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At least 595 records · Page 33

Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant

Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with ‘bolting on’ security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A 75 MW S-Band Klystron

This program performed computational and preliminary mechanical design for a klystron producing 75 MW at 2.856 GHz using periodic permanent magnet (PPM) focusing. The performance specifications achieved were those for the Matter-Radiation Interactions in the Extremes (MaRIE) project at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The klystron is designed to provide 10 microsecond pulses at 60 Hz with 56 dB gain. The PPM-Focusing eliminates requirements for solenoids and their associated power supplies, cooling systems, interlocks, control and diagnostic instrumentation, and maintenance. The represents a significant in both acquisition and operating costs. It also increases reliability by eliminating many potential failure modes.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Digital Architecture Planning Model

As part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, the Digital Architecture (DA) Project focuses on providing a model that nuclear utilities can refer to when planning deployment of advanced technologies. The digital architecture planning model (DAPM) is the methodology for mapping power plant operational and support activities into a DA that unifies all data sources needed by the utilities to operate their plants. The DA is defined as a collection of information technology capabilities needed to support and integrate a wide spectrum of real-time digital capabilities for performance improvements of nuclear power plants. DA can be thought of as integration of the separate instrumentation and control and information systems already in place in nuclear power plants, which are brought together for the purpose of creating new levels of automation in plant work activities. A major objective in DAPM development was to survey all key areas that needed to be reviewed in order for a utility to make knowledgeable decisions regarding needs and plans to implement a DA at the plant. The development was done in two steps. First, researchers surveyed the nuclear industry in order to learn their near-term plans for adopting new advanced capabilities and implementing a network (i.e., wireless and wire) infrastructure throughout the plant, including the power block. Secondly, a literature review covering regulatory documents, industry standards, and technical research reports and articles was conducted. The objective of the review was to identify key areas to be covered by the DAPM, which included the following: 1. The need for a DA and its benefits to the plant 2. Resources required to implement the DA 3. Challenges that need to be addressed and resolved to implement the DA 4. Roles and responsibilities of the DA implementation plan. The DAPM was developed based on results from the survey and the literature review. Model development, including the survey results and conclusions made about the key areas during the literature review, are described in this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

An Approach for Assessing Consequences of Potential Supply Chain and Insider Contributed Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

This paper provides an approach for developing potential attacks on I and C systems of NPPs and assessing their consequences. An important concept is that the NPPs were not designed to cope with Stuxnet-type of attacks (and any other cyber attacks). That is, the plants were only designed for design basis accidents. The safety margins and redundancies built in the design are all based on design basis accidents. They may be helpful in mitigating cyberattacks, but may not be adequate.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Model-Based Diagnostics and Mitigation of Cyber Threats

The report summarizes key tasks performed to develop a toolkit for detecting cyber-attack events in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. The toolkit connects the state-of-the-art GPWR Simulator with the RELAP5 code providing best-estimate nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) analyses, via the application programming interface (API), and allows users to introduce potential cyber-attack scenarios into power plant operational simulation. This summary for the project reflects topical reports submitted during the project as well as a journal paper published in 2022. The focus areas of the summary include: (1) modeling I&C systems for the AP1000 Generation III+ nuclear plant and GPWR simulator, (2) simulation and monitoring of plant response to cyber-attack events, (3) API structure for the toolkit interfacing the GPWR simulator and RELAP5 code, and (4) restructuring of the three-loop NSSS software of GPWR to model the two-loop AP1000 structure. Discussed in some details are (a) the attack tree analysis assessing the susceptibility of the AP1000 I&C system, resulting in reactor trips, in terms of the attack possibility and component sensitivity and (b) realistic estimation of the time to steam generator trip due to cyber-intrusions in the GPWR Simulator. Finally, sample demonstrations of the cyber-security tool kit, in the form of the GPWR-RELAP5 API, are summarized.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Technical Specification Surveillance Interval Extension Using Self-Diagnostics

As part of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability program, an ongoing research effort is being conducted on technical specifications surveillance interval extension of digital equipment in nuclear power plants. The research team is led by Idaho National Laboratory and includes Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Technology Resources, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This research focuses on developing methods for applying the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)–approved guidance to implement a licensee-controlled, risk-informed surveillance frequency change program in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems that include self-diagnostics and online monitoring (OLM) capabilities. Although approved methods exist for extending technical specifications (TS) surveillance test intervals (STIs) for general equipment, including analog I&C equipment, gaps remain in technology and guidance on crediting newer digital equipment’s internal self-diagnostics and OLM characteristics. Previous research described a general methodology for crediting internal self-diagnostics for extending surveillance test intervals. The methodology used self-diagnostics to detect—and credited recovery from—failure. Self-diagnostics were also applied for performance monitoring during the extended surveillance interval. This report discusses the status of recent activities to evaluate the previously developed methodology using a pilot study. Although both a utility partner for a pilot study and a specific digital asset were identified in FY2020, delays in obtaining proprietary information resulted in a limited ability to fully evaluate the methodology, and further interactions were complicated by the COVID pandemic. Therefore, at that time, the use of public-domain information—along with current processes for surveillance interval extension through a surveillance frequency control program—identified the need to fully assess diagnostic coverage as part of the pilot study. Furthermore, self-diagnostics were also identified as a potential option to replace the drift analyses conducted as part of current STI extension procedures. In FY2022, the project was reconstituted with the industry partner, and information and data were made available by the industry partner to the research team for review. The shared information included failure event descriptions and data for a digital I&C system since its implementation, as well as recent STI extension interval reports developed by the utility partner on that digital I&C system. This report presents an evaluation of this information and data and describes an application of the proposed methodology cited above. The methodology seeks to take advantage of the self-diagnostics and OLM capabilities to reduce risk or reduce the level of qualitative monitoring assessment needed to perform a risk-informed STI extension using existing NRC approved guidance or both. Addressing these issues of STI extension by crediting self-diagnostics is likely to result in benefits for current and future nuclear power plant (NPP) operations, including lowering the barriers to adoption of digital I&C systems and increasing cost savings by deferring or eliminating unneeded preventive maintenance (tasks or checks or activities). Specifically, self-diagnostic and OLM capabilities of newer digital equipment being installed in non-safety and safety applications are designed to detect failures, provide early warning of potential failures, and notify plant operators to take appropriate action to reduce out of service (OOS) time thus protecting safety margins. Moreover, the equipment is expected to provide information that time-related operational degradation is identified early to ensure timely and planned corrective actions instead of a reactive and unplanned approach ahead of an extended-surveillance interval.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Status Report on Regulatory Criteria Applicable to the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)

Although the interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in nuclear energy is increasing rapidly, at present their implementation is limited. This rapid increase in interest is not surprising considering that implementing AI and ML technology would allow for continuous monitoring, facilitate the implementation of predictive maintenance with optimized staffing plans, enable automation and autonomy opportunities that could drastically reduce fixed operation and maintenance costs, and provide training for operations and maintenance. Other industries are using AI for construction, and in the nuclear arena AI could provide great benefit in decommissioning activities. The ability of AI and ML to operate in real time vastly increases their potential impact. Before AI can be used in design, operations, or as a regulatory tool, the specifics on the regulations applicable to the use of AI for nuclear power applications need to be established. The difficulty is that the specific use cases will dictate the applicability of regulations. For example, even within the application domain associated with operations, the regulations might vary if the AI is used to create a virtual reference for plant operations or is used for training, optimization of maintenance intervals, prioritization of maintenance activities, etc. Different still is if the AI is to be used for design or setting technical specifications, which will introduce additional requirements. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing reviews are based on an applicant’s design meeting its performance assessment based on (1) safety goals and objectives, (2) deterministic and/or probabilistic analysis of accident scenarios, and (3) quantitative assessment of design alternatives against the safety goals and objectives using accepted engineering tools, methodologies, and performance criteria. The current regulatory framework does not explicitly address AI or autonomous control. However, as implementing AI technology will require the use of a digital platform, it must meet the requirements of an instrumentation and control (I&C) system. The regulatory requirements for AI, which will be incorporated into the I&C system, will be very dependent on how it is used (i.e., its functionality, safety classification, etc.). The licensing process is primarily risk-based with the identification of components and systems as nonsafety, important to safety, or safety related. A risk-informed approach allows further gradation of components and systems based on risk metrics such as core damage frequency or large early release fractions. Thus, the use cases and the risk categorization of impacted systems and components will determine the regulatory requirements. Regardless of how AI is used it presents new opportunities for risk-informing operating, maintenance, and regulatory decisions. Trustworthiness, transparency, and the ability to validate and verify the results will be paramount in showing that the systems and plant still meet their performance requirements. This report describes the results of research to identify regulatory implications of AI technologies and their uses. Specifically, this report reviews current regulatory guidance relevant to the application of AI for design (including design changes or new designs including advanced reactors), construction, operations, training, maintenance, research, testing, and as a regulatory tool. AI can be automated at different levels from purely informative purposes to autonomous controls. The focus of this review included determination of constraints on the application of AI technology, identification of any regulatory gaps or uncertainties, and clarification of anticipated technical basis information likely to be important for regulatory acceptance of these technologies. Currently, any use of AI at nuclear power plants is focused on nonsafety-related applications. The NRC and other regulatory bodies are evaluating providing guidance to address gaps rather than create new regulations to address the use of AI and ML. This approach seems to be the best to encourage AI development without adding regulatory uncertainty.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Complete Evaluation on Advanced Reactor Machine Learning Subversion Attacks (Final)

Navigating through the world of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in nuclear reactors and their Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems demands a careful, deliberate journey. AI’s capability to manage massive datasets and streamline control systems has indeed carved out a significant role in various sectors, including nuclear energy. However, while AI, and particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), bring a lot to the table in terms of operational efficiency and anomaly detection, they also expose the sector to a new breed of cybersecurity threats, like Inference Attacks, Adversarial Attacks, and Trojan Attacks. This guide is designed to be a straightforward manual, diving deep into the intertwining worlds of AI and cybersecurity within nuclear reactors, and tailoring insights for three crucial audiences: I&C Vendors/Developers, Nuclear Regulators, and Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams. (1) Section 2, directed at I&C Vendors/Developers, will provide a clear and focused look at several cybersecurity attacks, offering practical recommendations and detailed scenarios related to AI cybersecurity. This section isn’t just about identifying problems but also about giving solid, usable solutions. (2) Section 3, meant for Nuclear Regulators, gets straight to the point about regulations, policy suggestions, and guidelines that are needed to lay down a robust, secure, and ethical foundation for the application of AI in nuclear operations. The focus is on making sure that everything adheres to international standards and laws while being practicable and clear-cut. (3) Section 4, aimed at Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams, offers an exhaustive exploration and technical reports, with clear recommendations and scenario analyses vital to protect operational environments and guarantee the secure application of AI in nuclear reactor operations. The goal is simple: as we step into an era where AI becomes a fundamental element of our technological and energy infrastructures, this guide is here to act as a clear, direct handbook, ensuring that AI is implemented within the nuclear sector in a manner that is secure, responsible, and practical. It’s about striking a balance – optimizing the undeniable benefits offered by AI while securing and shielding against potential cyber threats as we move through this new and complex landscape.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human and Technology Integration Evaluation of Advanced Automation and Data Visualization

While the existing United States (U.S.) light water reactors are highly reliable, safe, and provide a significant proportion of carbon-free electricity, the cost of operating and maintaining them has become less competitive compared to other electricity generating sources. The reason for the gap in operating and maintenance (O&M) costs can be at least in part attributed to the advent of new digital technologies that other electricity generating industries are currently using. Advanced capabilities including digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, advanced automation and analytics, and greater span of data integration (i.e., connectedness) across these non-nuclear plants has transformed the way work is performed and ultimately given them a competitive advantage in terms of the cost required for operating, maintaining, and supporting them. To reduce O&M cost and address obsolescence of the aging I&C infrastructure of the existing U.S. light water reactors, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program Plant Modernization Pathway is conducting targeting multidisciplinary research that 1) delivers a sustainable business model to enable a cost-competitive U.S. nuclear industry and 2) is developing technology modernization solutions that address aging and obsolescence challenges. The work described in this report supports these two objectives and describes the demonstration of human and technology integration across recent industry collaborations to support their large-scale digital I&C modifications. This technical report describes the demonstration of the human and technology integration methodology in performing full-scale performance-based human-in-the-loop tests to evaluate plant-specific advanced automation and data visualization applications within these collaborators’ digital modifications. This technical report also documents future applications of human and technology integration that expand beyond main control room modernization and digital I&C upgrades, which have been a central focus to date. Thus, this technical report discusses how to implement human and technology integration across new business opportunities and how to develop an evaluation plan that defines measures and criteria, and documents key assumptions to support full plant modernization.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Digital-computer interface systems.

Digital computer interface systems design for simulation, control, instrumentation and data processing, discussing hybrid computer linkages

Korn, G. A.↗

Electronics Systems SRT

Guidance and control systems, communication, data acquisition, instrumentation, and electronics techniques for space application

Source record↗

Instruments and method of air navigation

Topics discussed include magnetic and astronavigation instruments; flight beyond ground visibility; aircraft radio navigation instruments and communication radio sets; instrument landing systems; and ground controlled landing systems.

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Instrumentation, control and data management for the MIST (Modular Integrated Utility System) Facility

An appendix providing the technical data required for computerized control and/or monitoring of selected MIST subsystems is presented. Specific computerized functions to be performed are as follows: (1) Control of the MIST heating load simulator and monitoring of the diesel engine generators' cooling system; (2) Control of the MIST heating load simulator and MIST heating subsystem including the heating load simulator; and (3) Control of the MIST air conditioning load simulator subsystem and the MIST air conditioning subsystem, including cold thermal storage and condenser water flows.

Celino, V. A.↗

Spacecraft induced error sources

The attitude control and measurement systems aboard the LANDSAT 2 and D satellites are described and associated errors are discussed. Also, the ephemeris errors from various tracking systems are examined. Use of the Global Positioning System and improved attitude control instruments is expected to greatly reduce the errors in LANDSAT D in comparison with previous LANDSATS.

Heuberger, H. S.↗

NASA supercritical laminar flow control airfoil experiment

The design and goals of experimental investigations of supercritical LFC airfoils conducted in the NASA Langley 8-ft Transonic Pressure Tunnel beginning in March 1982 are reviewed. Topics addressed include laminarization aspects; flow-quality requirements; simulation of flight parameters; the setup of screens, honeycomb, and sonic throat; the design cycle; theoretical pressure distributions and shock-free limits; drag divergence and stability analysis; and the LFC suction system. Consideration is given to the LFC airfoil model, the air-flow control system, airfoil-surface instrumentation, liner design and hardware, and test options. Extensive diagrams, drawings, graphs, photographs, and tables of numerical data are provided.

Harvey, W. D.↗

A survey of spacecraft thermal design solutions

A review of activities at the NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center in the heat transfer and thermodynamics disciplines as well as attendant fluid mechanics, transport phenomena, and computer science applications is presented. Attention is focused on recent activities including the Hubble Space Telescope, and large space instruments, particularly telescope thermal control systems such as those flown aboard Spacelab 2 and the Astro missions. Emphasis is placed on defining the thermal control features, unique design schemes, and performance of selected programs. Results obtained both by ground testing and analytical means, as well as flight and postflight data are presented.

Humphries, R.↗

STS-93 Flight Day 5 Highlights and Crew Activities

Columbia's crew began packing up experiments and preparing to return to Earth tomorrow with a touchdown planned for Kennedy Space Center at 10:20 p.m. CDT. Commander Eileen Collins and Pilot Jeff Ashby checked out the cockpit instruments, displays and flight control systems. They also test fired the 38 small steering jets. Everything was in good shape and ready for the trip back to Earth. Also, Collins and Ashby were joined by the rest of the crew for a press conference, fielding questions from reporters in Houston, Florida and Massachusetts.

Source record↗