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At least 559 records · Page 31

U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture Status and Initiatives

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), other organizations and individuals have been performing United States (U.S.) spacesuit knowledge capture since the beginning of space exploration via publication of reports, conference presentations, specialized seminars, and classes instructed by veterans in the field. Recently, the effort has been more concentrated and formalized whereby a new avenue of spacesuit knowledge capture has been added to the archives through which videotaping occurs, engaging both current and retired specialists in the field presenting technical scope specifically for education and preservation of knowledge or being interviewed to archive their significance to NASA s history. Now with video archiving, all these avenues of learning are brought to life with the real experts presenting their wealth of knowledge on screen for future learners to enjoy. U.S. spacesuit knowledge capture topics have included lessons learned in spacesuit technology, experience from the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Shuttle programs, hardware certification, design, development and other program components, spacesuit evolution and experience, failure analysis and resolution, aspects of program management, and personal interviews. These archives of actual spacesuit legacy now reflect its rich history and will provide a wealth of knowledge which will greatly enhance the chances for the success of future and more ambitious spacesuit system programs. In this paper, NASA s formal spacesuit knowledge capture efforts will be reviewed and a status will be provided to reveal initiatives and accomplishments since the inception of the more formal U.S. spacesuit knowledge program. A detail itemization of the actual archives will be addressed along with topics that are now available to the general NASA community and the public. Additionally, the latest developments in the archival relationship with the Smithsonian will be discussed.

Chullen, Cinda↗

Smart Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel - Integrated Structural Health Monitoring System to Meet Space Exploration and International Space Station Mission Assurance Needs

Currently there are no integrated NDE methods for baselining and monitoring defect levels in fleet for Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) or related fracture critical composites, or for performing life-cycle maintenance inspections either in a traditional remove-and-inspect mode or in a more modern in situ inspection structural health monitoring (SHM) mode. Implicit in SHM and autonomous inspection is the existence of quantitative accept-reject criteria. To be effective, these criteria must correlate with levels of damage known to cause composite failure. Furthermore, implicit in SHM is the existence of effective remote sensing hardware and automated techniques and algorithms for interpretation of SHM data. SHM of facture critical composite structures, especially high pressure COPVs, is critical to the success of nearly every future NASA space exploration program as well as life extension of the International Space Station. It has been clearly stated that future NASA missions may not be successful without SHM [1]. Otherwise, crews will be busy addressing subsystem health issues and not focusing on the real NASA mission

Saulsberry, Regor↗

U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture Status and Initiatives

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), other organizations and individuals have been performing United States (U.S.) spacesuit knowledge capture since the beginning of space exploration via publication of reports, conference presentations, specialized seminars, and classes instructed by veterans in the field. Recently, the effort has been more concentrated and formalized whereby a new avenue of spacesuit knowledge capture has been added to the archives through which videotaping occurs, engaging both current and retired specialists in the field presenting technical scope specifically for education and preservation of knowledge or being interviewed to archive their significance to NASA's history. Now with video archiving, all these avenues of learning are brought to life with the real experts presenting their wealth of knowledge on screen for future learners to enjoy. U.S. spacesuit knowledge capture topics have included lessons learned in spacesuit technology, experience from the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Shuttle programs, hardware certification, design, development and other program components, spacesuit evolution and experience, failure analysis and resolution, aspects of program management, and personal interviews. These archives of actual spacesuit legacy now reflect its rich history and will provide a wealth of knowledge which will greatly enhance the chances for the success of future and more ambitious spacesuit system programs. In this paper, NASA s formal spacesuit knowledge capture efforts will be reviewed and a status will be provided to reveal initiatives and accomplishments since the inception of the more formal U.S. spacesuit knowledge program. A detail itemization of the actual archives will be addressed along with topics that are now available to the general NASA community and the public. Additionally, the latest developments in the archival relationship with the Smithsonian will be discussed.

Chullen, Cinda↗

U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture Series Catalog

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other organizations have been performing U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture (USSKC) since the beginning of space exploration through published reports, conference presentations, specialized seminars, and classes instructed by veterans in the field. The close physical interaction between spacesuit systems and human beings makes them among the most personally evocative pieces of space hardware. Consequently, spacesuit systems have required nearly constant engineering refinements to do their jobs without impinging on human activity. Since 2008, spacesuit knowledge capture has occurred through video recording, engaging both current and former specialists presenting technical scope specifically to educate individuals and preserve knowledge. These archives of spacesuit legacy reflect its rich history and will provide knowledge that will enhance the chances for the success of future and more ambitious spacesuit system programs. The scope and topics of USSKC have included lessons learned in spacesuit technology; experience from the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle Programs; the process of hardware certification, design, development, and other program components; spacesuit evolution and experience; failure analysis and resolution; and aspects of program management. USSKC activities have progressed to a level where NASA, the National Air and Space Museum (NASM), Hamilton Sundstrand (HS) and the spacesuit community are now working together to provide a comprehensive way to organize and archive intra-agency information related to the development of spacesuit systems. These video recordings are currently being reviewed for public release using NASA export control processes. After a decision is made for either public or non-public release (internal NASA only), the videos and presentations will be available through the NASA Johnson Space Center Engineering Directorate (EA) Engineering Academy, the NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS), the NASA Aeronautics & Space Database (NA&SD), or NASA YouTube. Event availability is duly noted in this catalog.

Bitterly, Rose↗

International Space Station End-of-Life Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Although there are ongoing efforts to extend the ISS life cycle through 2028, the International Space Station (ISS) end-of-life (EOL) cycle is currently scheduled for 2020. The EOL for the ISS will require de-orbiting the ISS. This will be the largest manmade object ever to be de-orbited, therefore safely de-orbiting the station will be a very complex problem. This process is being planned by NASA and its international partners. Numerous factors will need to be considered to accomplish this such as target corridors, orbits, altitude, drag, maneuvering capabilities, debris mapping etc. The ISS EOL Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) will play a part in this process by estimating the reliability of the hardware supplying the maneuvering capabilities. The PRA will model the probability of failure of the systems supplying and controlling the thrust needed to aid in the de-orbit maneuvering.

Duncan, Gary↗

International Space Station End-of-Life Probabilistic Risk Assessment

The International Space Station (ISS) end‐of‐life (EOL) cycle is currently scheduled for 2020, although there are ongoing efforts to extend ISS life cycle through 2028. The EOL for the ISS will require deorbiting the ISS. This will be the largest manmade object ever to be de‐orbited therefore safely deorbiting the station will be a very complex problem. This process is being planned by NASA and its international partners. Numerous factors will need to be considered to accomplish this such as target corridors, orbits, altitude, drag, maneuvering capabilities etc. The ISS EOL Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) will play a part in this process by estimating the reliability of the hardware supplying the maneuvering capabilities. The PRA will model the probability of failure of the systems supplying and controlling the thrust needed to aid in the de‐orbit maneuvering.

Duncan, Gary W.↗

Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.

Source record↗

Fault localization in a microfabricated surface ion trap using diamond nitrogen-vacancy center magnetometry

Here, as quantum computing hardware becomes more complex with ongoing design innovations and growing capabilities, the quantum computing community needs increasingly powerful techniques for fabrication failure root-cause analysis. This is especially true for trapped-ion quantum computing. As trapped-ion quantum computing aims to scale to thousands of ions, the electrode numbers are growing to several hundred, with likely integrated photonic components also adding to the electrical and fabrication complexity, making faults even harder to locate. In this work, we used a high-resolution quantum magnetic imaging technique, based on nitrogen-vacancy centers in diamond, to investigate short-circuit faults in an ion trap chip. We imaged currents from these short-circuit faults to ground and compared them to intentionally created faults, finding that the root cause of the faults was failures in the on-chip trench capacitors. This work, where we exploited the performance advantages of a quantum magnetic sensing technique to troubleshoot a piece of quantum computing hardware, is a unique example of the evolving synergy between emerging quantum technologies to achieve capabilities that were previously inaccessible.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Post-Shuttle EVA Operations on ISS

The EVA hardware used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed with the assumption that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for ground processing, refurbishment, or failure investigation (if necessary). With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (EMU, Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support equipment and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2016 and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, NASA and the One EVA contractor team jointly initiated the EVA 2010 Project. Challenges were addressed to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, and protect EMU hardware operability on orbit for long durations.

West, Bill↗

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission POS

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. To accommodate this with regards to Navigation, the SLS utilizes an internally redundant Inertial Navigation System (INS) with built-in capability to detect, isolate, and recover from first failure conditions and still maintain adherence to performance requirements. The unit utilizes multiple hardware- and software-level techniques to enable detection, isolation, and recovery from these events in terms of its built-in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) algorithms. Successful operation is defined in terms of sufficient navigation accuracy at insertion while operating under worst case single sensor outages (gyroscope and accelerometer faults at launch). In addition to first fault detection and recovery, the SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the INS to detect a second fault, tracking any unacceptable uncertainty in knowledge of the vehicle's state. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error and sensor faults can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environments and outside of its performance envelope causing loss of mission, or worse, loss of crew. The criteria for operation under second faults allows for a larger set of achievable missions in terms of potential fault conditions, due to the INS operating at the edge of its capability. As this performance is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design space. Due to the implications of the vehicle response to abort conditions (such as a potentially failed INS), it is important to consider a wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both magnitude and time. As such, the Navigation team is taking advantage of the INS's capability to schedule and change fault detection thresholds in flight. These values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success, and reducing the probability of false positives (defined as when the INS would report a second fault condition resulting in loss of mission, but the vehicle would still meet insertion requirements within system-level margins). This paper will describe an optimization approach using Genetic Algorithms to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events as a function of potential fault magnitude and time of fault over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach, and performance assessment of the results will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this process to second fault detection to maximize mission probability of success.

Anzalone, Evan↗

Long life assurance study for manned spacecraft long life hardware. Volume 1: Summary of long life assurance guidelines

A long life assurance program for the development of design, process, test, and application guidelines for achieving reliable spacecraft hardware was conducted. The study approach consisted of a review of technical data performed concurrently with a survey of the aerospace industry. The data reviewed included design and operating characteristics, failure histories and solutions, and similar documents. The topics covered by the guidelines are reported. It is concluded that long life hardware is achieved through meticulous attention to many details and no simple set of rules can suffice.

Source record↗

Reversionary Control Modes for the Mitigation of Failures in a Partially Turboelectric Aircraft Propulsion System

In support of emission and fuel burn reduction goals, the aviation industry is actively pursuing the advancement of electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) technology. This includes turboelectric and hybrid electric propulsion designs that combine gas turbine engine and electrical system hardware. Such architectures exhibit a high degree of coupling between subsystems. This drives the need for system-level control strategies to ensure the safe, coordinated, and efficient operation of all subsystems. The design and certification of any aircraft propulsion system requires that all potential subsystem failures are identified, and the hazards posed by these failures are appropriately mitigated. This requirement is particularly challenging for EAP systems due to their integrated nature. One approach to assist in EAP failure mitigation is the inclusion of automated reconfiguration capabilities within the propulsion control system. Such control modes, referred to as reversionary control modes, are designed to automatically detect failures and activate backup control modes upon failure detection. This paper covers the design and evaluation of reversionary control mode logic developed for a partially turboelectric propulsion concept. Test results from a real-time hardware-in-the-loop evaluation of the concept are also presented and discussed. The results show that the developed reversionary control logic can successfully detect and mitigate subsystem failures in a representative environment that includes actual electrical system hardware.

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗

Reversionary Control Modes for the Mitigation of Failures in a Partially Turboelectric Aircraft Propulsion System

In support of emission and fuel burn reduction goals, the aviation industry is actively pursuing the advancement of electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) technology. This includes turboelectric and hybrid electric propulsion designs that combine gas turbine engine and electrical system hardware. Such architectures exhibit a high degree of coupling between subsystems. This drives the need for system-level control strategies to ensure the safe, coordinated, and efficient operation of all subsystems. The design and certification of any aircraft propulsion system requires that all potential subsystem failures are identified, and the hazards posed by these failures are appropriately mitigated. This requirement is particularly challenging for EAP systems due to their integrated nature. One approach to assist in EAP failure mitigation is the inclusion of automated reconfiguration capabilities within the propulsion control system. Such control modes, referred to as reversionary control modes, are designed to automatically detect failures and activate backup control modes upon failure detection. This paper covers the design and evaluation of reversionary control mode logic developed for a partially turboelectric propulsion concept. Test results from a real-time hardware-in-the-loop evaluation of the concept are also presented and discussed. The results show that the developed reversionary control logic can successfully detect and mitigate subsystem failures in a representative environment that includes actual electrical system hardware.

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗

Reversionary Control Modes for the Mitigation of Failures in a Partially Turboelectric Aircraft Propulsion System

In support of emission and fuel burn reduction goals, the aviation industry is actively pursuing the advancement of electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) technology. This includes turboelectric and hybrid electric propulsion designs that combine gas turbine engine and electrical system hardware. Such architectures exhibit a high degree of coupling between subsystems. This drives the need for system-level control strategies to ensure the safe, coordinated, and efficient operation of all subsystems. The design and certification of any aircraft propulsion system requires that all potential subsystem failures are identified, and the hazards posed by these failures are appropriately mitigated. This requirement is particularly challenging for EAP systems due to their integrated nature. One approach to assist in EAP failure mitigation is the inclusion of automated reconfiguration capabilities within the propulsion control system. Such control modes, referred to as reversionary control modes, are designed to automatically detect failures and activate backup control modes upon failure detection. This paper covers the design and evaluation of reversionary control mode logic developed for a partially turboelectric propulsion concept. Test results from a real-time hardware-in-the-loop evaluation of the concept are also presented and discussed. The results show that the developed reversionary control logic can successfully detect and mitigate subsystem failures in a representative environment that includes actual electrical system hardware.

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗

Maximum likelihood failure detection techniques applied to the shuttle orbiter reaction control subsystem

A technique for on-board detection and identification of hard failures and leaks of the shuttle orbiter reaction control subsystem jets, during the orbital flight phase, is presented. The method uses gimbal angle and linear accelerometer measurements from the orbiter inertial measurement unit and requires no additional hardware. Extended Kalman filters with residual traps are employed for state estimation, and generalized likelihood ratio tests for jet failure identification. Rigid body simulation results indicate identification times of less than 2 seconds for hard jet failures and less than 70 seconds for jet leaks.

Deckert, J. C.↗

Branch recovery with compiler-assisted multiple instruction retry

In processing systems where rapid recovery from transient faults is important, schemes for multiple instruction rollback recovery may be appropriate. Multiple instruction retry has been implemented in hardware by researchers and also in mainframe computers. This paper extends compiler-assisted instruction retry to a broad class of code execution failures. Five benchmarks were used to measure the performance penalty of hazard resolution. Results indicate that the enhanced pure software approach can produce performance penalties consistent with existing hardware techniques. A combined compiler/hardware resolution strategy is also described and evaluated. Experimental results indicate a lower performance penalty than with either a totally hardware or totally software approach.

Alewine, N. J.↗

Learning from Space Entrepreneurs

The early days of rocketry and space exploration in the United States were marked by incredibly rapid progress: a seemingly endless parade of firsts. Not coincidentally, this period also saw more than its fair share of failure, especially in the infamous "kaputnik" days prior to the successful launch of Explorer. Without a standard canon of known quantities to turn to, the early pioneers of rocketry and space flight were forced to dream up new ideas that ranged from the elegant to the bizarre and to accept the fact that the price of radical progress is occasional failure. Nowadays, rapid prototyping and testing have slowed, as we rely more and more on the extensive knowledge pined by our predecessors and on the embarrassment of riches modern engineers get from computational modeling and computer assisted design. In many cases, this leads to much improved or phenomenally more efficient designs. It also, however, fosters a culture so terrified of failure that we over-engineer and overanalyze everything, often tweaking designs for decades before a new system takes flight. (This is not a problem unique to rockets; the same phenomenon seems to have occurred in high-performance jets.) This is one reason why it was possible for President Kennedy to dream of the completion of the Mercury and Gemini missions and a successful landing on the moon in under a decade, while returning to the moon may take nearly twice as long. Lacking access to the tremendous computational resources of the national space program-and, just as importantly, removed from the harsh judgment of public shareholders or congressional appropriations committees-the hungry entrepreneurs who compete for our prizes tend not to display such fear of failure. Instead, most of them follow a rapid "build, test, fly" program. They are willing to throw a handful of concepts against the wall and see what sticks. They often go from drawing on the back of a napkin to firing engines or even flying vehicles in a matter of weeks or months, learning valuable lessons along the way. Indeed, our teams have repeatedly learned many of the most valuable lessons after only a few moments of working with real hardware-lessons that could never have been learned from a CAD drawing, like finding the failure modes of different welding practices or tracking down the interference between an onboard camera and a GPS unit. As Paul Breed, the leader of a Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge team (playfully called Unreasonable Rocket), is fond of saying, "In computer simulations the plumbing never leaks. In real life, it always does."

Pomerantz, William↗

Static stability of the Space Station solar array FASTMast structure

The combined loads test of the 3-Bay FASTMast marks the end of the Lewis Research Center (LeRC) effort to characterize the behavior of the principal Space Station solar array support structure. The primary objective of this test and analysis effort was to develop a method to predict structural stability failure modes under flight-like applied loads. Included at the beginning of this report is a brief historical perspective of the hardware design development and FASTMast structural stability problem evolution. Once an understanding of the solution process has been established, test and analysis details are presented and related to the postulated failure theories. The combined load test series subjected the structure to a combination of transverse, moment, and torsion loads similar to that expected in the service environment. Nonlinear finite element (FE) models were developed and large displacement analyses were performed to support the test effort and failure mode predictions. Details of the test configuration as well as test and analysis results are presented. The results were then critiqued to establish valid and successful support of the failure mode assessments. Finally, study conclusions are drawn and recommendations for safe operation of the FASTMast structure are presented for consideration.

Shaker, John F.↗