experimental work has identified trends for aluminum surrogate samples with oxyhydroxide layers for tests done at higher dose rates. At low initial doses a fast generation rate of hydrogen occurs which starts to roll over to a lower generation rate as the total dose applied in increased. A previous study created a small-scale chemical model was built to replicate a mini-canister surrogate system at SRNL as well as for the smaller capsule tests performed at INL. The previous iteration of the model utilized step function for its G-values for the hydrogen generation over a 200-year period. This model makes an update to the surface chemistry to account for theorized surface chemistry reactions allowing for oxygen to remain bounded to the oxyhydroxide layer. As additional experiments continue, the kinetic fits may be adjusted to adapt to new data. Three canister configurations are modeled – the base 18-inch, 15-foot DOR standard canister with 30 ATR fuel elements, an 18-inch, 10-foot DOE standard canister with 32 ATR fuel elements and a 24-inch, 10-foot DOE standard canister with 40 ATR fuel elements. In previous reports, the primary sensitivity of the canister conditions was identified as the decay heat of the fuel and the dried condition of the fuel. Only these parameters are studied in the report. For the nominal case with dried fuel, the hydrogen generation is only about 2%, so it is even less than the flammability limit if it were exposed to oxygen. For the densely packed 18-inch case the total hydrogen concentration is only around 4% with the nominal decay heat. For the densely packed 24-inch case the total hydrogen concentration is only 2.5%, roughly 20% higher than the original packing design, and still under flammability conditions if exposed to oxygen.

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DOE OSTI2022

MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item 1000089 (SSR136 and SSR136A) from Rocky Flats Peroxide Precipitation and Calcination Process

A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.

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