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NASA NTRS2011

The Evolution of Utilizing Manual Throttles to Avoid Excessively Low LH2 NPSP at the SSME Inlet

In the late 1970s, years before the Space Shuttle flew its maiden voyage, it was understood low liquid hydrogen (LH2) Net Positive Suction Pressure (NPSP) at the inlet to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) could have adverse effects on engine operation. A number of failures within both the External Tank (ET) and the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) could result in a low LH2 NPSP condition, which at extremely low levels can result in cavitation of SSME turbomachinery. Operational workarounds were developed to take advantage of the onboard crew s ability to manually throttle down the SSMEs (via the Pilot s Speedbrake/Throttle Controller), which alleviated the low LH2 NPSP condition. Manually throttling the SSME to a lower power level resulted in an increase in NPSP, mainly due to the reduction in frictional flow losses while at the lower throttle setting. Early in the Space Shuttle Program s history, the relevant Flight Rule for the Booster flight controllers in Mission Control did not distinguish between ET and Orbiter MPS failures and the same crew action was taken for both. However, after a review of all Booster operational techniques following the Challenger disaster in the late 1980s, it was determined manually throttling the SSME to a lower power was only effective for Orbiter MPS failures and the Flight Rule was updated to reflect this change. The Flight Rule and associated crew actions initially called for a single throttle step to minimum power level when a low threshold for NPSP was met. As engineers refined their understanding of the NPSP requirements for the SSME (through a robust testing program), the operational techniques evolved to take advantage of the additional capabilities. This paper will examine the evolution of the Flight rule and associated procedure and how increases in knowledge about the SSME and the Space Shuttle vehicle as a whole have helped shape their development. What once was a single throttle step when NPSP decreased to a certain threshold has now become three throttle steps, each occurring at a lower NPSP threshold. Additionally the procedure, which for early Space Shuttle missions required a Return-to-Launch-Site abort, now results in a nominal Main Engine Cut Off and no loss of mission objectives.

Henfling, Rick↗
NASA NTRS2011

History of POIC Capabilities and Limitations to Conduct International Space Station Payload Operations

Payload science operations on the International Space Station (ISS) have been conducted continuously twenty-four hours per day, 365 days a year beginning February, 2001 and continuing through present day. The Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC), located at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, has been a leader in integrating and managing NASA distributed payload operations. The ability to conduct science operations is a delicate balance of crew time, onboard vehicle resources, hardware up-mass to the vehicle, and ground based flight control team manpower. Over the span of the last ten years, the POIC flight control team size, function, and structure has been modified several times commensurate with the capabilities and limitations of the ISS program. As the ISS vehicle has been expanded and its systems changed throughout the assembly process, the resources available to conduct science and research have also changed. Likewise, as ISS program financial resources have demanded more efficiency from organizations across the program, utilization organizations have also had to adjust their functionality and structure to adapt accordingly. The POIC has responded to these often difficult challenges by adapting our team concept to maximize science research return within the utilization allocations and vehicle limitations that existed at the time. In some cases, the ISS and systems limitations became the limiting factor in conducting science. In other cases, the POIC structure and flight control team size were the limiting factors, so other constraints had to be put into place to assure successful science operations within the capabilities of the POIC. This paper will present the POIC flight control team organizational changes responding to significant events of the ISS and Shuttle programs.

Grimaldi, Rebecca↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Evolution of Utilizing Manual Throttling to Avoid Excessively Low LH2 NPSP at the SSME Inlet

In the late 1970s, years before the Space Shuttle flew its maiden voyage, it was understood low liquid hydrogen (LH2) Net Positive Suction Pressure (NPSP) at the inlet to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) could have adverse effects on engine operation. A number of failures within both the External Tank (ET) and the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) could result in a low LH2 NPSP condition, which at extremely low levels can result in cavitation of SSME turbomachinery. Operational workarounds were developed to take advantage of the onboard crew s ability to manually throttle down the SSMEs (via the Pilot s Speedbrake/Throttle Controller), which alleviated the low LH2 NPSP condition. Manually throttling the SSME to a lower power level resulted in an increase in NPSP, mainly due to the reduction in frictional flow losses while at the lower throttle setting. Early in the Space Shuttle Program s history, the relevant Flight Rule for the Booster flight controller in Mission Control did not distinguish between ET and Orbiter MPS failures and the same crew action was taken for both. However, after a review of all Booster operational techniques following the Challenger disaster in the late 1980s, it was determined manually throttling the SSME to a lower power was only effective for Orbiter MPS failures and the Flight Rule was updated to reflect this change. The Flight Rule and associated crew actions initially called for a single throttle step to minimum power level when a low threshold for NPSP was met. As engineers refined their understanding of the NPSP requirements for the SSME (through a robust testing program), the operational techniques evolved to take advantage of the additional capabilities. This paper will examine the evolution of the Flight rule and associated procedure and how increases in knowledge about the SSME and the Space Shuttle vehicle as a whole have helped shape their development. What once was a single throttle step when NPSP decreased to a certain low threshold has now become three throttle steps, each occurring at a lower NPSP threshold. Additionally the procedure, which for early Space Shuttle missions required a Return-to-Launch-Site abort, now results in a nominal Main Engine Cut Off and no loss of mission objectives.

Henfling, Rick↗
NASA NTRS2010

Chemical Analysis Results for Potable Water from ISS Expeditions 21 to 25

The Johnson Space Center Water and Food Analytical Laboratory (WAFAL) performed detailed ground-based analyses of archival water samples for verification of the chemical quality of the International Space Station (ISS) potable water supplies for Expeditions 21 to 25. Over a 14-month period, the Space Shuttle visited the ISS on five occasions to complete construction and deliver supplies. The onboard supplies of potable water available for consumption by the Expeditions 21 to 25 crews consisted of Russian ground-supplied potable water, Russian potable water regenerated from humidity condensate, and US potable water recovered from urine distillate and condensate. Chemical archival water samples that were collected with U.S. hardware during Expeditions 21 to 25 were returned on Shuttle flights STS-129 (ULF3), STS-130 (20A), STS-131 (19A), STS-132 (ULF4) and STS-133 (ULF5), as well as on Soyuz flights 19-22. This paper reports the analytical results for the returned archival water samples and evaluates their compliance with ISS water quality standards. The WAFAL also received and analyzed aliquots of some Russian potable water samples collected in-flight and pre-flight samples of Rodnik potable water delivered to the Station on the Russian Progress vehicle during Expeditions 21 to 25. These additional analytical results are also reported and discussed in this paper.

Straub, John E., II↗
NASA NTRS2019

Guidance and Navigation Design for a Martian Sample Return Ascent Vehicle

This paper focuses on the work being performed at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in support of Mars Ascent Vehicles (MAVs). Specifically, the analysis presented is in support of Martian sample return architectures. In or-der to assess vehicle sensitivities, a detailed simulation tool, (MAV Analysis Tool in Simscape) MANTIS, was implemented using the MATLAB/Simulink Sim-scape architecture. High fidelity navigation sensor models and guidance algorithms were included in order to facilitate sensor requirement development and flight algorithm selection. This work focuses on the performance of the integrated system and the coupling of navigation and guidance capabilities. The architecture trades are heavily dependent on the ascent flight profile chosen. This work assesses both open- and closed-loop guidance algorithms to capture their relative performance and the resulting requirements on sensor capability to support preliminary vehicle design. The analysis builds on previous work that focused on navigation performance for initialization and ascent flight of crewed vehicle. The results provide insight into the coupling between sensor requirements and ascent guidance approach. The analysis provides data to support requirements for hard-ware selection and testing. Additional discussion is also included focusing on other system constraints that affect hardware selection and operational constraints.

Anzalone, Evan↗
NASA NTRS2008

Ares V: Application to Solar System Scientific Exploration

The development of the Ares V launch vehicle will provide levels of performance unseen since the days of Apollo. This capability, like the Saturn V before it, is being developed primarily for crewed lunar missions. However, the tremendous jump in performance offered by the Ares V launch system has tremendous potential for the furtherance of robotic solar system exploration missions as well. Preliminary performance assessments indicate that Ares V could deliver 5 times the payload to Mars as compared to the most capable US expendable launch vehicle available today. Beyond Mars, the outer planets offer a number of high-priority investigations with compelling science. Presently, missions to these destinations are only achievable using indirect flights with gravity assist trajectories and, in many cases, suffer from long flight times. An Ares V with an upper stage could capture these missions using direct flights with shorter interplanetary transfer times that would enable extensive in situ investigations and possibly the return of samples to Earth. This paper lays out an estimate of Ares V performance for moderate and high C3 missions, and goes on to discuss a range of revolutionary mission concepts that could be enabled by this significant in-crease in launch capability.

Elliott, John↗
NASA NTRS2008

Lunar Ascent and Rendezvous Trajectory Design

The Lunar Lander Ascent Module (LLAM) will leave the lunar surface and actively rendezvous in lunar orbit with the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). For initial LLAM vehicle sizing efforts, a nominal trajectory, along with required delta-V and a few key sensitivities, is very useful. A nominal lunar ascent and rendezvous trajectory is shown, along with rationale and discussion of the trajectory shaping. Also included are ascent delta-V sensitivities to changes in target orbit and design thrust-to-weight of the vehicle. A sample launch window for a particular launch site has been completed and is included. The launch window shows that budgeting enough delta-V for two missed launch opportunities may be reasonable. A comparison between yaw steering and on-orbit plane change maneuvers is included. The comparison shows that for large plane changes, which are potentially necessary for an anytime return from mid-latitude locations, an on-orbit maneuver is much more efficient than ascent yaw steering. For a planned return, small amounts of yaw steering may be necessary during ascent and must be accounted for in the ascent delta-V budget. The delta-V cost of ascent yaw steering is shown, along with sensitivity to launch site latitude. Some discussion of off-nominal scenarios is also included. In particular, in the case of a failed Powered Descent Initiation burn, the requirements for subsequent rendezvous with the Orion vehicle are outlined.

Sostaric, Ronald R.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Overview of the Altair Lunar Lander Thermal Control System Design

NASA's Constellation Program has been developed to successfully return humans to the Lunar surface prior to 2020. The Constellation Program includes several different project offices including Altair, which is the next generation Lunar Lander. The planned Altair missions are very different than the Lunar missions accomplished during the Apollo era. These differences have resulted in a significantly different thermal control system architecture. The Altair project has employed a rather unique development approach as compared with previous manned spacecraft programs. Altair started the design process by developing a single-string (no fault tolerance), minimum functionality design. This first design and analysis cycle resulted in the baseline design for the entire process. From this point of departure, Altair continued the development process by adding vehicle functionality for the purposes of minimizing the risk of Loss Of Crew (LOC) and Loss Of Mission (LOM). Through the subsequent design and analysis cycles, the project office compared the added mass associated with the reduction of LOC/LOM and selected the most mass efficient design solutions. The current paper will summarize the Altair mission profile, the operational phases, and the LOC/LOM decisions that were made during the various design cycles. The evolution of the thermal control system design through Lunar Design and Analysis Cycle 3 (LDAC-3) will also be described in this paper.

Stephan, Ryan A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Long-Term Health Metric Development Effort

INTRODUCTION Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a methodology applied when high-stakes decisions need to be made about complex systems. PRA often uses risk minimization to aid decision making, such as when establishing vehicle requirements or resource allocations. The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains the human spaceflight risk postures, many of which have in-mission medical outcomes, but the full risk set also includes performance and Long-Term Health (LTH) outcomes. An effort is underway to determine the dependencies between LTH risk outcomes and mission characteristics and to identify metrics for quantifying LTH outcomes. The LTH metrics will be incorporated into future PRA tools currently under development to support crew health and performance decision making. LONG-TERM HEALTH (LTH) RISK LTH risk encompasses the timeframe from immediately post-flight, through the rest of an astronaut’s career, through retirement, and until death. LTH outcomes include the time and interventions needed for the astronaut to return to preflight physiological states after experiencing spaceflight hazards and recovery from any in-mission medical events that persist into the post-flight timeframe. It includes chronic complications that may arise due to experiencing in-flight medical conditions or injuries and medical conditions that occur later in life with a higher probability of occurrence or with more severity because of their spaceflight exposure. Finally, LTH outcomes can also include a reduction in life expectancy due to spaceflight exposures. Eighteen of the HSRB risks contain an LTH component, each with a unique incidence rate and consequence severity. ON-GOING LTH METRIC DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS Based on guidance from a stakeholder workshop held on June 1, 2023, only LTH outcomes with causes tied to spaceflight experience that are significantly different from normal healthy aging and which can be affected by changes in in-mission resources are targeted for inclusion within the PRA modeling efforts. Current on-going efforts include a sensitivity analysis of potential in-flight medical conditions to determine which conditions may persist into post-flight and how the consequences may be affected by in-mission medical resources. Also underway is determination of differences in the time for a return to preflight physiological baselines when in-flight countermeasures are available versus when they are not. Analyses performed with publicly available astronaut data and collaborations with the Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health team are being designed to understand which LTH outcomes differ significantly from natural healthy aging. Information exchanges are also occurring with LTH risk custodians to understand how they quantify outcomes. FUTURE PLANS Risk characteristics will be determined for each LTH risk that meets our inclusion criteria and the dependencies of their outcomes to in-mission resources and mission characteristics will be established. The individual risks will be integrated together into one or more high level LTH metrics for inclusion in the PRA tool, so that LTH risks can be considered along with in-mission risks during crew health and performance system decision support trade studies.

B. E. Lewandowski↗
NASA NTRS2010

Orion Entry Display Feeder and Interactions with the Entry Monitor System

The Orion spacecraft is designed to return astronauts to a landing within 10 km of the intended landing target from low Earth orbit, lunar direct-entry, and lunar skip-entry trajectories. Al pile the landing is nominally controlled autonomously, the crew can fly precision entries manually in the event of an anomaly. The onboard entry displays will be used by the crew to monitor and manually fly the entry, descent, and landing, while the Entry Monitor System (EMS) will be used to monitor the health and status of the onboard guidance and the trajectory. The entry displays are driven by the entry display feeder, part of the Entry Monitor System (EMS). The entry re-targeting module, also part of the EMS, provides all the data required to generate the capability footprint of the vehicle at any point in the trajectory, which is shown on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). It also provides caution and warning data and recommends the safest possible re-designated landing site when the nominal landing site is no longer within the capability of the vehicle. The PFD and the EMS allow the crew to manually fly an entry trajectory profile from entry interface until parachute deploy having the flexibility to manually steer the vehicle to a selected landing site that best satisfies the priorities of the crew. The entry display feeder provides data from the ENIS and other components of the GNC flight software to the displays at the proper rate and in the proper units. It also performs calculations that are specific to the entry displays and which are not made in any other component of the flight software. In some instances, it performs calculations identical to those performed by the onboard primary guidance algorithm to protect against a guidance system failure. These functions and the interactions between the entry display feeder and the other components of the EMS are described.

Baird, Darren↗
NASA NTRS1989

Space Station accommodation of life sciences in support of a manned Mars mission

Results of a life science impact analysis for accommodation to the Space Station of a manned Mars mission are discussed. In addition to addressing such issues as on-orbit vehicle assembly and checkout, the study also assessed the impact of a life science research program on the station. A better understanding of the effects on the crew of long duration exposure to the hostile space environment and to develop controls for adverse effects was the objective. Elements and products of the life science accommodation include: the identification of critical research areas; the outline of a research program consistent with the mission timeframe; the quantification of resource requirements; the allocation of functions to station facilities; and a determination of the impact on the Space Station program and of the baseline configuration. Results indicate the need at the Space Station for two dedicated life science lab modules; a pocket lab to support a 4-meter centrifuge; a quarantine module for the Mars Sample Return Mission; 3.9 man-years of average crew time; and 20 kilowatts of electrical power.

Meredith, Barry D.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Flashline Mars Arctic Research Station (FMARS) 2009 Expedition Crew Perspectives

The Flashline Mars Arctic Research Station (FMARS), located on the rim of the Haughton Crater on Devon Island in the Canadian Arctic, is a simulated Mars habitat that provides operational constraints similar to those which will be faced by future human explorers on Mars. In July 2009, a six-member crew inhabited the isolated habitation module and conducted the twelfth FMARS mission. The crew members conducted frequent EVA operations wearing mock space suits to conduct field experiments under realistic Mars-like conditions. Their scientific campaign spanned a wide range of disciplines and included many firsts for Mars analog research. Among these are the first use of a Class IV medical laser during a Mars simulation, helping to relieve crew stress injuries during the mission. Also employed for the first time in a Mars simulation at FMARS, a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) was used by the space-suited explorers, aiding them in their search for mineral resources. Sites identified by the UAV were then visited by geologists who conducted physical geologic sampling. For the first time, explorers in spacesuits deployed passive seismic equipment to monitor earthquake activity and characterize the planet's interior. They also conducted the first geophysical electromagnetic survey as analog Mars pioneers to search for water and characterize geological features under the surface. The crew collected hydrated minerals and attempted to produce drinkable water from the rocks. A variety of equipment was field tested as well, including new cameras that automatically geotag photos, data-recording GPS units, a tele-presence rover (operated from Florida), as well as MIT-developed mission planning software. As plans develop to return to the Moon and go on to Mars, analog facilities like FMARS can provide significant benefit to NASA and other organizations as they prepare for robust human space exploration. The authors will present preliminary results from these studies as well as their perspectives on topics including human factors, logistics, EVA operations, and the use of social media throughout the mission.

Cusack, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2010

Cast Glance Near Infrared Imaging Observations of the Space Shuttle During Hypersonic Re-Entry

High resolution calibrated infrared imagery of the Space Shuttle was obtained during hypervelocity atmospheric entries of the STS-119, STS-125 and STS128 missions and has provided information on the distribution of surface temperature and the state of the airflow over the windward surface of the Orbiter during descent. This data collect was initiated by NASA s Hypersonic Thermodynamic Infrared Measurements (HYTHIRM) team and incorporated the use of air- and land-based optical assets to image the Shuttle during atmospheric re-entry. The HYTHIRM objective is to develop and implement a set of mission planning tools designed to establish confidence in the ability of an existing optical asset to reliably acquire, track and return global quantitative surface temperatures of the Shuttle during entry. On Space Shuttle Discovery s STS-119 mission, NASA flew a specially modified thermal protection system tile and instrumentation package to monitor heating effects from boundary layer transition during re-entry. On STS-119, the windward airflow on the port wing was deliberately disrupted by a four-inch wide and quarter-inch tall protuberance built into the modified tile. In coordination with this flight experiment, a US Navy NP-3D Orion aircraft was flown 28 nautical miles below Discovery and remotely monitored surface temperature of the Orbiter at Mach 8.4 using a long-range infrared optical package referred to as Cast Glance. Approximately two months later, the same Navy Cast Glance aircraft successfully monitored the surface temperatures of the Orbiter Atlantis traveling at approximately Mach 14.3 during its return from the successful Hubble repair mission. In contrast to Discovery, Atlantis was not part of the Boundary Layer Transition (BLT) flight experiment, thus the vehicle was not configured with a protuberance on the port wing. In September 2009, Cast Glance was again successful in capturing infrared imagery and monitoring the surface temperatures on Discovery s next flight, STS-128. Again, NASA flew a specially modified thermal protection system tile and instrumentation package to monitor heating effects from boundary layer transition during re-entry. During this mission, Cast Glance was able to image laminar and turbulent flow phenomenology optimizing data collection for Mach 14.7. The purpose of this paper is to describe key elements associated with STS-119/125/128 mission planning and execution from the perspective of the Cast Glance flight crew that obtained the imagery. The paper will emphasize a human element of experience, expertise and adaptability seamlessly coupled with Cast Glance system and sensor technology required to manually collect the required imagery. Specific topics will include a near infrared (NIR) camera upgrade that was implemented just prior to the missions, how pre-flight radiance modeling was utilized to optimize the IR sensor configuration, communications, the development of aircraft test support positions based upon Shuttle trajectory information, support to contingencies such as Shuttle one orbit wave-offs/west coast diversions and then the Cast Glance perspective during an actual Shuttle imaging mission.

Tack, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2020

Building the RS-25 Engine for NASA’s Next Generation of Exploration.

NASA is aggressively pursuing a human lunar return to the Moon with the Artemis Program. The Space Launch System (SLS) is critical to the transportation architecture, providing both crew and cargo capability. To accelerate SLS development, NASA settled on space shuttle heritage propulsion technologies. Early missions will use repurposed RS-25 engines from the Shuttle Program adapted to SLS requirements. For future missions, however, NASA and engine contractor Aerojet Rocketdyne are restarting RS-25 production with a goal of using the latest manufacturing technologies to produce an RS-25 variant that will cost at least 30 percent less than the shuttle-era engines developed and flown for almost 30 years. The prospect of restarting the production line on these engines after many years and modifying the engine to reduce cost and better match the needs of the SLS vehicle presented unique challenges and opportunities for NASA and Aerojet Rocketdyne. NASA and AR are now deep into the process of adapting 16 RS-25 engines for the first four SLS Artemis flights and building the first RS-25 “Restart” engines for future Artemis missions. In addition to navigating programmatic, technical, and logistical challenges with the current RS-25 production work, NASA and AR have partnered to pursue new methods of building this engine through advanced manufacturing techniques to further reduce the cost and schedule required to build each RS-25 engine to contribute to the long-term affordability of the SLS vehicle. This presentation will discuss the goals for the restart program, the challenges, and results to date.

Jessica Jean Wood↗
NASA NTRS1973

Mission requirements: Skylab rescue mission SL-R

The Skylab Program includes three low earth orbit missions. These missions are designated SL-1/SL-2,SL-3 and SL-4. In addition to the three nominal Skylab missions, the program includes the Skylab Rescue Mission (SL-R). The SL-R mission is designed to provide a safe return of the Skylab crew in the event the Command Service Module (CSM) becomes disabled while docked to the Saturn Workshop (SWS). Mission requirements for the SL-R mission only are presented. SL-R mission configuration will be a CSM (modified with a field installed kit) manned by two crewmen launched on a Saturn IB Launch Vechicle. The SL-R CSM will rendezvous and dock with the SWS (or Orbital Assembly (OA), consisting of the SWS and disabled CSM, if the disabled CSM has not previously been jettisoned). The SWS configuration includes a Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA), Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), Airlock Module (AM), and an S-IVB stage (modified as an Orbital Workshop (OWS), previously launched and inserted into orbit on a two-stage Saturn V Launch Vehicle for the SL-1/SL-2 mission.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗
NASA NTRS1995

STS-71, Space Shuttle Mission Report

The STS-71 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities and provides detailed data on the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance. STS-71 is the 100th United States manned space flight, the sixty-ninth Space Shuttle flight, the forty-fourth flight since the return-to-flight, the fourteenth flight of the OV-104 Orbiter vehicle Atlantis, and the first joint United States (U.S.)-Russian docking mission since 1975. In addition to the OV-104 Orbiter vehicle, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated ET-70; three SSMEs that were designated 2028, 2034, and 2032 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated Bl-072. The RSRMs that were an integral part of the SRBs were designated 360L045A for the left SRB and 360W045B for the right SRB. The STS-71 mission was planned as a 1 0-day plus 1-day-extension mission plus 2 additional days for contingency operations and weather avoidance. The primary objectives of this flight were to rendezvous and dock with the Mir Space Station and perform on-orbit joint U.S.-Russian life sciences investigations, logistical resupply of the Mir Space Station, return of the United States astronaut flying on the Mir, the replacement of the Mir-18 crew with the two-cosmonaut Mir-19 crew, and the return of the Mir-18 crew to Earth. The secondary objectives were to perform the requirements of the IMAX Camera and the Shuttle Amateur Radio experiment-2 (SAREX-2).

Frike, Robert W., Jr.↗