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Soils Activity Mobility Study: Methodology and Application

This report presents a three-level approach for estimation of sediment transport to provide an assessment of potential erosion risk for sites at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that are posted for radiological purposes and where migration is suspected or known to occur due to storm runoff. Based on the assessed risk, the appropriate level of effort can be determined for analysis of radiological surveys, field experiments to quantify erosion and transport rates, and long-term monitoring. The method is demonstrated at contaminated sites, including Plutonium Valley, Shasta, Smoky, and T-1. The Pacific Southwest Interagency Committee (PSIAC) procedure is selected as the Level 1 analysis tool. The PSIAC method provides an estimation of the total annual sediment yield based on factors derived from the climatic and physical characteristics of a watershed. If the results indicate low risk, then further analysis is not warranted. If the Level 1 analysis indicates high risk or is deemed uncertain, a Level 2 analysis using the Modified Universal Soil Loss Equation (MUSLE) is proposed. In addition, if a sediment yield for a storm event rather than an annual sediment yield is needed, then the proposed Level 2 analysis should be performed. MUSLE only provides sheet and rill erosion estimates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center-Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) provides storm peak runoff rate and storm volumes, the inputs necessary for MUSLE. Channel Sediment Transport (CHAN-SED) I and II models are proposed for estimating sediment deposition or erosion in a channel reach from a storm event. These models require storm hydrograph associated sediment concentration and bed load particle size distribution data. When the Level 2 analysis indicates high risk for sediment yield and associated contaminant migration or when there is high uncertainty in the Level 2 results, the sites can be further evaluated with a Level 3 analysis using more complex and labor- and data-intensive methods. For the watersheds analyzed in this report using the Level 1 PSIAC method, the risk of erosion is low. The field reconnaissance surveys of these watersheds confirm the conclusion that the sediment yield of undisturbed areas at the NNSS would be low. The climate, geology, soils, ground cover, land use, and runoff potential are similar among these watersheds. There are no well-defined ephemeral channels except at the Smoky and Plutonium Valley sites. Topography seems to have the strongest influence on sediment yields, as sediment yields are higher on the steeper hill slopes. Lack of measured sediment yield data at the NNSS does not allow for a direct evaluation of the yield estimates by the PSIAC method. Level 2 MUSLE estimates in all the analyzed watersheds except Shasta are a small percentage of the estimates from PSIAC because MUSLE is not inclusive of channel erosion. This indicates that channel erosion dominates the total sediment yield in these watersheds. Annual sediment yields for these watersheds are estimated using the CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII channel sediment transport models. Both transport models give similar results and exceed the estimates obtained from PSIAC and MUSLE. It is recommended that the total watershed sediment yield of watersheds at the NNSS with flow channels be obtained by adding the washload estimate (rill and inter-rill erosion) from MUSLE to that obtained from channel transport models (bed load and suspended sediment). PSIAC will give comparable results if factor scores for channel erosion are revised towards the high erosion level. Application of the Level 3 process-based models to estimate sediment yields at the NNSS cannot be recommended at this time. Increased model complexity alone will not improve the certainty of the sediment yield estimates. Models must be calibrated against measured data before model results are accepted as certain. Because no measurements of sediment yields at the NNSS are available, model validation cannot be performed. This is also true for the models used in the Level 2 analyses presented in this study. The need to calibrate MUSLE to local conditions has been discussed. Likewise, the transport equations of CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII need to be calibrated against local data to assess their applicability under semi-arid conditions and for the ephemeral channels at the NNSS. Before these validations and calibration exercises can be undertaken, a long-term measured sediment yield data set must be developed. Development of long-term measured sediment yield data cannot be overemphasized. Long-term monitoring is essential for accurate characterization of watershed processes. It is recommended that a long-term monitoring program be set up to measure watershed erosion rates and channel sediment transport rates.

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The transportation factor in site evaluations for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities - 15460

New facility siting studies will be necessary to fulfill the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future 2012 recommendation to develop consolidated interim storage (CIS) for spent nuclear fuel in the next decade. Future site evaluations for used nuclear fuel (UNF) storage and disposal facilities must address transportation requirements, especially access to mainline railroads, early in the site selection process. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 2013 proposed a strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the BRC recommendations by establishing a pilot interim storage facility by 2021 and a consolidated interim storage facility by 2025. The authors demonstrate that currently available geographic information systems and already adopted siting criteria (defining favorable and unfavorable conditions) allow the identification of the transportation portion of a storage facility siting process to begin without delay. Ready access to the mainline rail system is absolutely critical since existing rail access, or easily constructed access, is a highly favorable condition for successful siting. Despite widespread rail abandonments over the past three decades, vast areas of the United States retain mainline rail service or could connect to existing mainlines by building new rail spurs of less than 25-50 miles. This precondition for transportation planning is critical. Planners need to start with the beginning - availability of rail transportation to and from the interim storage facility/facilities. A second step in transportation screening would be to evaluate those potential site locations within 50 miles of existing mainline railroads using other appropriate variables. This effort could begin with the application of the 1984 repository siting guidelines for transportation (10 CFR 960.5-2-7)[1]. Repository surface facilities have essentially the same transportation requirements as storage facilities. The guidelines in 10 CFR 960 provide a readily available template for evaluating sites based on transportation risks, impacts and costs. Initial site screening, after considering proximity to mainline railroads as the precursory step, should evaluate: 1) proximity to highly populated areas; 2) proximity to interstate highways; 3) proximity to environmentally sensitive areas and lands protected by federal, state, or tribal governments; and 4) proximity to military installations, hazardous materials facilities, or other facilities that might impact transportation safety and security.Several challenges exist which prevent effective transportation planning. The diversity of canister and cask types and SNF characteristics and conditions, the increasingly limited rail access at the shipping sites and the ease with which public attention can be marshalled against a waste management program, all suggest that future efforts need to identify potential storage sites that reduce transportation impacts and costs by reducing near-site transportation construction and reduce total system transportation impacts. This can most easily be accomplished by reducing shipping distances in a process that is easily defined and implemented. The paper concludes that the DOE should develop a site screening and evaluation program with transportation as a central consideration. (authors)

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Using EPA's Risk Assessment Tools for Superfund When Addressing Removal Actions and Late-Phase Response to Terrorist Attacks - 18228

EPA's Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation (OSRTI) has three internet based calculators, or risk assessment models, for developing risk based Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRGs) for radioactively contaminated CERCLA sites. These PRG calculators are EPA's recommended methodology for developing risk-based concentrations for remedial actions for soil and water (PRG), inside buildings (BPRG), and outside hard surfaces (SPRG). EPA has three equivalent calculators for dose assessment, which are the Dose Compliance Concentration (DCC) calculator for soil and water, inside buildings (BDCC), and outside hard surfaces (SDCC). The three PRG calculators also include default PRG tables provided for each of the calculators showing concentrations corresponding to 1 x 10-6 when the calculators are run using all of their default parameters. This presentation will provide information on how users may employ these tools beyond their original intended uses in the remedial program, to develop risk based cleanup levels during the late-phase portion of an actual response after a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) terrorist attack or a major accident at a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), or a simulation during an exercise of an RDD/IND/NPP event, they may want to run the calculator using more site-specific data. This presentation will provide information on how users may employ these tools beyond their original intended uses in the remedial program, and focus on some of the more conservative default parameters that are likely candidates for replacement by site-specific information. (authors)

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Knowledge Management: FY22 Los Alamos National Laboratory Hydrothermal Lab for Spent Fuel Campaign R&D

The use of Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) for spent nuclear fuel disposal is being investigated by the U.S. Department of Energy as a part of the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) Campaign. Such dry spent fuel canisters would be loaded with fuel bundles, and then transported and stored at a nuclear waste repository. Once the canisters are in place underground, the space between the canister and the wall rock will be filled with bentonite clay. Recent research has prioritized high temperature interactions of EBS materials, including phase transitions in bentonite clay, in order to reduce worker dose and repository cost. Higher temperature (i.e., 200ºC) thermal limits are a new area of investigation by the U.S. and international repository science programs. The hydrothermal experimental laboratory at Los Alamos, consisting of rocking autoclaves and cold seal assemblies, is critical to the campaign and presents a significant temperature / pressure safety hazard. Therefore, working competently and safely with these systems is very important to the knowledge management procedures developed at this laboratory. Therefore, the operation of these two systems (rocking autoclaves and cold seal assemblies) will be discussed first.

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M-Star ® Software Test and Verification

Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) currently manages the risk for retained hydrogen in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) vessels by implementing a Retained Hydrogen Program. The current program relies on Sludge Batch (SB) 8 Gas Chromatograph data and on conservative assumptions concerning gas release and retention to determine allowable vessel Quiescent time (Q-time). The authors identified M-Star ® CFD as a software that could simulate processes such as fluid flow, heat transfer, species transport, chemical reactions, particle transport, and retained hydrogen gas release. Preliminary simulation results suggest that more realistic assumptions on gas retention and release may be feasible for the DWPF retained hydrogen program. Because of the desire to use the M-Star ® software to perform analyses that support nuclear safety, SRMC has requested Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to upgrade the software classification level of M-Star ® CFD from level D to level A to perform analyses that support nuclear safety.

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German Support Program for Retrieval and Safe Storage of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Ukraine - 13194

The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supports the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) in enhancement of nuclear safety and radiation protection and strengthening of the physical protection. One of the main objectives of the agreement concluded by these parties in 2008 was the retrieval and safe interim storage of disused orphan high radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. At present, the Ukrainian National Registry does not account all high active radiation sources but only for about 70 - 80 %. GRS in charge of BMU to execute the program since 2008 concluded subcontracts with the waste management and interim storage facilities RADON at different regions in Ukraine as well with the waste management and interim storage facility IZOTOP at Kiev. Below selected examples of removal of high active Co-60 and Cs-137 sources from irradiation facilities at research institutes are described. By end of 2012 removal and safe interim storage of 12.000 disused radioactive sealed sources with a total activity of more than 5,7.10{sup 14} Bq was achieved within the frame of this program. The German support program will be continued up to the end of 2013 with the aim to remove and safely store almost all disused radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. (authors)

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Improved Management of the Technical Interfaces Between the Hanford Tank Farm Operator and the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant - 13383

The Department of Energy (DOE) is constructing the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford site in Washington to treat and immobilize approximately 114 million gallons of high level radioactive waste (after all retrievals are accomplished). In order for the WTP to be designed and operated successfully, close coordination between the WTP engineering, procurement, and construction contractor, Bechtel National, Inc. and the tank farms operating contractor (TOC), Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, is necessary. To develop optimal solutions for DOE and for the treatment of the waste, it is important to deal with the fact that two different prime contractors, with somewhat differing contracts, are tasked with retrieving and delivering the waste and for treating and immobilizing that waste. The WTP and the TOC have over the years cooperated to manage the technical interface. To manage what is becoming a much more complicated interface as the WTP design progresses and new technical issues have been identified, an organizational change was made by WTP and TOC in November of 2011. This organizational change created a co-located integrated project team (IPT) to deal with mutual and interface issues. The Technical Organization within the One System IPT includes employees from both TOC and WTP. This team has worked on a variety of technical issues of mutual interest and concern. Technical issues currently being addressed include: - The waste acceptance criteria; - Waste feed delivery and the associated data quality objectives (DQO); - Evaluation of the effects of performing a riser cut on a single shell tank on WTP operations; - The disposition of secondary waste from both TOC and WTP; - The close coordination of the TOC double shell tank mixing and sampling program and the Large Scale Integrated Test (LSIT) program for pulse jet mixers at WTP along with the associated responses to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2010-2; - Development of a set of alternatives to the current baseline that involve aspects of direct feed, feed conditioning, and design changes. The One System Technical Organization has served WTP, TOC, and DOE well in managing and resolving issues at the interface. This paper describes the organizational structure used to improve the interface and several examples of technical interface issues that have been successfully addressed by the new organization. (authors)

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SRS Tank Structural Integrity Program

The mission of the Structural Integrity Program is to ensure continued safe management and operation of the waste tanks for whatever period of time these tanks are required. Matthew Maryak provides an overview of the Structural Integrity Program to open Session 5 (Waste Storage and Tank Inspection) of the 2010 EM Waste Processing Technical Exchange.

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Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

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Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

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An experimental program to characterize confined explosions of hydrogen/oxygen mixtures in the context of radioactive material transport between CEA nuclear facilities - 15125

CEA, the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission, carries out a variety of nuclear research programs in many research reactors and nuclear facilities, decommissioning and dismantling operations that require multiple transports of different type of radioactive material such as radioactive waste or experimental fuel rods using a wide range of transportation packages. Packages are designed, constructed and operated to meet safety and regulatory requirements and must be approved by the French Safety Authority. Application for package approval (e.g. type B package) requires a complete and thorough safety demonstration in which flammable gas generation like radiolysis has become a major issue in the last few years. To face these challenges, the CEA unit in charge of transport package construction and transport operations (CEA/STMR, Cadarache Center, France), has developed a many-sided approach based on one hand on a better knowledge of both hydrogen gas generation and oxygen consumption in waste materials, and on the other hand, on design of transport packages or waste containers capable of withstanding dynamic pressure loads due to an inner hydrogen/air mixture explosion. This paper describes the experimental program that CEA/STMR has decided to implement in order to better characterize confined space explosions of hydrogen/oxygen mixtures. It presents how pressure profiles were experimentally measured in various pressure and temperature conditions which are representative of normal and accident transport conditions. It describes how different experimental set-ups were designed and improved progressively so as to obtain reliable and reproducible detonation conditions, investigate the influence of water vapor and characterize pressure profiles (peak pressure, residual pressure, peak duration). This experimental data will be used to qualify computational models and tools that are used to calculate the structural response of waste containers or fuel canisters, and finally demonstrate the safety of transport packages following an inner hydrogen explosion. (authors)

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RH Packaging Program Guidance (Rev. 3.1)

The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states, "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "…each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.

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Long-term performance of engineered barriers for high-level waste repositories - 15358

The evolution of the engineered barrier system (EBS) of geological repositories for high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent fuel (SF) has been the subject of many national and international research programs during recent years. The emphasis of the research activities was on the elaboration of a detailed understanding of the complex coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical and -chemical (THM-C) processes, which are expected to evolve in the early post-closure period in the near field. From the perspective of radiological long-term safety, an in-depth understanding of these coupled processes is of great significance, because the evolution of the EBS during the early post-closure phase may have a non-negligible impact on the safety functions at later stages of the repository's lifetime. Process interactions during the re-saturation phase (heat pulse, gas generation, non-uniform water uptake from the host rock) could impair the homogeneity of the safety-relevant properties in the EBS (e.g. swelling pressure, hydraulic conductivity, diffusivity). The 7. Framework EURATOM PEBS project (long-term Performance of Engineered Barrier Systems) was initiated in 2010 and completed in March 2014. The project aimed at evaluating the sealing and barrier performance of clay-based EBS over time. The project approach included experiments, model development and consideration of the potential impact on long-term safety functions. The specific project aims were to: -deepen the understanding of the THM and THM-C evolution of the EBS system with time, - provide an enhanced quantitative basis for relating the evolutionary behavior to the safety functions, - clarify further the significance of residual uncertainties for long-term performance assessment. It can be concluded that uncertainties in process understanding occurring in the re-saturation period have been better constrained through PEBS studies, thus the uncertainties in the long-term performance of bentonite barriers have been reduced in some areas. Improvements are in the areas of evolution of materials properties and model development and testing at various scales. On-going in-situ experiments in underground research laboratories may play an important role in further confirming bentonite performance over periods of 10 - 20 years. (authors)

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Groundwork for Universal Canister System Development

The mission of the United States Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. Some of the wastes that that must be managed have been identified as good candidates for disposal in a deep borehole in crystalline rock (SNL 2014a). In particular, wastes that can be disposed of in a small package are good candidates for this disposal concept. A canister-based system that can be used for handling these wastes during the disposition process (i.e., storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal) could facilitate the eventual disposal of these wastes. This report provides information for a program plan for developing specifications regarding a canister-based system that facilitates small waste form packaging and disposal and that is integrated with the overall efforts of the DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy Used Fuel Disposition Campaign's Deep Borehole Field Test. Wastes to be considered as candidates for the universal canister system include capsules containing cesium and strontium currently stored in pools at the Hanford Site, cesium to be processed using elutable or nonelutable resins at the Hanford Site, and calcine waste from Idaho National Laboratory. The initial emphasis will be on disposal of the cesium and strontium capsules in a deep borehole that has been drilled into crystalline rock. Specifications for a universal canister system are derived from operational, performance, and regulatory requirements for storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal of radioactive waste. Agreements between the Department of Energy and the States of Washington and Idaho, as well as the Deep Borehole Field Test plan provide schedule requirements for development of the universal canister system. Future work includes collaboration with the Hanford Site to move the cesium and strontium capsules into dry storage, collaboration with the Deep Borehole Field Test to develop surface handling and emplacement techniques and to develop the waste package design requirements, developing universal canister system design options and concepts of operations, and developing system analysis tools. Areas in which further research and development are needed include material properties and structural integrity, in-package sorbents and fillers, waste form tolerance to heat and postweld stress relief, waste package impact limiters, sensors, cesium mobility under downhole conditions, and the impact of high pressure and high temperature environment on seals design.

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Siting and Transportation for Consolidated Used Nuclear Fuel Management Facilities: A Proposed Approach for a Regional Initiative to Begin the Dialogue - 13562

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC) was formed in January 2010 to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, and to develop a new national strategy. Over two years, the BRC held dozens of meetings and heard from hundreds of Federal, State, Tribal, and local officials, as well as representatives of trade and labor organizations, technical groups, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders. The Commission's final report (issued January 26, 2012) offers a strategy to resolve longstanding challenges to responsible management of the United States' nuclear waste legacy. The Commission recommended Congressional action to rewrite parts of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA); however, a comprehensive legislative overhaul will likely take years to fully implement. The nature and characteristics of nuclear waste, the activities that generated it, and the past history of federal efforts to manage the waste make it virtually certain that finding workable solutions will be controversial and difficult. As the BRC report suggests, this difficulty can be made insurmountable if top-down, federally-mandated efforts are forced upon unwilling States, Tribes, and local communities. Decades of effort and billions of ratepayer and taxpayer dollars have been spent attempting to site and operate spent fuel storage and disposal facilities in this manner. The experience thus far indicates that voluntary consent and active partnership of States, Tribes, and local governments in siting, designing, and operating such facilities are critical. Some States, Tribes, and local communities have indicated that, given adequate scientific and technical information, along with appropriate incentives, assurances, and authority, they might be willing to consider hosting facilities for consolidated storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The authors propose a new regional approach to identifying and resolving issues related to the selection of a consolidated storage site. The approach would be characterized by informed discussion and deliberation, bringing together stakeholders from government, the non-governmental (NGO) community, industry, and other sectors. Because site selection would result in regional transportation impacts, the development of the transportation system (e.g., route identification, infrastructure improvements) would be integrated into the issue-resolution process. In addition to laying out the necessary steps and associated timeline, the authors address the challenges of building public trust and confidence in the new waste management program, as well as the difficulty of reaching and sustaining broad-based consensus on a decision to host a consolidated storage facility. (authors)

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Application for a Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site Area 5 Asbestiform Low-Level Solid Waste Disposal Site

The NTS solid waste disposal sites must be permitted by the state of Nevada Solid Waste Management Authority (SWMA). The SWMA for the NTS is the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Federal Facilities (NDEP/BFF). The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) as land manager (owner), and National Security Technologies (NSTec), as operator, will store, collect, process, and dispose all solid waste by means that do not create a health hazard, a public nuisance, or cause impairment of the environment. NTS disposal sites will not be included in the Nye County Solid Waste Management Plan. The NTS is located approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the federal lands management authority for the NTS, and NSTec is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NTS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NTS has signs posted along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NTS. The Area 5 RWMS is the location of the permitted facility for the Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS). The Area 5 RWMS is located near the eastern edge of the NTS (Figure 2), approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of Mercury, Nevada. The Area 5 RWMS is used for the disposal of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste. Many areas surrounding the RWMS have been used in conducting nuclear tests. A Notice of Intent to operate the disposal site as a Class III site was submitted to the state of Nevada on January 28, 1994, and was acknowledged as being received in a letter to the NNSA/NSO on August 30, 1994. Interim approval to operate a Class III SWDS for regulated asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) was authorized on August 12, 1996 (in letter from Paul Liebendorfer to Runore Wycoff), with operations to be conducted in accordance with the ''Management Plan for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste with Regulated Asbestos Waste.'' A requirement of the authorization was that on or before October 9, 1999, a permit was required to be issued. Because of NDEP and NNSA/NSO review cycles, the final permit was issued on April 5, 2000, for the operation of the Area 5 Low-Level Waste Disposal Site, utilizing Pit 7 (P07) as the designated disposal cell. The original permit applied only to Pit 7, with a total design capacity of 5,831 cubic yards (yd{sup 3}) (157,437 cubic feet [ft{sup 3}]). NNSA/NSO is expanding the SWDS to include the adjacent Upper Cell of Pit 6 (P06), with an additional capacity of 28,037 yd{sup 3} (756,999 ft{sup 3}) (Figure 3). The proposed total capacity of ALLW in Pit 7 and P06 will be approximately 33,870 yd{sup 3} (0.9 million ft{sup 3}). The site will be used for the disposal of regulated ALLW, small quantities of low-level radioactive hydrocarbon-burdened (LLHB) media and debris, LLW, LLW that contains PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, and small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids, or waste that is regulated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or state-of-generation hazardous waste regulations, will not be accepted for disposal at the site. The only waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that will be accepted at the disposal site is regulated asbestos-containing materials (RACM). The term asbestiform is used throughout this document to describe this waste. Other TSCA waste (i.e., polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]) will not be accepted for disposal at the SWDS. The disposal site will be used as a depository of permissible waste generated both on site and off site. All generators designated by NNSA/NSO will be eligible to dispose regulated ALLW at the Asbestiform Low-Level Waste Disposal Site in accordance with the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) 325, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC, current revision). Approval will be given by NNSA/NSO to generators that have successfully demonstrated through process knowledge (PK) and/or sampling and analysis that the waste is low-level, contains asbestiform material, and does not contain prohibited waste materials. Each waste stream will be approved through the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP), which ensures that the waste meets acceptance requirements outlined in the NTS Class III Permit and the NTSWAC.

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Nuclear Crisis Communications: The Plan Worked. A Critique of NRC Communications in the Fukushima Daiichi Reactor Crisis - 12073

'Call the AV-Photo folks and get someone in here to shoot b-roll. We'll never be able to accommodate the network cameras and the only way I can get this to the media is to produce it ourselves'. Eliot Brenner, Director NRC Office of Public Affairs, March 12, 2011. For the past four years we have been speaking to audiences at Waste Management about communications issues. Last year, though we were kept from attending because of the federal budget crisis, our surrogates described to you the lessons the nuclear industry should draw from the BP Gulf oil spill crisis. Those remarks were delivered 11 days before the Fukushima Daiichi tragedy became the nuclear landmark of a generation - an industry changing event with worldwide ramifications, both in science and regulation and in communications. Eliot Brenner cut his teeth on crisis communication in the aviation industry where tragedy unfolds rapidly. He has been a speech-writer to three cabinet secretaries, spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration and now spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since 2004. Holly Harrington manages the NRC crisis response program and has 26 years federal public affairs experience, including eight years at the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Her crisis experience includes the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, numerous hurricanes and floods, Sept 11, and, now Fukushima Daiichi. Rebecca Schmidt is a veteran government relations professional whose decades in Washington include service with the House Armed Services Committee, the House Budget Committee and the Secretary of Defense. Collectively, the Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Affairs conducted the largest outreach for the agency since Three Mile Island. We worked with the basic rule, described to Waste Management last year just 11 days before Fukushima - communicate early, often and clearly. The response - while not without its problems and lessons - went as smoothly as a chaotic event like Fukushima could go. That was due in large measure to the fact that the NRC has a well-tested system of responding to nuclear emergencies, and we followed our plan. (authors)

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