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TH-C-19A-02: Characterization of An Actively Controlled Graphite Probe Calorimeter

Purpose: To construct and experimentally evaluate the performance of a miniature probe-format graphite calorimeter (GPC) with built-in active control. The GPC is the first ever calorimeter designed specifically for routine clinical use. Methods: The original GPC design, developed as part of our previous work, was modified to accommodate a micro-thin, resistive heating element and sensing thermistors embedded in the outermost graphite layer. A software-based process control loop was written to maintain a predefined set point temperature throughout the detector by precisely modulating the current flowing through the resistive element. Continuous feedback is provided to the controller by the additional thermistors. A functioning prototype was constructed in-house and operated in adiabatic mode in a 6 MV photon beam. Ten sets of measurements of varying duration (10 to 60 seconds) and repetition rate (200 to 600 MU/min) were analyzed. Reproducibility, linearity and dose rate dependence were assessed. Results: A total of 47 individual measurements were performed using the active GPC. The reproducibility, defined here as the sample standard deviation weighted across all 10 measurement sets, was found to be 0.37%. Similarly, the standard error (type A uncertainty) was 0.17%. Linearity was quantified by plotting signal as a function of monitor units delivered at 600 MU/min. The adjusted R-square of the resulting linear fit was 0.9996. Dose rate dependence, evaluated as the change in normalized response (signal/MU) as a function of repetition rate, was found to be statistically insignificant. Conclusions: The incorporation of active control has resulted in a marked improvement in the GPC's reproducibility and it allows the user to now perform measurements within minutes of setup. With this refinement, it is estimated that the overall standard uncertainty in the absolute determination of dose to water is 1%, making the GPC comparable to a calibrated ionization chamber. This research has received financial support from Sun Nuclear Corporation.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

X-ray Induced Cycling of Rare-Earth Elements between Bulk and Interfacial Liquid

Reversible cycling of rare-earth elements between an aqueous electrolyte solution and its free surface is achieved by X-ray exposure. This exposure alters the competitive equilibrium between lanthanide ions bound to a chelating ligand, diethylenetriamine pentaacetic acid (DTPA), in the bulk solution and to insoluble monolayers of extractant di-hexadecyl phosphoric acid (DHDP) at its surface. Evidence for the exposure-induced temporal variations in the lanthanide surface density is provided by X-ray fluorescence near total reflection measurements. Comparison of results when X-rays are confined to the aqueous surface region to results when X-rays transmit into the bulk solution suggests the importance of aqueous radiolysis in the adsorption cycle. Amine binding sites in DTPA are identified as a likely target of radiolysis products. The molecules DTPA and DHDP are like those used in the separation of lanthanides from ores and in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Furthermore, these results suggest that an external source of X-rays can be used to drive rare-earth element separations. More generally, use of X-rays to controllably dose a liquid interface with lanthanides could trigger a range of interfacial processes, including enhanced metal ion extraction, catalysis, and materials synthesis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) 2024 annual meeting: advanced and small modular nuclear power reactors

On 25–26 March 2023, the U.S. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) held its 2024 annual meeting in Bethesda, Maryland, USA. The NCRP dates from 1929, and this meeting celebrated the 60th anniversary of receiving a U.S. Congressional Charter. For this annual meeting the NCRP felt it was essential to provide a briefing about advanced and small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). The Journal of Radiological Protection is delighted to publish the following synopsis of material presented at the U.S. NCRP meeting. This synopsis is divided into five sections. The first section provides an overview of the whole meeting together with summaries of two context setting overview papers. The following four sessions of this synopsis are specific to advanced and small modular nuclear power reactors. The meeting also included keynote presentations by three of NCRP annual award recipients. The meeting topical areas were Technology Overview and Critical Issues. The individual papers laid the groundwork to understanding reactor technologies, terminology, and the fundamental concepts and processes for electrical generation. The perspectives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and states, through the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors were provided. The papers included a discussion of diverse topics including potential emergency preparedness considerations, radiological survey requirements, an evaluation of the future of nuclear power, the economics of reactors (both large and small), and the critical issues identified by the recent National Academies of Sciences’ study on advanced reactors. Here, the summary papers were developed to briefly document the major points and concepts presented during the oral papers presented at the 2024 NCRP Annual Meeting. The meeting heralded the dawn of a new era for commercial nuclear power.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Panel Session 81: Engaging on Safety at the Work Face - Workers, Front Line Managers, and Subcontractors

This panel focuses on engaging on safety at the work face, with the people who are there every day. This panel will discuss management approaches deployed to directly engage internal and subcontracted workers that have delivered measurable improvements in safety performance and culture. The panelists will share what they did that worked and their perspectives on why. About 24 to 30 people were in attendance. All statements below are paraphrased by the panel reporter and should not be considered direct quotes by the panelists. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Engaging on Safety at the Work Face: Workers, Front Line Managers, and Subcontractors (Jan Preston, Fluor Corporation (USA)); 2 - Responsibility for Safety: Workers and Line Management Joining Together to Improve Performance (Cynthia Williams, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (Canada)); 3 - Worker Involvement: Trust and the Processing of the Remediated Nitrate Salts (David Funk, Los Alamos National Laboratory (USA)); 4 - Safety Culture: How Employee Engagement is Transforming the Paducah Site (Myrna Espinosa Redfield, Four Rivers Nuclear Partnership (USA)); 5 - Hazard Identification and Control: Subcontractor Performance, Oversight, and Continuous Improvement (Clint Wolfley, URS/CH2M Oak Ridge - UCOR (USA)); 6 - Managing Safety Performance Through Change (Alice Doswell, Fluor (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Quality Control of High-Dose-Rate Brachytherapy: Treatment Delivery Analysis Using Statistical Process Control

Purpose: Statistical process control (SPC) is a quality control method used to ensure that a process is well controlled and operates with little variation. This study determined whether SPC was a viable technique for evaluating the proper operation of a high-dose-rate (HDR) brachytherapy treatment delivery system. Methods and Materials: A surrogate prostate patient was developed using Vyse ordnance gelatin. A total of 10 metal oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) were placed from prostate base to apex. Computed tomography guidance was used to accurately position the first detector in each train at the base. The plan consisted of 12 needles with 129 dwell positions delivering a prescribed peripheral dose of 200 cGy. Sixteen accurate treatment trials were delivered as planned. Subsequently, a number of treatments were delivered with errors introduced, including wrong patient, wrong source calibration, wrong connection sequence, single needle displaced inferiorly 5 mm, and entire implant displaced 2 mm and 4 mm inferiorly. Two process behavior charts (PBC), an individual and a moving range chart, were developed for each dosimeter location. Results: There were 4 false positives resulting from 160 measurements from 16 accurately delivered treatments. For the inaccurately delivered treatments, the PBC indicated that measurements made at the periphery and apex (regions of high-dose gradient) were much more sensitive to treatment delivery errors. All errors introduced were correctly identified by either the individual or the moving range PBC in the apex region. Measurements at the urethra and base were less sensitive to errors. Conclusions: SPC is a viable method for assessing the quality of HDR treatment delivery. Further development is necessary to determine the most effective dose sampling, to ensure reproducible evaluation of treatment delivery accuracy.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

An automatic and accurate x-ray tube focal spot/grid alignment system for mobile radiography: System description and alignment accuracy

Purpose: A mobile radiography automatic grid alignment system (AGAS) has been developed by modifying a commercially available mobile unit. The objectives of this article are to describe the modifications and operation and to report on the accuracy with which the focal spot is aligned to the grid and the time required to achieve the alignment. Methods: The modifications include an optical target arm attached to the grid tunnel, a video camera attached to the collimator, a motion control system with six degrees of freedom to position the collimator and x-ray tube, and a computer to control the system. The video camera and computer determine the grid position, and then the motion control system drives the x-ray focal spot to the center of the grid focal axis. The accuracy of the alignment of the focal spot with the grid and the time required to achieve alignment were measured both in laboratory tests and in clinical use. Results: For a typical exam, the modified unit automatically aligns the focal spot with the grid in less than 10 s, with an accuracy of better than 4 mm. The results of the speed and accuracy tests in clinical use were similar to the results in laboratory tests. Comparison patient chest images are presented--one obtained with a standard mobile radiographic unit without a grid and the other obtained with the modified unit and a 15:1 grid. The 15:1 grid images demonstrate a marked improvement in image quality compared to the nongrid images with no increase in patient dose. Conclusions: The mobile radiography AGAS produces images of significantly improved quality compared to nongrid images with alignment times of less than 10 s and no increase in patient dose.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Computational Human Performance Modeling For Alarm System Design

The introduction of new technologies like adaptive automation systems and advanced alarms processing and presentation techniques in nuclear power plants is already having an impact on the safety and effectiveness of plant operations and also the role of the control room operator. This impact is expected to escalate dramatically as more and more nuclear power utilities embark on upgrade projects in order to extend the lifetime of their plants. One of the most visible impacts in control rooms will be the need to replace aging alarm systems. Because most of these alarm systems use obsolete technologies, the methods, techniques and tools that were used to design the previous generation of alarm system designs are no longer effective and need to be updated. The same applies to the need to analyze and redefine operators’ alarm handling tasks. In the past, methods for analyzing human tasks and workload have relied on crude, paper-based methods that often lacked traceability. New approaches are needed to allow analysts to model and represent the new concepts of alarm operation and human-system interaction. State-of-the-art task simulation tools are now available that offer a cost-effective and efficient method for examining the effect of operator performance in different conditions and operational scenarios. A discrete event simulation system was used by human factors researchers at the Idaho National Laboratory to develop a generic alarm handling model to examine the effect of operator performance with simulated modern alarm system. It allowed analysts to evaluate alarm generation patterns as well as critical task times and human workload predicted by the system.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Riparian and Upland Restoration at the U.S. Department of Energy Rocky Flats, Colorado, Site - 12360

Remedial investigation and cleanup at the Rocky Flats, Colorado, Site was completed in 2005. Uplands, riparian, and wetland habitat were disturbed during cleanup and closure activities and required extensive revegetation. Unavoidable disturbances to habitat of the Preble's meadow jumping mouse (a federally listed species) and wetlands required consultation with regulatory agencies and mitigation. Mitigation wetlands were constructed in two drainages, and a third developed naturally where a soil borrow area intercepted the groundwater table. During the 50-plus years of site operations, 12 ponds were constructed in three drainages to manage and retain runoff and sewage treatment plant discharges prior to release off site. A batch-release protocol has been used for the past several decades at the terminal ponds, which has affected the riparian communities downstream. To return the hydrologic regime to a more natural flow-through system similar to the pre-industrial-use conditions, seven interior dams (of 12) have been breached, and the remaining five dams are scheduled for breaching between 2011 and 2020. At the breached dams, the former open water areas have transformed to emergent wetlands, and the stream reaches have returned to a flow-through system. Riparian and wetland vegetation has established very well. The valves of the terminal ponds were opened in fall 2011 to begin flow-through operations and provide water to the downstream plant communities while allowing reestablishment of vegetation in the former pond bottoms prior to breaching. A number of challenges and issues were addressed during the revegetation effort. These included reaching an agreement on revegetation goals, addressing poor substrate quality and soil compaction problems, using soil amendments and topsoil, selecting seeds, determining the timing and location of revegetation projects relative to continuing closure activities, weed control, erosion control, revegetation project field oversight, and contractual limitations. A variety of ecological restoration techniques were conducted at the site to meet these challenges. These efforts have resulted in vegetation becoming well established in most locations. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2016 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The site was the location of an underground nuclear test in 1968, which resulted in residual contamination at and near the detonation depth of approximately 3200 feet (ft) below ground surface (bgs) that requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (State of Nevada et al. 1996) (as amended) (FFACO) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (LMS/CNT/S12760) (DOE 2016a) (Closure Report) describes LM’s plan for the long-term postclosure monitoring of radioisotope concentrations and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2016a).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Erosion Challenges at the L-Bar Disposal Site - 19561

The L-Bar, New Mexico, Disposal Site is located in the northeast corner of Cibola County, 10 miles north of Laguna, and was the former site of a uranium mill and underground mine. The mill operated from 1977 to 1981 where a total of 1.9 x 10{sup 6} tonnes (2.1 million tons) of ore was processed. Solid and liquid byproduct, or tailings, from the milling process were impounded behind a dam constructed of native weathered Mancos Shale, which is a predominant geologic formation in the area. The tailings were encapsulated in place, and the resulting 40.5-hectare (100-acre) engineered disposal cell was completed in 2000. The 299-hectare (738-acre) Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II site was transferred to the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management under a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission general license in 2004. During reclamation activities, channels were designed and constructed into the surrounding weathered shale to protect the disposal cell from high-precipitation events. Due to the highly erodible soils and anticipated sediment deposition into the diversion channels, a sediment trap was also excavated. By excavating the channels and sediment trap, the local base elevation was altered, which exacerbated erosional forces. Recontouring surrounding drainage basins during the reclamation activities also promoted erosion by reducing natural rock armoring and vegetation that aids in soil stability. To compound the erosion issue, the L-Bar site is susceptible to short-duration, high-intensity, localized convective storms. Because the local geomorphology includes soils consisting of weathered shale, these precipitation events are not conducive to absorption into the soils, but rather to sheet flows that follow topography and concentrate in lower elevation areas where flow volumes and velocities increase. These factors result in the formation of deeply incised gullies and promote soil piping, which is an important geomorphic process in the widening of arroyos and the advancement of head-cutting, evident at the L-Bar site and surrounding areas. At the first annual inspection by DOE in 2005, it was noted that extensive erosion was occurring upgradient of the sediment trap. DOE determined that the design of the site's drainage system was the cause of extensive erosion. It is believed that by lowering the base elevation of the local drainage system through excavation of the sediment trap, the geomorphic response common to fluvial systems in a semiarid environment has increased the incision and remobilization of sediment downstream. Over time, these sediments would be deposited in the channels, which are designed to divert runoff away from the disposal cell, effectively limiting their capacities. The development of alluvial fans on one side of the channel directs flows to the opposite side of the channel, presenting the risk of cutting into the side slopes of the disposal cell. In addition, the upstream migrating gullies could intersect access roads and create hazards for adjacent stakeholders, including their grazing livestock. Current estimates conclude that potential offsite impacts could occur within the next 20 years, with gully migrations of up to 19 meters (63 feet) per year. In 2009, several erosion-control structures were constructed to reduce runoff velocities and ease the elevation differential created by the construction of the sediment trap and diversion channels. The first measurable storm events after construction occurred in August and September 2011, where one structure washed out and another structure was bypassed when runoff breached an earthen berm. DOE has conducted site assessments, continues to monitor erosion, and has applied lessons learned in the process of evaluating options to repair or modify the structures to stabilize the site and prevent potential short-term damage to adjacent properties as well as long-term damage to the disposal cell. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Avoiding Carbon Bed Hot Spots in Thermal Process Off-Gas Systems

Mercury has had various uses in nuclear fuel reprocessing and other nuclear processes, and so is often present in radioactive and mixed (radioactive and hazardous) wastes. Test programs performed in recent years have shown that mercury in off-gas streams from processes that treat radioactive wastes can be controlled using fixed beds of activated sulfur-impregnated carbon, to levels low enough to comply with air emission regulations such as the Hazardous Waste Combustor (HWC) Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards. Carbon bed hot spots or fires have occurred several times during these tests, and also during a remediation of tanks that contained mixed waste. Hot spots occur when localized areas in a carbon bed become heated to temperatures where oxidation occurs. This heating typically occurs due to heat of absoption of gas species onto the carbon, but it can also be caused through external means such as external heaters used to heat the carbon bed vessel. Hot spots, if not promptly mitigated, can grow into bed fires. Carbon bed hot spots and fires must be avoided in processes that treat radioactive and mixed waste. Hot spots are detected by (a) monitoring in-bed and bed outlet gas temperatures, and (b) more important, monitoring of bed outlet gas CO concentrations. Hot spots are mitigated by (a) designing for appropriate in-bed gas velocity, for avoiding gas flow maldistribution, and for sufficient but not excessive bed depth, (b) appropriate monitoring and control of gas and bed temperatures and compositions, and (c) prompt implementation of corrective actions if bed hot spots are detected. Corrective actions must be implemented quickly if bed hot spots are detected, using a graded approach and sequence starting with corrective actions that are simple, quick, cause the least impact to the process, and are easiest to recover from.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Monitoring Aqueous Reprocessing Systems for Detection of Facility Misuse

Traditional approaches to material control and accounting at used nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities relies in large part on laboratory-based destructive assay of periodic samples taken from key stages. These techniques are highly accurate, but limited inspection frequency may limit the size and operation of a reprocessing facility. Online monitoring techniques using inline detectors can be applied to fuel reprocessing systems to improve the situational awareness as the facility is operating to provide additional indicators of the evolving state of the facility between normal inspection periods, potentially alerting regulators to the need for additional inspection. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor combines medium-resolution gamma detectors with statistical data analysis techniques to monitor reprocessing systems for anomalous conditions resulting from process control issues or malfeasance. Gamma spectra collected from the H-Canyon reprocessing facility were modeled using principal component analysis to demonstrate the efficacy of the MIP Monitor for detecting notional diversion scenarios.

safeguards, nuclear fuel reprocessing, gamma spect↗

Assessment of Process Modeling Tools for Determining Variability in Additively Manufactured Parts

The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program aims to accelerate the development, qualification, demonstration, and deployment of advanced materials and manufacturing technologies to enable reliable and economical nuclear energy However, the unique aspects of additive manufacturing (AM) materials in terms of their processing history, microstructure, and properties, are a major barrier for qualification and certification of nuclear components. Much of this challenge may be attributed to component scale variations in microstructure and properties that are driven by local influences of process conditions and geometry on thermal history, melt pool dynamics, and corresponding microstructure evolution. Computational modeling tools may be helpful in this regard to aid in predicting and controlling this level of variability. The purpose of this report is to review the current state-of-the-art for process modeling with regards to metal AM. For this purpose, we consider specifically the case study of laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) processing of SS316, a family of alloys that are both commonly used in nuclear energy applications and suitable for AM processing. The report first introduces the necessary components of a process modeling workflow, followed by a review of the current status of each. At the end, application of these modeling tools to understanding variability in AM process given their current state are considered, and recommendations for future development are proposed

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Baseline Test Specimen Machining Report

The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project is tasked with selecting a high temperature gas reactor technology that will be capable of generating electricity and supplying large amounts of process heat. The NGNP is presently being designed as a helium-cooled high temperature gas reactor (HTGR) with a large graphite core. The graphite baseline characterization project is conducting the research and development (R&D) activities deemed necessary to fully qualify nuclear-grade graphite for use in the NGNP reactor. Establishing nonirradiated thermomechanical and thermophysical properties by characterizing lot-to-lot and billet-to-billet variations (for probabilistic baseline data needs) through extensive data collection and statistical analysis is one of the major fundamental objectives of the project. The reactor core will be made up of stacks of graphite moderator blocks. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the varying characteristics in a wide range of suitable graphites, any of which can be classified as “nuclear grade,” an experimental program has been initiated to develop an extensive database of the baseline characteristics of numerous candidate graphites. Various factors known to affect the properties of graphite will be investigated, including specimen size, spatial location within a graphite billet, specimen orientation within a billet (either parallel to [P] or transverse to [T] the long axis of the as-produced billet), and billet-to-billet variations within a lot or across different production lots. Because each data point is based on a certain position within a given billet of graphite, particular attention must be paid to the traceability of each specimen and its spatial location and orientation within each billet. The evaluation of these properties is discussed in the Graphite Technology Development Plan (Windes et. al, 2007). One of the key components in the evaluation of these graphite types will be mechanical testing on specimens drawn from carefully controlled sections of each billet. To this end, this report will discuss the machining of the first set of test specimens that will be evaluated in this program through tensile, compressive, and flexural testing. Validation that the test specimens have been produced to the tolerances required by the applicable ASTM standards, and to the quality control levels required by this program, will demonstrate the viability of sending graphite to selected suppliers that will provide valuable and certifiable data to future data sets that are integral to the NGNP program and beyond.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Suspect/Counterfeit Items Information Guide for Subcontractors/Suppliers

Counterfeiting of industrial and commercial grade items is an international problem that places worker safety, program objectives, expensive equipment, and security at risk. In order to prevent the introduction of Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CI), this information sheet is being made available as a guide to assist in the implementation of S/CI awareness and controls, in conjunction with subcontractor's/supplier's quality assurance programs. When it comes to counterfeit goods, including industrial materials, items, and equipment, no market is immune. Some manufactures have been known to misrepresent their products and intentionally use inferior materials and processes to manufacture substandard items, whose properties can significantly cart from established standards and specifications. These substandard items termed by the Department of Energy (DOE) as S/CI, pose immediate and potential threats to the safety of DOE and contractor workers, the public, and the environment. Failure of certain systems and processes caused by an S/CI could also have national security implications at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Nuclear Safety Rules (federal Laws), DOE Orders, and other regulations set forth requirements for DOE contractors to implement effective controls to assure that items and services meet specified requirements. This includes techniques to implement and thereby minimizing the potential threat of entry of S/CI to LANL. As a qualified supplier of goods or services to the LANL, your company will be required to establish and maintain effective controls to prevent the introduction of S/CI to LANL. This will require that your company warrant that all items (including their subassemblies, components, and parts) sold to LANL are genuine (i.e. not counterfeit), new, and unused, and conform to the requirements of the LANL purchase orders/contracts unless otherwise approved in writing to the Los Alamos National Security (LANS) contract administrator/procurements specialist.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Dynamic Networks Experiment FY18 - Quality Control Focus Area Efforts

The availability of data whose quality is fittingly labeled is of tantamount importance to signal detection and all other downstream signal processing operations. Without identification, the goals of low yield nuclear monitoring cannot reach their full potential. A fundamental question that remains is the knowledge of the capability gaps that prevent us from using open network data. With these new channels, we will need better understanding of the frequency, type, severity, and impact of artifacts when compared to conventional networks. Moreover, beyond a simple quality label, thresholds for acceptable use of the data will need to be established, likely on a use case by use case basis. Finally, orders of magnitude more data with an at-best static analyst pool size means that quality artifacts must be identified with as little human interaction as possible. Automated methodologies must be developed to account for the scale of the problem when ad hoc networks are candidates for processing. At the same time that “data wealth” provides more opportunity for signal exploitation, the introduction of ad hoc networks introduces an increased risk quality issues in both sensor value and metadata issues. The artifacts shown below are examples of some sensor-based quality issues that impair downstream processing. The machine learning model used in this project was able to identify the artifacts that produce these spurious correlations, significantly improving analyst productivity.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗