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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1995

Research & Technology Report Goddard Space Flight Center

The main theme of this edition of the annual Research and Technology Report is Mission Operations and Data Systems. Shifting from centralized to distributed mission operations, and from human interactive operations to highly automated operations is reported. The following aspects are addressed: Mission planning and operations; TDRSS, Positioning Systems, and orbit determination; hardware and software associated with Ground System and Networks; data processing and analysis; and World Wide Web. Flight projects are described along with the achievements in space sciences and earth sciences. Spacecraft subsystems, cryogenic developments, and new tools and capabilities are also discussed.

Soffen, Gerald A.↗
NASA NTRS1996

An Architecture to Promote the Commercialization of Space Mission Command and Control

This paper describes a command and control architecture that encompasses space mission operations centers, ground terminals, and spacecraft. This architecture is intended to promote the growth of a lucrative space mission operations command and control market through a set of open standards used by both gevernment and profit-making space mission operators.

cost efficient operations standardisation money ca↗
NASA NTRS1965

Apollo mission

Operational aspects of proposed lunar surface exploration activities reviewed by astronaut in training

OPERATIONAL PROBLEM↗
NASA NTRS2013

Managing the Risk of Command File Errors

Command File Error (CFE), as defined by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) is, regardless of the consequence on the spacecraft, either: an error in a command file sent to the spacecraft, an error in the process for developing and delivering a command file to the spacecraft, or the omission of a command file that should have been sent to the spacecraft. The risk consequence of a CFE can be mission ending and thus a concern to space exploration projects during their mission operations. A CFE during space mission operations is often the symptom of some kind of imbalance or inadequacy within the system that comprises the hardware & software used for command generation and the human experts involved in this endeavour. As we move into an era of enhanced collaboration with other NASA centers and commercial partners, these systems become more and more complex and hence it is all the more important to formally model and analyze CFEs in order to manage the risk of CFEs. Here we will provide a summary of the ongoing efforts at JPL in this area and also explain some more recent developments in the area of developing quantitative models for the purpose of managing CFE's.

Bayesian Belief Networks↗
NASA NTRS2012

Improving operations: Metrics to Results

As a result of the mission failure of the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) spacecraft in 1999, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) initiated the development of a Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) program to be implemented across all flight projects managed by JPL. One of the initiatives undertaken in 2001 was the collection of data on command file errors occurring in the operational phase of the mission. This paper defines command file errors and how and where they occur in the operations process. It also describes the problem reporting system (PRS) in use for mission operations at JPL. We examine the recent modifications to the PRS that enable the collection of metrics, specifically on command file errors. This paper discusses what the data show us since metrics have been collected for the operational missions conducted by JPL. We examine the evolution of an operational working group initiative to evaluate proximate, contributing, and root causes for the errors. As part of this discussion we see what the metrics have indicated over a decade. At the macro level, we can say that the aggregate command file error rate has been cut to roughly one third of the initial 2001 level by the end of 2011. Additionally, we explore efficient and innovative means to continually integrate the findings and recommendations from the working group back into the flight operations environment.

command file errors↗
NASA NTRS2017

Conjunction Assessment Techniques and Operational Results from the Magnetospheric Multiscale Mission

This paper will describe the results that have been obtained to date during the MMS mission concerning conjunction assessment. MMS navigation makes use of a weak-signal GPS-based system: this allows signals to be received even when MMS is flying above the GPS orbits, producing a highly accurate determination of the four MMS orbits. This data is downlinked to the MMS Mission Operations Center (MOC) and used by the Flight Dynamics Operations Area (FDOA) for both maneuver design and conjunction assessment. The MMS fly in tetrahedron formations around apogee, in order to collect simultaneous particles and fields science data. The original plan was to fly tetrahedra between 10 and 160 km in size; however, after Phase 1a of the mission, the science team requested that smaller sizes be flown if feasible. After analysis (to be detailed in a companion paper), a new minimum size of 7 km was decided upon. Flying at this reduced scale size makes conjunction assessment between the MMS spacecraft even more important: the methods that are used by the MMS FDOA to address this problem will be described in the paper, and a summary given of the previous analyses that went into the development of these techniques. Details will also be given of operational experiences to date. Finally, two CA mitigation maneuver types that have been designed (but never yet required to actually be performed) will also be outlined.

conjunction Assessment↗
NASA NTRS2022

The Cooling Loop A Anomaly of 2013: A Case Study in Human-Systems Resilience

Throughout the history of human spaceflight, NASA has employed an operational paradigm of 24/7 dependence on experts in Mission Control Center (MCC). In addition to nominal flight control and mission operations, these 85+ experts per shift manage anomaly detection, diagnosis, and response, and support the crew in real-time in performing maintenance and repair, procedure execution, and other complex mission operations. Future long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) will not operate successfully using this same Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) where crew rely on ground controllers, have ready access to resupply, and have a fallback plan of evacuation. As distance from Earth increases and the communication delay grows, crews will need to respond independently and adequately to time-critical vehicle malfunctions. It will not always be sufficient or even possible to ‘safe the system’ and then wait upon ground intervention. A new and radically different HSIA is needed to accommodate the paradigm shift of deep-space travel. Historical International Space Station (ISS) data show that for a 30-day mission, the likelihood of a high-consequence vehicle anomaly of uncertain origin that requires rapid response is greater than 10%. The likelihood of such an event is 50% by the fourth month of the mission, and it grows exponentially with time. Our team has conducted in-depth investigations into these events and their corresponding anomaly resolution activities. Using MCC and Mission Evaluation Room (MER) anomaly resolution artifacts (including meeting summaries, caution and warning data, and ISS daily summaries), we created timelines detailing ground actions and in-orbit events for two significant anomalies. We then mapped these timelines onto Mars transit conditions, introducing a ground-crew communications time delay and shifting immediate response, time-critical task execution, and vehicle commanding to the crew. In detailing successful anomaly resolution in transit to Mars, the timelines highlight where effective resolution requires drastically evolved onboard capabilities. Though this research has yielded a rich data set based on ground response in past missions, there is still insufficient knowledge to assess the potential impact of inflight anomalies on a small autonomous crew on future LDEMs beyond LEO. To begin building an evidence base that will inform future HSIA standards and requirements, we are developing an approach to systematically capture crew anomaly response and procedure execution during early Artemis missions. Being the first human spaceflight beyond LEO since Apollo, early Artemis missions provide a rare and unique opportunity to serve as a testbed for Mars missions. Our work aims to capitalize on planned data collection to derive crew operational responses to anomalous events in real-time. Our team is also researching the level of simulation fidelity required for empirically validating proposed HSIA standards and evaluating HSIA implementations for LDEMs beyond LEO. This work will produce a trade space study of HSIA simulation objectives and fidelity requirements. Ultimately, these research efforts will assist in developing the standards and technologies needed to build a next-generation HSIA for LDEMs beyond LEO.

human-systems integration architecture↗
NASA NTRS2015

Early Mission Maneuver Operations for the Deep Space Climate Observatory

DSCOVR Lissajous Orbit sized such that orbit track never extends beyond 15 degrees from Earth-Sun line (as seen from Earth). Requiring delta-V maneuvers, control orbit to obey a Solar Exclusion Zone (SEZ) cone of half-angle 4 degrees about the Earth-Sun line. Spacecraft should never be less than 4 degrees from solar center as seen from Earth. Following Lissajous Orbit Insertion (LOI), DSCOVR should be in an opening phase that just skirts the 4-degree SEZ. Maximizes time to the point where a closing Lissajous will require avoidance maneuvers to keep it out of the SEZ. Station keeping maneuvers should take no more than 15 minutes

OPERATIONS↗
NASA NTRS2016

Psychological Support Operations and the ISS One-Year Mission

Since NASA began human presence on the International Space Station (ISS) in November 1998, crews have spent two to seven months onboard. In March 2015 NASA and Russia embarked on a new era of ISS utilization, with two of their crewmembers conducting a one-year mission onboard ISS. The mission has been useful for both research and mission operations to better understand the human, technological, mission management and staffing challenges that may be faced on missions beyond Low Earth Orbit. The work completed during the first 42 ISS missions provided the basis for the pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight work completed by NASA's Space Medicine Operations Division, while our Russian colleagues provided valuable insights from their long-duration mission experiences with missions lasting 10-14 months, which predated the ISS era. Space Medicine's Behavioral Health and Performance Group (BHP) provided pre-flight training, evaluation, and preparation as well as in-flight psychological support for the NASA crewmember. While the BHP team collaboratively planned for this mission with the help of all ISS international partners within the Human Behavior and Performance Working Group to leverage their collective expertise, the US and Russian BHP personnel were responsible for their respective crewmembers. The presentation will summarize the lessons and experience gained within the areas identified by this Working Group as being of primary importance for a one-year mission.

Beven, G.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Linking and Combining Distributed Operations Facilities using NASA's "GMSEC" Systems Architectures

NASA's Goddard Mission Services Evolution Center (GMSEC) ground system architecture has been in development since late 2001, has successfully supported eight orbiting satellites and is being applied to many of NASA's future missions. GMSEC can be considered an event-driven service-oriented architecture built around a publish/subscribe message bus middleware. This paper briefly discusses the GMSEC technical approaches which have led to significant cost savings and risk reduction for NASA missions operated at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The paper then focuses on the development and operational impacts of extending the architecture across multiple mission operations facilities.

Smith, Danford↗
NASA NTRS1991

Radiation dose estimates for typical piloted NTR lunar and Mars mission engine operations

The natural and manmade radiation environments to be encountered during lunar and Mars missions are qualitatively summarized. The computational methods available to characterize the radiation environment produced by an operating nuclear propulsion system are discussed. Mission profiles and vehicle configurations are presented for a typical all-propulsive, fully reusable lunar mission and for a typical all-propulsive Mars mission. Estimates of crew location biological doses are developed for all propulsive maneuvers. Post-shutdown dose rates near the nuclear engine are estimated at selected mission times.

Schnitzler, Bruce G.↗
NASA NTRS2000

The Transition from Spacecraft Development Ot Flight Operation: Human Factor Considerations

In the field of aeronautics and astronautics, a paradigm shift has been witnessed by those in academia, research and development, and private industry. Long development life cycles and the budgets to support such programs and projects has given way to aggressive task schedules and leaner resources to draw from all the while challenging assigned individuals to create and produce improved products of processes. however, this "faster, better, cheaper" concept cannot merely be applied to the design, development, and test of complex systems such as earth-orbiting of interplanetary robotic spacecraft. Full advantage is not possible without due consideration and application to mission operations planning and flight operations, Equally as important as the flight system, the mission operations system consisting of qualified personnel, ground hardware and software tools, and verified and validated operational processes, should also be regarded as a complex system requiring personnel to draw upon formal education, training, related experiences, and heuristic reasoning in engineering an effective and efficient system. Unquestionably, qualified personnel are the most important elements of a mission operations system. This paper examines the experiences of the Deep Space I Project, the first in a series of new technology in-flight validation missions sponsored by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), specifically, in developing a subsystems analysis and technology validation team comprised of former spacecraft development personnel. Human factor considerations are investigated from initial concept/vision formulation; through operational process development; personnel test and training; to initial uplink product development and test support. Emphasis has been placed on challenges and applied or recommended solutions, so as to provide opportunities for future programs and projects to address and disposition potential issues and concerns as early as possible to reap the benefits associated with learning from other's past experiences.

Basilio, Ralph R.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Increases in Efficiency and Enhancements to the Mars Observer Non-stored Commanding Process

The Mars Observer team was, until the untimely loss of the spacecraft on August 21, 1993, performing flight operations with greater efficiency and speed than any previous JPL mission of its size. This level of through-put was made possible by a Mission Operations System which was composed of skilled personnel using sophisticated sequencing and commanding tools. During cruise flight operations, however, it was realized by the project that this commanding level was not going to be sufficient to support the activities planned for the mapping operations. The project had committed to providing the science instrument principle investigators with a much higher level of commanding during mapping. Thus, the project began taking steps to enhance the capabilities of the flight team. One mechanism used by project management was a tool available from Total Quality Management (TQM). This tool is known as a Process Action Team (PAT). The Mars Observer PAT was tasked to increase the capacity of the flight team's non-stored commanding process by fifty percent with no increase in staffing and a minimal increase in risk. The outcome of this effort was to, in fact, increase the capacity by a factor of 2.5 rather than the desired fifty percent and actually reduce risk. The majority of these improvements came from the automation of the existing command process. The results required very few changes to the existing mission operations system. Rather, the PAT was able to take advantage of automation capabilities inherent in the existing system and make changes to the existing flight team procedures. This paper will describe in detail the enhancements recommended by the PAT for the non-stored command generation process on Mars Observer. This will be contrasted with the process used by the flight team prior to implementation of these improvements. Finally, there will be a discussion of the applicability of the techniques devised by the PAT for enhancement of the non-stored command process to present and future projects.

Process↗
NASA NTRS1991

Analysis of the potential application of the Davenport/Short information technology model to a research and development organization

Part of the role of the Mission Operations Lab is the development of budget inputs for Huntsville Operations/Payload Crew Training Center/Payload Operations Control Center (HOSC/PCTC/POCC) activity. These budget inputs are part of the formal Program Operating Plan (POP) process, which occurs twice yearly, and of the formal creation of the yearly operating plan. Both POPs and the operation plan serve the purpose of mapping out planned expenditures for the next fiscal year and for a number of outlying years. Based on these plans, the various Project Offices at the Center fund the HOSC/PCTC/POCC activity. Because of Mission Operations Lab's role in budget development, some of the Project Offices have begun looking to Mission Operations, and specifically the EO02 branch, to track expenditures and explain/justify any deviations from plans. EO02 has encountered difficulties acquiring the necessary information to perform this function. It appears that the necessary linkages with other units had not been fully developed and integrated with the flow of information in budget implementation. The purpose of this study is to document the budget process from the point of view of EO02 and to identify the steps necessary for it to effectively perform this role on a continuous basis.

Decker, Deron R.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Utilization of the International Space Station for Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test (CAST)

The United States space policy is evolving toward missions beyond low Earth orbit. In an effort to meet that policy, NASA has recognized Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) as a valuable capability. Identified within AMO capabilities is the potential for autonomous planning and replanning during human spaceflight operations. That is allowing crew members to collectively or individually participate in the development of their own schedules. Currently, dedicated mission operations planners collaborate with international partners to create daily plans for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), taking into account mission requirements, ground rules, and various vehicle and payload constraints. In future deep space operations the crew will require more independence from ground support due to communication transmission delays. Furthermore, crew members who are provided with the capability to schedule their own activities are able to leverage direct experience operating in the space environment, and possibly maximize their efficiency. CAST (Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test) is an ISS investigation designed to analyze three important hypotheses about crew autonomous scheduling. First, given appropriate inputs, the crew is able to create and execute a plan in a reasonable period of time without impacts to mission success. Second, the proximity of the planner, in this case the crew, to the planned operations increases their operational efficiency. Third, crew members are more satisfied when given a role in plan development. This paper presents the results from a single astronaut test subject who participated in five CAST sessions. The details on the operational philosophy of CAST are discussed, including the approach to crew training, selection criteria for test days, and data collection methods. CAST is a technology demonstration payload sponsored by the ISS Research Science and Technology Office, and performed by experts in Mission Operations Planning from the Flight Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center, and researchers across multiple NASA centers. It is hoped the results of this investigation will guide NASA's implementation of autonomous mission operations for long duration human space missions to Mars and beyond.

Healy, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2005

Mars Exploration Rover Operations with the Science Activity Planner

The Science Activity Planner (SAP) is the primary science operations tool for the Mars Exploration Rover mission and NASA's Software of the Year for 2004. SAP utilizes a variety of visualization and planning capabilities to enable the mission operations team to direct the activities of the Spirit and Opportunity rovers. This paper outlines some of the challenging requirements that drove the design of SAP and discusses lessons learned from the development and use of SAP in mission operations.

ground systems↗
NASA NTRS2017

NASA's Current Initiative to Improve Operations Planning

As a follow-on to the Technical Capability Assessment Team, in 2015 NASA began seven Agency-wide efforts to seek out opportunities to improve the effectiveness of NASA operations. One of these technical teams is the Mission Operations Planning team, charged with increasing interactions and efficiency for planning of mission activities. That team is chaired by the author with representatives from eight other centers across the Agency. As the strategic architects for the vision of agency-wide ops planning, the team has identified a number of new initiatives and techniques to improve planning, including: breaking down walls within centers which obstruct multi-mission planning; breaking down walls agency-wide which obstruct the sharing of ops planning lessons and capabilities; strengthening the community of practice of ops planning capability developers; establishing best practices for a variety of types of ops planning; defining standards for activity plans and timelines, and plan inputs; and recommending the presence of "multi-mission operations champions" within each center to implement these recommendations into the next decade.

Seal, David↗