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At least 613 records · Page 34

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DOE OSTI2024

Data Security Defense: Modeling and Detection of Synchrophasor Data Spoofing Attack for Grid Edge

Data security and cyberattack have become critical issues in the distributed power system where adversaries can swap the source information of sensors or even spoof and alter measurements. However, the cyber security of the power system is challenged by the unpredictability and stealth of the spoofing attacks. Here, to protect the data security at the grid edge, this paper developed a synchrophasor data spoofing attack detection framework based on the time-frequency feature extraction techniques including the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) and object detection network for real-time synchrophasor data categorization and spoofing attack localization. The proposed approach outperforms earlier work in terms of spoofing attack detection and offers a vital localization function employing distributed synchrophasor sensors.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2015

Security vulnerabilities of connected vehicle streams and their impact on cooperative driving

Autonomous vehicles capable of navigating unpredictable real-world environments with little human feedback are a reality today. Such systems rely heavily on onboard sensors such as cameras, radar/LIDAR, and GPS as well as capabilities such as 3G/4G connectivity and V2V/V2I communication to make real-time maneuvering decisions. Autonomous vehicle control imposes very strict requirements on the security of the communication channels used by the vehicle to exchange information as well as the control logic that performs complex driving tasks such as adapting vehicle velocity or changing lanes. This research presents a first look at the effects of security attacks on the communication channel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle stream equipped to achieve CACC. Our simulation results show that an insider attack can cause significant instability in the CACC vehicle stream. We also outline how different countermeasures, such as downgrading to ACC mode, could potentially be used to improve the security and safety of the connected vehicle streams.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2015

Secure information transmission in filter bank multi-carrier spread spectrum systems

This report discusses the issue of secure information transmission for a spread-spectrum system, which in our case is Filter-Bank Multi-Carrier spread spectrum (FB-MC SS). We develop a novel method for generating a secret key to augment the security of the spread spectrum system. The proposed key generation takes advantage of the channel reciprocity exhibited between two communicating parties.We validate the key generation aspect of our system by using real-world measurements. It is found that our augmentation of strongest path cancellation (SPC) is shown to be highly effective in our measurement scenarios where the adversary’s key would otherwise be significantly correlated with the legitimate nodes. Our approach in using the proposed key generation method as a part of FB-MC SS allows for it to be fault tolerant and it is not necessarily limited to FB-MC SS or spread-spectrum system in general. However, the advantage that our approach has in the domain of spread-spectrum security is that it significantly decorrelates the adversary’s key from the authentic parties. This aspect is crucial because if the adversary’s key is similar to the legitamate parties, then the adversary obtains a sizable advantage due to the fault tolerance nature of the developed spread spectrum key.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2011

Using Swarming Agents for Scalable Security in Large Network Environments

The difficulty of securing computer infrastructures increases as they grow in size and complexity. Network-based security solutions such as IDS and firewalls cannot scale because of exponentially increasing computational costs inherent in detecting the rapidly growing number of threat signatures. Hostbased solutions like virus scanners and IDS suffer similar issues, and these are compounded when enterprises try to monitor these in a centralized manner. Swarm-based autonomous agent systems like digital ants and artificial immune systems can provide a scalable security solution for large network environments. The digital ants approach offers a biologically inspired design where each ant in the virtual colony can detect atoms of evidence that may help identify a possible threat. By assembling the atomic evidences from different ant types the colony may detect the threat. This decentralized approach can require, on average, fewer computational resources than traditional centralized solutions; however there are limits to its scalability. This paper describes how dividing a large infrastructure into smaller managed enclaves allows the digital ant framework to effectively operate in larger environments. Experimental results will show that using smaller enclaves allows for more consistent distribution of agents and results in faster response times.

agents↗

DOE OSTI2016

Security-Oriented and Load-Balancing Wireless Data Routing Game in the Integration of Advanced Metering Infrastructure Network in Smart Grid

Ensuring flexible and reliable data routing is indispensable for the integration of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks, we propose a secure-oriented and load-balancing wireless data routing scheme. A novel utility function is designed based on security routing scheme. Then, we model the interactive security-oriented routing strategy among meter data concentrators or smart grid meters as a mixed-strategy network formation game. Finally, such problem results in a stable probabilistic routing scheme with proposed distributed learning algorithm. One contributions is that we studied that different types of applications affect the routing selection strategy and the strategy tendency. Another contributions is that the chosen strategy of our mixed routing can adaptively to converge to a new mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) during the learning process in the smart grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Secure and Adaptive Hierarchical Multi-Timescale Framework for Resilient Load Restoration Using a Community Microgrid

Distribution system integrated community microgrids (CMGs) can partake in restoring loads during extended duration outages. At such times, the CMGs are challenged with limited resource availability, absence of robust grid support, and heightened demand-supply uncertainty. Here, this paper proposes a secure and adaptive three-stage hierarchical multi-timescale framework for scheduling and real-time (RT) dispatch of CMGs with hybrid PV systems to address these challenges. The framework enables the CMG to dynamically expand its boundary to support the neighboring grid sections and is adaptive to the changing forecast error impacts. The first stage solves a stochastic extended duration scheduling (EDS) problem to obtain referral plans for optimal resource rationing. The intermediate near-real-time (NRT) scheduling stage updates the EDS schedule closer to the dispatch time using new obtained forecasts, followed by the RT dispatch stage. To make the decisions more secure and robust against forecast errors, a novel concept called delayed recourse is designed. The approach is evaluated via numerical simulations on a modified IEEE 123-bus system and validated using OpenDSS and hardware-in-loop simulations. The results show superior performance in maximizing load supply and continuous secure distribution network operation under different operating scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Development of a leading simulator/trailing simulator methodology as part of an integrated safety-security analysis for nuclear power plants

Nuclear power plant (NPP) risk assessment is broadly separated into disciplines of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Different analysis methods and computer models have been constructed to analyze each of these as separate disciplines. However, due to the complexity of NPP systems, there are risks that can span all these disciplines and require consideration of safety-security (2S) interactions which allows a more complete understanding of the relationship among these risks. In this work, a novel leading simulator/trailing simulator (LS/TS) method is introduced to integrate multiple generic safety and security computer models into a single, holistic 2S analysis. A case study is performed using this novel method to determine its effectiveness. The case study shows that the LS/TS method avoided introducing errors in simulation, compared to the same scenario performed without the LS/TS method. A second case study is then used to illustrate an integrated 2S analysis which shows that different levels of damage to vital equipment from sabotage at a NPP can affect accident evolution by several hours.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cyber–Physical System Security of Distribution Systems

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2011

Technical Cooperation on Nuclear Security between the United States and China: Review of the Past and Opportunities for the Future

The United States and China are committed to cooperation to address the challenges of the next century. Technical cooperation, building on a long tradition of technical exchange between the two countries, can play an important role. This paper focuses on technical cooperation between the United States and China in the areas of nonproliferation, arms control and other nuclear security topics. It reviews cooperation during the 1990s on nonproliferation and arms control under the U.S.-China Arms Control Exchange, discusses examples of ongoing activities under the Peaceful Uses of Technology Agreement to enhance security of nuclear and radiological material, and suggests opportunities for expanding technical cooperation between the defense nuclear laboratories of both countries to address a broader range of nuclear security topics.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2012

Geology of the Source Physics Experiment Site, Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site

A test bed for a series of chemical explosives tests known as Source Physics Experiments (SPE) was constructed in granitic rock of the Climax stock, in northern Yucca Flat at the Nevada National Security Site in 2010-2011. These tests are sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration's National Center for Nuclear Security. The test series is designed to study the generation and propagation of seismic waves, and will provide data that will improve the predictive capability of calculational models for detecting and characterizing underground explosions. Abundant geologic data are available for the area, primarily as a result of studies performed in conjunction with the three underground nuclear tests conducted in the Climax granite in the 1960s and a few later studies of various types.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2011

Cyber Security Indications and Warning System (SV) (CRADA 1573.94 Project Accomplishments Summary)

As the national focus on cyber security increases, there is an evolving need for a capability to provide for high-speed sensing of events, correlation of events, and decision-making based on the adverse events seen across multiple independent large-scale network environments. The purpose of this Shared Vision project, Cyber Security Indications and Warning System, was to combine both Sandia's and LMC's expertise to discover new solutions to the challenge of protecting our nation's infrastructure assets. The objectives and scope of the proposal was limited to algorithm and High Performance Computing (HPC) model assessment in the unclassified environment within funding and schedule constraints. The interest is the identification, scalability assessment, and applicability of current utilized cyber security algorithms as applied in an HPC environment.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2012

Valuing Energy Security: Customer Damage Function Methodology and Case Studies at DoD Installations

This report describes a methodology to value non-energy savings that can be attributed to energy security projects. The methodology is based on: (1) completing a site survey to collect data on two hypothetical outage scenarios lasting for different durations to compute a customer damage function (CDF), which represents interruption costs as a function of the outage duration; (2) characterizing the reliability of the commercial power supply at the site; and (3) estimating the value of electrical energy security (VEES), which is a metric that characterizes on an annual basis the cost of utility outages. The avoided cost of commercial power outages can be used as ancillary non-energy savings to increase the return on investment of energy security projects.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2013

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following: • DOE hazardous and non-hazardous non-radioactive classified waste • DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW) • DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW) • U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and shall be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified waste may be sent to the NNSS as classified matter. Section 3.1.18 provides the requirements that must be met for permanent burial of classified matter. The NNSA/NFO and support contractors are available to assist the generator in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management Operations (EMO) at (702) 295-7063, and the call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2013

Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses (2012 Annual Summary Report)

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs), with the results submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE 1999a, 2000). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for fiscal year (FY) 2012. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2012 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (RD) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and RD activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2012 include the following: Release of a special analysis for the Area 3 RWMS assessing the continuing validity of the PA and CA; Development of a new Area 5 RWMS closure inventory estimate based on disposals through FY 2012; Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis; and Development of version 4.114 of the Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA model. The Area 3 RWMS has been in inactive status since July 1, 2006, with the last shipment received in April 2006. The FY 2012 review of operations, facility design, closure plans, monitoring results, and RD results for the Area 3 RWMS indicates no changes that would impact PA validity. A special analysis using the Area 3 RWMS v2.102 GoldSim PA model was prepared to update the PA results for the Area 3 RWMS in FY 2012. The special analysis concludes that all performance objectives can be met and the Area 3 RWMS PA remains valid. There is no need to the revise the Area 3 RWMS PA. Review of Area 5 RWMS operations, design, closure plans, monitoring results, and RD activities indicates no significant changes other than an increase in the inventory disposed. The FY 2012 PA results, generated with the Area 5 RWMS v4.114 GoldSim PA model, indicate that there continues to be a reasonable expectation of meeting all performance objectives. The results and conclusions of the Area 5 RWMS PA are judged valid, and there is no need to the revise the PA. A review of changes potentially impacting the CAs indicates that no significant changes occurred in FY 2012. The continuing adequacy of the CAs was evaluated with the new models, and no significant changes that would alter CA results or conclusions were found. The revision of the Area 3 RWMS CA, which will include the Underground Test Area source term (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 97), is scheduled for FY 2024, following the completion of the Yucca Flat CAU 97 Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan in FY 2016. Inclusion of the Frenchman Flat CAU 98 results in the Area 5 RWMS CA is scheduled for FY 2016, pending the completion of the CAU 98 closure report in FY 2015. Near-term RD efforts will focus on continuing development of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA/CA and inventory models.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2014

2013 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2014

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2013

This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) (formerly designated as the Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO]). The new field office designation occurred in March 2013. Published reports cited in this 2013 report, therefore, may bear the name or authorship of NNSA/NSO. This and previous years’ reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NFO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2014

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2013 Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2012 (National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2013). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological setting and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗