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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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564 records · Page 32
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Testing of Microchannels and Lab-Grown Stress Corrosion Cracks for Quantification of Aerosol Transmission

The formation of a stress corrosion crack (SCC) in the canister wall of a dry cask storage system (DCSS) has been identified as a potential issue for the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel. The presence of an SCC in a storage system could represent a through-wall flow path from the canister interior to the environment. Modern, vertical DCSSs are of particular interest due to the commercial practice of using higher backfill pressures in the canister, up to approximately 800 kPa, compared to their horizontal counterparts. This pressure differential offers a relatively high driving potential for blowdown of any particulates that might be present in the canister. In this study, the rates of gas flow and aerosol transmission of a spent fuel surrogate through an engineered microchannel with dimensions representative of an SCC were evaluated experimentally using coupled mass flow and aerosol analyzers. The microchannel was formed by mating two gage blocks with a linearly tapering slot orifice nominally 13 μm (0.005 in.) tall on the upstream side and 25 μm (0.0010 in.) tall on the downstream side. The orifice is 12.7 mm (0.500 in.) wide by 8.86 mm (0.349 in.) long (flow length). Surrogate aerosols of cerium oxide, CeO 2 , were seeded and mixed with either helium or air inside a pressurized tank. The aerosol characteristics were measured immediately upstream and downstream of the simulated SCC at elevated and ambient pressures, respectively. These data sets are intended to add to previous testing that characterized SCCs under well-controlled boundary conditions through the inclusion of testing improvements that establish initial conditions in a more consistent way. While the engineered microchannel has dimensions similar to actual SCCs, it does not reproduce the tortuous path the aerosol laden flow would have to traverse for eventual transmission. SCCs can be rapidly grown in a laboratory setting given the right conditions, and initial characterization and clean-flow testing has begun on lab grown crack samples provided to Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Many such samples are required to produce statistically relevant transmission results, and SNL is developing a procedure to produce samples in welded steel plates. These ongoing testing efforts are focused on understanding the evolution in both size and quantity of a hypothetical release of aerosolized spent fuel particles from failed fuel to the canister interior and ultimately through an SCC.

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DOE OSTI2021

Modeling of ATR fuel in DOE Standard Canisters with Helium Backfilled Condition

Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel dictates storage within helium backfilled sealed DOE standard canisters. These sealed canisters are intended for extened (>50 year) dry storage). The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE canisters places 10 ATR elements within a Type 1a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water from the surface. As testing to the effectiveness of the drying procedure is still underway, this modeling will include results at fully saturated and fully dried conditions. In previous modeling efforts, the G-value for the production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers was assumed to be in argon environments as measured by Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution. Previous experimental testing showed differences in the hydrogen generated based on the gaseous environment. In the associated experimental work, Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution, additional tests were completed in a helium environment, and updated G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. These values are 28% and 58% higher than values for argon. In addition, a change to the modeling of the oxyhydroxide radiolysis has been made from previous reports. This change assumes the dependency of the dose rate on the overall reaction rate is applied to the total weight of the sample, rather than to just the weight of the oxyhydroxide layer. This decreases the dependency of the radiolytic reaction on the thickness of the oxyhydroxide layer. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, assuming the chemi-/physio- sorbed water have been fully removed, the internal canister pressure increases to 1.61 atm over a 50 year period, with a hydrogen mole percentage of 21%. As in previous modeling, any oxygen present is in negligible amounts (<1 ppt). If a small amount residual air is present, nitric acid can form up to 1300 ppm. For a scenario with high fuel decay heat, the model shows internal pressure increasing to 2.1 atm, with 39.3 mole percentage of hydrogen. In a scenario where significant chemi-/physio- sorbed water is present within the corrosion layer, the nominal scenario shows a pressure increase to 2.54 atm, with 21.1 mole percent hydrogen. The high decay heat case shows a pressure increase to 3.18 atm with 39.9 mole percent hydrogen.

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DOE OSTI2023

FY23 Update: Aerosol Sampling for the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration

This report describes the results of preliminary testing of aerosol monitoring equipment that will be used to continuously monitor the aerosol source term for the multi-year Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (CDFD). These data are required inputs for the development and validation of models for the deposition of dust and potentially corrosive salts on the surface of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters. Surface salt loads correlate with the extent of corrosion damage on a metal surface, and potentially to the likelihood and timing of initiation of stress corrosion cracks. Aerosols will be monitored at the CDFD site using three instruments. A Dekati ® ELPI+ cascade impactor will be used for real-time monitoring of aerosol particle sizes. It will also collect dust in 14 size bins on impactor targets that can be chemically analyzed to determine the soluble salts present as a function of particle size. However, this instrument can only measure dried aerosols, with a diameter of <10 µm. The second instrument is a Topas laser particle size spectrometer, which provides real-time monitoring of aerosol particle sizes up to ~40 µm in size. It monitors both the ambient (potentially deliquesced) aerosol particle size distributions required for the dust deposition models and the distributions of the equivalent dried particles, allowing correlation with the Dekati ® data. However, it does not discriminate between inert dust particles and salt aerosols, and it does not retain samples of the different particle sizes for later analysis. The third instrument that will monitor aerosols at the CDFD site is a Clean Air Status and Trends Network (CASTNET) tower, which uses a multiple canister system to collect weekly samples for analysis to total suspended aerosol particle compositions and atmospheric gas concentrations. This status report describes work in FY23 to develop the capabilities for using these tools. In two training exercises, the cascade impactor and laser particle sizer were deployed in two different testing environments, one indoor and one outdoor. For the cascade impactor, the tests provided opportunities for the operators to familiarize themselves with impactor substrate preparation, and post-test sample removal and analysis. For the laser particle sizer, the tests were used to evaluate different instrument parameters, to determine the most appropriate settings for capturing transient events. Data and samples were collected for weeks to months for each test, and the results are presented here. In addition to the preliminary testing, contracts were developed with WSP Analytical Labs for sample preparation and analysis of the cascade impactor samples. The impactor tower from outdoor test was delivered to WSP and used to train the staff there in disassembly, sample extraction, sample analysis, and tower reassembly with new target substrates. These are tasks that WSP will be performing routinely for the CDFD project. The CASTNET system cannot be purchased or tested until an actual site has been selected for the CDFD test. Work for this FY has been restricted to preparation of contracts for purchasing the CASTNET tower, and for sample analysis, once the tower is in operation.

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DOE OSTI2024

An introduction to Spent Nuclear Fuel decay heat for Light Water Reactors: a review from the NEA WPNCS

This paper summarized the efforts performed to understand decay heat estimation from existing spent nuclear fuel (SNF), under the auspices of the Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Needs for precise estimations are related to safety, cost, and optimization of SNF handling, storage, and repository. The physical origins of decay heat (a more correct denomination would be decay power) are then introduced, to identify its main contributors (fission products and actinides) and time-dependent evolution. Due to limited absolute prediction capabilities, experimental information is crucial; measurement facilities and methods are then presented, highlighting both their relevance and our need for maintaining the unique current full-scale facility and developing new ones. The third part of this report is dedicated to the computational aspect of the decay heat estimation: calculation methods, codes, and validation. Different approaches and implementations currently exist for these three aspects, directly impacting our capabilities to predict decay heat and to inform decision-makers. Finally, recommendations from the expert community are proposed, potentially guiding future experimental and computational developments. One of the most important outcomes of this work is the consensus among participants on the need to reduce biases and uncertainties for the estimated SNF decay heat. If it is agreed that uncertainties (being one standard deviation) are on average small (less than a few percent), they still substantially impact various applications when one needs to consider up to three standard deviations, thus covering more than 95% of cases. The second main finding is the need of new decay heat measurements and validation for cases corresponding to more modern fuel characteristics: higher initial enrichment, higher average burnup, as well as shorter and longer cooling time. Similar needs exist for fuel types without public experimental data, such as MOX, VVER, or CANDU fuels. A third outcome is related to SNF assemblies for which no direct validation can be performed, representing the vast majority of cases (due to the large number of SNF assemblies currently stored, or too short or too long cooling periods of interest). A few solutions are possible, depending on the application. For the final repository, systematic measurements of quantities related to decay heat can be performed, such as neutron or gamma emission. This would provide indications of the SNF decay heat at the time of encapsulation. For other applications (short- or long-term cooling), the community would benefit from applying consistent and accepted recommendations on calculation methods, for both decay heat and uncertainties. This would improve the understanding of the results and make comparisons easier.

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DOE OSTI2021

Fracture toughness evaluations for spent nuclear fuel dry storage canister welds and spent nuclear fuel clad-pellet structures

Integrity of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) interim storage canisters is very important to the safety of the back-end nuclear fuel cycle. Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) potential of interim storage canister has been considered as a high priority. Because no post-weld heat treatment was required for forming these canisters, the high tensile residual stress existed within these canister welds. This can change the fracture resistance capacity significantly as well as increase SCC potential. Due to relative thin shell thickness of a canister weldment, the spiral notch torsion test (SNTT) method was used to estimate the canister weldment fracture toughness. SNTT was developed to measure the intrinsic fracture toughness of structural materials using small specimens. The SNTT method has been applied to a wide variety of structural materials, such as low-alloy steels, stainless steel, aluminum alloy, ceramics, concrete, and composites. The SNTT system operates by applying pure torsion to cylindrical specimens with a notch line that spirals around the specimen at a 45° pitch. In order to carry out pure torsion load mode, biaxial tension/torsion tester was developed accordingly to perform SNTT protocol. Moreover, applying fracture mechanics approach to SNF system reliability investigation is warranted due to the inherent flaws and hydride structures existed in a SNF system after nuclear reactor operation. However, none of the existing fracture toughness data deal with fuel cladding specific geometry or spent fuel material conditions, such as cladding structure with the pellet-inserts and the associated pellet clad mechanical interactions induced mixed-mode damage mechanisms. Thus, the development of an intrinsic fracture mechanics approach that is suitable for SNF materials is needed. Furthermore, due to thin wall and small dimension of clad tubing structure, the SNTT method was used to estimate the clad tubing structure fracture toughness. Fracture testing were performed on the received stainless steel canister weldment, most SNTT weld samples fracture initiation sites are at heat-affected zone (HAZ) regions. The estimated fracture toughness J Q ’ for the baseline SS304 steel is at 283 kJ/m². The estimated JQ’ for the SS304/308 weld and baseline metals are 148 kJ/m 2 and 459 kJ/m 2 , respectively. Out of cell fracture testing for spent fuel structure were carried out on the surrogate rods made of Zr-4 clad and alumina inserts, the estimated fracture toughness values for baseline Zr-4 cladding with alumina-pellet inserts are: (1) For SNTT samples with a short or medium crack length, between 5.4-mm and 8-mm, the estimate J IQ upon fracture initiation for the baseline Zr-4 cladding is at 50 kJ/m 2 with 2-sigma uncertainty of 3.26 kJ/m 2 , and the associated K IQ is at 67.46 MPa$\sqrt{m}$; and (2) For SNTT samples with a long crack length, around 13-mm, the crack initialization is deviated from that of the Mode-I tensile fracture and appears to be a mixed-mode fracture of Mode I - tensile stress and Mode III - out of plane shear stress; the estimated J MQ is at 18.9 kJ/m 2 , the associated K MQ is at 41.4 MPa$\sqrt{m}$.

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DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

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