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The long-term safety and performance analyses of the surface disposal facility for the Belgian category a waste at Dessel

ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, and its partners have developed long-term safety and performance analyses in the framework of the license application for a surface disposal facility for low level radioactive waste (category A waste) at Dessel, Belgium. This paper focusses on the methodology of the safety assessments and on key results from the application of this methodology. An overview is given (1) of the performance analyses for the containment safety function of the disposal system and (2) of the radiological impact analyses confirming that radiological impacts are below applicable reference values and constraints and leading to radiological criteria for the waste and the facility. In this discussion, multiple indicators for performance and safety are used to illustrate the multi-faceted nature of long-term performance and safety of the surface disposal. This contributes to the multiple lines of reasoning for confidence building that a positive decision to proceed to the next stage of construction is justified. (authors)

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Scenario development for safety assessment in deep geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel: A review

Radiation and radioactive substances result in the production of radioactive wastes which require safe management and disposal to avoid risks to human health and the environment. To ensure permanent safe disposal, the performance of a deep geological repository for radioactive waste is assessed against internationally agreed risk-based standards. Assessing postclosure safety of the future system's evolution includes screening of features, events, and processes (FEPs) relevant to the situation, their subsequent development into scenarios, and finally the development and execution of safety assessment (SA) models. Global FEP catalogs describe important natural and man-made repository system features and identify events and processes that may affect these features into the future. By combining FEPs, many of which are uncertain, different possible future system evolution scenarios are derived. Repository licensing should consider both the reference or “base” evolution as well as alternative futures that may lead to radiation release, pollution, or exposures. Scenarios are used to derive and consider both base and alternative evolutions, often through production of scenario-specific SA models and the recombination of their results into an assessment of the risk of harm. Furthermore, while the FEP-based scenario development process outlined here has evolved somewhat since its development in the 1980s, the fundamental ideas remain unchanged. A spectrum of common approaches is given here (e.g., bottom–up vs. top–down scenario development, probabilistic vs. bounding handling of uncertainty), related to how individual numerical models for possible futures are converted into a determination as to whether the system is safe (i.e., how aleatoric uncertainty and scenarios are integrated through bounding or Monte Carlo approaches).

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Revision of the Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation - 12510

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation governing low-level waste (LLW) disposal, 'Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste', 10 CFR Part 61, establishes a waste classification system based on the concentration of specific radionuclides contained in the waste. The regulation also states, at 10 CFR 61.55(a)(8), that, 'the concentration of a radionuclide (in waste) may be averaged over the volume of the waste, or weight of the waste if the units are expressed as nanocuries per gram'. The NRC's Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation provides guidance on averaging radionuclide concentrations in waste under 10 CFR 61.55(a)(8) when classifying waste for disposal. In 2007, the NRC staff proposed to revise the Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation. The Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation is an NRC guidance document for averaging and classifying wastes under 10 CFR 61. The Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation is used by nuclear power plants (NPPs) licensees and sealed source users, among others. In addition, three of the four U.S. LLW disposal facility operators are required to honor the Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation as a licensing condition. In 2010, the Commission directed the staff to develop guidance regarding large scale blending of similar homogenous waste types, as described in SECY-10-0043 as part of its Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation revision. The Commission is improving the regulatory approach used in the Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation by moving towards a making it more risk-informed and performance-based approach, which is more consistent with the agency's regulatory policies. Among the improvements to the Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation are more risk-informed limits for the sizes of sealed sources for safe disposal. Using more realistic intruder exposure scenarios, the suggested limits for Class B and C waste disposal of sealed sources, particularly Cs-137 and Co-60, have been increased. These suggested changes, and others in the Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation, if adopted by Agreement States, have the potential to eliminate numerous orphan sources (i.e., sources that currently have no disposal pathway) that are now being stored. Permanent disposal of these sources, rather than temporary storage, will help reduce safety and security risks. The revised Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation has an alternative approach section which provides flexibility to generators and processors, while also ensuring that intruder protection will be maintained. Alternative approaches provide flexibility by allowing for consideration of likelihood of intrusion, the possibility of averaging over larger volumes and allowing for disposal of large activity sources. The revision has improved the organization of the Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation, improved its clarity, better documented the bases for positions, and made the positions more risk informed while also maintaining protection for intruder as required by 10 CFR Part 61. (authors)

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Evaluation of Low-Level Waste Disposal Receipt Data for Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility - Fiscal Year 2011

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) generates radioactive waste as a result of various activities. Operational or institutional waste is generated from a wide variety of research and development activities including nuclear weapons development, energy production, and medical research. Environmental restoration (ER), and decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) waste is generated as contaminated sites and facilities at LANL undergo cleanup or remediation. The majority of this waste is low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and is disposed of at the Technical Area 54 (TA-54), Area G disposal facility. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 (DOE, 2001) requires that radioactive waste be managed in a manner that protects public health and safety, and the environment. To comply with this order, DOE field sites must prepare and maintain site-specific radiological performance assessments for LLW disposal facilities that accept waste after September 26, 1988. Furthermore, sites are required to conduct composite analyses that account for the cumulative impacts of all waste that has been (or will be) disposed of at the facilities and other sources of radioactive material that may interact with the facilities. Revision 4 of the Area G performance assessment and composite analysis was issued in 2008 (LANL, 2008). These analyses estimate rates of radionuclide release from the waste disposed of at the facility, simulate the movement of radionuclides through the environment, and project potential radiation doses to humans for several on-site and off-site exposure scenarios. The assessments are based on existing site and disposal facility data and on assumptions about future rates and methods of waste disposal. The accuracy of the performance assessment and composite analysis depends upon the validity of the data used and assumptions made in conducting the analyses. If changes in these data and assumptions are significant, they may invalidate or call into question certain aspects of the analyses. For example, if the volumes and activities of waste disposed of during the remainder of the disposal facility's lifetime differ significantly from those projected, the doses projected by the analyses may no longer apply. DOE field sites are required to implement a performance assessment and composite analysis maintenance program. The purpose of this program is to ensure the continued applicability of the analyses through incremental improvement of the level of understanding of the disposal site and facility. Site personnel are required to conduct field and experimental work to reduce the uncertainty in the data and models used in the assessments. Furthermore, they are required to conduct periodic reviews of waste receipts, comparing them to projected waste disposal rates. The radiological inventory for Area G was updated in conjunction with Revision 4 of the performance assessment and composite analysis (Shuman, 2008). That effort used disposal records and other sources of information to estimate the quantities of radioactive waste that have been disposed of at Area G from 1959, the year the facility started receiving waste on a routine basis, through 2007. It also estimated the quantities of LLW that will require disposal from 2008 through 2044, the year in which it is assumed that disposal operations at Area G will cease. This report documents the fourth review of Area G disposal receipts since the inventory was updated and examines information for waste placed in the ground during fiscal years (FY) 2008 through 2011. The primary objective of the disposal receipt review is to ensure that the future waste inventory projections developed for the performance assessment and composite analysis are consistent with the actual types and quantities of waste being disposed of at Area G. Toward this end, the disposal data that are the subject of this review are used to update the future waste inventory projections for the disposal facility. These projections are compared to the future inventory projections that were developed for Revision 4 of the performance assessment and composite analysis. The approach used to characterize the FY 2008 through 2011 waste is generally the same as that used to characterize the inventory for the Revision 4 analyses (Shuman, 2008). This methodology is described in Section 2. The results of the disposal receipt review are presented in Section 3 and discussed in terms of their significance to the Area G analyses.

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A Conceptual World Information Library (WIL) and Land Use Information System (LUIS) - 16181

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency initiative on the Preservation of Records, Knowledge and Memory is addressing the topic of communicating with future generations on the location, specific contents, and potential risks associated with deep geologic nuclear waste repositories. At the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in the United States, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has committed, prior to the facility closure, to develop a Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) program designed to last as long as practicable. A portion of this PICs program includes development of records packages, selection of data storage materials and methods, and a determination of records retention/storage locations. The approved plan for record retention at WIPP includes the storage of information including hard copies of data, figures and maps in multiple libraries and archive record centers. With this in mind, it is easy to envision reams of various paper documents in a robust physical archive record center similar to one of the museums in Washington D.C., or DOE's Legacy Management facility in Morgantown, West Virginia. While some portion of records for nuclear waste burial sites should be maintained in this fashion for near-term retrieval purposes, it is widely accepted that this is not an efficient way to communicate with future generations even 1,000 years from now. Transmitting large detailed volumes of information to the future should be captured in an electronic format; maintained on computers, translated by computers, and perhaps updated by artificial intelligence as machine and human languages change over the centuries. In addition to a physical records development and storage process for transmittal to future generations, a web-based electronic database system should be developed. A World Electronic Library (WEL) database could be funded from various nations and perhaps sanctioned by the United Nations and/or the IAEA. This WEL could contain information regarding several different subjects with the intent of being a one-stop-information-shop for future generations. This database would require updates and maintenance for as long as there is a recipient. One subset of the WEL would be a spatial database containing all the information available to any set of GPS coordinates, anywhere within the world. This Land Use Information System (LUIS) database would contain information on past and present land use, natural resources, known geology, hydrology and atmospheric conditions, potential warnings, and other pertinent information. The LUIS database is where specific electronic information, a subset of all the records data gathered for a nuclear waste repository, could reside. For not only would LUIS provide the information on a nuclear waste repository when specific GPS coordinates were entered; but a search from the LUIS on 'Nuclear Waste Repositories' could bring up information, including data on location of repositories, radionuclides, operations, D and D, maps, and regulations, plus many other details for locations throughout the world. This tool could be used by future generations for a number of land use or resource exploration decisions. So what can we do now? We can agree to the types of information that should be captured into an electronic database for nuclear waste repositories. We can agree to the levels of detail, the file names and the formats, for ease of combining information sets in the future. Perhaps we can agree to a central electronic data storage site, or sites, where this information will reside for import into a centralized electronic record system, if one is ever developed. (authors)

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Stakeholder Engagement on the Environmental Impact Statement for the Disposal of Greater-Than-Class C Low-Level Radioactive Waste -12565

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Disposal Operations is responsible for developing a permanent disposal capability for a small volume, but highly radioactive, class of commercial low-level radioactive waste, known as Greater-Than-Class C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste. DOE has issued a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) and will be completing a final EIS under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that evaluates a range of disposal alternatives. Like other classes of radioactive waste, proposing and evaluating disposal options for GTCC waste is highly controversial, presents local and national impacts, and generates passionate views from stakeholders. Recent national and international events, such as the cancellation of the Yucca Mountain project and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, have heighten stakeholder awareness of everything nuclear, including disposal of radioactive waste. With these challenges, the Office of Disposal Operations recognizes that informed decision-making that will result from stakeholder engagement and participation is critical to the success of the GTCC EIS project. This paper discusses the approach used by the Office of Disposal Operations to engage stakeholders on the GTCC EIS project, provides advice based on our experiences, and proffers some ideas for future engagements in today's open, always connected cyber environment. (authors)

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Effect of low-level radioactive waste leachate on antioxidant depletion in HDPE geo-membranes - 15135

Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed waste (MW) disposal facilities in the US are required to have a service life in excess of 1000 yr. Understanding the rate of degradation of high-density polyethylene (HDPE) geo-membranes (GMs) used in barriers of LLW and MW facilities is necessary to assess their service life. HDPE GMs undergo degradation in three stages: antioxidant depletion (Stage I), induction time (stage II), and polymer degradation (Stage III). For LLW and MW facilities, these degradation mechanisms must be assessed with the GM in contact with leachates representative of LLW or MW. This paper focuses on antioxidant depletion in LLW leachate. HDPE GM coupons (2-mm thick) were immersed in radioactive synthetic leachate (RSL) with chemistry representative of leachate in LLW disposal facilities operated by the US Department of Energy's environmental restoration programs. Depletion was assessed at four temperatures (25, 50, 70, and 90 deg.C). Comparative tests were conducted with non-radioactive synthetic leachate (NSL), which has the same chemistry as RSL except radionuclides are excluded. Control tests were conducted with deionized (DI) water. Specimens were removed periodically and tested to determine their mechanical and chemical properties. Antioxidant depletion was measured by both standard and high-pressure oxidative induction time (OIT) tests. The rate of antioxidant depletion in RSL is statistically no different than depletion in NSL. Extrapolating the laboratory data at elevated temperatures to a typical LLW liner at 15 deg.C via Arrhenius modeling showed that the time for antioxidant depletion for a GM in a composite liner is approximately 650 yr when exposed to LLW leachate. Actual service life of the GM will be longer. (authors)

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Current status of R and D activities and future plan and role of JAEA's two generic URLs - 15356

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has promoted R and D on geological disposal technology contribute to the implementation and safety regulation for high-level radioactive waste(HLW) disposal. JAEA launched two purpose-built generic URL projects to cover the diversity of geological environments in Japan, in accordance with 'Long-Term Program for Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy' published in 1994 by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. One is the Mizunami URL Project started in 1996. The Mizunami URL Project is a comprehensive geo-scientific research project investigating the deep underground environment within crystalline rock at Mizunami City in Gifu Prefecture, central Japan. The other one is the Horonobe URL Project started in 2001. The Horonobe URL Project consists of two major research areas, geo-scientific studies and R and D on geological disposal technology in the sedimentary rock environment at Horonobe Town in Hokkaido Prefecture, northern Japan. Both of the URL projects have been planned to proceed in three overlapping phases, 'Phase I: Surface-based investigation', 'Phase II: Construction' and 'Phase III: Operation', with a total duration of about 20 years. Currently, the construction of research galleries in both of the Mizunami and the Horonobe URLs has been completed to 500 m and 350 m depths, respectively. R and D activities in Phase III are being conducted at both URLs. According to the latest five-year plan, announced in September 2014, JAEA will promote R and D activities in Phase III including study of the effects of long-term evolution of the geological environment on geological characteristics such as groundwater flow and chemistry for reducing the uncertainty inherent in the evaluation of the long-term stability of the geological environment. This has been a very critical issue for HLW geological disposal in Japan after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. Furthermore, JAEA will contribute to international cooperation especially with countries having a similar geological environment such as those in the Circum-Pacific area, development of human resources and communication amongst stakeholders through the generic URL projects. (authors)

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Analysis of the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14349

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls will ensure that all waste packages are sub-critical, and the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is prevented for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages begin to degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Therefore, the possibility for the evolution of conditions in a GDF to result in criticality requires assessment. RWM established the 'Likelihood of Criticality' research project to develop qualitative and quantitative arguments to demonstrate that criticality after closure of a GDF is unlikely. The project included consideration of the criticality safety of disposal concepts for intermediate and high level waste, spent fuel, separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in different generic geological settings. The results are underpinned by the construction of post-closure criticality scenarios that have been evaluated using high-level judgments about scenario credibility as well as modelling of evolving conditions in a GDF. In the latter case, a probabilistic modelling approach has been undertaken to address uncertainty in the calculation of concentrations and masses of fissile material that could occur at potential accumulation sites. The potential for criticality has been judged based on comparisons of the calculated fissile masses with minimum values required for criticality at different locations in the barrier system. This paper explains the novel approach taken to evaluating the likelihood of criticality in a GDF based on the probabilistic modelling of waste package evolution and plutonium and uranium migration. The role of this research in RWM's work to demonstrate the criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper, which also draws on the results of a parallel research project that demonstrates that, even if a criticality were to occur, then its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. (authors)

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Radioactive Waste Management Complex Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Low-Level Waste (INEL11006367N, Revision 4 [INL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL RWMC Low-Level Waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The INL RWMC Low-Level Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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German research and development for high level waste in light of the new site selection process - 15516

The German government decided 50 years ago, that radioactive waste is to be disposed of in Deep Geologic Repositories, preferably in a salt rock formation. Soon after, in 1967, research in the Asse salt mine was initiated. Since then substantial progress has been achieved in the development of the radioactive waste disposal programme in Germany. For a geologic repository for High Level Waste in salt a reference concept has been developed, which represented the radioactive waste management processes from transport of High Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel to an interim storage site, waste conditioning and repackaging for disposal, to emplacement of the waste packages. The feasibility of the reference concept has been proven by demonstration tests for all relevant equipment: a pilot conditioning plant has been built as well as the main equipment for the entire transport chain including the shaft transport and emplacement technologies for heavy loads fulfilling strict requirements for nuclear and mining safety. Also the backfilling technology has been optimised for the purposes of a repository for radioactive waste. Finally, tests have been performed to verify thermo-mechanical models for the host rock. The demonstration tests have been performed to an extent which even would allow immediate licensing of the repository and the employed equipment. The Research and Development work was completed by further optimisation of the reference concept. Construction and operation of deep geologic repositories for low and intermediate level radioactive wastes in Germany benefited from the above mentioned but also stimulated the knowledge and experience build-up for the repositories for High Level Waste. Despite the well progressed work for a deep geologic repository in salt R and D work in Germany for already a long time also considered other host rock formations. While work for crystalline rock mainly consisted of relatively small contributions to international research projects due to the limited occurrence of suitable sites in Germany, projects and developments for repositories in clay formations have had an increasing contribution to the overall Research and Development work for radioactive waste repositories in Germany. In July 2013 a new site selection act was put into force, which set the initiating conditions for the German programme on radioactive waste management. Principally, a process was initiated to search for a site for a deep geologic repository for High Level Waste independent from earlier decisions. This means that a site shall be determined without predetermination by earlier decisions. Nevertheless, to enable a sound decision for a site selection it is necessary to be able draw back on the knowledge and experience from earlier activities. Otherwise, tedious learning processes would have to be experienced again. Since efforts to open up a site selection process again grew since the late 1990's projects had been implemented timely to capture existing knowledge. The paper at hand describes the achievements of R and D activities in Germany, the change of radioactive waste management policy and the endeavours to maintain the achievements. (authors)

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Understanding the consequences of hypothetical post-closure transient criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14439

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher-activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety for the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal all waste packages will be safely sub-critical. Containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is not possible for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Although the likelihood of a critical configuration developing is demonstrably low, it cannot be assumed to be zero over long post-closure timescales. The UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation for a GDF includes a specific requirement to consider the consequences of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. RWM has undertaken a programme of research to model and understand the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events. Initially focused on the scenario of fissile material relocation and accumulation following intermediate level waste (ILW) disposal, two bespoke computer models were developed. The quasi-steady-state (QSS) model considered critical systems maintained by accumulation of fissile materials where the temperature feedback remains negative throughout the transient. The rapid transient model (RTM) considered systems with positive temperature feedback. The QSS model development included a successful comparison with the Oklo natural reactors. With a requirement to consider post-closure criticality for a wider range of potential waste types under different illustrative disposal concepts, the initial transient criticality models had some limitations. For the QSS model this was the assumption of fixed geometry, while the complex functional inputs required in the RTM were not readily available for different materials. For the QSS model this paper describes the model development to allow changing volume; this has enabled its application to 'what-if' scenarios of flooding within a spent fuel waste package and the slumping of a stack of ILW packages. For rapid transient criticality this paper explains how the development of a simpler 'bounding approach' model to complement the RTM has enabled transient criticality analysis for a wider range of host materials. The role of this research in demonstrating post-closure criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper which also draws on the results of a parallel research project to demonstrate that the likelihood of post-closure criticality is low. (authors)

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Feasibility of Using Steel Drums for the Confinement of Burned Low-Level Radioactive Waste Ashes

The selection of suitable materials to construct a facility for the final disposal of radioactive wastes (repository) is a challenge in materials science, since these facilities must be designed to provide confinement to the radionuclides for long periods of time. In the case of the low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) repository, the confinement of the species must be guaranteed for more than 300 years. In this context, the evaluation of the proposed materials must be performed under accelerated laboratory tests. One type of LLRW consists of ashes that result from the incineration of solid combustible radioactive waste. In Argentina, one of the proposed projects is to place these ashes inside steel drums and immobilized them by a cementation process. The issue to be resolved is whether the steel drums will undergo internal corrosion depending on the presence of certain deleterious species. The aim of the present work is to evaluate the corrosion susceptibility of steel drums containing simulated cemented incineration ashes. To this purpose, a special type of specimen was designed and the corrosion process was followed up for almost 4 years. It was found that, although the deleterious effect of chloride is undeniable, corrosion rates are not as high as to compromise the integrity of the steel drums for a design period of 300 years.

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Conception and Operation of a New Treatment Center for Radioactive Waste from High Energy Accelerators - 18293

CERN has operated high-energy accelerators for more than 60 years of research in fundamental physics. The side-product of this activity is the generation of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, most of which is in solid form and free of surface contamination. Today, one operational year produces about 400 tons of radioactive waste which need to be disposed of towards the final repositories of the two CERN Host States, France and Switzerland. A new facility for the collection, interim storage, characterization and treatment of radioactive waste became operational at CERN in 2015. This facility was specifically conceived for an accelerator complex with a wide range of challenging waste items, which are often unique in their irradiation history as well as in their physical, chemical and radiological characteristics. The disposal rate was ramped up in 2016 with a unique treatment process tailored for metallic low-level waste. In 2017, two parallel processes were successfully tested for the elimination of radioactive cables and for the recycling of valuable metals. This paper gives an overview of the challenges in the design, commissioning and operation of the CERN radioactive waste treatment center. It outlines the methodology followed for the conception of the elimination processes, which can be of guidance for the development of similar facilities. (authors)

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Numerical simulation of coupled THM behaviour of full-scale EBS in backfilled experimental gallery in the Horonobe URL

Bentonite-based engineered barrier system (EBS) is a key component of many repository designs for the geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste. Given the complexity and interaction of the phenomena affecting the barrier system, coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical (THM) numerical analyses are a potentially useful tool for a better understanding of their behaviour. In this context, a Task (the Horonobe EBS experiment) was undertaken to study, using numerical analyses, the thermo-hydro-mechanical (and thermo-hydro) interactions in bentonite based engineered barriers within the international cooperative project DECOVALEX 2023. One full-scale in-situ experiment and four laboratory experiments, largely complementary, were selected for modelling. The Horonobe EBS experiment is a temperature-controlled non-isothermal experiment combined with artificial groundwater injection. The Horonobe EBS experiment consists of the heating and cooling phases. Six research teams performed the THM or TH (depended on research team approach) numerical analyses using a variety of computer codes, formulations and constitutive laws. Finally, for each experiment, the basic features of the analyses are described and the comparison between calculations and laboratory experiments and field observations are presented and discussed.

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RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection provides facility information on the design, processes, and security features associated with the Cell 18 Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU) at the Nevada National Security Site, under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). Onsite and offsite containerized low-level mixed waste (LLMW) that has an approved DOE nexus, DOE non-radioactive classified hazardous waste, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agency non-radioactive classified hazardous waste (hereafter called waste) are disposed in the unit. Classified waste is the only non-radioactive waste accepted for disposal and is required to meet waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste. The MWDU is located in the southeast portion of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The RWMC includes transuranic waste storage units, breaching and re-packaging facilities, and the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The RWMS is an active disposal site for waste. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and friable and non-friable asbestos are accepted for disposal. The MWDU has been compliantly operating since January 26, 2011, and approximately 60 percent of its capacity has been used for disposal. In addition to the requirements of the RCRA, the MWDU is also subject to DOE orders, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (for receipt of offsite waste), and State of Nevada requirements. General information and hazardous waste codes identified for disposal at the MWDU are described. State-only designated hazardous waste may also be received at the NNSS as hazardous waste. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

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Developments in the Regulatory Framework of Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in Germany - 17374

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license, granted by the competent authority in this field, which has been the Federal Office of Radiation Protection (BfS) until July 2016 and currently is the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE). A first license was granted in 1983 for storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and vitrified high level waste (HAW) at the interim storage facility in Gorleben. This license was reviewed in 1995. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its current form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the NPP Lingen. Since that time at each site of an operational NPP storage facilities were licensed and erected. Thus additionally to the three central storage facilities (Ahaus, Gorleben and Rubenow) there are now 12 storage facilities onsite the NPPs. All of these facilities use dry storage in metallic dual purpose casks (DPCs). The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years after closing the transport and storage cask. The first license to expire will be the storage license for the interim storage facility in Gorleben in the year 2034. The German 'Programme for the safe and responsible management of spent fuel and radioactive waste' expects to take the disposal facility into operation in the year 2050. Thus necessary preparations for interim storage till that time have to be taken on the side of the regulator. In the German Atomic Energy Act precautions have already been taken and a consulting of the German parliament (Bundestag) is mandatory if inevitable events would require an extension of currently licensed interim storage period. In the year 2016, the regulatory body in Germany was given a new structure. The BfS was formerly competent authority in the field of radiation protection since 1989. It had competencies for ionizing and non-ionizing radiation protection (e.g. mobile phone radiation, high voltage power lines and the effects of electric fields), licensing storage of spent nuclear fuel and as the operator of facilities for final disposal. Now there is a new structure with two Federal Offices (BfS and BfE) and a federal company for final disposal (BGE). The BfE is responsible for regulation in the field of nuclear disposal since 30.07.2016. So the package design approval for DPCs and the storage licenses for SNF are now granted by this office. The search for a repository site will be coordinated there as well. The site selection, construction and operation of the repository will be in the responsibility of BGE. The parts of the former BfS dealing with recovery of the waste from Asse (a former salt mine used for disposal research) and the construction of the repository Konrad (for low and medium level radioactive waste) will be transferred into that company. It is planned to incorporate the German company for construction and management of waste disposal facilities (DBE) which is owned by the German utilities as well. The BfS will focus on the scientific foundations and further advancement of radiation protection. (authors)

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