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DOE OSTI2021

CAR-T Cell Therapy: Mechanism, Management, and Mitigation of Inflammatory Toxicities

Engineered T cell therapies such as chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) expressing T cells (CAR-T cells) have great potential to treat many human diseases; however, inflammatory toxicities associated with these therapies present safety risks and can greatly limit its widespread use. This article briefly reviews our current understanding of mechanisms for inflammatory toxicities during CAR T-cell therapy, current strategies for management and mitigation of these risks and highlights key areas of knowledge gap for future research..

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Optimizing Power Line Undergrounding Decisions under Varying Wildfire Risk and Weather Scenarios

Abstract—The threat of wildfire ignitions from electric power equipment has led utilities to increasingly turn to preemptive power shutoffs, which, while effective in reducing grid-induced wildfire risk, can cause significant load loss. Undergrounding power lines is an alternative strategy for preventing grid-induced wildfires. However, undergrounding lines is costly, so an efficient undergrounding plan must balance reductions in wildfire risk and load loss with the cost of undergrounding lines. We propose a robust optimization model to identify which power lines to underground to maximize load served while limiting wildfire risk across a range of wildfire risk and weather scenarios. Since solving this problem may be computationally heavy for large power grids and many operating scenarios, we present a delayed constraint generation algorithm to iteratively add scenarios until an optimal solution is found. We evaluate the performance of this framework on the RTS-GMLC with scenarios representing a year of operating conditions and compare it with a stochastic programming formulation. Our results indicate that our undergrounding model is successful in reducing load shed and risk compared to baseline cases in which no mitigation action is taken and only power shutoffs are implemented (no undergrounding). The robust formulation also reduces more load shed than the stochastic formulation in the most extreme scenarios. Index Terms—grid resilience, optimization, transmission systems, underground power lines, wildfire risk.

Taylor, S. [Department of Electrical and Computer ↗

DOE OSTI2025

Consequence Based Framework for Deployment of Cloud Solutions in the Digital Energy Transition

This study proposes a framework for evaluating cloud computing deployment in the electric sector, focusing on the digital transition of energy systems. It assesses the implications of cloud technology adoption, particularly in terms of security, operational resilience, and efficiency. The paper introduces a method for consequence-driven risk analysis, enabling utilities to prioritize and mitigate potential threats effectively. It also discusses the shared responsibility model in cloud computing, highlighting the need for collaborative security efforts. The research aims to provide utilities with a strategic assessment tool for cloud adoption, emphasizing the importance of security culture in enhancing cloud computing's role in critical infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

BayoTech Risk and Modeling Support of NM Gas Site

The BayoTech hydrogen generation system has been evaluated in terms of safety considerations at the NM Gas site. The consequence of a leak in different components in the system was evaluated in terms of plume dispersion and overpressure. Additionally, the likelihood of a leak scenario for different hydrogen components was identified. The worst-case plume dispersion cases, full-bore leaks, resulted in relatively large plumes. However, these cases were noted to be far less likely than the partial break cases that were evaluated. The partial break cases resulted in nearly negligible plume lengths. Similarly, the overpressure analysis of the full-bore break scenarios resulted in much larger overpressures than the partial break cases (which resulted in negligible overpressure at the lot line). There were several cases evaluated in the analysis that represented leak scenarios from both hydrogen and natural gas sources. Generally, the natural gas leak scenarios resulted in a smaller horizontal impact than that of hydrogen leaks. The worst-case consequence from a hydrogen leak resulted from the compressors, storage pods, or dispensing system. To consider the safety features that may isolate the leak, the consequence was evaluated at different times after the leak event to show the reduction of pressure. After 2 seconds, the plume dispersion from this event is contained within the perimeter of the site. The worst-case consequences show that the plume may disperse to adjacent facilities and to the street. When considering both likelihood and consequence, the risk may be considered low because the maximum frequency of a full-bore leak from any component within the hydrogen compound is 8.2 E-5/yr. This means that a full-bore leak is expected to occur less than once every 10,000 years. The risk can be further reduced by implementing mitigative countermeasures, such as CMU walls along the sides of the equipment compound. This would reduce the overall consequence of the worst-case dispersion scenarios (horizontal impact of plume). In terms of siting and safety analysis, the NFPA 2 code was used to provide a high-level evaluation of the current site plan. The most limiting equipment in terms of set-back distance are the compressors/storage units because of the high-pressure hydrogen. The site layout was evaluated for an acceptable location for the compression/storage unit based on NFPA 2 set-back distances. It is important to note that the NFPA 2 set-back distances consider both likelihood and consequence. This is important because the worst-case results evaluated herein also represent the least likely leak scenario. Other site-specific considerations were evaluated, including the parking shade structure with photovoltaic cells and refueling vehicles. These issues were dispositioned and determined to not present a safety risk.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Consequence Based Framework for Deployment of Cloud Solutions in the Digital Energy Transition

This study proposes a framework for evaluating cloud computing deployment in the electric sector, focusing on the digital transition of energy systems. It assesses the implications of cloud technology adoption, particularly in terms of security, operational resilience, and efficiency. The paper introduces a framework for consequence-driven applied risk analysis, enabling utilities to prioritize and mitigate potential threats effectively, and responsibly deploy cloud applications. It also discusses the shared responsibility model in cloud computing, highlighting the need for collaborative security efforts. The research aims to provide utilities with a strategic assessment tool for cloud adoption, emphasizing the importance of security culture in enhancing cloud computing's role in critical infrastructure.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Simulation Center for Runaway Electron Avoidance and Mitigation (SCREAM SciDAC) (Technical Final Report)

Runaway electrons can severely damage the plasma facing components on ITER during a major disruption and pose a major risk for tokamak fusion. It has been recognized that an adequate disruption mitigation system (DMS) is essential for the safe operation of ITER. The United States is responsible for the design and implementation of the disruption mitigation system on ITER, and in July 2016 the Simulation Center for Runaway Electron Avoidance and Mitigation (SCREAM) was launched by DOE, in a joint Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) and Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) collaboration. SCREAM was a comprehensive theory and simulation SciDAC center that provided physics guidance in the avoidance and mitigation of runaway electrons, and in tandem with domestic and international experiments, helped establish the qualitative and quantitative bases for safe operational scenarios and viable mitigation techniques. The SCREAM center assembled a national team of experts in runaway electron physics, tokamak disruptions, magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) simulation, and advanced algorithms and computing. The team combined advanced simulation and analysis capability facilitated by direct participation of ASCR SciDAC institutes with theoretical models and code development by FES scientists to focus on the runaway risk for ITER and tokamaks in general. The research scope was focussed on integrated simulations of kinetic runaway electrons, including MHD and fluid models of impurity transport, within a research plan guided by theory. The specific research tasks were (1) establish the fundamental physics of runaway generation, saturation, and dynamical evolution in a tokamak; (2) examine the critical path toward runaway avoidance; and (3) investigate the viability and effectiveness of the leading candidate schemes for runaway mitigation. In all three areas, members of the team carried out scoping studies that established the readiness for rapid and critical advances, especially in the deployment and further development of large-to extreme-scale simulation tools. Our multi-pronged computational approach included (1) relativistic Fokker-Planck solvers with discretization in phase space, (2) self-consistent particle-in-cell techniques, (3) particle-based Monte-Carlo, and (4) MHD-particle hybrid simulations. Cross-check between these different methods provided an additional means for verification and further bolstered the fidelity of our physics prediction. Validation against experimental results brings confidence to the predictive capability for ITER and frequently leads to new ideas for understanding and mitigating the thermal quench driven runaway electron phenomenon.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Hantavirus is Associated With Open Developed Areas and Arid Climates, Highlighting Increased Risk in the Western United States

In the United States, hantaviruses can cause hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) in humans, an acute respiratory illness with a high mortality rate. Most people contract HPS from exposure to infected rodent excrement. The interannual dynamics of hantavirus transmission are tied to both environmental and human-related factors, including changes in annual climate conditions, rodent populations, and the built environment in which humans are more likely to be exposed. Similar environmental conditions and socioeconomic factors also likely determine the long-term risk of hantavirus exposure. Here, we use ecological niche models and human cases of HPS in the U.S. from 1993 to 2022 to assess hantavirus risk using four socioeconomic variables, 17 land use variables, one variable of rodent richness, and seven climate variables to determine both the geographical locations of highest exposure risk and leading environmental predictors. We found that areas with higher relative risk tend to be where it is drier, higher social vulnerability, increased rodent richness, and more open to low levels of development—this largely mapped to the western U.S. We found evidence that fringe ecosystems may be important areas of hantavirus transmission, similar to other emerging diseases. Increased rodent richness was associated with increased hantavirus risk, warranting further investigation into how the abundance and community composition of rodents could impact long-term risk. These risk maps can help public health officials develop plans for mitigating hantavirus, especially for the most susceptible populations. They can also be used to further investigate regions estimated to be at high risk for hantavirus where disease cases have not been as common but may be underreported.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Integrated, Coordinated, Open, and Networked (ICON) Science to Advance the Geosciences: Introduction and Synthesis of a Special Collection of Commentary Articles

The sciences struggle with poor integration across disciplines, the absence of coordination within and across data generation and modeling activities, scarce or disconnected open data, and weaknesses of networks to engage diverse stakeholders within and beyond the scientific community. The American Geophysical Union (AGU) is divided into 25 sections intended to encompass the breadth of the geosciences. Here, we introduce a special collection of commentary articles spanning 19 AGU sections on the challenges and opportunities associated with the use of ICON science principles. These principles focus on research intentionally designed to be Integrated, Coordinated, Open, and Networked (ICON) with the goal of maximizing mutual benefit (among stakeholders) and cross-system transferability of science outcomes. This article summarizes the ICON principles; discusses the crowdsourced approach to creating the collection; and explores insights from across the articles. There were multiple common themes among the commentary articles, including the broad agreement that the benefits of using ICON principles outweigh the costs, but that using ICON principles has important risks that need to be understood and mitigated. It was also clear that the ICON principles are not monolithic or static, but should instead be considered a heuristic tool that can and should be modified to meet changing needs. As a whole, the collection is intended as a resource for scientists pursuing ICON science and represents an important inflection point in which the geosciences community has come together around ICON principles as a unified approach for improving how science is done across the geosciences and beyond.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Integrated, Coordinated, Open, and Networked (ICON) Science to Advance the Geosciences: Introduction and Synthesis of a Special Collection of Commentary Articles

Abstract The sciences struggle to integrate across disciplines, coordinate across data generation and modeling activities, produce connected open data, and build strong networks to engage stakeholders within and beyond the scientific community. The American Geophysical Union (AGU) is divided into 25 sections intended to encompass the breadth of the geosciences. Here, we introduce a special collection of commentary articles spanning 19 AGU sections on challenges and opportunities associated with the use of ICON science principles. These principles focus on research intentionally designed to be Integrated, Coordinated, Open, and Networked (ICON) with the goal of maximizing mutual benefit (among stakeholders) and cross‐system transferability of science outcomes. This article (a) summarizes the ICON principles; (b) discusses the crowdsourced approach to creating the collection; (c) explores insights from across the articles; and (d) proposes steps forward. There were common themes among the commentary articles, including broad agreement that the benefits of using ICON principles outweigh the costs, but that using ICON principles has important risks that need to be understood and mitigated. It was also clear that the ICON principles are not monolithic or static, but should instead be considered a heuristic tool that can and should be modified to meet changing needs. As a whole, the collection is intended as a resource for scientists pursuing ICON science and represents an important inflection point in which the geosciences community has come together to offer insights into ICON principles as a unified approach for improving how science is done across the geosciences and beyond.

Goldman, A. E.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Enhanced flood synchrony and downstream severity in the Delaware River under rising temperatures

River floods threaten life and economic stability, with risks increasing globally, especially in densely populated coastal areas. In mountainous coastal watersheds like the Delaware River Basin, rising temperature is projected to reduce snowpack, reshaping upstream–downstream flood dynamics. However, the impact on flood synchronization between upland tributaries and estuarine mainstems remains poorly understood. Using multidecadal streamflow simulations from a high-resolution hydrological model, we find significant increases in the frequency and magnitude of synchronized floods under future warming scenarios, particularly severe floods (above the 75 th percentile). Under higher warming scenarios, snowpack and rain-on-snow floods in headwater subbasins nearly vanish. Surprisingly, this regime shift amplifies estuarine flooding by enhancing synchronization between historically snow-dominated subbasins and their downstream counterparts. Despite intensified synchronization and flood magnitude, cold-season flood risk declines due to fewer rain-on-snow events. Conversely, summer floods grow larger, more frequent, and synchronized, driving a seasonal reconfiguration of flood risk that should be considered in future mitigation strategies.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

Analysis of Solids Obtained from 201O, 201P, 202A, and 202B Contactors in the Salt Waste Processing Facility

In December 2022, Savannah River Mission Completion personnel recovered solids samples from four contractors (EXT-001, EXT-007, EXT-031, and EXT-040) employed at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). These solids were submitted to Savannah River National Laboratory for analysis and characterization. This Technical Report outlines the analytical findings and observations associated with these samples and explores the potential source of solid generation within the SWPF. The following conclusions are offered as a result of this work: the light color solids recovered from EXT-007 are consistent with crystallized, soluble salt components (such as sodium nitrate, sodium hydroxide, and sodium carbonate), all of which can be easily re-dissolved in process water and do not represent a threat to SWPF CSSX processing. While the light solids from the top of EXT-040 were not analyzed, it is believed that they share similar characteristics to those recovered from EXT-007; The dark color solids recovered from EXT-001, EXT-031, and the inside of EXT-040 appear to be complex, consisting of several different types of solids: High concentrations of mercury (Hg, 40-75% by mass) partially present as elemental Hg are consistent with the precipitation of Hg 0 /Hg 2+ from disproportionation of Hg + species in pH swing conditions; Moderate concentrations of titanium (Ti) (2-7%, by mass) are also present, often co-located with Hg. This is consistent with co-precipitation, entrainment, and/or amalgamation of Ti and Hg; Moderate concentrations of iron (Fe) (1-3%, by mass) are observed in SWPF solids and are likely attributable to erosion of stainless-steel components within the CSSX process; Small concentrations of tungsten (W) and cobalt (Co) (<1%, by mass) are observed in SWPF solids. The presence of these solids is consistent with the erosion of components coated with W and Co (e.g., Stellite); Small concentrations of aluminum (Al) (<1%, by mass) are observed in the form of gibbsite and potentially sodium aluminosilicate. The presence of these compounds is likely attributable to the pH swing observed between the scrub and extraction cycles within the CSSX process. The following recommendations are made as a result of this work: Testing should be performed to determine the chemical drivers, process, and mechanism of Hg precipitation in CSSX processing. Special care should be taken to include titanium in tests to evaluate the potential for co-precipitation, entrainment, and amalgamation; Hg-mitigation options that would minimize or eliminate risks of Hg precipitation and solids accumulation (e.g., Hg-absorption techniques, ion exchange/adsorbents, flowsheet changes, etc.) should be assessed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Oil and Natural Gas Development near and beneath Uranium Tailings Cells and Other Remediated Sites - 20358

DOE LM is responsible for maintaining remedies at more than 50 remediated sites that require active long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Institutional controls (ICs) were established to limit human and environmental exposures to residual contamination by controlling land use, restricting access to potential hazards, and making the public aware of potential dangers from the residual contamination. ICs for each site were developed based on current and foreseeable conditions; however, these controls should evolve to mitigate potential human health and other environmental risks from unanticipated changes in activities or site conditions. Activities conducted beyond the DOE long-term care boundaries by non-DOE parties may impact the effectiveness of ICs or even the long-term stability of disposal cells and groundwater remedies. Several sites that LM manages or that will transfer to LM for LTS and M are in active oil and gas production basins. The sites are associated with uranium ore milling or nuclear test sites and have been remediated or are in the process of remediation and have no ongoing DOE mission. Particularly since 2005, hydraulic fracturing ('fracking') combined with directional drilling has dramatically increased oil and natural gas (oil/gas) production in the United States, now making it the number one hydrocarbon-producing country. Fracking has allowed production from shale and other rocks of low natural permeability that were historically not considered viable oil/gas resources. Also, because wellbores can now be drilled as many as 5 kilometers or more horizontally, hydrocarbons can be recovered from zones without having access to the surface above them. Drilling activity near Rulison, Colorado, the location of an underground nuclear detonation managed by LM, has raised public concerns that remnant radioactivity in the detonation zone could migrate to producing wells and enter the natural gas distribution system. At sites like the Falls City, Texas, Disposal site, transitioned to LM with a split estate, increased production in the region has resulted in wellbores beneath the long-term care boundary of the site. While the DOE license for Falls City was approved by the NRC in 1997 without the acquisition of the subsurface rights, NRC has raised concerns on whether this activity impacts the integrity of the cell and/or groundwater remedies. In Wyoming, LM is anticipating receiving the license for the Bear Creek site and manages the Spook site, both locations of uranium mill tailings disposal cells. These Wyoming sites are in an active region of major oil and gas development. This change in surrounding land use will require LM to work collaboratively with NRC to address these concerns. At several DOE sites radioactive waste, and often intermixed nonradioactive constituents, is permanently isolated in engineered disposal cells. At other sites, residual contamination can be present in groundwater, blast cavities, and infinite amounts within soil. Areas targeted for oil and gas development at the Texas and Wyoming sites range from depths of 2440 to 3350 meters (8000-11000 feet) below ground surface. When most site remedies were designed, oil and gas development was not considered to be an issue within the site boundary. With the more recent uses of directional drilling, fracking, and associated wastewater injections, the evaluative criteria for incoming sites and ICs for managing long-term protectiveness and regulatory compliance are changing. Although DOE surface ownership was previously thought to be a robust IC to prevent surface and subsurface development, particularly at disposal sites, that may no longer be the case. Whereas the subsurface development at Texas and Wyoming sites is currently occurring at thousands of meters beneath the surface, shallower and direct onsite development would be more of a concern for LM. The energy introduced when a well is hydraulically fractured causes microseismic events (magnitude -2 to 1.0) as the fractures propagate but does not directly cause seismic events (earthquakes) of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures. Additionally, the extent of the hydraulic fractures is limited to the targeted depths, which are far below the surface. However, earthquakes of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures have been attributed to the injection of wastewater into disposal wells. States that have experienced these effects have enacted regulations that limit the rate and pressures that wastewater can be injected into disposal wells. Items LM may consider are the need for monitoring the volume of water injected into nearby disposal wells and possibly installing seismic stations at sites most susceptible to damage. While the need to demonstrate that no impact from oil and gas extraction activities on a site groundwater remedy or disposal cells will vary from site to site, LM is assessing risk criteria for this activity. Though LM has not experienced an issue yet at a uranium tailings disposal site, it cannot assume that there will be none, and must address NRC concerns. LM is building on past experiences at other sites and beginning to form new processes with the hope that these concepts can be applied for other future sites. (authors)

04 OIL SHALES AND TAR SANDS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Vind: A Blockchain-Enabled Supply Chain Provenance Framework for Energy Delivery Systems

Enterprise-level energy delivery systems (EDSs) depend on different software or hardware vendors to achieve operational efficiency. Critical components of these systems are typically manufactured and integrated by overseas suppliers, which expands the attack surface to adversaries with additional opportunities to infiltrate into EDSs. Due to this reason, the risk management of the EDS supply chain is crucial to ensure that we are knowledgeable about the vulnerabilities in software and hardware components that comprise any critical part, quantifiable risk metrics to assess the severity and exploitability of the attack, and provide remediation solutions that can influence a prioritized mitigation plan. There is a need to realize cyber supply chain risk management for industrial control systems’ hardware, software, and computing and networking services associated with bulk electric system (BES) operations. This article proposes a blockchain-based cyber supply chain provenance platform (“Vind”) for EDSs to realize data provenance in a cyber supply chain ecosystem.

Bandara, Eranga↗

DOE OSTI2023

Quantitative Risk Assessment (Topical Report)

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) in geological formations plays a key role in mitigating anthropogenic CO 2 emissions and achieving the aggressive goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. Quantitative risk assessment is crucial for ensuring the safety and reliability of geologic carbon storage (GCS) by evaluating CO 2 migration in subsurface, forecasting potential leakage and induced seismicity risks, and optimizing operational and monitoring plans. We present the use, progress, and research trends of risk assessment from the Southwest Regional Partnership on Carbon Sequestration (SWP) as an example of large-scale CCUS projects in North America. The information provided in this report can help readers understand the significance of risk and uncertainty assessment and apply them effectively in large-scale CCUS projects.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Requirements and Recommendations for a Physical Attack Characterization Framework

This study seeks to identify existing frameworks or develop requirements and recommendations for a new framework that can consistently characterize physical attacks, analogous to MITRE ATT&CK®. MITRE ATT&CK is widely used across government, research organizations, and the cyber security community to characterize cyber attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a consistent and commonly understood manner. While physical attack taxonomies, methodologies, and other tools for evaluating physical security do exist, many are sector and/or facility-type specific—and therefore not able to provide comparable scenarios across sectors—or are more focused on security assessment instead of the characterization of attacks themselves. A MITRE ATT&CK analog for physical attacks on critical infrastructure would provide a common language and structure for analysis of physical attacks. Existing attack characterization methodologies do not robustly address cyber-physical security risks. To fully understand a facility’s security needs, it is important to understand the entire vulnerability landscape from both a physical and a cyber perspective. To underscore this need, organizations such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are calling for a coordinated approach to cyber and physical security, which they refer to as cyber and physical security convergence. A physical attack characterization framework that could be used jointly with MITRE ATT&CK would help support a more robust analysis in support of convergence, enabling the consistent characterization of attacks that utilize both cyber and physical tactics and techniques. This could provide analysts and stakeholders with a clearer understanding of how security mitigations deployed in the physical realm impact security risks in the cyber realm, and vice versa. In this study, the project team evaluates existing physical security taxonomies and methodologies to assess whether an existing method can be used to create a “physical half” of MITRE ATT&CK. This study then provides requirements and recommendations for a framework that can leverage aspects of existing methodologies. The goal of the final framework is for it to be widely adopted and referenced, regardless of critical infrastructure sector, facility type, or facility components. This study also identifies applicable use cases for when and how a framework could be applied across the various critical infrastructure sectors for a variety of attack types or motivations. Through a literature review of existing security-focused methodologies and taxonomies, engagement with relative stakeholders, evaluation of potential physical attack framework use cases, and subsequent identification of requirements, this study identified the following key findings and recommendations: There is a need for a new physical attack characterization framework; A physical attack framework should be interoperable with the MITRE ATT&CK framework; A physical attack framework should be broadly applicable, but with detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures that encompass the entire attack path; A physical attack framework should be based on observed or feasible events; A physical attack framework should adapt features from existing methodologies, frameworks, and taxonomies; A physical attack framework should be owned, overseen, and maintained by one organization.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗