IMPROVING PROCESS CONTROLS AT IN-SITU LEACHING URANIUM MINES
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The L-Bar, New Mexico, Disposal Site is located in the northeast corner of Cibola County, 10 miles north of Laguna, and was the former site of a uranium mill and underground mine. The mill operated from 1977 to 1981 where a total of 1.9 x 10{sup 6} tonnes (2.1 million tons) of ore was processed. Solid and liquid byproduct, or tailings, from the milling process were impounded behind a dam constructed of native weathered Mancos Shale, which is a predominant geologic formation in the area. The tailings were encapsulated in place, and the resulting 40.5-hectare (100-acre) engineered disposal cell was completed in 2000. The 299-hectare (738-acre) Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II site was transferred to the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management under a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission general license in 2004. During reclamation activities, channels were designed and constructed into the surrounding weathered shale to protect the disposal cell from high-precipitation events. Due to the highly erodible soils and anticipated sediment deposition into the diversion channels, a sediment trap was also excavated. By excavating the channels and sediment trap, the local base elevation was altered, which exacerbated erosional forces. Recontouring surrounding drainage basins during the reclamation activities also promoted erosion by reducing natural rock armoring and vegetation that aids in soil stability. To compound the erosion issue, the L-Bar site is susceptible to short-duration, high-intensity, localized convective storms. Because the local geomorphology includes soils consisting of weathered shale, these precipitation events are not conducive to absorption into the soils, but rather to sheet flows that follow topography and concentrate in lower elevation areas where flow volumes and velocities increase. These factors result in the formation of deeply incised gullies and promote soil piping, which is an important geomorphic process in the widening of arroyos and the advancement of head-cutting, evident at the L-Bar site and surrounding areas. At the first annual inspection by DOE in 2005, it was noted that extensive erosion was occurring upgradient of the sediment trap. DOE determined that the design of the site's drainage system was the cause of extensive erosion. It is believed that by lowering the base elevation of the local drainage system through excavation of the sediment trap, the geomorphic response common to fluvial systems in a semiarid environment has increased the incision and remobilization of sediment downstream. Over time, these sediments would be deposited in the channels, which are designed to divert runoff away from the disposal cell, effectively limiting their capacities. The development of alluvial fans on one side of the channel directs flows to the opposite side of the channel, presenting the risk of cutting into the side slopes of the disposal cell. In addition, the upstream migrating gullies could intersect access roads and create hazards for adjacent stakeholders, including their grazing livestock. Current estimates conclude that potential offsite impacts could occur within the next 20 years, with gully migrations of up to 19 meters (63 feet) per year. In 2009, several erosion-control structures were constructed to reduce runoff velocities and ease the elevation differential created by the construction of the sediment trap and diversion channels. The first measurable storm events after construction occurred in August and September 2011, where one structure washed out and another structure was bypassed when runoff breached an earthen berm. DOE has conducted site assessments, continues to monitor erosion, and has applied lessons learned in the process of evaluating options to repair or modify the structures to stabilize the site and prevent potential short-term damage to adjacent properties as well as long-term damage to the disposal cell. (authors)
Mercury has had various uses in nuclear fuel reprocessing and other nuclear processes, and so is often present in radioactive and mixed (radioactive and hazardous) wastes. Test programs performed in recent years have shown that mercury in off-gas streams from processes that treat radioactive wastes can be controlled using fixed beds of activated sulfur-impregnated carbon, to levels low enough to comply with air emission regulations such as the Hazardous Waste Combustor (HWC) Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards. Carbon bed hot spots or fires have occurred several times during these tests, and also during a remediation of tanks that contained mixed waste. Hot spots occur when localized areas in a carbon bed become heated to temperatures where oxidation occurs. This heating typically occurs due to heat of absoption of gas species onto the carbon, but it can also be caused through external means such as external heaters used to heat the carbon bed vessel. Hot spots, if not promptly mitigated, can grow into bed fires. Carbon bed hot spots and fires must be avoided in processes that treat radioactive and mixed waste. Hot spots are detected by (a) monitoring in-bed and bed outlet gas temperatures, and (b) more important, monitoring of bed outlet gas CO concentrations. Hot spots are mitigated by (a) designing for appropriate in-bed gas velocity, for avoiding gas flow maldistribution, and for sufficient but not excessive bed depth, (b) appropriate monitoring and control of gas and bed temperatures and compositions, and (c) prompt implementation of corrective actions if bed hot spots are detected. Corrective actions must be implemented quickly if bed hot spots are detected, using a graded approach and sequence starting with corrective actions that are simple, quick, cause the least impact to the process, and are easiest to recover from.
Traditional approaches to material control and accounting at used nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities relies in large part on laboratory-based destructive assay of periodic samples taken from key stages. These techniques are highly accurate, but limited inspection frequency may limit the size and operation of a reprocessing facility. Online monitoring techniques using inline detectors can be applied to fuel reprocessing systems to improve the situational awareness as the facility is operating to provide additional indicators of the evolving state of the facility between normal inspection periods, potentially alerting regulators to the need for additional inspection. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor combines medium-resolution gamma detectors with statistical data analysis techniques to monitor reprocessing systems for anomalous conditions resulting from process control issues or malfeasance. Gamma spectra collected from the H-Canyon reprocessing facility were modeled using principal component analysis to demonstrate the efficacy of the MIP Monitor for detecting notional diversion scenarios.
The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program aims to accelerate the development, qualification, demonstration, and deployment of advanced materials and manufacturing technologies to enable reliable and economical nuclear energy However, the unique aspects of additive manufacturing (AM) materials in terms of their processing history, microstructure, and properties, are a major barrier for qualification and certification of nuclear components. Much of this challenge may be attributed to component scale variations in microstructure and properties that are driven by local influences of process conditions and geometry on thermal history, melt pool dynamics, and corresponding microstructure evolution. Computational modeling tools may be helpful in this regard to aid in predicting and controlling this level of variability. The purpose of this report is to review the current state-of-the-art for process modeling with regards to metal AM. For this purpose, we consider specifically the case study of laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) processing of SS316, a family of alloys that are both commonly used in nuclear energy applications and suitable for AM processing. The report first introduces the necessary components of a process modeling workflow, followed by a review of the current status of each. At the end, application of these modeling tools to understanding variability in AM process given their current state are considered, and recommendations for future development are proposed
The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project is tasked with selecting a high temperature gas reactor technology that will be capable of generating electricity and supplying large amounts of process heat. The NGNP is presently being designed as a helium-cooled high temperature gas reactor (HTGR) with a large graphite core. The graphite baseline characterization project is conducting the research and development (R&D) activities deemed necessary to fully qualify nuclear-grade graphite for use in the NGNP reactor. Establishing nonirradiated thermomechanical and thermophysical properties by characterizing lot-to-lot and billet-to-billet variations (for probabilistic baseline data needs) through extensive data collection and statistical analysis is one of the major fundamental objectives of the project. The reactor core will be made up of stacks of graphite moderator blocks. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the varying characteristics in a wide range of suitable graphites, any of which can be classified as “nuclear grade,” an experimental program has been initiated to develop an extensive database of the baseline characteristics of numerous candidate graphites. Various factors known to affect the properties of graphite will be investigated, including specimen size, spatial location within a graphite billet, specimen orientation within a billet (either parallel to [P] or transverse to [T] the long axis of the as-produced billet), and billet-to-billet variations within a lot or across different production lots. Because each data point is based on a certain position within a given billet of graphite, particular attention must be paid to the traceability of each specimen and its spatial location and orientation within each billet. The evaluation of these properties is discussed in the Graphite Technology Development Plan (Windes et. al, 2007). One of the key components in the evaluation of these graphite types will be mechanical testing on specimens drawn from carefully controlled sections of each billet. To this end, this report will discuss the machining of the first set of test specimens that will be evaluated in this program through tensile, compressive, and flexural testing. Validation that the test specimens have been produced to the tolerances required by the applicable ASTM standards, and to the quality control levels required by this program, will demonstrate the viability of sending graphite to selected suppliers that will provide valuable and certifiable data to future data sets that are integral to the NGNP program and beyond.
Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).
Counterfeiting of industrial and commercial grade items is an international problem that places worker safety, program objectives, expensive equipment, and security at risk. In order to prevent the introduction of Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CI), this information sheet is being made available as a guide to assist in the implementation of S/CI awareness and controls, in conjunction with subcontractor's/supplier's quality assurance programs. When it comes to counterfeit goods, including industrial materials, items, and equipment, no market is immune. Some manufactures have been known to misrepresent their products and intentionally use inferior materials and processes to manufacture substandard items, whose properties can significantly cart from established standards and specifications. These substandard items termed by the Department of Energy (DOE) as S/CI, pose immediate and potential threats to the safety of DOE and contractor workers, the public, and the environment. Failure of certain systems and processes caused by an S/CI could also have national security implications at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Nuclear Safety Rules (federal Laws), DOE Orders, and other regulations set forth requirements for DOE contractors to implement effective controls to assure that items and services meet specified requirements. This includes techniques to implement and thereby minimizing the potential threat of entry of S/CI to LANL. As a qualified supplier of goods or services to the LANL, your company will be required to establish and maintain effective controls to prevent the introduction of S/CI to LANL. This will require that your company warrant that all items (including their subassemblies, components, and parts) sold to LANL are genuine (i.e. not counterfeit), new, and unused, and conform to the requirements of the LANL purchase orders/contracts unless otherwise approved in writing to the Los Alamos National Security (LANS) contract administrator/procurements specialist.
The availability of data whose quality is fittingly labeled is of tantamount importance to signal detection and all other downstream signal processing operations. Without identification, the goals of low yield nuclear monitoring cannot reach their full potential. A fundamental question that remains is the knowledge of the capability gaps that prevent us from using open network data. With these new channels, we will need better understanding of the frequency, type, severity, and impact of artifacts when compared to conventional networks. Moreover, beyond a simple quality label, thresholds for acceptable use of the data will need to be established, likely on a use case by use case basis. Finally, orders of magnitude more data with an at-best static analyst pool size means that quality artifacts must be identified with as little human interaction as possible. Automated methodologies must be developed to account for the scale of the problem when ad hoc networks are candidates for processing. At the same time that “data wealth” provides more opportunity for signal exploitation, the introduction of ad hoc networks introduces an increased risk quality issues in both sensor value and metadata issues. The artifacts shown below are examples of some sensor-based quality issues that impair downstream processing. The machine learning model used in this project was able to identify the artifacts that produce these spurious correlations, significantly improving analyst productivity.
Research highlights: {yields} CK2 subunits are nuclear both in glucose and in ethanol growing yeast cells. {yields} CK2 activity is modulated in S. cerevisiae. {yields} CK2 activity is higher in conditions supporting higher growth rates. {yields} V{sub max} is higher in faster growing cells, while K{sub m} is not affected. -- Abstract: CK2 is a highly conserved protein kinase controlling different cellular processes. It shows a higher activity in proliferating mammalian cells, in various types of cancer cell lines and tumors. The findings presented herein provide the first evidence of an in vivo modulation of CK2 activity, dependent on growth rate, in Saccharomyces cerevisiae. In fact, CK2 activity, assayed on nuclear extracts, is shown to increase in exponential growing batch cultures at faster growth rate, while localization of catalytic and regulatory subunits is not nutritionally modulated. Differences in intracellular CK2 activity of glucose- and ethanol-grown cells appear to depend on both increase in molecule number and k{sub cat}. Also in chemostat cultures nuclear CK2 activity is higher in faster growing cells providing the first unequivocal demonstration that growth rate itself can affect CK2 activity in a eukaryotic organism.
The photochemical reactions performed by transition metal complexes have been proposed as viable routes towards solar energy conversion and storage into other forms that can be conveniently used in our everyday applications. In order to develop efficient materials, it is necessary to identify, characterize and optimize the elementary steps of the entire process on the atomic scale. To this end, we have studied the photoinduced electronic and structural dynamics in two heterobimetallic ruthenium–cobalt dyads, which belong to the large family of donor–bridge–acceptor systems. Using a combination of ultrafast optical and X-ray absorption spectroscopies, we can clock the light-driven electron transfer processes with element and spin sensitivity. In addition, the changes in local structure around the two metal centers are monitored. These experiments show that the nature of the connecting bridge is decisive for controlling the forward and the backward electron transfer rates, a result supported by quantum chemistry calculations. More generally, this work illustrates how ultrafast optical and X-ray techniques can disentangle the influence of spin, electronic and nuclear factors on the intramolecular electron transfer process. Finally, some implications for further improving the design of bridged sensitizer-catalysts utilizing the presented methodology are outlined.
This paper demonstrates a high-speed spiral imaging technique for an atomic force microscope (AFM). As an alternative to traditional raster scanning, an approach of gradient pulsing using a spiral line is implemented and spirals are generated by applying single-frequency cosine and sine waves of slowly varying amplitudes to the X and Y-axes of the AFM’s piezoelectric tube scanner (PTS). Due to these single-frequency sinusoidal input signals, the scanning process can be faster than that of conventional raster scanning. A linear quadratic Gaussian controller is designed to track the reference sinusoid and a vibration compensator is combined to damp the resonant mode of the PTS. An internal model of the reference sinusoidal signal is included in the plant model and an integrator for the system error is introduced in the proposed control scheme. As a result, the phase error between the input and output sinusoids from the X and Y-PTSs is reduced. The spirals produced have particularly narrow-band frequency measures which change slowly over time, thereby making it possible for the scanner to achieve improved tracking and continuous high-speed scanning rather than being restricted to the back and forth motion of raster scanning. As part of the post-processing of the experimental data, a fifth-order Butterworth filter is used to filter noises in the signals emanating from the position sensors and a Gaussian image filter is used to filter the images. A comparison of images scanned using the proposed controller (spiral) and the AFM PI controller (raster) shows improvement in the scanning rate using the proposed method.
As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.
These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2010: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2010 in Orlando, Florida,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, National Science Foundation (NSF), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.
Sandia National Laboratories has hired Itasca Consulting Group, Inc., the authors of the FLAC3D geomechanics software, to couple FLAC3D with TOUGH3, the porous media flow solver. The work is being done to enable a coupled mechanical-thermal-hydraulic analysis of a potential criticality event in a dual purpose cannister (DPC). The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Science & Technology is investigating the performance of DPCs for direct geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Post closure criticality control is an important aspect of this investigation. Over geological timescales, it is envisioned that the canister and canister overpack will develop fractures due to stress corrosion processes. A breach in the canister could allow groundwater to fill the canister. Fresh water is a neutron moderator; thus, if the canister internals and fuel assemblies have been sufficiently degraded, a criticality event could occur. Such an event would release enough energy to boil the water between the fuel rods and pressurize the cannister. This internal pressurization may cause the initial fractures in the canister and overpack to grow. It is important to understand the change in hydraulic transmissivity between the canister and surroundings for two reasons: first, because it may control the potential for and frequency of subsequent criticality events; second, because it will control the release of radionuclides from the canister. The motivation for this work is to better understand the potential for periodic criticality events, cannister damage, and release of radionuclides during a criticality event in a DPC.
An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. It is critical that a nuclear facility conduct a thorough self-assessment of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system to evaluate system effectiveness. Self-assessment involves vulnerability analysis and performance testing of the MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. Analysis of the MPC&A system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. Self-assessment helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's MPC&A system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MPC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MPC&A functions based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time and reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential performance improvement or system upgrade can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance. The analyses reveal where performance degradation has the greatest detrimental impact on total system risk and where performance improvements have the greatest reduction in system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction actually achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk.
Ultraviolet–visible spectroscopy (UV–Visible) and time-resolved laser fluorescence spectroscopy (TRLFS) optical techniques can permit on-line analysis of actinide elements in a solvent extraction process in real time. These techniques have been used for measuring actinide speciation and concentration under laboratory conditions and are easily adaptable to multiple sampling geometries, such as dip probes, fiber-optic sample cells, and flow-through cell geometries. To fully exploit these techniques, researchers must determine the fundamental speciation of target actinides and the resulting influence on spectroscopic properties. Detection limits, process conditions, and speciation of key actinide components can be established and utilized in a range of areas, particularly those related to materials accountability and process control. Through this project, researchers will develop tools and spectroscopic techniques to evaluate solution extraction conditions and concentrations of U, Pu, and Cm in extraction processes, addressing areas of process control and materials accountability. The team will evaluate UV– Visible and TRLFS for use in solvent extraction-based separations. Ongoing research is examining efficacy of UV-Visible spectroscopy to evaluate uranium and plutonium speciation under conditions found in the UREX process and using TRLFS to evaluate Cm speciation and concentration in the TALSPEAK process. A uranyl and plutonium nitrate UV–Visible spectroscopy study met with success, which supports the utility and continued exploration of spectroscopic methods for evaluation of actinide concentrations and solution conditions for other aspects of the UREX+ solvent extraction scheme. This project will examine U and Pu absorbance in TRUEX and TALSPEAK, perform detailed examination of Cm in TRUEX and TALSPEAK, study U laser fluorescence, and apply project data to contactors. The team will also determine peak ratios as a function of solution concentrations for the UV-Visible spectroscopy studies. The use of TRLFS to examine Cm and U will provide data to evaluate lifetime, peak location, and peak ratios (mainly for U). The bases for the spectroscopic techniques have been investigated, providing fundamental evidence for the application’s utility.
Control Room modernization is an important part of life extension for the existing light water reactor fleet. None of the 99 currently operating commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. has completed a full-scale control room modernization to date. A full-scale modernization might, for example, entail replacement of all analog panels with digital workstations. Such modernizations have been undertaken successfully in upgrades in Europe and Asia, but the U.S. has yet to undertake a control room upgrade of this magnitude. Instead, nuclear power plant main control rooms for the existing commercial reactor fleet remain significantly analog, with only limited digital modernizations. Previous research under the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program has helped establish a systematic process for control room upgrades that support the transition to a hybrid control. While the guidance developed to date helps streamline the process of modernization and reduce costs and uncertainty associated with introducing digital control technologies into an existing control room, these upgrades do not achieve the full potential of newer technologies that might otherwise enhance plant and operator performance. The aim of the control room benefits research presented here is to identify previously overlooked benefits of modernization, identify candidate technologies that may facilitate such benefits, and demonstrate these technologies through human factors research. This report serves as an outline for planned research on the benefits of greater modernization in the main control rooms of nuclear power plants.