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At least 559 records · Page 31

Attack Scenarios Relating to Army Facility-Related Control Systems: Quantifying the Cost to Secure and Cost Savings of the Army’s FRCS Program

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) analyzed the cyber-threat environment to U.S. Army facilities. This report describes three key factors in securing Army-owned facility-related control systems (FRCS). First, Section 1.0 provides background information about the project. Section 2.0 describes the various types of cyber-attacks. Section 3.0 provides a series of attack scenarios from real-world use cases are described in Section 3. These examples are relevant to the Army because the targeted systems or operating environments are like those used at Army installations. An estimated range for the cost to secure these systems is described in Section 4.0. Finally, the cost savings of preventing these kinds of attacks are described in Section 5.0.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

EISA (Energy Independence and Security Act) compliant ethanol fuel from corn stover in a depot-based decentralized system

Cellulosic biofuels face significant problems of feedstock aggregation and logistics leading to poor economies of scale. The current model is based on relatively small biorefineries using locally-gathered feedstocks. Here, we examine the potential capacity of a hypothetically distributed, depot-based, biorefinery system to produce cellulosic ethanol from corn stover in the United States Midwest. The local depots serve to aggregate, pretreat and densify biomass (via pellets), which are collected, transported, and fed to a few very large, cellulosic ethanol biorefineries. We found that a corn stover-based depot system would help establish one or two very large-scale biorefineries capable of processing about 8-12% of total corn stover available in the United States Midwest. About 55-153 depots could supply the pretreated pellets to each distributed biorefinery leading to an annual production of 1.02 - 2.91 billion liters of cellulosic ethanol. Most of the participating depots would be located in Illinois and Iowa. The ethanol selling price in this depot-based biorefinery system would varys between U$S 0.67 and U$S 0.72 liter-1. The estimated range of GHG savings from cellulosic ethanol in the depot system compared to gasoline was 3.35-4.84 Tg CO2 year-1. In addition of being economically competitive, a distributed, depot-based, biorefinery system could meet the 60% GHG reduction requirement of the U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA).

Biorefinery, Cellulosic biofuel, Corn stover, Dist↗

Security Vulnerability and Mitigation in Photovoltaic Systems

Software and firmware vulnerabilities pose security threats to photovoltaic (PV) systems. When patches are not available or cannot be timely applied to fix vulnerabilities, it is important to mitigate vulnerabilities such that they cannot be exploited by attackers or their impacts will be limited when exploited. However, the vulnerability mitigation problem for PV systems has received little attention. This paper analyzes known security vulnerabilities in PV systems, proposes a multi-level mitigation framework and various mitigation strategies including neural network-based attack detection inside inverters, and develops a prototype system as a proof-of-concept for building vulnerability mitigation into PV system design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Security for safety critical space borne systems

The Space Station contains safety critical computer software components in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3 of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA-Johnson Space Center.

Legrand, Sue↗

NASA Blue Team: Determining Operational Security Posture of Critical Systems and Networks

Emergence of Cybersecurity has increased the focus on security risks to Information Technology (IT) assets going beyond traditional Information Assurance (IA) concerns: More sophisticated threats have emerged from increasing sources as advanced hacker tools and techniques have emerged and proliferated to broaden the attack surface available across globally interconnected networks.

cybersecurity↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Multi–LDAP Dynamic User Management Tool Utilizing Oracle Application Express and PL/SQL

A Center for Infrastructure Security Analysis (CISA) client system required support of multiple Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directories for multiple, varied user communities. The LDAP directories were all based upon different technologies, i.e., Microsoft Active Directory (AD), Microsoft Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (ADLDS), and Oracle Internet Directory (OID), depending on system setup, security requirements, and legacy software. Research revealed that PL/SQL provided the capability to execute dynamic PL/SQL and SQL blocks. The dynamic capabilities were utilized along with several configuration tables to provide an object-oriented, polymorphic-like behavior. This architecture was chosen so that a top-level application programming interface (API) could be defined for all calls, no matter what type of LDAP was being manipulated, as each LDAP type has slightly different attributes and requirements. The dynamic nature of the user management system allowed for easy setup and utilization of any new LDAP directories, minimizing the time and effort expended on system changes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Review of the Security of Insulin Pump Infusion Systems

Insulin therapy has enabled diabetic patients to maintain blood glucose control to lead healthier lives. Today, rather than manually injecting insulin using syringes, a patient can use a device, such as an insulin pump, to programmatically deliver insulin. This allows for more granular insulin delivery while attaining blood glucose control. The insulin pump system features have increasingly benefited patients, but the complexity of the resulting system has grown in parallel. As a result security breaches that can negatively affect patient health are now possible. Rather than focus on the security of a single device, we concentrate on protecting the security of the entire system. In this paper we describe the security issues as they pertain to an insulin pump system that includes an embedded system of components including the insulin pump, continuous glucose management system, blood glucose monitor, and other associated devices (e.g., a mobile phone or personal computer). We detail not only the growing wireless communication threat in each system component, but we also describe additional threats to the system (e.g., availability and integrity). Our goal is to help create a trustworthy infusion pump system that will ultimately strengthen pump safety, and we describe mitigating solutions to address identified security issues both for now and in the future.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA) of networked systems.

This report describes recent progress made in developing and utilizing hybrid Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA) environments. Many organizations require advanced tools to analyze their information system's security, reliability, and resilience against cyber attack. Today's security analysis utilize real systems such as computers, network routers and other network equipment, computer emulations (e.g., virtual machines) and simulation models separately to analyze interplay between threats and safeguards. In contrast, this work developed new methods to combine these three approaches to provide integrated hybrid SEPIA environments. Our SEPIA environments enable an analyst to rapidly configure hybrid environments to pass network traffic and perform, from the outside, like real networks. This provides higher fidelity representations of key network nodes while still leveraging the scalability and cost advantages of simulation tools. The result is to rapidly produce large yet relatively low-cost multi-fidelity SEPIA networks of computers and routers that let analysts quickly investigate threats and test protection approaches.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS).

The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security - SBIR Phase II Final Report

This is the Final Report for the DOE Phase II SBIR project “Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security.” The topics covered herein include technical progress made, progress against the planned milestones and deliverables, project outcomes (results, collaborations, intellectual property, etc.), and a discussion on future expectations of deployment and impacts of the results of this work. In brief, all planned work for the project was successfully completed, on or ahead of schedule and on budget. The major accomplishment was the successful development of a very advanced passive ultra-secure RFID tag system with combined security features unmatched by any commercially available ones. These tags have high-level dynamic encrypted authentication, a novel tamper-proofing mechanism, system software including graphical user interfaces and networking, and integration with a fiber-optic seal mechanism. This is all accomplished passively (with no battery) by incorporating sophisticated hardware in the tag which harvests the energy from the RFID readers that are interrogating the tag. Based on initial feedback (and deployments) at DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), it is anticipated these tags and their offspring will meet DOE and international community needs for highly secure RFID systems. Beyond the accomplishment of those original objectives for the ultra-secure RF tags, major new spin-off thrusts from the original work were identified and successfully pursued with the cognizance of the DOE sponsor office. In particular, new classes of less sophisticated RFID tags were developed whose lineage derives from the core R&D thrusts of this SBIR. These RF “tag variants” have some, but not necessarily all, of the advanced characteristics described above and can therefore be less expensive and meet far wider markets. With customer pull from the DOE and its national laboratories, new RFID tags and systems (including custom readers and software) for government needs in asset management and tracking were developed. These were tested at a national laboratory and other government facilities, and resulted in immediate procurement actions by the government and deployment of these new systems. Thus, commercialization of the results of this Phase II DOE SBIR was already underway before the end of the SBIR itself. More importantly, operations involving asset management at selected DoE and government sites are already being impacted favorably and could have much broader impacts in the near future.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Data-based and secure switched cyber–physical systems

In this work, we develop a completely model-free moving target defense framework for the detection and mitigation of sensor and/or actuator attacks in cyber–physical systems with dynamics that evolve in discrete-time. We incorporate an intrusion detection mechanism based on an approximate dynamic programming technique that learns the policies for optimal regulation and optimal tracking while simultaneously defending against actuator and sensor attacks in a model-free fashion. Switching rules are leveraged to force proactive and reactive defense mechanisms as well as, guarantee the stability of the equilibrium point. Finally, as a case study, we apply the proposed moving target defense framework to a DC–DC converter that is used in electric vehicles.

42 ENGINEERING↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.

computer information security↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

security↗

Managing Complex IT Security Processes with Value Based Measures

Current trends indicate that IT security measures will need to greatly expand to counter the ever increasingly sophisticated, well-funded and/or economically motivated threat space. Traditional risk management approaches provide an effective method for guiding courses of action for assessment, and mitigation investments. However, such approaches no matter how popular demand very detailed knowledge about the IT security domain and the enterprise/cyber architectural context. Typically, the critical nature and/or high stakes require careful consideration and adaptation of a balanced approach that provides reliable and consistent methods for rating vulnerabilities. As reported in earlier works, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System provides a comprehensive measure of reliability, security and safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders interests in that requirement. This paper advocates a dependability measure that acknowledges the aggregate structure of complex system specifications, and accounts for variations by stakeholder, by specification components, and by verification and validation impact.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Suggestion of a Framework to Evaluate the Extent of Cyber Security Enhancements in NPP

Digital I and C systems have been developed and installed in nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, due to installation of digital I and C systems, cyber security concerns have been emerged. One of the major problems is that nuclear industry is in very early stage in dealing with cyber security issues. It is because that cyber security has received less attention compared to other safety problems. In addition, late adoption of digital I and C systems has resulted in lower level of cyber security advancements in nuclear industry than ones in other industries. With this regards, recently, international standard organizations, regulatory institutes, and research institutes have performed a number of studies addressing these cyber security issues in nuclear industries. In order to provide useful information about cyber security issues including cyber security enhancements, this paper suggests a framework to evaluate how much cyber security is improved when a specific cyber security enhancement is applied in NPPs. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗