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At least 631 records · Page 35

Bringing in the Reinforcements

What do NASA and ballistics have in common? More than the average person may know. Everyday, millions of Americans drive in vehicles, cross over bridges, and fly in airplanes without knowing just how important NASA s role in studying ballistics is in making these actions viable and safe for them. At Glenn Research Center s Ballistic Impact Facility, NASA scientists and engineers study the dynamics of high-speed projectiles and their impact on targets to create materials and structures that are smarter, lighter, and stronger. By applying the science of ballistics to new developments, these researchers are taking major steps in preventing catastrophic events. The Ballistic Impact Facility s main features are a 40-foot-long gas gun that can launch projectiles at speeds over 1,000 miles per hour and highspeed cameras that can capture up to 250 million images per second.

Source record↗

Aerocapture Performance Analysis of A Venus Exploration Mission

A performance analysis of a Discovery Class Venus Exploration Mission in which aerocapture is used to capture a spacecraft into a 300km polar orbit for a two year science mission has been conducted to quantify its performance. A preliminary performance assessment determined that a high heritage 70 sphere-cone rigid aeroshell with a 0.25 lift to drag ratio has adequate control authority to provide an entry flight path angle corridor large enough for the mission s aerocapture maneuver. A 114 kilograms per square meter ballistic coefficient reference vehicle was developed from the science requirements and the preliminary assessment s heating indicators and deceleration loads. Performance analyses were conducted for the reference vehicle and for sensitivity studies on vehicle ballistic coefficient and maximum bank rate. The performance analyses used a high fidelity flight simulation within a Monte Carlo executive to define the aerocapture heating environment and deceleration loads and to determine mission success statistics. The simulation utilized the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories (POST) that was modified to include Venus specific atmospheric and planet models, aerodynamic characteristics, and interplanetary trajectory models. In addition to Venus specific models, an autonomous guidance system, HYPAS, and a pseudo flight controller were incorporated in the simulation. The Monte Carlo analyses incorporated a reference set of approach trajectory delivery errors, aerodynamic uncertainties, and atmospheric density variations. The reference performance analysis determined the reference vehicle achieves 100% successful capture and has a 99.87% probability of attaining the science orbit with a 90 meters per second delta V budget for post aerocapture orbital adjustments. A ballistic coefficient trade study conducted with reference uncertainties determined that the 0.25 L/D vehicle can achieve 100% successful capture with a ballistic coefficient of 228 kilograms per square meter and that the increased ballistic coefficient increases post aerocapture V budget to 134 meters per second for a 99.87% probability of attaining the science orbit. A trade study on vehicle bank rate determined that the 0.25 L/D vehicle can achieve 100% successful capture when the maximum bank rate is decreased from 30 deg/s to 20 deg/s. The decreased bank rate increases post aerocapture delta V budget to 102 meters per second for a 99.87% probability of attaining the science orbit.

Starr, Brett R.↗

Initial Studies on Development of High-Performance Nano-structured Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} Catalysts for Solid Rocket Propellants

Space launch vehicles and strategic military vehicles commonly employ composite solid rocket propellants containing Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} as ballistic modifier. Nanoscale catalysts, including nanoscale Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3}, have been reported to exhibit superior activity in the thermal decomposition and combustion of composite rocket propellants. However, scalable methods to prepare such nano-structured catalysts with high performance as ballistic modifiers and systematic studies relating the synthesis parameters to the catalyst characteristics and consequently to the thermal and combustion properties of the composite propellant are scarce. In this paper, we report a novel and facile route to prepare nano-structured Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} with enhanced catalytic activity in the ballistic modification of ammonium perchlorate (AP)-based composite solid rocket propellant. A submerged spray precipitation method using air-assisted liquid-centered coaxial atomization has been developed to prepare these nano-structured Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} catalysts. The prepared Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} catalysts possess higher surface area and exhibit superior activity in the thermal sensitization of AP, leading to an 88% increase in the burning rate of AP-based composite solid rocket propellants, than the Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} catalyst prepared via traditional precipitation method. Merits of the developed preparatory route, influence of the atomization process on the nano-structure morphology and subsequent benefits of these nano-structured catalysts on the ballistic properties of AP-based propellants are demonstrated and discussed in this paper.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Anomalous localization in a kicked quasicrystal

Abstract Quantum transport can distinguish between dynamical phases of matter. For instance, ballistic propagation characterizes the absence of disorder, whereas in many-body localized phases, particles do not propagate for exponentially long times. Additional possibilities include states of matter exhibiting anomalous transport in which particles propagate with a non-trivial exponent. Here we report the experimental observation of anomalous transport across a broad range of the phase diagram of a kicked quasicrystal. The Hamiltonian of our system has been predicted to exhibit a rich phase diagram, including not only fully localized and fully delocalized phases but also an extended region comprising a nested pattern of localized, delocalized and multifractal states, which gives rise to anomalous transport. Our cold-atom realization is enabled by new Floquet engineering techniques, which expand the accessible phase diagram by five orders of magnitude. Mapping transport properties throughout the phase diagram, we observe disorder-driven re-entrant delocalization and sub-ballistic transport, and we present a theoretical explanation of these phenomena based on eigenstate multifractality.

Physics↗

CALIBRATING THE JOHNSON-HOLMQUIST CERAMIC MODEL FOR SIC USING CTH

The Johnson-Holmquist ceramic material model has been calibrated and successfully applied to numerically simulate ballistic events using the Lagrangian code EPIC. While the majority of the constants are ''physics'' based, two of the constants for the failed material response are calibrated using ballistic experiments conducted on a confined cylindrical ceramic target. The maximum strength of the failed ceramic is calibrated by matching the penetration velocity. The second refers to the equivalent plastic strain at failure under constant pressure and is calibrated using the dwell time. Use of these two constants in the CTH Eulerian hydrocode does not predict the ballistic response. This difference may be due to the phenomenological nature of the model and the different numerical schemes used by the codes. This paper determines the aforementioned material constants for SiC suitable for simulating ballistic events using CTH.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Response Surface Modeling Tool Suite, Version 1.x

The Response Surface Modeling (RSM) Tool Suite is a collection of three codes used to generate an empirical interpolation function for a collection of drag coefficient calculations computed with Test Particle Monte Carlo (TPMC) simulations. The first code, "Automated RSM", automates the generation of a drag coefficient RSM for a particular object to a single command. "Automated RSM" first creates a Latin Hypercube Sample (LHS) of 1,000 ensemble members to explore the global parameter space. For each ensemble member, a TPMC simulation is performed and the object drag coefficient is computed. In the next step of the "Automated RSM" code, a Gaussian process is used to fit the TPMC simulations. In the final step, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is used to evaluate the non-analytic probability distribution function from the Gaussian process. The second code, "RSM Area", creates a look-up table for the projected area of the object based on input limits on the minimum and maximum allowed pitch and yaw angles and pitch and yaw angle intervals. The projected area from the look-up table is used to compute the ballistic coefficient of the object based on its pitch and yaw angle. An accurate ballistic coefficient is crucial in accurately computing the drag on an object. The third code, "RSM Cd", uses the RSM generated by the "Automated RSM" code and the projected area look-up table generated by the "RSM Area" code to accurately compute the drag coefficient and ballistic coefficient of the object. The user can modify the object velocity, object surface temperature, the translational temperature of the gas, the species concentrations of the gas, and the pitch and yaw angles of the object. Together, these codes allow for the accurate derivation of an object's drag coefficient and ballistic coefficient under any conditions with only knowledge of the object's geometry and mass.

Walker, Andrew↗

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Aerobrake design studies for manned Mars missions

The dimensions of aerobrakes and associated heat shields are calculated as a fraction of the vehicle mass required for a high-velocity manned Mars entry. The entry speed and deceleration limit are assumed to be 8.6 km/sec and 5 earth g, respectively, to consider vehicles with low lift-drag ratio (L/D) and ballistic coefficients of 100 and 200 kg/sq m, as well as a vehicle with a medium L/D and a ballistic coefficient of 375 kg/sq m. The aerobrake mass plus the heat shield divided by an optimized, blunt-shaped vehicle's total mass is 15 and 13 percent for ballistic coefficients of 100 and 200 kg/sq m, respectively. For a winged vehicle the mass fraction is 17 percent because the higher ballistic coefficient requires more thermal protection to account for the greater temperatures generated. It is concluded that aerobraking is more efficient than propulsive braking because the mass fraction for a propulsive system would be 4 or 5 times greater than those calculated for aerobraking.

Tauber, M.↗

A comparison of whipple shield hypervelocity impact tests to penetration predictors

An analytical model is presented for converting ballistic limit curves obtained from flat plate projectile experiments to ballistic limit curves based on equivalent diameter spheres. The developed method demonstrates good correlation of the ballistic limit of the shield concept for the flat-plate projectiles to the theoretical ballistic limit for equivalent spheres as predicted by the penetration equations.

Hill, Scott A.↗

Comparison of impact results for several polymeric composites over a wide range of low impact velocities

Static indentation, falling weight, and ballistic impact tests were conducted in clamped plates made of AS4/3501-6 and IM7/8551-7 prepreg tape. The transversely isotropic plates were nominally 7-mm thick. Pendulum and ballistic tests were also conducted on simply supported plates braided with Celion 12000 fibers and 3501-6 epoxy. The 20 degree braided plates were about 5-mm thick. The impactors had spherical or hemispherical shapes with a 12.7 mm diameter. Residual compression strength and damage size were measured. For a given kinetic energy, damage size was least for IM7/8551-7 and greatest for the braided material. Strengths varied inversely with damage size. For a given damage size, strength loss as a fraction of original strength was least for the braided material and greatest for AS4/3501-6 and IM7/8551-7. Strength loss for IM7/8551-7 and AS4/3501-6 was nearly equal. No significant differences were noticed between damage sizes and residual compression strengths for the static indentation, falling weight, and ballistic tests of AS4/3501-6 and IM7/8551-7. For the braided material, sizes of damage were significantly less and compression strengths were significantly more for the falling weight tests than for the ballistic tests.

Poe, C. C., Jr.↗

1958 NASA/USAF Space Probes (Able-1): Summary - Volume 1

Early in calendar year 1958 Space Technology Laboratories, Inc. (STL) (then Space Technology Laboratories, a division of the Ramo-Wooldridge Corp.) developed for the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD) an Advanced Re-entry Test Vehicle (ARTV) for the purpose of testing ballistic missile nose cones at the full range of 5500 nautical miles. The two-stage ARTV utilized the Thor ballistic missile and the second stage propulsion system developed for the Vanguard program. In late 1957 and early 1958, STL/AFBMD prepared studies of various missile combinations which could be utilized for space testing. The Thor, in combination with the Vanguard second and third stages, was one of the vehicles considered which offered a very early capability of placing a reasonable payload in a lunar orbit. These STL/AFBMD studies were presented to various appropriate groups including the Killian, Millikan, H. J . Stewart Committees; Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command, and ARDC Centers. Subsequently the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) contacted STL relative to the availability of hardware for an early lunar shot. By utilizing existing spares already purchased for the ARTV, and by making use of the ARTV contractors already in being, it appeared feasible to launch by the third quarter of calendar year 1958 a payload which would be captured by the moon's gravitational force. On 27 March 1958, ARPA directed STL to proceed with a program of three lunar shots. As much as possible, these shots were to utilize existing ARTV spare hardware and impose no interference with the ballistic missile programs. In September this program was transferred to the direction of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). On 17 August 1958 the first launching of the Able-1 vehicle was attempted, but the flight was terminated by a propulsion failure of the first stage. Subsequent launchings were attempted on 13 October and 8 November 1958. Of these launchirigs the October attempt was the most successful. Although the payload did not reach the vicinity of the moon, a maximum altitude of 71,700 was attained, and useful scientific data was obtained from the instrumentation.

Source record↗

Impact Resistance of Lightweight Hybrid Structures for Gas Turbine Engine Fan Containment Applications

The ballistic impact resistance of hybrid composite sandwich structures was evaluated with the ultimate goal of developing new materials or structures for potential gas turbine engine fan containment applications. The sandwich structures investigated consisted of GLARE-5 laminates as face sheets with lightweight cellular metallic materials such as honeycomb, foam, and lattice block as a core material. The impact resistance of these hybrid sandwich structures was compared to GLARE-5 laminates and 2024-T3 Al sheet, which were tested as a function of areal weight (material thickness). The GLARE-5 laminates exhibited comparable impact properties to that of 2024-T3 Al at low areal weights, even though there were significant differences in the static tensile properties of these materials. The GLARE-5, however, did have a greater ballistic limit than straight aluminum sheet at higher areal weights. Furthermore, there is up to a 25% advantage in ballistic limit for the GLARE-5/foam sandwich structures compared to straight 2024-T3 Al. But no advantage in ballistic limit was observed between any of the hybrid sandwich structures and thicker versions of GLARE-5. Recommendations for future work are provided, based on these preliminary data.

Hebsur, Mohan G.↗

Coronas-F Orbit Monitoring and Re-Entry Prediction

Russian scientific satellite CORONAS-F was launched on July, 31, 2001. The object was inserted in near-circular orbit with the inclination 82.5deg and a mean altitude approx. 520 km. Due to the upper atmosphere drag CORONAS-F was permanently descended and as a result on December, 6, 2005 it has finished the earth-orbital flight, having lifetime in space approx. 4.5 years. The satellite structural features and its flight attitude control led to the significant variations of its ballistic coefficient during the flight. It was a cause of some specific difficulties in the fulfillment of the ballistic and navigation support of this space vehicle flight. Besides the main mission objective CORONAS-F also has been selected by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) as a target object for the next regular international re-entry test campaign on a program of surveillance and re-entry prediction for the hazard space objects within their de-orbiting phases. Spacecraft (S/C) CORONAS-F kept its working state right up to the end of the flight - down to the atmosphere entry. This fact enabled to realization of the additional research experiments, concerning with an estimation of the atmospheric density within the low earth orbits (LEO) of the artificial satellites, and made possible to continue track the S/C during final phase of its flight by means of Russian regular command & tracking system, used for it control. Thus there appeared a unique possibility of using for tracking S/C at its de-orbiting phase not only passive radar facilities, belonging to the space surveillance systems and traditionally used for support of the IADC re-entry test campaigns, but also more precise active trajectory radio-tracking facilities from the ground control complex (GCC) applied for this object. Under the corresponding decision of the Russian side such capability of additional high-precise tracking control of the CORONAS-F flight in this period of time has been implemented. The organizing of the CORONAS-F ballistic and navigational support (BNS) and solving its main tasks (such as S/C orbit determination (OD) and its motion prediction and connected with them) both for regular mission stage and for additional flight program were realized by the group of specialists from the Mission Control Center (MCC). MCC was also assigned as a principal organization from the Russian side for participation in the 7th IADC re-entry test campaign on CORONAS-F. The CORONAS-F flight features and space environments circumstances during its flight as well as a methodology and technology of spacecraft ballistic and navigational support are given below. The BNS results for different phases of S/C flight, including the results of its re-entry predictions, obtained during the realization of the 7th IADC test campaign are submitted. The accuracy of space vehicle re-entry prediction and its dependence on various factors are analyzed in more details.

Ivanov, N. M.↗

Hypervelocity Impact Performance of Open Cell Foam Core Sandwich Panel Structures

Metallic foams are a relatively new class of materials with low density and novel physical, mechanical, thermal, electrical and acoustic properties. Although incompletely characterized, they offer comparable mechanical performance to traditional spacecraft structural materials (i.e. honeycomb sandwich panels) without detrimental through-thickness channeling cells. There are two competing types of metallic foams: open cell and closed cell. Open cell foams are considered the more promising technology due to their lower weight and higher degree of homogeneity. Leading micrometeoroid and orbital debris shields (MMOD) incorporate thin plates separated by a void space (i.e. Whipple shield). Inclusion of intermediate fabric layers, or multiple bumper plates have led to significant performance enhancements, yet these shields require additional non-ballistic mass for installation (fasteners, supports, etc.) that can consume up to 35% of the total shield weight [1]. Structural panels, such as open cell foam core sandwich panels, that are also capable of providing sufficient MMOD protection, represent a significant potential for increased efficiency in hypervelocity impact shielding from a systems perspective through a reduction in required non-ballistic mass. In this paper, the results of an extensive impact test program on aluminum foam core sandwich panels are reported. The effect of pore density, and core thickness on shielding performance have been evaluated over impact velocities ranging from 2.2 - 9.3 km/s at various angles. A number of additional tests on alternate sandwich panel configurations of comparable-weight have also been performed, including aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels (see Figure 1), Nomex honeycomb core sandwich panels, and 3D aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels. A total of 70 hypervelocity impact tests are reported, from which an empirical ballistic limit equation (BLE) has been derived. The BLE is in the standard form suitable for implementation in risk analysis software, and includes the effect of panel thickness, core density, and facesheet material properties. A comparison between the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panel structures and common MMOD shielding configurations is made for both conservative (additional 35% non-ballistic mass) and optimistic (additional mass equal to 30% of bumper mass) considerations. Suggestions to improve the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panels are made, including the use of outer mesh layers, intermediate fabric/composite layers, and varying pore density.

Ryan, Shannon↗

Performance of Whipple Shields at Impact Velocities above 9 km/s

Whipple shields were first proposed as a means of protecting spacecraft from the impact of micrometeoroids in 1947 [1] and are currently in use as micrometeoroid and orbital debris shields on modern spacecraft. In the intervening years, the function of the thin bumper used to shatter or melt threatening particles has been augmented and enhanced by the use of various types and configurations of intermediate layers of various materials. All shield designs serve to minimize the threat of a spall failure or perforation of the main wall of the spacecraft as a result of the impact of the fragments. With increasing use of Whipple shields, various ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for guiding the design and estimating the performance of shield systems have been developed. Perhaps the best known and most used are the "new" modified Cour-Palais (Christiansen) equations [2]. These equations address the three phases of impact: (1) ballistic (<3 km/s), where the projectile is moving too slowly to fragment and essentially penetrates as an intact projectile; (2) shatter (3 to 7 km/s), where the projectile fragments at impact and forms an expanding cloud of debris fragments; and (3) melt/vaporization (>7 km/s), where the projectile melts or vaporizes at impact. The performance of Whipple shields and the adequacy of the BLEs have been examined for the first two phases using the results of impact tests obtained from two-stage, light-gas gun test firings. Shield performance and the adequacy of the BLEs has not been evaluated in the melt/vaporization phase until now because of the limitations of launchers used to accelerate projectiles with controlled properties to velocities above 7.5 km/s. A three-stage, light-gas gun, developed at the University of Dayton Research Institute (UDRI) [3], is capable of launching small, aluminum spheres to velocities above 9 km/s. This launcher was used to evaluate the ballistic performance of two Whipple shield systems, various thermal protection system materials, and other spacecraft-related materials to the impact of 1.6-mm- to 2.6-mm-diameter, 2017-T4 aluminum spheres at impact velocities ranging from 8.91 km/s to 9.28 km/s. Test results, details of the shield systems, and nominal ballistic limits for the two Whipple shields are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Attitude determination with three-axis accelerometer for emergency atmospheric entry

Two algorithms are disclosed that, with the use of a 3-axis accelerometer, will be able to determine the angles of attack, sideslip and roll of a capsule-type spacecraft prior to entry (at very high altitudes, where the atmospheric density is still very low) and during entry. The invention relates to emergency situations in which no reliable attitude and attitude rate are available. Provided that the spacecraft would not attempt a guided entry without reliable attitude information, the objective of the entry system in such case would be to attempt a safe ballistic entry. A ballistic entry requires three controlled phases to be executed in sequence: First, cancel initial rates in case the spacecraft is tumbling; second, maneuver the capsule to a heat-shield-forward attitude, preferably to the trim attitude, to counteract the heat rate and heat load build up; and third, impart a ballistic bank or roll rate to null the average lift vector in order to prevent prolonged lift down situations. Being able to know the attitude, hence the attitude rate, will allow the control system (nominal or backup, automatic or manual) to cancel any initial angular rates. Also, since a heat-shield forward attitude and the trim attitude can be specified in terms of the angles of attack and sideslip, being able to determine the current attitude in terms of these angles will allow the control system to maneuver the vehicle to the desired attitude. Finally, being able to determine the roll angle will allow for the control of the roll ballistic rate during entry.

Garcia-Llama, Eduardo↗

Dynamic Stability Analysis of Blunt Body Entry Vehicles Using Time-Lagged Aftbody Pitching Moments

This analysis defines an analytic model for the pitching motion of blunt bodies during atmospheric entry. The proposed model is independent of the pitch damping sum coefficient present in the standard formulation of the equations of motion describing pitch oscillations of a decelerating blunt body, instead using the principle of a time-lagged aftbody moment as the forcing function for oscillation divergence. Four parameters, all with intuitive physical relevance, are introduced to fully define the aftbody moment and the associated time delay. It is shown that the dynamic oscillation responses typical to blunt bodies can be produced using hysteresis of the aftbody moment in place of the pitch damping coefficient. The approach used in this investigation is shown to be useful in understanding the governing physical mechanisms for blunt body dynamic stability and in guiding vehicle and mission design requirements. A validation case study using simulated ballistic range test data is conducted. From this, parameter identification is carried out through the use of a least squares optimizing routine. Results show good agreement with the limited existing literature for the parameters identified, suggesting that the model proposed could be validated by an experimental ballistic range test series. The trajectories produced by the identified parameters were found to match closely those from the MER ballistic range tests for a wide array of initial conditions and can be identified with a reasonable number of ballistic range shots and computational effort.

Supersonic↗

Bumper 3 Update for IADC Protection Manual

The Bumper code has been the standard in use by NASA and contractors to perform meteoroid/debris risk assessments since 1990. It has undergone extensive revisions and updates [NASA JSC HITF website; Christiansen et al., 1992, 1997]. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied BUMPER to risk assessments for Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) space suits, and other spacecraft (e.g., LDEF, Iridium, TDRS, and Hubble Space Telescope). Bumper continues to be updated with changes in the ballistic limit equations describing failure threshold of various spacecraft components, as well as changes in the meteoroid and debris environment models. Significant efforts are expended to validate Bumper and benchmark it to other meteoroid/debris risk assessment codes. Bumper 3 is a refactored version of Bumper II. The structure of the code was extensively modified to improve maintenance, performance and flexibility. The architecture was changed to separate the frequently updated ballistic limit equations from the relatively stable common core functions of the program. These updates allow NASA to produce specific editions of the Bumper 3 that are tailored for specific customer requirements. The core consists of common code necessary to process the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment models, assess shadowing and calculate MMOD risk. The library of target response subroutines includes a board range of different types of MMOD shield ballistic limit equations as well as equations describing damage to various spacecraft subsystems or hardware (thermal protection materials, windows, radiators, solar arrays, cables, etc.). The core and library of ballistic response subroutines are maintained under configuration control. A change in the core will affect all editions of the code, whereas a change in one or more of the response subroutines will affect all editions of the code that contain the particular response subroutines which are modified. Note that the Bumper II program is no longer maintained or distributed by NASA.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗