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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 595 records · Page 33
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Intrinsic use control for system and use controlled component security

An Initialization Unit (IU) initiates an initial secure connection with an Intrinsic Use Control (IUC) Chip based on very large random numbers (VLRNs). The IUC Chip in turn initiates a secondary secure connection between it and one or more Use Controlled Components (UCCs). Polling by the IU allows confirmation of an ongoing secure connection, and also allows the IUC Chip to confirm the secondary secure connection to the UCCs. Removal or improper polling response from one of the UCCs results in a response from the IUC Chip that may include notification of tampering, or temporary or permanent discontinued operation of the offending UCC. Permanent discontinued operation may include destruction of the offending UCC, and cascaded discontinued operation of all other UCCs secured by the IUC Chip. A UCC may in turn be another nested layer of IUC Chips, controlling a corresponding layer of UCCs, ad infinitum.

Hart, Mark Miles↗
DOE OSTI2021

Communication system and method for applying security for a time sensitive network

A method includes identifying power connections between plural components of a time sensitive network (TSN) that are interconnected via a predetermined connection plan. The method also includes determining a topology of the components of the TSN based on the power connections. Also, the method includes scheduling flows for the TSN based on the topology determined based on the power connections.

Bush, Stephen Francis↗
DOE OSTI2022

Achieving American Leadership in the Hydrogen Supply Chain Factsheet

Hydrogen has been identified as a key energy option to enable full decarbonization of the energy system. A secure, resilient supply chain will be critical to achieving emissions reductions and capturing the economic opportunity inherent in the energy sector transition. Electrolyzers and fuel cells are two critical components of the hydrogen supply chain that today are largely nascent industries with limited data on supply chain needs and constraints. This fact sheet summarizes findings from an accompanying report that is one in a series of deep dive assessments of the energy industrial base called for in Executive Order 14017 on America’s supply chains. The report identifies key considerations for the development of water electrolyzer and fuel cell supply chains and materials, focusing on polymer electrolyte and solid oxide technologies, to meet future demand for hydrogen produced by electrolysis and achieve U.S. decarbonization goals.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2022

CyTRICS: Vulnerability Analysis Tailored for Critical Infrastructure

Society and modern life are dependent on critical infrastructure that is composed of expensive, special purpose devices that have long life cycles and may be in use for decades before being replaced. There are an abundance of organizations and individuals doing vulnerability analysis on a variety of systems, but what makes the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program unique and valuable is its strategic focus on high-priority critical infrastructure, close partnership with vendors, and ability to leverage bills of materials (BOMs) to identify and relate vulnerabilities to affected systems. Creating a bill of materials is a formal way of understanding and documenting the components of a system, including everything from integrated circuits to operating systems to third-party libraries. This is beneficial for connecting known vulnerabilities to affected devices, since vulnerabilities in a specific component are often not mapped to all systems that use that vulnerable component. Additionally, CyTRICS finds novel vulnerabilities through its vulnerability testing process and works closely with vendor partners to provide vulnerability reports so that affected systems can be patched in a timely manner. This presentation will describe the interrelated technical processes CyTRICS uses to create bills of materials and conduct vulnerability analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Real-time supervisory control implementation of SmAHTR power plant - 143

This paper discusses an implementation of a supervisory control system for a nuclear power plant model using Small modular Advanced High Temperature Reactors (SmAHTR). The simulation operates in real-time using a network of computer agents, implemented on Raspberry Pi's (RPi's), where each major task is performed by one or more RPi's running calculations in parallel. The system architecture contains local, module, master, and operator actions to automate all aspects of the plant. Local level controllers run individual control loops to ensure the desired reference signals are met. The module level controllers set the local level reference signals within each SMR unit and detect sensor and actuator failures to adjust those reference signals as needed. Master level controllers balance plant power by calculating required heat power from each reactor and electric power from each generator and sending that data to the module controllers. Finally, the operator level contains an operator interface to summarize data and faults gathered through the controller levels, with options to review plant and reactor details as desired. This control implementation allows the plant to run autonomously, load follow a desired electrical power curve, and detect a growing number of fault scenarios. Ultimately, this type of supervisory control system will reduce labor-intensive surveillance and testing and allow fewer operators to more safely monitor an entire plant. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Opdefender Network Monitoring And Control System

OpDefender is a new system designed to enhance the cyber security of control system networks. It accomplishes this by inspecting each network packet using a novel, patent-pending method that extends software defined networking into the application/ICS protocol layer. OpDefender consists of two key components: 1. Smart, “ICS-aware” network switches that analyze and filter network traffic in real time. 2. A network management human machine interface (HMI) that allows an operator to monitor and control network traffic in real time. The “ICS-aware” switches can serve as a drop-in replacement for typical network switches, or they can be used in conjunction with existing network switches. OpDefender is configured and controlled in real time via a custom-built, web-based HMI designed with the operator in mind.

Johnson, BriamE.↗
DOE OSTI2018

E Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System Quarterly Monitoring Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada Water Pollution Control Permit NEV 96021, Third Quarter 2018

This report includes the results of the E Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System (ETDS) inspections and monitoring for July, August, and September 2018. Monitoring and sampling activities were performed in accordance with the requirements of Water Pollution Control Permit NEV 96021, Revision 1, effective October 1, 2013. Monthly monitoring was conducted on July 16, August 13, and September 13, 2018. Operating personnel measured the instantaneous flow rate (see Table 1), log hydrogen ion activity (pH), temperature, and specific conductance of the discharge water (see Table 2). Monthly inspections also included an assessment of the general condition of the berms, including ponding (the water levels relative to the overflow pipes); any tunneling or burrowing into the berms; soil conditions on and around the berms, including erosion or sloughing of the interior or exterior slopes of the berms; seeps at the toe of the berms; the presence of any deep-rooting botanicals on the berms; and the physical condition of fencing (see Tables 3 through 7). Monthly rainfall quantities are presented in Table 8.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

An Automated, Disruption-Tolerant Device Authentication and Key Management Framework for Critical Systems

Key management is critical to secure operation. Distributed control systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, have unique operational requirements that make conventional key management solutions less effective and burdensome. In this paper a novel Kerberos based framework for automated, disruption-tolerant key management for control system environments is presented. Experimental tests and their results are presented to quantify expected performance overhead of this approach. In addition, Zeek sensor analytics are presented to monitor the health and security of the key management framework operation.

Edgar, Thomas W.↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Automated Disruption-Tolerant Key Management Framework for Critical Systems

Key management is critical to secure operation. Distributed control systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, have unique operational requirements that make conventional key management solutions less effective and burdensome. This paper presents a novel Kerberos-based framework for automated, disruption-tolerant key management for control system environments. Here, experimental tests and their results are presented to quantify the expected performance overhead of this approach. Additionally, Zeek sensor analytics are presented to aid in monitoring the health and security of the key management framework operation.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Forming IDEAS: Interactive Data Exploration & Analysis System

Modern cyber security operations collect an enormous amount of logging and alerting data. While analysts have the ability to query and compute simple statistics and plots from their data, current analytical tools are too simple to admit deep understanding. To detect advanced and novel attacks, analysts turn to manual investigations. While commonplace, current investigations are time-consuming, intuition-based, and proving insufficient. Our hypothesis is that arming the analyst with easy-to-use data science tools will increase their work efficiency, provide them with the ability to resolve hypotheses with scientific inquiry of their data, and support their decisions with evidence over intuition. To this end, we present our work to build IDEAS (Interactive Data Exploration and Analysis System). We present three real-world use-cases that drive the system design from the algorithmic capabilities to the user interface. Finally, a modular and scalable software architecture is discussed along with plans for our pilot deployment with a security operation command.

Bridges, Robert↗