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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA's Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V's desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V's assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Whitman, Gerek↗
NASA NTRS1995

Verification and Validation of Simulation Models for High-Speed Flow Fields

This paper is largely based on the paper titled "Guide to Credible Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations (Invited)" (AIAA Paper 95-2225). The significance of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations depends solely on their credibility. A customer of CFD products -- simulations and software -- expects that these products are credible for the intended use. Simulation model verification and validation are critical in establishing the credibility of simulations and in certifying simulation software. The only thing that matters in establishing the credibility is uncertainty, not veracity or validity. The sensitivity-uncertainty analysis is the key to the establishment of this credibility. Assessing the credibility of complex simulation results poses a significant challenge. Terminology, concepts, framework, and guidelines are presented for addressing this challenge. Verification assesses whether the problem is solved correctly and estimates the level of computational accuracy of simulations; validation determines whether the right problem is solved and assesses the level of validity of the simulation model by estimating the degree to which simulations accurately represent reality. These concepts and the related guidelines are discussed with examples from high-speed flow fields.

Mehta, Unmeel B.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Alternative Method for Performing As-Built, As-Irradiated Neutronics Analyses

Neutronics analyses have been used to assist in the design, development, and qualification of miniature fuel (MiniFuel) experiments irradiated in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) since their conception almost a decade ago. In recent years, upon completion of a MiniFuel target’s irradiation, neutronics analyses that reflect the as-built, as-irradiated conditions of an experiment have also been performed to validate postirradiation examination (PIE) efforts. Several radiation transport and depletion/activation software wrapper programs have been developed to increase the fidelity of these calculations; at ORNL, a program called HFIRCON is the primary software method employed. However, the utilization of these wrapper programs comes at a cost. To produce accurate results, the radiation transport portion of these analyses requires significant time and resources to execute. Therefore, this report discusses an alternative methodology for calculating some of the desired output for PIE validation—specifically, the output used in evaluating the experiment’s fuel burnup—without complete reliance on ORNL’s wrapper program. The alternative method is not a new software but rather a procedure for utilizing the depletion/activation software, SCALE, in conjunction with limited input data and reasonable assumptions to bypass most of the radiation transport calculations and thereby reduce the time required for the completion of a standard analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most missions is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and spacecraft operations. FM is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. Generally, FM architecture, implementation, and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (V&V) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Annual Workshop titled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes" exposed this issue in terms of V&V for a representative set of architectures. NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) has provided funds to NASA IV&V to extend the work performed at the Workshop session in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). NASA IV&V will extract FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio and evaluate the data set, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This SARP initiative focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures and associated V&V/IV&V techniques provides a data set that can enable improved assurance that a system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the space community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS1996

The Role of Independent V&V in Upstream Software Development Processes

This paper describes the role of Verification and Validation (V&V) during the requirements and high level design processes, and in particular the role of Independent V&V (IV&V). The job of IV&V during these phases is to ensure that the requirements are complete, consistent and valid, and to ensure that the high level design meets the requirements. This contrasts with the role of Quality Assurance (QA), which ensures that appropriate standards and process models are defined and applied. This paper describes the current state of practice for IV&V, concentrating on the process model used in NASA projects. We describe a case study, showing the processes by which problem reporting and tracking takes place, and how IV&V feeds into decision making by the development team. We then describe the problems faced in implementing IV&V. We conclude that despite a well defined process model, and tools to support it, IV&V is still beset by communication and coordination problems.

Easterbrook, Steve↗
DOE OSTI2025

Software and computing for Run 3 of the ATLAS experiment at the LHC

The ATLAS experiment has developed extensive software and distributed computing systems for Run 3 of the LHC. These systems are described in detail, including software infrastructure and workflows, distributed data and workload management, database infrastructure, and validation. The use of these systems to prepare the data for physics analysis and assess its quality are described, along with the software tools used for data analysis itself. An outlook for the development of these projects towards Run 4 is also provided.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

OASSIS: Onboard Adaptive Safe-site Identification System Y3

The OASSIS Year 3 project continues to innovate with three goals: 1) transition to a generic configuration compatible with GNC flight software, 2) implement a new, computationally-efficient TRN algorithm for lunar landing, and 3) integrate with the a HWIL testbed to validate lunar landing GNC systems. This project enables lunar lander GNC flight software to be tested dynamically without the need of a costly flight campaign and without the risk of catastrophic hardware loss. Additionally, the TRN algorithm development and testing enhances the state-of-the-art in pinpoint landing navigation, ultimately improving the overall landing accuracy, safety, and reliability of a crewed lunar landing mission.

James S Mccabe↗
NASA NTRS2007

Survey of Product-line Verification and Validation Techniques

This report presents the results from the first task of the SARP Center Initiative, 'Product Line Verification of Safety-Critical Software.' Task 1 is a literature survey of available techniques for product line verification and validation. Section 1 of the report provides an introduction to product lines and motivates the survey of verification techniques. It describes what is reused in product-line engineering and explains the goal of verifiable conformance of the developed system to its product-line specifications. Section 2 of the report describes six lifecycle steps in product-line verification and validation. This description is based on, and refers to, the best practices extracted from the readings. It ends with a list of verification challenges for NASA product lines (2.7) and verification enablers for NASA product lines (2.8) derived from the survey. Section 3 provides resource lists of related conferences, workshops, industrial and defense industry experiences and case studies of product lines, and academic/industrial consortiums. Section 4 is a bibliography of papers and tutorials with annotated entries for relevant papers not previously discussed in sections 2 or 3.

testing↗
DOE OSTI2025

HyRAM+ (Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models) v.6.1

SAND2025-11565O HyRAM+ (Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models) is a tool for conducting quantitative risk assessment (QRA) in transportation systems. HyRAM+ contains validated, simplified release behavior models, engineering models, and generic data relevant to hydrogen installations. HyRAM+’s platform integrates models and data to conduct QRA on user-defined hydrogen or other alternative fuel systems. The software will enable the international safety research community to add validated models to the HyRAM+ platform for use in QRAs. HyRAM (hydrogen-only) versions 1.0 to 3.1 were developed by Sandia for the Department of Energy (DOE) Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies Office. The following agencies contributed to the development of HyRAM+ version 4.0 regarding the addition of methane (natural gas) and propane models: the DOE Vehicle Technologies Office and the Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Groth, Katrina [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Alb↗
NASA NTRS2018

Incorporating Test Data for Small UAS at the Conceptual Design Level

Increasing demand for improved capabilities of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) has generated interest in improving the design techniques for these vehicles. sUAS have typically been designed using iterative methods with multiple prototypes, but advancements in aircraft design software will make it possible to generate conceptual designs of very small VTOL aircraft with reduced hardware prototyping. This paper describes a research effort to generate a conceptual design of an approximately 6-lb quadcopter using the NASA rotorcraft design software NDARC. Wind tunnel and hover test data are used to validate and refine the conceptual design results. The effects of parametric design variations on vehicle scale are shown. The design study described herein shows that the NDARC software, which was designed for full-scale rotorcraft, can be used to design and evaluate sUAS vehicles.

Russell, Carl R.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

The satellite systems Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and operations. This structure is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. These architecture, implementation and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (VV) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Annual Workshop titled VV of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes exposed these issues in terms of VV for a representative set of architectures. NASA's IVV is funded by NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to extend the work performed at the Workshop session. NASA IVV will extract FM architectures across the IVV portfolio and evaluate the data set for robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This work focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated VVIVV techniques provides a data set that can enable higher assurance that a satellite system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the satellite community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research including identification of FM architectures, visibility observations, and methods utilized for VVIVV.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2003

A Predictive Safety Management System Software Package Based on the Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology

The goal of this research was to integrate a previously validated and reliable safety model, called Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology (CHTFPM), into a software application. This led to the development of a safety management information system (PSMIS). This means that the theory or principles of the CHTFPM were incorporated in a software package; hence, the PSMIS is referred to as CHTFPM management information system (CHTFPM MIS). The purpose of the PSMIS is to reduce the time and manpower required to perform predictive studies as well as to facilitate the handling of enormous quantities of information in this type of studies. The CHTFPM theory encompasses the philosophy of looking at the concept of safety engineering from a new perspective: from a proactive, than a reactive, viewpoint. That is, corrective measures are taken before a problem instead of after it happened. That is why the CHTFPM is a predictive safety because it foresees or anticipates accidents, system failures and unacceptable risks; therefore, corrective action can be taken in order to prevent all these unwanted issues. Consequently, safety and reliability of systems or processes can be further improved by taking proactive and timely corrective actions.

Quintana, Rolando↗
NASA NTRS2012

Certification of COTS Software in NASA Human Rated Flight Systems

Adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in safety critical systems has been seen as a promising acquisition strategy to improve mission affordability and, yet, has come with significant barriers and challenges. Attempts to integrate COTS software components into NASA human rated flight systems have been, for the most part, complicated by verification and validation (V&V) requirements necessary for flight certification per NASA s own standards. For software that is from COTS sources, and, in general from 3rd party sources, either commercial, government, modified or open source, the expectation is that it meets the same certification criteria as those used for in-house and that it does so as if it were built in-house. The latter is a critical and hidden issue. This paper examines the longstanding barriers and challenges in the use of 3rd party software in safety critical systems and cover recent efforts to use COTS software in NASA s Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) project. It identifies some core artifacts that without them, the use of COTS and 3rd party software is, for all practical purposes, a nonstarter for affordable and timely insertion into flight critical systems. The paper covers the first use in a flight critical system by NASA of COTS software that has prior FAA certification heritage, which was shown to meet the RTCA-DO-178B standard, and how this certification may, in some cases, be leveraged to allow the use of analysis in lieu of testing. Finally, the paper proposes the establishment of an open source forum for development of safety critical 3rd party software.

Goforth, Andre↗
NASA NTRS2007

Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Subcomponent Flat Plate Impact Testing for Space Shuttle Orbiter Return to Flight

Following the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003, a major effort commenced to develop a better understanding of debris impacts and their effect on the Space Shuttle subsystems. An initiative to develop and validate physics-based computer models to predict damage from such impacts was a fundamental component of this effort. To develop the models it was necessary to physically characterize Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) and various debris materials which could potentially shed on ascent and impact the Orbiter RCC leading edges. The validated models enabled the launch system community to use the impact analysis software LS DYNA to predict damage by potential and actual impact events on the Orbiter leading edge and nose cap thermal protection systems. Validation of the material models was done through a three-level approach: fundamental tests to obtain independent static and dynamic material model properties of materials of interest, sub-component impact tests to provide highly controlled impact test data for the correlation and validation of the models, and full-scale impact tests to establish the final level of confidence for the analysis methodology. This paper discusses the second level subcomponent test program in detail and its application to the LS DYNA model validation process. The level two testing consisted of over one hundred impact tests in the NASA Glenn Research Center Ballistic Impact Lab on 6 by 6 in. and 6 by 12 in. flat plates of RCC and evaluated three types of debris projectiles: BX 265 External Tank foam, ice, and PDL 1034 External Tank foam. These impact tests helped determine the level of damage generated in the RCC flat plates by each projectile. The information obtained from this testing validated the LS DYNA damage prediction models and provided a certain level of confidence to begin performing analysis for full-size RCC test articles for returning NASA to flight with STS 114 and beyond.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Impact Testing on Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Flat Panels with Ice Projectiles for the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Program

Following the tragedy of the Orbiter Columbia (STS-107) on February 1, 2003, a major effort commenced to develop a better understanding of debris impacts and their effect on the space shuttle subsystems. An initiative to develop and validate physics-based computer models to predict damage from such impacts was a fundamental component of this effort. To develop the models it was necessary to physically characterize reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) along with ice and foam debris materials, which could shed on ascent and impact the orbiter RCC leading edges. The validated models enabled the launch system community to use the impact analysis software LS-DYNA (Livermore Software Technology Corp.) to predict damage by potential and actual impact events on the orbiter leading edge and nose cap thermal protection systems. Validation of the material models was done through a three-level approach: Level 1--fundamental tests to obtain independent static and dynamic constitutive model properties of materials of interest, Level 2--subcomponent impact tests to provide highly controlled impact test data for the correlation and validation of the models, and Level 3--full-scale orbiter leading-edge impact tests to establish the final level of confidence for the analysis methodology. This report discusses the Level 2 test program conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) Ballistic Impact Laboratory with ice projectile impact tests on flat RCC panels, and presents the data observed. The Level 2 testing consisted of 54 impact tests in the NASA GRC Ballistic Impact Laboratory on 6- by 6-in. and 6- by 12-in. flat plates of RCC and evaluated three types of debris projectiles: Single-crystal, polycrystal, and "soft" ice. These impact tests helped determine the level of damage generated in the RCC flat plates by each projectile and validated the use of the ice and RCC models for use in LS-DYNA.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Impact Testing on Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Flat Panels With BX-265 and PDL-1034 External Tank Foam for the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Program

Following the tragedy of the Orbiter Columbia (STS-107) on February 1, 2003, a major effort commenced to develop a better understanding of debris impacts and their effect on the space shuttle subsystems. An initiative to develop and validate physics-based computer models to predict damage from such impacts was a fundamental component of this effort. To develop the models it was necessary to physically characterize reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) along with ice and foam debris materials, which could shed on ascent and impact the orbiter RCC leading edges. The validated models enabled the launch system community to use the impact analysis software LS-DYNA (Livermore Software Technology Corp.) to predict damage by potential and actual impact events on the orbiter leading edge and nose cap thermal protection systems. Validation of the material models was done through a three-level approach: Level 1-fundamental tests to obtain independent static and dynamic constitutive model properties of materials of interest, Level 2-subcomponent impact tests to provide highly controlled impact test data for the correlation and validation of the models, and Level 3-full-scale orbiter leading-edge impact tests to establish the final level of confidence for the analysis methodology. This report discusses the Level 2 test program conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) Ballistic Impact Laboratory with external tank foam impact tests on flat RCC panels, and presents the data observed. The Level 2 testing consisted of 54 impact tests in the NASA GRC Ballistic Impact Laboratory on 6- by 6-in. and 6- by 12-in. flat plates of RCC and evaluated two types of debris projectiles: BX-265 and PDL-1034 external tank foam. These impact tests helped determine the level of damage generated in the RCC flat plates by each projectile and validated the use of the foam and RCC models for use in LS-DYNA.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Estimated Probability of a Cervical Spine Injury During an ISS Mission

Introduction: The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) utilizes historical data, cohort data, and external simulations as input factors to provide estimates of crew health, resource utilization and mission outcomes. The Cervical Spine Injury Module (CSIM) is an external simulation designed to provide the IMM with parameter estimates for 1) a probability distribution function (PDF) of the incidence rate, 2) the mean incidence rate, and 3) the standard deviation associated with the mean resulting from injury/trauma of the neck. Methods: An injury mechanism based on an idealized low-velocity blunt impact to the superior posterior thorax of an ISS crewmember was used as the simulated mission environment. As a result of this impact, the cervical spine is inertially loaded from the mass of the head producing an extension-flexion motion deforming the soft tissues of the neck. A multibody biomechanical model was developed to estimate the kinematic and dynamic response of the head-neck system from a prescribed acceleration profile. Logistic regression was performed on a dataset containing AIS1 soft tissue neck injuries from rear-end automobile collisions with published Neck Injury Criterion values producing an injury transfer function (ITF). An injury event scenario (IES) was constructed such that crew 1 is moving through a primary or standard translation path transferring large volume equipment impacting stationary crew 2. The incidence rate for this IES was estimated from in-flight data and used to calculate the probability of occurrence. The uncertainty in the model input factors were estimated from representative datasets and expressed in terms of probability distributions. A Monte Carlo Method utilizing simple random sampling was employed to propagate both aleatory and epistemic uncertain factors. Scatterplots and partial correlation coefficients (PCC) were generated to determine input factor sensitivity. CSIM was developed in the SimMechanics/Simulink environment with a Monte Carlo wrapper (MATLAB) used to integrate the components of the module. Results: The probability of generating an AIS1 soft tissue neck injury from the extension/flexion motion induced by a low-velocity blunt impact to the superior posterior thorax was fitted with a lognormal PDF with mean 0.26409, standard deviation 0.11353, standard error of mean 0.00114, and 95% confidence interval [0.26186, 0.26631]. Combining the probability of an AIS1 injury with the probability of IES occurrence was fitted with a Johnson SI PDF with mean 0.02772, standard deviation 0.02012, standard error of mean 0.00020, and 95% confidence interval [0.02733, 0.02812]. The input factor sensitivity analysis in descending order was IES incidence rate, ITF regression coefficient 1, impactor initial velocity, ITF regression coefficient 2, and all others (equipment mass, crew 1 body mass, crew 2 body mass) insignificant. Verification and Validation (V&V): The IMM V&V, based upon NASA STD 7009, was implemented which included an assessment of the data sets used to build CSIM. The documentation maintained includes source code comments and a technical report. The software code and documentation is under Subversion configuration management. Kinematic validation was performed by comparing the biomechanical model output to established corridors.

Brooker, John E.↗