Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Network Time Protocol”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

569 records · Page 32

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Dynamic Time-Variant Connection Management for PGAS Models on InfiniBand

InfiniBand (IB) has established itself as a promising network infrastructure for high-end cluster computing systems as evidenced by its usage in the Top500 supercomputers today. While the IB standard describes multiple communication models (including reliable-connection (RC), and unreliable datagram (UD)), most of its promising features such as remote direct memory access (RDMA), hardware atomics and network fault tolerance are only available for the RC model which requires connections between communicating process pairs. In the past, several researchers have proposed on-demand connection management techniques that establish connections when there is a need to communicate, and not before. While such techniques work well for algorithms and applications that only communicate with a small set of processes in their life-time, there exists a broad set of applications that do not follow this trend. For example, applications that perform dynamic load balancing and adaptive work stealing have a small set of communicating neighbors at any given time, but over time the total number of neighbors can be very high; in some cases, equal to the entire system size. In this paper, we present a dynamic time-variant connection management approach that establishes connections on-demand like previous approaches, but further intelligently tears down some of the unused connections as well. While connection tear-down itself is relevant for any programming model, different models have different complexities. In this paper, we study the Global Arrays (GA) PGAS model for two reasons: (1) the simple one-sided communication primitives provided by GA and other PGAS models ensure that connection requests are always initiated by the origin process without explicit synchronization with the target process---this makes connection tear-down simpler to handle; and (2) GA supports several applications that demonstrate this behavior making it an obvious first target for the proposed enhancements. We evaluate our proposed approach using several micro-benchmarks as well as the NWChem computational chemistry application on more than 6000 processes, and show that our approach can significantly reduce the memory requirements of the communication library while maintaining its performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first design, implementation and evaluation of connection tear-down protocols over InfiniBand.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA Earth Systems Digital Twins (ESDT)

"Similarly to artificial intelligence, which is now revolutionizing many aspects of our daily lives, Earth system digital twin technologies have the potential to revolutionize the way Earth Science research will be conducted in the future, and how results and knowledge from this research will provide information to support decision making and yield impactful societal benefits. An Earth System Digital Twin or ESDT is a dynamic and interactive information system that first provides a digital replica of the past and current states of the Earth or Earth system as accurately and timely as possible; second, allows for computing forecasts of future states under nominal assumptions and based on the current replica; and third, offers the capability to investigate many hypothetical scenarios under varying impact assumptions. In other words, an ESDT provides the integrated What-Now, What-Next, and What-If pictures of the Earth or Earth system, by continuously ingesting newly observed data and by leveraging multiple interconnected models, machine learning as well advanced computing and visualization capabilities. Digital twins have been developed in engineering since 2002, but the interest in digital twins for the Earth domain is more recent and stems from the convergence of several developments: - The huge amount of diverse data that has now been collected continuously for more than 50 years, and that is becoming more and more difficult to access, understand, and utilize. - At the same time, because of climate change and its impacts the information produced by all of this data is becoming of interest to many new non-traditional users for analyzing and predicting various phenomena. - Because of advances in computational and visualization capabilities and the parallel unprecedented development of machine learning (ML), extracting relevant information from these large amounts of data and running complex models faster has become possible. As a result, it is becoming necessary and possible to build intuitive and interactive frameworks that will enable users with various skill levels and/or organizational hierarchy levels to easily access large amounts of targeted information along with the relevant tools and models (Earth system and human activity models), to support them in analyzing and visualizing this information, to help them understand interactions among models, to visualize the potential outcomes of various impacts, and to support decision or policy making. The full power of digital twins is that, through an integrated representation and standardized tools and software technologies, the same digital replica can address the needs of multiple users at various resolutions (spatial and temporal) and for various applications (science, economic, policy, etc.) – “from farmer to scientist”. With all these interests at stake, the challenges of building optimal digital twins are many and complex. The first challenge is to determine if a Digital Twin should be global or local, and multi-domain or thematic. For example, some domains such as Climate or Weather will require a global Digital Twin or Digital Twin capabilities while science areas such as Biodiversity might be more local. We can also envision that multiple thematic ESDTs, e.g., Air Quality, Wildfires, Hydrology could be federated or provide input to other ESDTs, either on a regional level or to a more global ESDT. Overall, we can imagine a future “web” of Digital Twins co-existing in a hierarchy or in a network, and capable of being connected or federated depending on the needs. This last point brings up the very important challenge of interoperability, including standards and protocols that will need to be built into these systems from the beginning. Each individual digital twin would have full flexibility in internal construction but would need standards-based interfaces (input and output) or hooks to make it compatible with others. Another challenge when building digital twins will be to decide how to organize each digital replica. Based on the applications targeted by the DT under implementation, various amounts and types of raw data, Analysis Ready Data (ARD) and information will need to be incorporated. Depending on the required latencies and needs of the users, various solutions can be considered, including Data Cubes, Data Lakes, pointers, or computing information on demand. We envision that each ESDT will choose a solution adapted to its specific objectives. Another important challenge is the type(s) of visualization that will be used, as well as the level of interactivity and refresh rate that will be required. Again, this will depend on the objectives of the ESDT, but also on the various users’ needs. In most cases, several types of visualizations and human interfaces will need to be offered depending on the projected users of that system. In parallel to the challenges highlighted above, there are also many tools and technologies that will need to be developed or improved for all types of digital twins. Among those are improved machine learning technologies, for example providing explainability, but also ML techniques for causality and providing a better integration of physics models. Additionally, reliable uncertainty quantification methods will be needed for all ESDT components, from validating data fusion and assimilation to assessing the accuracy of ML models and weighing the values of decisions supported by those systems. This presentation introduces the ESDT concept, presents several ESDT use cases, and a proposed ESDT architecture framework, as well as various technologies being developed by the Advanced Information Systems Technology (AIST) Program."

Earth Science Remote Sensing; Information Systems↗

Botnet behaviour analysis: How would a data analytics-based system with minimum a priori information perform?

Botnets, as one of the most aggressive threats, has used different techniques, topologies, and communication protocols in different stages of their lifecycle since 2003. Hence, identifying botnets has become very challenging specifically given that they can upgrade their methodology at any time. Various detection approaches have been proposed by the cyber-security researchers, focusing on different aspects of these threats. In this work, 5 different botnet detection approaches are investigated. These systems are selected based on the technique used and type of data used where 2 are public rule–based systems (BotHunter and Snort) and the other 3 use machine learning algorithm with different feature extraction methods (packet payload based and traffic flow based). On the other hand, 4 of these systems are based on a priori knowledge while one is using minimum a priori information. The objective here is to evaluate the effectiveness of these approaches under different scenarios (eg, multi-botnet and single-botnet classifications) as well as exploring how a system with minimum a priori information would perform. The goal is to investigate if a system with minimum a priori information could result in a competitive performance compared to systems using a priori knowledge. The evaluation is shown on 24 publicly available botnet data sets. Results indicate that a machine learning–based system with minimum a priori information not only achieves a very high performance but also generalizes much better than the other systems evaluated on a wide range of botnet structures (from centralized to decentralized botnets).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Recommended Practice: Creating Cyber Forensics Plans for Control Systems

Cyber forensics has been in the popular mainstream for some time, and has matured into an information-technology capability that is very common among modern information security programs. The goal of cyber forensics is to support the elements of troubleshooting, monitoring, recovery, and the protection of sensitive data. Moreover, in the event of a crime being committed, cyber forensics is also the approach to collecting, analyzing, and archiving data as evidence in a court of law. Although scalable to many information technology domains, especially modern corporate architectures, cyber forensics can be challenging when being applied to non-traditional environments, which are not comprised of current information technologies or are designed with technologies that do not provide adequate data storage or audit capabilities. In addition, further complexity is introduced if the environments are designed using proprietary solutions and protocols, thus limiting the ease of which modern forensic methods can be utilized. The legacy nature and somewhat diverse or disparate component aspects of control systems environments can often prohibit the smooth translation of modern forensics analysis into the control systems domain. Compounded by a wide variety of proprietary technologies and protocols, as well as critical system technologies with no capability to store significant amounts of event information, the task of creating a ubiquitous and unified strategy for technical cyber forensics on a control systems device or computing resource is far from trivial. To date, no direction regarding cyber forensics as it relates to control systems has been produced other than what might be privately available from commercial vendors. Current materials have been designed to support event recreation (event-based), and although important, these requirements do not always satisfy the needs associated with incident response or forensics that are driven by cyber incidents. To address these issues and to accommodate for the diversity in both system and architecture types, a framework based in recommended practices to address forensics in the control systems domain is required. This framework must be fully flexible to allow for deployment into any control systems environment regardless of technologies used. Moreover, the framework and practices must provide for direction on the integration of modern network security technologies with traditionally closed systems, the result being a true defense-in-depth strategy for control systems architectures. This document takes the traditional concepts of cyber forensics and forensics engineering and provides direction regarding augmentation for control systems operational environments. The goal is to provide guidance to the reader with specifics relating to the complexity of cyber forensics for control systems, guidance to allow organizations to create a self-sustaining cyber forensics program, and guidance to support the maintenance and evolution of such programs. As the current control systems cyber security community of interest is without any specific direction on how to proceed with forensics in control systems environments, this information product is intended to be a first step.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Middleware Case Study: MeDICi

In many application domains in science and engineering, data produced by sensors, instruments and networks is naturally processed by software applications structured as a pipeline . Pipelines comprise a sequence of software components that progressively process discrete units of data to produce a desired outcome. For example, in a Web crawler that is extracting semantics from text on Web sites, the first stage in the pipeline might be to remove all HTML tags to leave only the raw text of the document. The second step may parse the raw text to break it down into its constituent grammatical parts, such as nouns, verbs and so on. Subsequent steps may look for names of people or places, interesting events or times so documents can be sequenced on a time line. Each of these steps can be written as a specialized program that works in isolation with other steps in the pipeline. In many applications, simple linear software pipelines are sufficient. However, more complex applications require topologies that contain forks and joins, creating pipelines comprising branches where parallel execution is desirable. It is also increasingly common for pipelines to process very large files or high volume data streams which impose end-to-end performance constraints. Additionally, processes in a pipeline may have specific execution requirements and hence need to be distributed as services across a heterogeneous computing and data management infrastructure. From a software engineering perspective, these more complex pipelines become problematic to implement. While simple linear pipelines can be built using minimal infrastructure such as scripting languages, complex topologies and large, high volume data processing requires suitable abstractions, run-time infrastructures and development tools to construct pipelines with the desired qualities-of-service and flexibility to evolve to handle new requirements. The above summarizes the reasons we created the MeDICi Integration Framework (MIF) that is designed for creating high-performance, scalable and modifiable software pipelines. MIF exploits a low friction, robust, open source middleware platform and extends it with component and service-based programmatic interfaces that make implementing complex pipelines simple. The MIF run-time automatically handles queues between pipeline elements in order to handle request bursts, and automatically executes multiple instances of pipeline elements to increase pipeline throughput. Distributed pipeline elements are supported using a range of configurable communications protocols, and the MIF interfaces provide efficient mechanisms for moving data directly between two distributed pipeline elements.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Data Analytics for Electrical Distribution Systems with Micro PMUs (GMLC 1.4.9 Technical Report)

This report describes how electrical utilities with residential, industrial, commercial and government customers make decisions using Data Analytics (DA) applications and discusses how OpenFMB was leveraged to share that data among disparate types of devices for DA. OpenFMB is a data standard developed by utilities for distributed communication and control of power system assets. Here we explored how OpenFMB can be used for sharing analytics and what those analytics could be for a set of representative grid devices. A review of DA applications performed by electrical utilities and customers is presented. An overview of how the testbed we used was built and configured is summarized. Several experiments which were carried out to explore the capabilities of OpenFMB alongside other data sharing mechanisms for gathering sensor measurements and sharing analytics is also discussed. And finally a comparison of OpenFMB and LBNL’s SPARK framework is summarized. Today’s electrical utilities focus on monitoring the real-time customer consumptions, offering new real-time tariff models based on customer usage habits (rewards and punishments), providing energy peak during peak load times (plan energy generation and distribution), improving the load management for transformers and power lines, and controlling the energy and grid resources efficiently. On the other hand, the DA applications for residential customers are based on modifying the customer electricity usage habit to save money, making accurate and timely decisions for electrical billing. However, the DA applications for industrial, commercial and government customers focus on creating efficient programs to improve the environmental condition (reducing CO₂ emission), developing better load forecasting for industrial and/or commercial activities. In this project, a testbed was built to explore how the OpenFMB framework can be used to distribute data among various types of representative grid edge devices. Micro PMUs (Phasor Measurement Unit) were used to collect and transmit data to an OpenPDC server alongside relays with a framework configured with a system using OpenFMB to collect and transmit data. The testbed was composed of a physical asset based on a 60 Hz AC radial power system constructed using SI-GRID components. The power system consisted of a 3-phase 14 volts line-to-ground (24 volts line-to-line) power source, three 3-phase line emulators, a programmable resistive load bank, two smart relays, two micro PMUs, and a (SCADA) and Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) computer. This testbed configuration allowed us to perform breaker operation tests collecting data from the micro PMUs and from the relays’ sensors. During the micro PMU breaker operation tests we collected the measured and estimated fundamental voltages, currents, frequency as well as the total true, reactive and apparent power. The displacement power factor from two micro PMUs located in parallel power lines was also used. The software steps for the implementation of the Synchrophasor system are explained in detail in this report. The setting (1-2-3) and data collection (4-5) phases were performed with a free download open source software. In the setting phase, the micro PMUs were set (1), the data stream for each micro PMU was validated, and the connection and configuration files were created (2). The PDC computer was set using the connection and configuration files of the micro PMUs (3). In the data collection phase, the binary data from the micro PMUs was collected (4), and the binary data files of the micro PMUs was converted to analyze the test results (5). OpenFMB was configured to use protocol translators to read Modbus and transform the reading into the OpenFMB data model to be read for DA applications.Our experiments showed that by leveraging the OpenFMB data model and the micro PMUs together we could obtain better situational awareness of network faults, which in some cases could lead to failures in the system and would be less perceivable otherwise. For example, in one experiment the fundamental RMS current angle, and the fundamental displacement power factor (estimated by the ratio between the measured real and apparent total power) had a disturbance at the micro PMU connected to the beginning of the parallel power line because the breaker was opened without the operators or SCADA system’s knowledge, and no current was available. Based on the breaker state scenarios and micro PMU locations, the DA applications using the current angle and displacement power factor from the micro PMUs should be studied in detail to avoid a non-desired measurement that could affect the decision from the DA. Also, the sample rates for PMU, Relay and micro PMU devices were compared. The DA application improved the control and operation between the electrical utilities and their customers (residential, industrial, transportation, commercial and government). The higher the sample rate, the better the quality of the measurement for DA estimations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Intelligent Integrated Health Management for a System of Systems

An intelligent integrated health management system (IIHMS) incorporates major improvements over prior such systems. The particular IIHMS is implemented for any system defined as a hierarchical distributed network of intelligent elements (HDNIE), comprising primarily: (1) an architecture (Figure 1), (2) intelligent elements, (3) a conceptual framework and taxonomy (Figure 2), and (4) and ontology that defines standards and protocols. Some definitions of terms are prerequisite to a further brief description of this innovation: A system-of-systems (SoS) is an engineering system that comprises multiple subsystems (e.g., a system of multiple possibly interacting flow subsystems that include pumps, valves, tanks, ducts, sensors, and the like); 'Intelligent' is used here in the sense of artificial intelligence. An intelligent element may be physical or virtual, it is network enabled, and it is able to manage data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) focused on determining its condition in the context of the entire SoS; As used here, 'health' signifies the functionality and/or structural integrity of an engineering system, subsystem, or process (leading to determination of the health of components); 'Process' can signify either a physical process in the usual sense of the word or an element into which functionally related sensors are grouped; 'Element' can signify a component (e.g., an actuator, a valve), a process, a controller, an actuator, a subsystem, or a system; The term Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) is used to describe a capability that focuses on determining the condition (health) of every element in a complex system (detect anomalies, diagnose causes, prognosis of future anomalies), and provide data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) not just data to control systems for safe and effective operation. A major novel aspect of the present development is the concept of intelligent integration. The purpose of intelligent integration, as defined and implemented in the present IIHMS, is to enable automated analysis of physical phenomena in imitation of human reasoning, including the use of qualitative methods. Intelligent integration is said to occur in a system in which all elements are intelligent and can acquire, maintain, and share knowledge and information. In the HDNIE of the present IIHMS, an SoS is represented as being operationally organized in a hierarchical-distributed format. The elements of the SoS are considered to be intelligent in that they determine their own conditions within an integrated scheme that involves consideration of data, information, knowledge bases, and methods that reside in all elements of the system. The conceptual framework of the HDNIE and the methodologies of implementing it enable the flow of information and knowledge among the elements so as to make possible the determination of the condition of each element. The necessary information and knowledge is made available to each affected element at the desired time, satisfying a need to prevent information overload while providing context-sensitive information at the proper level of detail. Provision of high-quality data is a central goal in designing this or any IIHMS. In pursuit of this goal, functionally related sensors are logically assigned to groups denoted processes. An aggregate of processes is considered to form a system. Alternatively or in addition to what has been said thus far, the HDNIE of this IIHMS can be regarded as consisting of a framework containing object models that encapsulate all elements of the system, their individual and relational knowledge bases, generic methods and procedures based on models of the applicable physics, and communication processes (Figure 2). The framework enables implementation of a paradigm inspired by how expert operators monitor the health of systems with the help of (1) DIaK from various sources, (2) software tools that assist in rapid visualization of the condition of the system, (3) analical software tools that assist in reasoning about the condition, (4) sharing of information via network communication hardware and software, and (5) software tools that aid in making decisions to remedy unacceptable conditions or improve performance.

Smith, Harvey↗

Device Access Abstractions for Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid

An open application platform distributes the intelligence and control capability to local endpoints (or nodes) reducing total network traffic, improving speed of local actions by avoiding latency, and improving reliability by reducing dependencies on numerous devices and communication interfaces. The platform must be multi-tasking and able to host multiple applications running simultaneously. Given such a system, the core functions of power grid control systems include grid state determination, low level control, fault intelligence and reconfiguration, outage intelligence, power quality measurement, remote asset monitoring, configuration management, power and energy management (including local distributed energy resources, such as wind, solar and energy storage) can be eventually distributed. However, making this move requires extensive regression testing of systems to prove out new technologies, such as phasor measurement units (PMU). Additionally, as the complexity of the systems increase with the inclusion of new functionality (especially at the distribution and consumer levels), hidden coupling issues becomes a challenge with possible N-way interactions known and not known by device and application developers. Therefore, it is very important to provide core abstractions that ensure uniform operational semantics across such interactions. Here in this paper, we describe the pattern for abstracting device interactions we have developed for the RIAPS platform in the context of a microgrid control application we have developed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advanced Communication and Control for Distributed Energy Resource Integration: Phase 2 Scientific Report

The objective of this research project is to demonstrate sensing, communication, information and control technologies to achieve a seamless integration of multivendor distributed energy resource (DER) units at aggregation levels that meet individual user requirements for facility operations (residential, commercial, industrial, manufacturing, etc.) and further serve as resource options for electric and natural gas utilities. The fully demonstrated DER aggregation system with embodiment of communication and control technologies will lead to real-time, interactive, customer-managed service networks to achieve greater customer value. Work on this Advanced Communication and Control Project (ACCP) consists of a two-phase approach for an integrated demonstration of communication and control technologies to achieve a seamless integration of DER units to reach progressive levels of aggregated power output. Phase I involved design and proof-of-design, and Phase II involves real-world demonstration of the Phase I design architecture. The scope of work for Phase II of this ACCP involves demonstrating the Phase I design architecture in large scale real-world settings while integrating with the operations of one or more electricity supplier feeder lines. The communication and control architectures for integrated demonstration shall encompass combinations of software and hardware components, including: sensors, data acquisition and communication systems, remote monitoring systems, metering (interval revenue, real-time), local and wide area networks, Web-based systems, smart controls, energy management/information systems with control and automation of building energy loads, and demand-response management with integration of real-time market pricing. For Phase II, BPL Global shall demonstrate the Phase I design for integrating and controlling the operation of more than 10 DER units, dispersed at various locations in one or more Independent System Operator (ISO) Control Areas, at an aggregated scale of more than 1 MW, to provide grid support. Actual performance data with respect to each specified function above is to be collected during the Phase II field demonstration. At a minimum, the Phase II demonstration shall span one year of field operations. The demonstration performance will need to be validated by the target customer(s) for acceptance and subsequent implementation. An ISO must be involved in demonstration planning and execution. As part of the Phase II work, BPL Global shall develop a roadmap to commercialization that identifies and quantifies the potential markets for the integrated, aggregated DER systems and for the communication and control technologies demonstrated in Phase I. In addition, the roadmap must identify strategies and actions, as well as the regional and national markets where the aggregated DER systems with communication and control solutions will be introduced, along with a timeline projected for introduction into each identified market. In Phase I of this project, we developed a proof-of-concept ACCP system and architecture and began to test its functionality at real-world sites. These sites had just over 10 MW of DERs and allowed us to identify what needed to be done to commercialize this concept. As a result, we started Phase II by looking at our existing platform and identified its strengths and weaknesses as well as how it would need to evolve for commercialization. During this process, we worked with different stakeholders in the market including: Independent System Operators, DER owners and operators, and electric utility companies to fully understand the issues from all of the different perspectives. Once we had an understanding of the commercialized ACCP system, we began to document and prepare detailed designs of the different system components. The components of the system with the most significant design improvements were: the on-site remote terminal unit, the communication technology between the remote site and the data center, and the scalability and reliability of the data center application. As we began to implement the Phase II ACCP system, we upgraded the real-world demonstration sites from Phase I of the project as well as added additional sites to broaden the types of DER the platform was tested with. We worked with the owners and operators of these sites to understand how the system was meeting their needs and made modifications throughout the project as needed. This also included an effort to continue to understand the barriers to commercial adoption of the ACCP architecture and standardized communication protocols. The final aspect of this phase of the project was to prepare resources to aid in the commercial adoption of the ACCP architecture and standardized communication protocols. This entailed: presentations at conferences, published articles and papers, and web-based technical resources to provide tools to aid in the design and implementation of ACCP systems.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗