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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 595 records · Page 33

Use of Virtual Mission Operations Center Technology to Achieve JPDO's Virtual Tower Vision

The Joint Program Development Office has proposed that the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) consolidate control centers. NGATS would be managed from a few strategically located facilities with virtual towers and TRACONS. This consolidation is about combining the delivery locations for these services not about decreasing service. By consolidating these locations, cost savings in the order of $500 million have been projected. Evolving to spaced-based communication, navigation, and surveillance offers the opportunity to reduce or eliminate much of the ground-based infrastructure cost. Dynamically adjusted airspace offers the opportunity to reduce the number of sectors and boundary inconsistencies; eliminate or reduce "handoffs;" and eliminate the distinction between Towers, TRACONS, and Enroute Centers. To realize a consolidation vision for air traffic management there must be investment in networking. One technology that holds great potential is the use of Virtual Mission Operations Centers to provide secure, automated, intelligent management of the NGATS. This paper provides a conceptual framework for incorporating VMOC into the NGATS.

Ivancic, William D.↗

Telescience Resource Kit Software Capabilities and Future Enhancements

The Telescience Resource Kit (TReK) is a suite of PC-based software applications that can be used to monitor and control a payload on board the International Space Station (ISS). This software provides a way for payload users to operate their payloads from their home sites. It can be used by an individual or a team of people. TReK provides both local ground support system services and an interface to utilize remote services provided by the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC). by the POIC and to perform local data functions such as processing the data, storing it in local files, and forwarding it to other computer systems. TReK can also be used to build, send, and track payload commands. In addition to these features, work is in progress to add a new command management capability. This capability will provide a way to manage a multi- platform command environment that can include geographically distributed computers. This is intended to help those teams that need to manage a shared on-board resource such as a facility class payload. The environment can be configured such that one individual can manage all the command activities associated with that payload. This paper will provide a summary of existing TReK capabilities and a description of the new command management capability. For example, 7'ReK can be used to receive payload data distributed

Schneider, Michelle↗

Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US

The characterization and quantification of nuclear deposits, or residual nuclear material retained in process equipment, generally referred to as holdup, continues to challenge nuclear processing facilities in DOE program areas such as nuclear criticality safety, material control and accountability, environmental management. The efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear operations in these facilities depends heavily on the results from nondestructive techniques designed to measure nuclear materials in situ. The traditional methods used to measure holdup were established more than 30 years ago and assume unrealistic conditions for most measurement cases. These blind, in situ measurements present unique challenges due to the following attributes: unique, non-ideal geometries; unknown deposit thicknesses; lack of representative calibration standards; large number of holdup deposit locations; and poor accessibility for many measurement locations. These difficulties and the poor assumptions made to handle them have resulted in measurement uncertainties that are often too large for many programs to effectively utilize. In an effort to address and identify solutions to the current holdup challenges facing the US nuclear industry, Oak Ridge National Laboratory hosted the Technical Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US. The two-day workshop held August 21–22, 2019, was attended by 35 holdup measurement practitioners, program managers, stakeholders from US Department of Energy sites, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and representatives from commercial industry. The primary objectives were to identify critical elements of a successful and defensible holdup measurement program; identify technical challenges, needs, and potential improvements associated with measurement of holdup; and share best practices and lessons learned from recent accumulation events. Fourteen presentations were delivered on holdup topics including necessary elements for effective program management, measurement needs, emerging technologies and other measurement solutions, and lessons learned from recent events. These presentations highlighted best practices related to accumulation monitoring, considerations and proactive steps to facilitate holdup in new facility designs, imaging solutions to improve holdup assumptions, and new software developed in support of holdup measurements. Breakout sessions were also employed to determine additional needs and identify potential solutions to common holdup challenges. The primary discussions focused on causes and prevention of material accumulations, needs for uranium and plutonium measurements, and reduction of measurement uncertainty, all of which were explicitly identified as critical needs during the 2018 Workshop on Technical and Programmatic Needs for a Sustainable NDA Program for the US DOE.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dual Purpose Canister Reactivity and Groundwater Absorption Analyses

The current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy includes reliance on dry storage. Utilities are meeting their interim storage needs on an individual basis with use of large-capacity dry storage casks, with a current focus on meeting existing storage and transportation requirements, as disposal requirements are not currently available. These casks are commonly known as dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). However, a small percentage of single-purpose (storage only) systems is also being used to meet storage needs. These are included under the “DPC” heading. This report investigates the postclosure criticality safety aspects of DPCs. Placing large, heavy waste packages containing DPCs into a repository for direct disposal has not yet been implemented domestically or internationally. Therefore, direct disposal of DPCs represents new engineering and scientific challenges. Some of the engineering challenges that have already been addressed include handling and placement, use of ramps vs. shafts, use of hoists, use of transport equipment, and thermal management. Additionally, some studies have been conducted in the past regarding the feasibility of direct disposal from a criticality analysis perspective and have concluded that while possible, demonstrating subcriticality over the disposal time period is a challenge. The alternative to direct disposal of DPCs into a repository is to repackage the SNF into different canisters. The direct disposal of DPCs without cutting them open and repackaging is appealing because it could be more cost-effective, reduce the complexity of fuel management operations both in and outside reactor facilities, and result in less cumulative worker dose during interim storage and handling before eventual disposal in a deep geologic repository.

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Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

Cybersecurity↗

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

cybersecurity↗

Readiness Evaluation for Sustained Operations

Readiness evaluation for sustained operations is a continuous function that progresses from overseeing establishment of five key programmatic elements during design and construction phases to monitoring the output of those elements performing during commissioning and operations. Continuously assessing readiness for sustained operations becomes an important business function for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of River Protection as competition for federal funds increases with increasing waste treatment operations throughout the Office of Environmental Management complex. The five key programmatic elements are as follows: Risk management – Risks and opportunities should prioritize continuous improvement initiatives and be informed by the design and technical authorities and stakeholder monitors. Continuous improvement – All levels of the project organization should exhibit commitment to continuous improvement and learning. Continuity of design and technical authorities – The authorities are responsible for managing knowledge for its effective use in the other elements. Stakeholder monitoring – Active and deliberate monitoring of stakeholder relationships. Sustained operations integrated business planning – Integrated business planning in a federal environment competitive for congressional funding.

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Treatment of Problematic Reactive Metal Wastes Using GeoMelt ICV - WM2020 Conference Paper

Decommissioning of sodium-cooled reactors and fast reactor technologies has generated a number of reactive metal waste configurations that are problematic to treat and typically lack cost effective treatment methods and disposition options. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions, under contract with Idaho National Laboratory (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) demonstrated its GeoMelt® In-Container Vitrification (ICV)™ technology to safely convert sodium metal to a non-reactive vitrified oxide form. The demonstration project, supported by glass formulation and crucible testing, consisted of a series of ICV™ melts that processed elemental sodium into stable non-reactive glass. INL is currently implementing GeoMelt® technology as a means to safely and reliably convert radioactive reactive metal residues that contaminate sodium cooled reactor components into waste forms that comply with existing disposition pathways. Reactive metal wastes require treatment in order to remove the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reactivity and ignitability characteristics to comply with land disposal restrictions. GeoMelt®, which is an alternative to other potential treatment approaches, provides a robust approach that chemically converts the reactive metals to an inert oxide while also immobilizing radionuclides in a vitrified waste form with durability equal to or better than vitrified nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes (very robust and inert waste forms). Most other treatment approaches generate hydrogen gas which is problematic. In 2016, Veolia Nuclear Solutions first demonstrated the effectiveness of the GeoMelt® ICV™ process in deactivating reactive sodium metal. Crucible, bench-scale, and engineering-scale demonstrations were conducted on several surrogate waste configurations with various ratios of sodium metal and glass-formers. Each ratio and configuration demonstrated complete deactivation of the surrogate sodium metal. Follow-on work in 2017 demonstrated the deactivation of reactive sodium by GeoMelt® ICV™ at a higher waste loading relative to previously demonstrated work performed in 2016; the higher waste loading optimized glass chemistry while enhancing the economical full-scale treatment of reactive metals. Additionally, follow-on demonstration testing in 2018 and 2019 focused on more complex shapes and other reactive-metals (mocked up Experimental Breeder Reactor II [EBR-II] subassembly, sodium filled heat exchanger, and a can containing sodium potassium alloy) which were all performed at engineering-scale. Since 2018, a 10-metric ton full-scale GeoMelt unit (GeoMelt® Richland) was designed, installed, and commissioned at Perma-Fix Northwest in Richland, Washington for the treatment of reactive metal wastes. As of September 2019, over 900 55-gallon drums containing a total of around 3,500 lb of sodium with low levels of radioactivity have been treated at GeoMelt ® Richland, with resulting glass monoliths disposed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). A full-scale radiological demonstration melt on an actual EBR-II subassembly has also been performed using the full-scale melter in 2019. The GeoMelt® technology is a proven radioactive waste treatment technology capable of immobilizing radioactive wastes, including bulk rubble such as drums and other steel vessels usually without pretreatment. Utilizing the GeoMelt® technology to treat reactive metals eliminates pretreatment steps resulting from having to separate the reactive metal from steel containers or jackets as GeoMelt® can easily operate at temperatures sufficient to melt the steel and expose the reactive metal for treatment. Eliminating handling steps of reactive metals is a significant safety advantage since reactive metals are pyrophoric. The results generated as a part of the 2018-2019 demonstration program are presented in the paper.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Perma-Fix Environmental Services Macroencapsulated Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Perma-Fix Environmental Services (PERM) Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Lead (Pb) Solids, Cadmium/Mercury/Silver (Cd/Hg/Ag) Containing Batteries from U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Generators (PERM000000027, Revision 28 [PERM 2021]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the PERM Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Pb Solids, Cd/Hg/Ag Containing Batteries from DOE Generators meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The PERM Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Pb Solids, Cd/Hg/Ag Containing Batteries from DOE Generators stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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