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Water Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR)

The Water Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR) is an open source Python package designed to simulate and analyze resilience of water distribution networks. The United States Environmental Protection Agency, in partnership with Sandia National Laboratories, developed WNTR to integrate critical aspects of resilience modeling for water distribution networks into a single software framework. The software includes capability to: • Generate water network models • Modify network structure and operations • Assign fragility and survival curves to network components • Model disruptive events such as power outages, earthquakes, fires, pipe breaks, and contamination incidents • Model response and repair strategies • Simulate hydraulics and water quality • Evaluate resilience using a wide range of metrics • Integrate dependency with other critical infrastructure and supply chains • Analyze results and generate graphics SAND2019-450 M

Villa, Daniel↗

Arcing on dc power systems

Unexpected and undesirable arcing on dc power systems can produce hazardous situations aboard space flights. The potential for fire and shock might exist in a situation where there is a broken conductor, a loose power connection, or a break in the insulation of the power cable. Such arcing has been found to be reproducible in a laboratory environment. Arcing tests show that the phenomena can last for several seconds and yet be undetectable by present protection schemes used in classical power relaying and remote power controller applications. This paper characterizes the arcing phenomena and suggests future research that is needed.

Moores, Greg↗

Measuring Fluctuating Pressure Levels and Vibration Response in a Jet Plume

The characterization of loads due to solid rocket motor plume impingement allows for moreaccurate analyses of components subjected to such an environment. Typically, test verification of predicted loads due to these conditions is widely overlooked or unsuccessful. ATA Engineering, Inc., performed testing during a solid rocket motor firing to obtain acceleration and pressure responses in the hydrodynamic field surrounding the jet plume. The test environment necessitated a robust design to facilitate measurements being made in close proximity to the jet plume. This paper presents the process of designing a test fixture and an instrumentation package that could withstand the solid rocket plume environment and protect the required instrumentation.

Osterholt, Douglas J.↗

Spinoff 2015

Topics covered include: 3D Endoscope to Boost Safety, Cut Cost of Surgery; Audio App Brings a Better Night's Sleep Liquid Cooling Technology Increases Exercise Efficiency; Algae-Derived Dietary Ingredients Nourish Animals; Space Grant Research Launches Rehabilitation Chair; Vision Trainer Teaches Focusing Techniques at Home; Aircraft Geared Architecture Reduces Fuel Cost and Noise; Ubiquitous Supercritical Wing Design Cuts Billions in Fuel Costs; Flight Controller Software Protects Lightweight Flexible Aircraft; Cabin Pressure Monitors Notify Pilots to Save Lives; Ionospheric Mapping Software Ensures Accuracy of Pilots' GPS; Water Mapping Technology Rebuilds Lives in Arid Regions; Shock Absorbers Save Structures and Lives during Earthquakes; Software Facilitates Sharing of Water Quality Data Worldwide; Underwater Adhesives Retrofit Pipelines with Advanced Sensors; Laser Imaging Video Camera Sees through Fire, Fog, Smoke; 3D Lasers Increase Efficiency, Safety of Moving Machines; Air Revitalization System Enables Excursions to the Stratosphere; Magnetic Fluids Deliver Better Speaker Sound Quality; Bioreactor Yields Extracts for Skin Cream; Private Astronaut Training Prepares Commercial Crews of Tomorrow; Activity Monitors Help Users Get Optimum Sun Exposure; LEDs Illuminate Bulbs for Better Sleep, Wake Cycles; Charged Particles Kill Pathogens and Round Up Dust; Balance Devices Train Golfers for a Consistent Swing; Landsat Imagery Enables Global Studies of Surface Trends; Ruggedized Spectrometers Are Built for Tough Jobs; Gas Conversion Systems Reclaim Fuel for Industry; Remote Sensing Technologies Mitigate Drought; Satellite Data Inform Forecasts of Crop Growth; Probes Measure Gases for Environmental Research; Cloud Computing Technologies Facilitate Earth Research; Software Cuts Homebuilding Costs, Increases Energy Efficiency; Portable Planetariums Teach Science; Schedule Analysis Software Saves Time for Project Planners; Sound Modeling Simplifies Vehicle Noise Management; Custom 3D Printers Revolutionize Space Supply Chain; Improved Calibration Shows Images' True Colors; Micromachined Parts Advance Medicine, Astrophysics, and More; Metalworking Techniques Unlock a Unique Alloy; Low-Cost Sensors Deliver Nanometer-Accurate Measurements; Electrical Monitoring Devices Save on Time and Cost; Dry Lubricant Smooths the Way for Space Travel, Industry; and Compact Vapor Chamber Cools Critical Components.

Source record↗

NASA's Space Launch System Begins Integration, Stacking in Preparation for Artemis I Launch

The Artemis era of human lunar exploration is nearing take-off as NASA’s new super heavy-lift launch vehicle, the Space Launch System (SLS), begins stack-ing and integration operations in mid-2020 at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. With a planned upgrade path to progressively more powerful vehicles and availability in crew and cargo configurations, SLS provides a unique and flexible launch solution to send crew, large-scale infrastructure and robotic probes to deep space. The SLS Block 1 vehicle, the initial variant to fly, is optimized for lunar missions with a proven propulsion system consisting of four liquid hydrogen (LH2)/liquid oxygen (LOX)-fed RS-25 engines and twin five-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs). The Block 1 vehicle can also be outfitted with an industry-standard 5 m-class payload fairing (the “cargo” configuration) and will launch at least 27 metric tons (t) of mass to trans-lunar injection (TLI). SLS is the backbone of NASA’s Artemis program, which will return the agency’s human spaceflight program to the Moon for the first time since 1972. For the Artemis I mission, SLS will send an uncrewed Orion spacecraft to TLI, where it will enter a distant retrograde lunar orbit and fly 38,000 nmi past the Moon – farther than any spacecraft built for humans has ever traveled. The SLS Block 1 vehicle for Artemis I completed manufacturing in 2019. Several elements, including the upper stage, have been delivered to the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) program at KSC and are being prepped for integration and stack-ing. The five-segment solid rocket boosters – the largest and most powerful ever built for flight – are also complete. The booster motor segments for the Artemis I flight are scheduled to ship from prime contractor Northrop Grumman’s Utah facilities and begin stacking and integration at KSC in June 2020. The SLS core stage is the largest rocket stage NASA has ever built in terms of volume and height, and includes the avionics and the tanks that feed cryogenic propellant to the four RS-25s (formerly Space Shuttle Main Engines [SSMEs]). They have been modified with an updated controller and nozzle insulation to protect them from the hotter launch environment. The SLS core stage is currently being test-ed at NASA’s Stennis Space Center (SSC) in a series of “green run” tests to verify it meets design and performance requirements. Following the green run test series, which is scheduled to culminate with a full-duration hot-fire of the four RS-25 engines, the core stage will ship to KSC and be stacked between the sol-id rocket boosters in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Integration of the vehicle will continue with the upper stage, known as the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) and the Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter (LVSA) on the core stage. Another adapter, the Orion Stage Adapter (OSA), connects SLS to Orion and provides housing for 13 6U CubeSat payloads manifested on Artemis I. The CubeSats will be released in deep space after Orion separates from the vehicle, and the flight marks the first ride share opportunity for independent small-sats to deep space. The second major SLS variant to come online, Block 1B, replaces the single-engine ICPS with a four-engine LH2/LOX Exploration Upper Stage (EUS). This more powerful upper stage, along with other vehicle up-grades, will enable the Block 1B vehicle to launch 38-42 t to TLI, depending on crew or cargo configuration. The final evolution of the vehicle, Block 2, will onramp evolved solid rocket boosters to increase mass to TLI to 43-46 t, de-pending on crew or cargo configuration. The Block 1B/Block 2 vehicles can be outfitted with an 8.4 m-diameter payload fairing in 19.1 m or 27.4 m lengths, to provide unprecedented volume for payloads. With the initial Block 1 vehicle completely manufactured and the core stage in final testing before shipping to KSC, the SLS Program and its industry partners have made significant progress manufacturing subsequent vehicles. For the second Block 1 vehicle, the solid rocket motor segments are complete, as are the RS-25 engines with controllers. All five major components of the Artemis II core stage – the forward skirt, LOX and LH2 tanks, intertank and engine section – are manufactured and technicians are installing subsystems at NASA’s rocket factory, Michoud Assembly Facility. The RL-10 engine for the Artemis II ICPS is complete and panels have been machined for its LH2 tank. In addition, panels are machined for the vehicle’s two adapters, with welding scheduled to begin in summer 2020. Flight hard-ware is also in production for the third SLS vehicle, with several booster motor segments cast. The pace of development on the EUS has increased, with the goal to complete Critical Design Review (CDR) in December 2020. Several EUS test rings have been machined at Michoud. The EUS is designed to exe-cute a variety of missions – human spaceflight, deployment of deep-space infra-structure, or high-C3 missions to the outer solar system – with crew and cargo configurations available beginning in the mid-2020s. The near-term goal for the nation’s powerful new space exploration asset, however, is to launch the Arte-mis program, and send the first woman and the next man to the lunar surface. At the Astrodynamics Specialist Conference, the SLS program will update the community on the progress of the initial Block 1 vehicle in final green run test-ing, integration and stacking. In addition, this paper will provide an update to the community on the manufacturing status of subsequent Block 1 and Block 1B vehicles.

Steve Creech↗

Analysis of beam loss induced abort kicker instability

Through more than a decade of operation, we have noticed the phenomena of beam loss induced kicker instability in the RHIC beam abort systems. In this study, we analyze the short term beam loss before abort kicker pre-fire events and operation conditions before capacitor failures. Beam loss has caused capacitor failures and elevated radiation level concentrated at failed end of capacitor has been observed. We are interested in beam loss induced radiation and heat dissipation in large oil filled capacitors and beam triggered thyratron conduction. We hope the analysis result would lead to better protection of the abort systems and improved stability of the RHIC operation.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) refers to a set of technologies that can greatly reduce carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) emissions from new and existing coal- and gas-fired power plants, industrial processes, and other stationary sources of CO{sub 2}. In its application to electricity generation, CCS could play an important role in achieving national and global greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals. However, widespread cost-effective deployment of CCS will occur only if the technology is commercially available and a supportive national policy framework is in place. In keeping with that objective, on February 3, 2010, President Obama established an Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage composed of 14 Executive Departments and Federal Agencies. The Task Force, co-chaired by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was charged with proposing a plan to overcome the barriers to the widespread, cost-effective deployment of CCS within ten years, with a goal of bringing five to ten commercial demonstration projects online by 2016. Composed of more than 100 Federal employees, the Task Force examined challenges facing early CCS projects as well as factors that could inhibit widespread commercial deployment of CCS. In developing the findings and recommendations outlined in this report, the Task Force relied on published literature and individual input from more than 100 experts and stakeholders, as well as public comments submitted to the Task Force. The Task Force also held a large public meeting and several targeted stakeholder briefings. While CCS can be applied to a variety of stationary sources of CO{sub 2}, its application to coal-fired power plant emissions offers the greatest potential for GHG reductions. Coal has served as an important domestic source of reliable, affordable energy for decades, and the coal industry has provided stable and quality high-paying jobs for American workers. At the same time, coal-fired power plants are the largest contributor to U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and coal combustion accounts for 40 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) emissions from the consumption of energy. EPA and Energy Information Administration (EIA) assessments of recent climate and energy legislative proposals show that, if available on a cost-effective basis, CCS can over time play a large role in reducing the overall cost of meeting domestic emissions reduction targets. By playing a leadership role in efforts to develop and deploy CCS technologies to reduce GHG emissions, the United States can preserve the option of using an affordable, abundant, and domestic energy resource, help improve national security, help to maximize production from existing oil fields through enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and assist in the creation of new technologies for export. While there are no insurmountable technological, legal, institutional, regulatory or other barriers that prevent CCS from playing a role in reducing GHG emissions, early CCS projects face economic challenges related to climate policy uncertainty, first-of-a-kind technology risks, and the current high cost of CCS relative to other technologies. Administration analyses of proposed climate change legislation suggest that CCS technologies will not be widely deployed in the next two decades absent financial incentives that supplement projected carbon prices. In addition to the challenges associated with cost, these projects will need to meet regulatory requirements that are currently under development. Long-standing regulatory programs are being adapted to meet the circumstances of CCS, but limited experience and institutional capacity at the Federal and State level may hinder implementation of CCS-specific requirements. Key legal issues, such as long-term liability and property rights, also need resolution. A climate policy designed to reduce our Nation's GHG emissions is the most important step for commercial deployment of low-carbon technologies such as CCS, because it will create a stable, long-term framework for private investments. A concerted effort to properly address financial, economic, technological, legal, institutional, and social barriers will enable CCS to be a viable climate change mitigation option that can over time play an important role in reducing the overall cost of meeting domestic and global emissions reduction targets. Federal and State agencies can use existing authorities and programs to begin addressing these barriers while ensuring appropriate safeguards are in place to protect the environment and public health and safety.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials

The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials.

Calle, Luz M.↗

Flame retardants

The use of flame retardants in plastics has grown only slightly in recent years and will probably grow slowly in the future. The reasons for this are slow economic growth and the absence of fundamentally new requirements for future fire prevention. The trends are toward the increasing use of easily handled, dust-free and well-dispersed flame retardant compounds and master batches; there are no spectacular new developments. In the future, questions of smoke evolution, toxicity and corrosiveness of combustion gases will become increasingly important, especially due to new regulations and rising requirements for environmental protection.

Troitzsch, J.↗

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Evaluation of AG-1 FC Filters Under Upset Conditions and the Effects of Aging on Filters - 19501

High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are routinely used in nearly every operating Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) nuclear facility. These nuclear grade HEPA filters installed in DOE and NNSA confinement ventilation systems are credited as the final barrier to protect the environment, the public, and the worker from accidental release of virtually all airborne radioactive materials, and must meet the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' (ASME) Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment (CONAGT) AG-1 standard. This testing activity evaluates ASME AG-1 Section FC axial flow HEPA filters, both separator and separator-less, under upset conditions. Additionally, testing efforts have analyzed the effects of filter degradation due to aging. In 1997, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) raised concerns of the potential vulnerability of HEPA filters in vital safety systems, both from a design stand point and the potential for degradation of HEPA filter performance over time. The DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) has a Cooperative Agreement with Mississippi State University (MSU) Institute for Clean Energy Technology (ICET) to conduct testing of HEPA filters. DOE-EM has established a Technical Working Group (TWG) of over thirty subject matter experts from the nuclear industry to provide input and oversight of ICET projects and activities. This has included establishment/approval of testing parameters for evaluating these filters under ASME NQA-1 compliant Test Plans. The current scope of work involves evaluation of the performance envelope for new and aged separator and separator-less designs of AG-1 Section FC axial flow HEPA filters. A range of elevated test conditions (T and RH) are used to determine the operating envelope within which DOE nuclear safety experts can credit installed HEPA filter performance, thereby establishing a risk-informed DOE service life. This paper will present preliminary test results of new and aged axial flow filters tested at ICET. Results in this paper include data collected from new separator and separator-less type FC HEPA filters and equivalent test data for a limited group of aged separator and separator-less type FC HEPA filters. Testing for both scopes of work evaluate initial filter performance under ambient conditions of temperature (60 deg. F - 80 deg. F (∼16 - ∼27 deg. C)) and relative humidity (40-60%), loading of each filter with Aluminum Trihydroxide, Al(OH)3, to a specified differential pressure, and then exposing the filter to specified elevated temperature and relative humidity conditions. In addition to the upset conditions of elevated temperature and relative humidity, the performance of HEPA filters under fire scenarios is not well characterized. ICET is currently designing a burn box and testing apparatus to study the effects of fire from burning liquids and a wide range of blends of combustible solids. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modernization of Insulative Reusable Thermal Protection Systems (IRTPS)

Insulative thermal protection systems, such as Flexible Reusable Surface Insulation blankets and High Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation tiles, were developed for the Shuttle Orbiter to enable reuse of the vehicle for low-earth orbit missions. Since reusability is essential to many new industry launch and space vehicles, Shuttle-derived thermal protection materials (TPMs) are being sought for their flight proven performance. Alumina Enhanced Thermal Barrier (AETB) is the state-of-the-art tile material that was developed in the 90’s. AETB along with associated coatings, reaction cured glass (RCG) and Toughened Unipiece Fibrous Insulation (TUFI), are currently made by NASA using heritage raw materials derived from lifetime purchases. Finding viable replacements for raw materials that have changed in nature or are obsolete is important for continuation of these TPMs. In some cases, the use of modern raw materials has been shown to yield tile with reduced performance, most notably in mechanical properties. ​ In this work, the production of AETB will be discussed to better understand the process-structure-property relationships and for allowing use of these modern alternatives. A small-scale tile casting system was developed for rapid and efficient exploration of the manufacturing variables such raw material selection and pre-processing, casting process parameters, and billet firing protocols. An optical transmission defect characterization technique was implemented to correlate process variables to structure. Comparisons between TUFI/RCG coated AETB derived from heritage and modern raw materials will be shown including AHF arc jet test results completed under a collaboration with Stratolaunch.

thermal protection materials↗

Performance of Whipple Shields at Impact Velocities above 9 km/s

Whipple shields were first proposed as a means of protecting spacecraft from the impact of micrometeoroids in 1947 [1] and are currently in use as micrometeoroid and orbital debris shields on modern spacecraft. In the intervening years, the function of the thin bumper used to shatter or melt threatening particles has been augmented and enhanced by the use of various types and configurations of intermediate layers of various materials. All shield designs serve to minimize the threat of a spall failure or perforation of the main wall of the spacecraft as a result of the impact of the fragments. With increasing use of Whipple shields, various ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for guiding the design and estimating the performance of shield systems have been developed. Perhaps the best known and most used are the "new" modified Cour-Palais (Christiansen) equations [2]. These equations address the three phases of impact: (1) ballistic (<3 km/s), where the projectile is moving too slowly to fragment and essentially penetrates as an intact projectile; (2) shatter (3 to 7 km/s), where the projectile fragments at impact and forms an expanding cloud of debris fragments; and (3) melt/vaporization (>7 km/s), where the projectile melts or vaporizes at impact. The performance of Whipple shields and the adequacy of the BLEs have been examined for the first two phases using the results of impact tests obtained from two-stage, light-gas gun test firings. Shield performance and the adequacy of the BLEs has not been evaluated in the melt/vaporization phase until now because of the limitations of launchers used to accelerate projectiles with controlled properties to velocities above 7.5 km/s. A three-stage, light-gas gun, developed at the University of Dayton Research Institute (UDRI) [3], is capable of launching small, aluminum spheres to velocities above 9 km/s. This launcher was used to evaluate the ballistic performance of two Whipple shield systems, various thermal protection system materials, and other spacecraft-related materials to the impact of 1.6-mm- to 2.6-mm-diameter, 2017-T4 aluminum spheres at impact velocities ranging from 8.91 km/s to 9.28 km/s. Test results, details of the shield systems, and nominal ballistic limits for the two Whipple shields are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Assessing the Renal Toxicity of Capstone Depleted Uranium Oxides and Other Uranium Compounds

The primary target for uranium toxicity is the kidney. The most frequently used guideline for uranium kidney burdens is the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) value of 3 µg U/g kidney, a value that is based largely upon chronic studies in animals. In the present effort, we have developed a risk model equation to assess potential outcomes of acute uranium exposure. Twenty-seven previously published case studies in which workers were acutely exposed to soluble compounds of uranium (as a result of workplace accidents) were analyzed. Kidney burdens of uranium for these individuals were determined based on uranium in the urine, and correlated with health effects observed over a period of up to 38 years. Based upon the severity of health effects, each individual was assigned a score (- to +++) and then placed into an Effect Group. A discriminant analysis was used to build a model equation to predict the Effect Group based on the amount of uranium in the kidneys. The model equation was able to predict the Effect Group with 85% accuracy. The risk model was used to predict the Effect Group for Soldiers exposed to DU as a result of friendly fire incidents during the 1991 Gulf War. This model equation can also be used to predict the Effect Group of new cases in which acute exposures to uranium have occurred.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Electrospun core-shell microfiber separator with thermal-triggered flame-retardant properties for lithium-ion batteries

Although the energy densities of batteries continue to increase, safety problems (for example, fires and explosions) associated with the use of highly flammable liquid organic electrolytes remain a big issue, significantly hindering further practical applications of the next generation of high-energy batteries. We have fabricated a novel “smart” nonwoven electrospun separator with thermal-triggered flame-retardant properties for lithium-ion batteries. The encapsulation of a flame retardant inside a protective polymer shell has prevented direct dissolution of the retardant agent into the electrolyte, which would otherwise have negative effects on battery performance. Furthermore, during thermal runaway of the lithium-ion battery, the protective polymer shell would melt, triggered by the increased temperature, and the flame retardant would be released, thus effectively suppressing the combustion of the highly flammable electrolytes.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Impulse Noise Sampling at 9965 - Armag

One detonation test was monitored for impulse noise at Thunder Range on November 6, 2020. The TNT equivalency for this shot was 100 lbs. Ground zero for this test was located at an open area of Range 7. The Armag, where MOW were remotely located, was just south of the east end of the TR shock tube The purpose of this sampling event was to characterize the noise attenuation provided by the Armag which will be used as the primary firing location in a future test series. To determine attenuation provided by the Armag, one sound level monitor was placed inside and a second monitor was placed outside the hardened structure at the same distance from ground zero. The Armag was located 1300 feet from ground zero. Essential personnel performing these tests were remotely located inside the Armag and wore hearing protection with a minimum NRR of 23. Members of the Workforce (MOW) who are exposed to noise levels above 140 dBC, regardless of hearing protection worn, are required to be enrolled into the SNL Hearing Conservation Program which includes audiometric testing, online training (HCP100) and wearing hearing protection.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Space-station crew-safety requirements

Baseline rescue and survival concepts for future space station crews are described. Preliminary studies are being carried out to identify potential threats to crew safety and means to counteract the dangers. Significant factors being considered include the type of threat, the warning time, the number of crewmembers, strategies for protection of the crew (including life-support measures redundancy), and the dependence of space station crews on ground personnel. Attention is being given to the impact of safety devices on the space station geometry and cost, as well as the equipment necessary to maintain the crew in a psychological status positive enough to cope with emergencies. Typical threats would be fire, crewmember illness or injury, and abandonment of the station. A Shuttle launch could take up to 12 days, while equipping the space station with an emergency return capsule would permit return on the same day as the capsule was occupied.

Witcofski, R. D.↗