Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Apollo program”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 577 records · Page 32

Chapter 6: Evaluation of Cardiothermal Model Prediction of Simulated Lunar Extravehicular Activity

Fewer than 20 extravehicular activities were completed during the Apollo program. The lunar environment has consistent unknowns to address particularly that of suited performance in partial gravity. The moon has altered gravity that is 1/6th that of Earth’s. This study is focused to investigate validation of the regression techniques identified in subsequent chapters and look to improve predictive outcomes during simulated lunar EVA tasks. Heart rate predictions of metabolic energy expenditure are investigated to predict workload throughout simulated lunar EVA conducted in the active response gravity offload system (ARGOS) with in the NASA Mark III space suit. Heart rate variability metrics are utilized to identify periods of high workload. Continually, the lunar offload capacity is further characterized to aid in improving the cardiothermal prediction models including predictions of core temperature, skin temperature and heat storage using heart rate, metabolic rates and suit thermal data during the simulated EVA. The outcome of this model provides an application for future use in contingency predictions of energy expenditure during Lunar EVAs and provide a suite of instrumentation to predict workload during training scenarios.

Simulated EVA↗

NASA’s Identified Risks of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture in Human Spaceflight

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.

Daniel M Buckland↗

Dust Mitigation Technology Characterization of Coatings and Pliable Cleaners

Lunar Dust. Dust has been identified as one of the most significant hazards to human lunar exploration, but limited testing has been performed on lunar dust mitigation technologies since the Apollo program concluded. The safety of the crewmembers and sustainability of habitats, science, and supporting hardware depend on effective dust mitigation techniques and technologies to prevent dust from degrading hardware and equipment.

dust mitigation↗

Lunar Base Construction Overview

Previous lunar missions and campaigns have been restricted to using robotic landers and lunar orbiting satellites as well as sortie type of operations using astronaut crews (NASA Apollo program). Now, the next phase of lunar exploration has begun under NASA’s Artemis program and there has been an international response where other nations such as China, Russia, India, Canada, Japan and the European Union of nations, have all expressed interest in either collaborating or competing with NASA on the Moon. This next phase has an over arching goal of achieving a permanent human presence on the Moon via sustainable methods. A lunar base with human occupancy will require infrastructure to provide shelter, utilities, landing/launch pads, roads, communications, power and all the other necessities to sustain human life and protect equipment. Since human biology is not well suited for surviving in the lunar environment, there will be many forms of automated equipment, autonomy and robotic helpers that will minimize the amount of Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) required by the crew. This will mean that the radiation dosage received by the crew will stay within acceptable and safe career doses. Radiation shielding via the use of regolith can also mitigate radiation dangers. The required infrastructure must be constructed, but the mass and logistics of bringing all the construction materials from Earth are prohibitive, which makes the necessary construction difficult to achieve. In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) aims to solve this challenge by sourcing construction materials locally or “in-situ”. This means that their transportation can be completely eliminated, resulting in large cost savings by avoiding the launch out of Earth’s deep gravity well and subsequent trans lunar injection, lunar orbit capture and landing. This paper will give an overview of the required construction tasks and related equipment that will be required to robotically build a lunar base using in-situ resources. It will also organize these tasks into logical groupings so that technology development and implementation can be pursued within a framework that can be referenced by all involved.

Lunar Base↗

Lunar Base Construction Planning

Previous lunar missions and campaigns have been restricted to using robotic landers and lunar orbiting satellites as well as sortie type of operations using astronaut crews(NASA Apollo program).Now, the next phase of lunar exploration has begun under NASA’s Artemis program and there has been an international response where other nations such as China, Russia, India, Canada, Japan and theEuropean Union of nations, have all expressed interest in either collaborating or competing with NASA on theMoon. This next phase has an overarching goal of achieving a permanent human presence on theMoon via sustainable methods. A lunar base with human occupancy will require infrastructure to provide shelter, utilities, landing/launch pads, roads, communications, power and all the other necessities to sustain human life and protect equipment.Since human biology is not well suited for surviving in the lunar environment, there will be many forms of automated equipment, autonomy and robotic helpers that will minimize the amount of Extra-Vehicular Activity(EVA) required by the crew. This will mean that the radiation dosage received by the crew will stay within acceptable and safe career doses. Radiation shielding via the use of regolith can also mitigate radiation dangers.The required infrastructure must be constructed, but the mass and logistics of bringing all the construction materials from Earth are prohibitive, which makes the necessary construction difficult to achieve.In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) aims to solve this challenge by sourcing construction materials locally or “in-situ”. This means that their transportation can be completely eliminated, resulting in large cost savings by avoiding the launch out of Earth’s deep gravity well and subsequent trans lunar injection, lunar orbit capture and landing. This paper will give ahistorical review and current status of lunar construction planning and a high level introduction to the required infrastructure and construction equipment that will be required to robotically build a lunar base using in-situ resources.It will also organize these tasks into logical groupings so that technology development and implementation can be pursued within a framework that can be referenced by all involved.

Lunar↗

Going South: Warnings from the Largest Project Engineering Failure in Modern History

NASA’s successful conduct of the Apollo Program greatly enhanced the prestige of the United States and remains broadly accepted as America’s gift “for all Mankind.” NASA’s Artemis Program to return humanity to the Moon promises to again reveal America’s leadership in this field. In preparation for the initiation of Artemis and its predecessor project Constellation, NASA thoroughly examined space program precedents. There remains, however, another relevant precedent which has not been examined in this context. Though this project involved technology radically different from that managed by NASA, its scope and environment in many ways parallel NASA’s large programs. This project was initiated by a private sector team that had, ten years before, successfully completed an effort that, at a cost of $275 billion (in 2021 USD), had stimulated new technology, had brought economic growth, had established their country as the world leader in engineering innovation, and, though it was a commercial success, had been broadly accepted as their nation’s gift “to all Mankind.” The new project was inspired by popular belief that private capital could again be marshalled to enhance national prestige and make yet another major contribution to the progress of Humanity. This new effort was predicted to require eight years and $258 billion. However, after the passage of nine years, achievement of only 45% complete on the baseline design, and expenditures 96% beyond the baseline cost, the project collapsed amid bankruptcy, political scandal, and criminal prosecution. While the private sector team that carried out this project was exceptionally well educated and experienced in the field, their efforts resulted in what remains (in terms of the money wasted) the largest project engineering failure in modern history. This paper examines what went wrong.

Project Management↗

Toward an IMU-Based Space Suit Motion Capture System

Spacesuits are complex engineering systems that sustain human health and enable performance outside Earth-like environments. These systems must support human mobility and physical workload demands while minimizing injury risk during extravehicular activity (EVA). Future EVA operations on the Lunar surface are expected to be more frequent and require higher physical workloads than previously during the ISS, Shuttle, and Apollo programs. To characterize the workloads and ergonomics needs a suit must support, the kinematics of the space suit must be measured during operationally-relevant tasks in ground analog environments. Kinematics capture of the suit is challenging for traditional optical motion capture (OMC) approaches due to marker occlusion, harsh lighting or environmental conditions, and tests with suit surrogates in outdoor field environments. To this end, engineers at NASA are developing the Augmented Suit Inverse Kinematics (ASIK) system, a complete motion capture method and inverse kinematics solver which relies solely on a network of wireless inertial measurement units (IMUs) attached to the major kinematic segments of the spacesuit. The ASIK modeling language allows for the simple inclusion of probabilistic priors such as suit size and shape or IMU poses. The ASIK system was tested in a 7-subject pilot study. Each subject donned NASA’s new prototype exploration spacesuit in the Active Response Gravity Offload System (ARGOS) facility at Johnson Space Center in Houston, TX. The suits were outfitted with 12 IMUs to estimate lower body and trunk kinematics. The suits were also outfitted with a set of reflective OMC markers, and traditional OMC data was collected and processed. Characterization of the ASIK-derived suit joint angles’ accuracy against an optical motion capture datum will be presented. Discussion of these results, as well as discussion of system calibration and nuances of mathematical observability, will be included.

IMU↗

Prospects for Future Human Space Flight Missions to Near-Earth Asteroids

The forthcoming Near-Earth Object (NEO) Surveyor space telescope is a foundational asset designed to complete NASA’s congressionally-mandated goal of cataloging ≥90% of NEOs ≥140 meters in size as soon as practical, and discover Earth impactors far in advance. NEO Surveyor is also critical to near-Earth asteroid (NEA) exploration because it will find suitable low-Δv NEAs for robotic and human missions, often on Earth-like orbits with long synodic periods. Such NEAs have usually not been detected until imminent Earth launch opportunities because they were not observable until close to Earth. Discovering them far enough in advance to deploy missions requires a deep-space infrared survey telescope such as NEO Surveyor. In addition to posing hazards and being scientifically important, NEAs contain resources, such as water (OH), that could be utilized off-Earth. They also offer unique opportunities for the most ambitious human voyages ever undertaken. The Apollo program forever changed humanity’s perspective by showing us Earthrise from our Moon through human eyes. Crewed missions to NEAs will forever change our perspective again by showing us Earth as a distant point of light in the heavens as seen from an asteroid by astronauts. Planetary defense endeavors to understand asteroid and comet impact risks and develop mitigation capabilities. NEA exploration is synergistic in multiple ways. NEO Surveyor will discover and help characterize Earth impactors and accessible NEAs. Heavy-lift launch is highly enabling for both human NEA missions and planetary defense. Reconnaissance missions for planetary defense can also characterize NEAs prior to crewed missions. In situ resource utilization (ISRU) systems may be applicable to deflecting or destroying hazardous NEAs. NEA characterization data critically inform planetary defense efforts and indicate NEA types suitable for human exploration or ISRU. In 2010, NASA performed the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Human Space Flight (HSF) Accessible Targets Study (NHATS), creating an automated online system monitoring mission accessibility of NEAs 2 . NHATS database NEAs meet criteria that require less total mission Δv and/or round-trip mission duration than the Martian surface or even Mars orbit. There are currently 4,658 NHATS NEAs, and many rival or exceed lunar orbit/surface accessibility. Thus, NHATS NEAs could be explored by humans prior to attempting a Mars mission. Human missions to NEAs would test human-rated spacecraft systems with less cost and risk than Mars missions. Thus, human missions to NEAs are compelling in their own right while also providing prudent preparation for more demanding Mars missions. Lunar missions can offer similar opportunities, but they differ from NEA missions in important ways. Lunar missions pose less demanding psychological challenges to crew and ground staff. Earth light-time delay for communications is significantly longer during NEA missions. NEA missions are available that require more propulsion system consumables than lunar missions but less than Mars missions. In this paper, we summarize NEA accessibility for human missions, discuss motivations for such missions, survey knowledge about NEAs that informs future human missions, present exemplar mission opportunities to the currently known NHATS NEAs, and describe future work towards enabling human NEA missions.

Near-Earth asteroids↗

Artemis, Ethics and Society: Synthesis from a Workshop

NASA’s planning and implementation of the Artemis missions and Moon to Mars efforts may set precedents in exploration for decades to come. In April 2023, NASA convened a workshop on how to assess the ethical and societal implications of Artemis. This workshop was NASA’s first structured foray into studying the ethical and societal implications of exploration since the Apollo program in the 1960s. This report documents the discussion and ideas feedback and suggestions from the 55 participants invited to the Artemis and Ethics workshop and focuses on the following key study questions: 1) How should NASA consider the ethical, legal, and societal implications (ELSI) of the Artemis and Moon to Mars efforts?; and 2) What are the key ethical and societal implications that need consideration? This initial exploratory study does not make formal recommendations but instead maps out options available for NASA and other actors to consider as humanity goes to the Moon, Mars and beyond.

Artemis↗

Datascope to Enable Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO)

BACKGROUND: NASA has amassed sixty years of knowledge and experience relevant to maintenance of crew health and performance in low earth orbit. The Apollo Program introduced the importance of ensuring progressively autonomous operational capability. Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) will require a gradual shift in the balance of medical responsibility, management, and authority from terrestrial to space-based assets. Terrestrial assets will continue to be essential for pre-mission screening and planning in addition to maintenance of crew health and performance. However, new capabilities are needed to enable EIMO and the amount of data required to support these systems, and mitigate the impacts of data transmission delays and reduced bandwidth coupled with lack of cloud-like resources and on-board computing capacity that is currently unclear or operationally insufficient. OVERVIEW: The overall goal of EIMO is to develop artificial intelligence (AI)-based solutions to analyze crew health and performance data utilizing a clinical decision support system (CDSS) to provide crew medical officers (CMO) with the equivalent of real-time, on-board medical consults. The EIMO ecosystem is envisioned as a “system of systems” where embedded reference databases and real-time data streams from multiple input vectors continuously and seamlessly assess crew health and performance. EIMO will be designed to make recommendations to the CMO using multi-modal AI-based natural language processing and machine learning methods with interoperability to push/pull data within and between multiple vehicle and habitat architectures. DISCUSSION: Data flows and storage/retrieval capacity are severely constrained during space missions and the challenges will become even greater during exploration missions. Just as each past program from Mercury to the International Space Station (ISS) required rethinking the interaction between ground-based controllers and space-based crew, so too will future missions to the Moon and Mars. While the NASA High-Performance Spaceflight Computing Processor project aims to increase computational capacity by 100 times over current spaceflight computers, the projected deliverable still lags considerably behind what will be needed to enable an AI-driven CDSS. Restrictions in processing speed and data storage capacity, coupled with transmission bottlenecks and delays, necessitate definition and optimization of an integrated data architecture to enable a progressively autonomous medical capability.

Medical operations↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗

Moon to Mars (M2M): Exploration Atmosphere

As humans leave the bounds of Earth to explore the lunar surface and beyond, crew will don extravehicular activity (EVA) suits to learn more about these extraterrestrial environments, establish sustained presence, and perform needed upgrades and maintenance to their space vehicle and habitation systems. Spacefaring vehicle and habitation design will need to support these EVA excursions while ensuring crew health and safety. A crucial technological design advancement towards this goal is the use of a lower pressure exploration atmosphere (EA) that enables high efficiency EVA, rather than the sea level atmosphere of 14.7 psia, 21% oxygen (O 2 ) found on the International Space Station, Shuttle, and most other Russian and Chinese space vehicles and stations. Early space vehicles (Mercury through Apollo Programs) used a 5 psia, 100% O 2 environment, which eliminated the need for pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols, simplified the life support system to a single gas, and saved structural mass. For longer duration missions (Skylab), a diluent gas was added, changing the atmosphere to 5 psia, 70-74% O 2 to prevent atelectasis while remaining normoxic. As in-flight science became a top priority, Shuttle and ISS atmospheres were chosen to operate at sea level allowing for simpler ground-based study control conditions. Consequently this led to long pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols involving up to 4 hours of O 2 prebreathe because the EVA suit still operated at a low pressure of 4.3 psid. To increase operational efficiency, the Shuttle was retroactively certified to operate using 10.2 psia, 26.5% O 2 , reducing O 2 prebreathe time to 40-75 min. Current plans for M2M habitats on the Lunar surface require EVA, thus EA recommendation became 8 psia and 32% O 2 but was revised to 8.2 psia and 34% O 2 to decrease hypoxia exposure. Unfortunately, the benefits of EA in support of safe and efficient EVAs comes with the challenge of fire management in a higher-than-normal O 2 % environment. Although known for decades, the recommended forward work to address fire management has only recently begun. Current flammability tests include examining material propagation and ignition sources as well as fire mitigation processes to better understand these properties for proposed new EA environments. Fire safety, DCS risk, and mission design all contribute to the multifaceted parameters of EA. Thus while it is clear that EA is required to achieve the goals of future exploratory space missions, final specifications are still being evaluated for optimizing crew health and safety.

space atmosphere↗

LTV-xEVA Applied Injury Biomechanics

Beginning in Artemis V, Lunar Terrain Vehicles (LTV) will be utilized to enable astronauts to explore the lunar south pole and conduct science farther from the landing site than during the Apollo program. However, LTV operation has the potential to cause injury to the suited crew member during their Extravehicular Activity (EVA). Injury risk caused by LTV acceleration and jerk combined with blunt loading from rigid suit components needs to be better understood. An effort began to create requirements for, model, and address the injury risk caused by the LTV combined with Exploration EVA (xEVA) suits. Mitigation of crew injury is a shared responsibility between LTV and the suit since neither can accomplish this independently. The modeling completed in Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23) helped to verify the fidelity of the requirements and parse out vendor responsibility (LTV, xEVAS, or NASA) for Artemis V and beyond. The scope of the modeling in FY23 used the LTV System Requirements Document (SRD) as worst-case inputs and modeled female 5th-, male 50th-, and male 95th-percentile subjects in hard-mounted seated and semi-standing postures. Soft-mounted (i.e., lap belt) and testing to validate the analysis was determined out of scope for FY23 work.

Spacesuit↗

LTV-xEVA Applied Injury Biomechanics

Beginning in Artemis V, Lunar Terrain Vehicles (LTV) will be utilized to enable astronauts to explore the lunar south pole and conduct science farther from the landing site than during the Apollo program. However, LTV operation has the potential to cause injury to the suited crew member during their Extravehicular Activity (EVA). Injury risk caused by LTV acceleration and jerk combined with blunt loading from rigid suit components needs to be better understood. An effort began to create requirements for, model, and address the injury risk caused by the LTV combined with Exploration EVA (xEVA) suits. Mitigation of crew injury is a shared responsibility between LTV and the suit since neither can accomplish this independently. The modeling completed in Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23) helped to verify the fidelity of the requirements and parse out vendor responsibility (LTV, xEVAS, or NASA) for Artemis V and beyond. The scope of the modeling in FY23 used the LTV System Requirements Document (SRD) as worst-case inputs and modeled female 5th-, male 50th-, and male 95th-percentile subjects in hard-mounted seated and semi-standing postures. Soft-mounted (i.e., lap belt) and testing to validate the analysis was determined out of scope for FY23 work.

Spacesuit↗

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗

Full Lunar Surface Visualization and Simulation Platform

This paper reports the results of the innovative work completed to facilitate the creation of a lunar surface visualization and simulation platform for the entire surface of the moon as a design, test, training, verification, and mission support environment. The mathematical approach to the visualization of the data sets utilizes fractal mathematics to generate not only the highest possible detail that the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) data can provide, but it also additionally supplies an estimation of surface reflectivity and lighting based upon location on the lunar surface. This level of detail and accuracy is required to conduct accurate integrated crew / vehicle risk assessment throughout the design-to-disposal life cycle of vehicles and their supporting procedures and mission priorities. This process starts with safety assessments of integrated hardware / software / crew/ and support environments. Unlike the Apollo Program, the Artemis Program is not risk tolerant.

Simulation↗

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗

Assessment of the State of Communication Delay Research in Preparation for Missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit

NASA’s mission-operations paradigm, established during Project Mercury and minimally evolving through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions, has primarily depended on real-time support from a ground team of experts. This ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years, managing the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. However, this operational paradigm, which has seen little change in its Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), will face challenges during long-duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. Lunar missions may experience one-way communication latencies ranging from 3 to 14 seconds, while Mars missions will encounter up to a 44-minute round-trip latency at a maximum distance from Earth. Communication delays negatively impact the behavioral health and performance of individuals and crews operating across the multi-team space-to-ground system. Previous research indicates that increased isolation and the challenges posed by delayed communication lead to heightened stress, frustration, adverse behavioral symptoms, and reduced individual performance. NASA has investigated the nature and effectiveness of managing this shift in complex operations since early 2000, but additional research is necessary to assess the issues associated with communication latencies and identify effective countermeasures. This work aimed to examine the evidence from 20 years of research on comm delays. We systematically reviewed the past 20 years of communication delay literature, focusing on how this research aligns with relevant, high-priority needs in the HSIA, Team, and BMed Risks. This type of panoramic review has not been done since 2013; a current, aggregated picture of what has been studied and how is needed to inform additional studies and mitigation development. Additional perspectives were gained from interviews with the research participants, operations experts, and communication delay researchers. Results from this effort will help characterize the risk posed by communication latency for upcoming Artemis missions and point toward potential mitigations. The final results will be presented. For the literature review, we formed a search term seed set drawing from languages used in two papers representative of the previous state of knowledge and supplemented it with additional search terms. We conducted literature searches on Google Scholar, PubMed, and Web of Science and searched NASA project archives for output from NASA-sponsored research. This search yielded 150 papers, of which 48 were relevant. SME interviews provided perspective on key communication delay issues and concerns and what is being worked on to mitigate those issues. Preliminary results of the literature review have been presented. Final results to be presented include the results of the literature review and findings from the interviews.

literature review↗