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At least 613 records · Page 34

Security and Privacy Grand Challenges for the Internet of Things

Abstract— The growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) is driven by market pressures, and while security is being considered, the relationship between the unintended consequences of billions of such devices connecting to the Internet cannot be described with existing mathematical methods. The possibilities for illicit surveillance through lifestyle analysis, unauthorized access to information, and new attack vectors will continue to increase by 2020, when up-to 50 billion devices may be connected. This paper discusses various kinds of vulnerabilities that can be expected to arise, and presents a research agenda for mitigating the worst of the impacts. We hope to draw research attention to the potential dangers of IoT so that many of these problems can be avoided.

grand challenge↗

Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector

With utilities in the U.S. and around the world increasingly moving toward smart grid technology and other upgrades with inherent cyber vulnerabilities, correlative threats from malicious cyber attacks on the North American electric grid continue to grow in frequency and sophistication. The potential for malicious actors to access and adversely affect physical electricity assets of U.S. electricity generation, transmission, or distribution systems via cyber means is a primary concern for utilities contributing to the bulk electric system. This paper seeks to illustrate the current cyber-physical landscape of the U.S. electric sector in the context of its vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, the likelihood of cyber attacks, and the impacts cyber events and threat actors can achieve on the power grid. In addition, this paper highlights utility perspectives, perceived challenges, and requests for assistance in addressing cyber threats to the electric sector. There have been no reported targeted cyber attacks carried out against utilities in the U.S. that have resulted in permanent or long term damage to power system operations thus far, yet electric utilities throughout the U.S. have seen a steady rise in cyber and physical security related events that continue to raise concern. Asset owners and operators understand that the effects of a coordinated cyber and physical attack on a utility’s operations would threaten electric system reliability–and potentially result in large scale power outages. Utilities are routinely faced with new challenges for dealing with these cyber threats to the grid and consequently maintain a set of best practices to keep systems secure and up to date. Among the greatest challenges is a lack of knowledge or strategy to mitigate new risks that emerge as a result of an exponential rise in complexity of modern control systems. This paper compiles an open-source analysis of cyber threats and risks to the electric grid, utility best practices for prevention and response to cyber threats, and utility suggestions about how the federal government can aid utilities in combating and mitigating risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Audits Made Simple

A company just got notified there is a big external audit coming in 3 months. Getting ready for an audit can be challenging, scary, and full of surprises. This Gold Paper describes a typical audit from notification of the intent to audit through disposition of the final report including Best Practices, Opportunities for Improvement (OFI), and issues that must be fixed. Good preparation can improve the chances of success. Ensuring the auditors understand the environment and requirements is paramount to success. It helps the auditors understand that the enterprise really does think that security is important. Understanding and following a structured process ensures a smooth audit process. Ensuring follow-up on OFIs and issues in a structured fashion will also make the next audit easier. It is important to keep in mind that the auditors will use the previous report as a starting point. Now the only worry is the actual audit and subsequent report and how well the company has done. “Virtualization, mobilization, and cloud technology have created new points of entry into business, leaving them vulnerable to covert cyber-attacks,” states a report by Ernst & Young. Executives are struggling with the potential for a data breach, and resolving this business risk is high on their agenda. While most audit committee members are financially solid, they lack knowledge of technology issues, making understanding of this risk difficult. Success with an audit helps management understand the risk management is accepting, highlight gaps in security, and generate ideas on how to improve. These results are an important aspect of managing the business risk.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic well being. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyber attacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal is to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The team consisted of leading experts from two major universities – Iowa State University, Washington State University – complemented by reputed researchers from two DOE national laboratories – Pacific Northwest National Lab, and Argonne National Lab, one major utility vendor GE Global Research, and one utility partner – Cedar Falls Utilities (CFU). The team members have proven track record of successful academic-industry collaboration in interdisciplinary R&D projects, and bring onboard some of the best state-of-the-art testbed resources, industry-grade SCADA/EMS/DMS environment for experimentation and field demonstration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Physical Security and Resiliency Analysis Testbed for Critical Microgrids with IEEE 2030.5: Preprint

IEEE 2030.5, also known as the Common Smart Inverter Standard (CSIP) is a protocol that specifies the interface between the end user and the smart grid. This standard was proposed recently, and provides many functions which if implemented incorrectly might lead to vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a cyber-physical microgrid testbed using OpenDSS and IEEE 2030.5 that can be used to study the performance of the CSIP protocol various scenarios. For critical microgrid installations, it is essential that the critical loads are served in spite of multiple contingencies. A resiliency analysis is performed for a military microgrid to study its performance and the results are analyzed.

CVSS↗

FIC Consequence Profile - Hypothetical Cybercrime Syndicate Adversary Dossier

The FIC team has engaged PNNL’s Shamrock Cyber team to produce this Consequence Profile. This Consequence Profile is an Adversary Dossier, which provides the foundation for a thorough understanding of unacceptable mission outcomes, and the threats and vulnerabilities that make these outcomes plausible. The dossier helps stakeholders and development teams understand each other’s viewpoints. It also provides a means for reducing overall risk by prioritizing threats and vulnerabilities based on unacceptable outcomes. The Consequence Profile can be used as is, or as content to inform other reports tailored to a specific audience. It is intended to enable decision makers at all levels to improve the security posture of the system.

Beaman, Jacob E.↗

Estimating Tropical Cyclone Threats to Floating Rigs in the Gulf of Mexico

Offshore drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico are particularly vulnerable during hurricane season. When a weather threat arises, a decision to evacuate the rig and/or move to a safe location may need to be made. Depending on the activities in progress at the time of the threat, securing the well, evacuating, and/or moving to a safe location can take a considerable amount of time. This transition time is called T-time. T-time is not only rig dependent, but also depends on the activity being performed at the time of the threat. For these reasons it is important to assess tropical cyclone threats and the time it takes for them to reach the rig location. The objective of this study is to use the available 50 years of past cyclone history to estimate cyclone threats at any location in the Gulf of Mexico. The cyclone threat is estimated based on the rig location as well as the start date and duration of the offshore activity. By threat, it is meant the likelihood that a specific location with an associated offshore activity would be exposed to an upcoming cyclone whose forecasted track cone and storm size lies within that location. Three representative rig locations in the Gulf of Mexico were selected as assessment sites to evaluate the threat of incoming cyclones for different T-times. To conduct this tropical cyclone study, an Excel spreadsheet tool was developed to automate the analysis of the tropical cyclone data from the Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTrACS) Version 4. The spreadsheet tool allows the user to input any location (i.e., longitude and latitude) in the Gulf of Mexico and displays a list of historical cyclones that have passed within 150 nautical miles of that location during the activity period selected by the user. Also, the tool allows the user to input a T-time to assess the threat of cyclones that would not provide adequate time to secure the well, evacuate, and/or move to a safe location.

Risk↗

Finite Energy and Bounded Actuator Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems

As control system networks are being connected to enterprise level networks for remote monitoring, operation, and system-wide performance optimization, these same connections are providing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors for attack, financial gain, and theft of intellectual property. Much effort in cyber-physical system (CPS) protection has focused on protecting the borders of the system through traditional information security techniques. Less effort has been applied to the protection of cyber-physical systems from intelligent attacks launched after an attacker has defeated the information security protections to gain access to the control system. In this paper, attacks on actuator signals are analyzed from a system theoretic context. The threat surface is classified into finite energy and bounded attacks. These two broad classes encompass a large range of potential attacks. The effect of theses attacks on a linear quadratic (LQ) control are analyzed, and the optimal actuator attacks for both finite and infinite horizon LQ control are derived, therefore the worst case attack signals are obtained. The closed-loop system under the optimal attack signals is given and a numerical example illustrating the effect of an optimal bounded attack is provided.

Djouadi, Seddik M↗

Compound Effects of Climate Change on Future Transboundary Water Issues in the Middle East

The Middle East is one of the world’s most vulnerable areas to climate change, which has exacerbated environmental, agricultural, water conflict, and public health issues in the region. Here we analyze the latest climate model projections of precipitation and temperature for the very high emissions scenario, SSP5-8.5,to detect potential future changes in this region. A baseline period (1981-2010) is compared with the middle(2040-2069) and end (2070-2099) of the 21stcentury. The results, representing the worst-case scenario, identify the Tigris-Euphrates headwaters as the hotspot of future compounding effects of climate change in the Middle East. Those effects result from the coincidence of elevated temperature, reduced precipitation, and enhanced interannual variability of precipitation. The hotspot overlays the location of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (in Turkish, GAP) irrigation initiative. In this climate context, risks to GAP viability and downstream water security, and associated potential for water-related conflicts and migration are considerable and demand a reconsideration of the risk-benefit assessment of GAP. This need has become more urgent after the recent widespread and deadly climate-related conflicts and wildfires in summer 2021 across the Middle East that further underlined vulnerability of the region to climate extremes.

Tigris-Euphrates headwater↗

Security Informatics Research Challenges for Mitigating Cyber Friendly Fire

This paper addresses cognitive implications and research needs surrounding the problem of cyber friendly re (FF). We dene cyber FF as intentional o*ensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintentionally harms the mission e*ectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. We describe examples of cyber FF and discuss how it ts within a general conceptual framework for cyber security failures. Because it involves human failure, cyber FF may be considered to belong to a sub-class of cyber security failures characterized as unintentional insider threats. Cyber FF is closely related to combat friendly re in that maintaining situation awareness (SA) is paramount to avoiding unintended consequences. Cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system's topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system and its nodes, the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive and o*ensive countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. We describe a test bed designed to support empirical research on factors a*ecting cyber FF. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF, including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches.

cyber friendly fire↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Recommended Functionalities for Improving Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources

The current electric grid is transitioning through increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), which include intermittent renewable generation resources on the distribution side. Both the monitoring and control of DERs require extensive data-exchange and communication networks. These networks lead to cyber vulnerabilities and risks of new kinds of cyberattacks that may be extremely destructive for power system operations. Although current standards, such as IEEE Std. 1547-2018, do not discuss cybersecurity measures for DERs, cybersecurity controls should be developed for securing DER systems at the device level, communications level, and applications level. This paper discusses the current industry's best practices related to DER cybersecurity and proposes recommended functionalities for improving the cybersecurity posture of DERs, specifically at the device/distribution level. These practical recommendations have been discussed and verified with the industry through a DER cybersecurity working group.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity-Tools/V2W-BERT

Software Vulnerabilities to Weakness Mapping. V2W-BERT optimizes the learnable parameters θ of Fθ in two steps. In the first step, the pre-trained BERT language model is further fine-tuned with CVE/CWE descriptions specific to cyber security. In the second step, the trained BERT model is employed in a Siamese network architecture to establish links between CVEs and CWEs. The architecture takes a specific CVE-CWE pair as input and predicts whether the CVE belongs to the CWE or not, with a confidence value. V2W-BERT includes a Mask Language Model (LM) based Reconstruction Decoder to ensure that the descriptions’ contexts are not changed too much during the training process.

Halappanavar,, Mahantesh↗

Cybersecurity Assessment Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

This growing number of smart devices that support DERs can increase the number of access points outside a utility’s administrative domain, which can increase the potential for cyberattack. With the integration of DERs at federal sites, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of DER systems must be understood and addressed. This presentation covers two NREL tools available. The Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) is a web-based holistic tool for evaluating cybersecurity posture including governance, physical security and technical management. The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) extends the DER-CF by applying it to the NIST risk management framework process. It will be downloadable application that runs locally and documents all the major requirements for achieving Authority to Operate the DER.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Present status and future plans for the restoration of Fukushima Daiichi NPS

There are many challenges at Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, even though the reactors have reached a condition equivalent to cold shutdown. Cooling of reactors is maintained using the circulating cooling system, which contains some temporary equipments and consists of long pipes reaching to about 4 km. The reliability of the cooling system is one of the keys to maintaining the stabilized condition. Therefore a variety of activities, such as the replacement of hoses with more durable pipes, is being conducted to improve the reliability of the cooling system. The first fuel bundle will be removed from the spent fuel pool (SFP) at Unit 4 in November, which is earlier than the original plan. In preparation for the fuel debris removal, investigations inside the primary containment vessel (PCVs) have been initiated. Visual images and other data, such as water level, radiation dose and temperature inside the PCVs, have been taken at Units 1 and 2. The issue of excessive contaminated water is the most urgent one. About 400 tons of ground water is intruding into the turbine and reactor buildings every day. This intruding water mixes with the core cooling water and becomes a large amount of contaminated water. It has to be stored on the site, despite the fact that some radioactive nuclides remain in it even after cesium is removed. The amount of water stored on the site has reached about 290,000 tons so far and is increasing. Counter measures for this issue, such as reduction of intruding water, cleaning up of the contaminated water and securing of water storage tanks, are under consideration and being conducted. However, certain recent events, such as the power loss of the SFP cooling systems and leakage of contaminated water from the underground tanks, have raised concerns about reliability. Vulnerabilities have been evaluated systematically and counter measures are being taken. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Security Enhancements for Distributed Energy Resource Systems Interconnected with Distribution Networks: Final Technical Report

The revised IEEE 1547 Standard defines new complex communication-adjustable voltage and frequency regulation and ride-through characteristics, while maintaining the general antiislanding requirement for unintentional islanding situations. Unintentional islanding is prohibited while intentional islanding is specifically allowed, thus effectively enabling microgrid operation mode. Further, IEEE 1547-2018 Standard introduces new requirements in terms of interoperability so that the DER plant/circuit segments may be seamlessly integrated with the utility networks but at the same time become vulnerable to a cyber-attack. Traditional cybersecurity measures including encryption, authentication and role-based access control may not be fully implementable to all communication protocols specified in the IEEE 1547 Standard. Therefore, in this project we have identified, researched, implemented and tested several cyberphysical approaches that rely mostly on the behavior of the DER circuit and may help with validating the incoming command and control action potentially coming through an insecure communications channel. Additionally, we have built semantic models and communications profiles for DER facilities and have implemented lightweight IEC 61850 based publisher-subscriber GOOSE messaging mechanism, with security extensions in terms of authentication and encryption. The project proposed information models for integration into UCA OpenFMB 2.0 profiles focusing on grid code compliance.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE REACTOR CONVERSION PROGRAM: STATUS AND CURRENT PLANS

The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Reactor Conversion Program supports the minimization, and to the extent possible, elimination of the use of high enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications by working to convert research and test reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU). The Reactor Conversion Program is a technical pillar of the NNSA Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) which is a key organization for implementing U.S. HEU minimization policy and works to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material domestically and abroad.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗