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621 records · Page 35

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2020

How Low Can You Go? Using Synthetic 3D Imagery to Drastically Reduce Real-World Training Data for Object Detection

Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) currently provide state-of-the-art performance on image classification and object detection tasks, and there are many global security mission areas where such models could be extremely useful. Crucially, the success of these models is driven in large part by the widespread availability of high-quality open source data sets such as Image Net, Common Objects in Context (COCO), and KITTI, which contain millions of images with thousands of unique labels. However, global security relevant objects-of-interest can be difficult to obtain: relevant events are low frequency and high consequence; the content of relevant images is sensitive; and adversaries and proliferators seek to obscure their activities. For these cases where exemplar data is hard to come-by, even fine-tuning an existing model with available data can be effectively impossible. Recent work demonstrated that models can be trained using a combination of real-world and synthetic images generated from 3D representations; that such models can exceed the performance of models trained using real-world data alone; and that the generated images need not be perfectly realistic (Tremblay, et al., 2018). However, this approach still required hundreds to thousands of real-world images for training and fine tuning, which for sparse, global security-relevant datasets can be an unrealistic hurdle. In this research, we validate the performance and behavior of DCNN models as we drive the number of real-world images used for training object detection tasks down to a minimal set. We perform multiple experiments to identify the best approach to train DCNNs from an extremely small set of real-world images. In doing so, we: Develop state-of-the-art, parameterized 3D models based on real-world images and sample from their parameters to increase the variance in synthetic image training data; Use machine learning explainability techniques to highlight and correct through targeted training the biases that result from training using completely synthetic images; and Validate our results by comparing the performance of the models trained on synthetic data to one another, and to a control model created by fine-tuning an existing ImageNet-trained model with a limited number (hundreds) of real-world images.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Total absorption spectroscopy of two isomers in 70 Cu influencing nucleosynthesis signatures

Isomers have long been known to be important for astrophysical nucleosynthesis processes, yet they are often neglected in network calculations due to computational limitations or lack of data. "Astromers" are astrophysically metastable nuclear states that can greatly impact nucleosynthesis pathways. In this work we show that astromers further impact the time-dependent electromagnetic signal during heavy element nucleosynthesis. In an experiment performed at the National Superconducting Cyclotron Laboratory, three 𝛽-decaying states of 70 Cu (6 − ground state, and two isomeric states: 3 − and 1 + ) were produced. 𝛽-feeding values were extracted from experimental spectra and compared to shell-model and QRPA+PVC calculations. Here, average 𝛾-ray energies from the 𝛽-decay events were incorporated into simulations of heavy element nucleosynthesis and were found to exhibit different energy release profiles over time, which may impact, in aggregate, time-dependent observable signals.

59 ≤ A ≤ 89↗

DOE OSTI2025

Securing Federated Learning Against Active Reconstruction Attacks

Federated Learning (FL) has amassed notable attention for its ability to preserve user privacy while emphasizing the retainment of model training efficiency. Due to this potential, FL has been integrated in many domains, such as healthcare, finance, law, and industrial engineering, where data cannot be easily exchanged due to sensitive information and strict privacy laws. However, current research has indicated that FL protocols are easily compromised by active data reconstruction attacks employed by actively dishonest servers. The malicious modification of global model parameters allows an actively dishonest server to obtain a direct copy of users’ private data via gradient inversion. Here, this class of attacks is highly underexplored and continues to be a major challenge due to the intense threat model. In this paper, we propose OASIS as a scalable and modality-agnostic defense based on data augmentation that counteracts active data reconstruction attacks while preserving model performance. To generalize our defense, we uncover the intuition behind gradient inversion that enables these attacks and theoretically establish the conditions by which the defense can be considered robust regardless of attack design. From this, we formulate our defense with data augmentation that illustrates its ability to undermine the attack principle. We evaluate OASIS on five real-world datasets–two image-based (ImageNet and CIFAR100) and three text-based (Wikitext, Stack Overflow, and Shakespeare)–which span diverse uses cases such as vision tasks and language modeling. Comprehensive evaluations on these datasets exhibit the efficacy of OASIS and highlight its feasibility as a solution.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Some Aeronautical Communications Experiments

Classically there has existed an asymmetry between the computing and communicating sides of aerospace systems. Over the past few decades, this asymmetry has shifted to favoring communication link technologies, meaning that advancements in available central processing units (CPUs), storage devices, and internal data buses have stagnated. Indeed, the increased emphasis placed on refining subsystem performance such as with antenna bandwidth in phased arrays, amplifier power efficiency, software defined radio (SDR) flexibility and encoding for data compression and error correction has given rise to successful debuts of multi-gigabit-per-second data return from long space-link distances. These accomplishments are easily quantifiable through link budgets and illustrate what is possible, but also reveal the deficiencies in overall communications capabilities. In particular, the ever-accelerating presence of aerospace vehicles gives rise to newer and larger classes of challenges to address the needs of 21st century systems. Furthermore remote sensing and imaging capabilities have far outpaced our ability to transmit their products to the ground, so we are increasingly dependent on pre-processing and downselection to contend with the communications bottleneck. No longer may we depend upon the constrained logistics in delivering end-to-end data delivery through manual reconfigurations, static event scheduling and execution on a per-vehicle basis, for these methods do not scale and therefore must give way to dynamic, networked approaches with an overall systems view in mind. Emerging mission requirements exhibit a trend toward multiple smaller-scale vehicles working together to perform dissimilar observations. Such operations necessitate sensor fusion across a constellation, and where data processing may be distributed throughout a fairly disconnected network whose topology changes over time in non-deterministic manners. Individual communications link performance is still very relevant to deploying an effective communications system, but now must be embedded within a greater architecture of capability to optimally utilize the bandwidth available from each link to generate an ultimate end-to-end quality of service. The deleterious effects of timing uncertainty across the arrangement presents a challenge to measurement synchronization and delivery, so a successful deployed system needs to be tolerant to the delays inherent in time-of-light between elements and digital processing latencies existing at each node. In this presentation we share the flight test results from a high performance Gbps laser communications terminal evaluated with a suite of store and forward capabilities called High-rate Delay Tolerant Networking (HDTN). The communications payload is operated over Lake Erie across a range of configurations including several convergence layers, and is evaluated to determine recovery time after link disruptions, information loss, efficiency and speed. The effectiveness of utilizing a flying laboratory to increase the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of an integrated system in relevant environments is discussed, as well as the value of conducting aeronautics experiments to retire risk for technology infusion into space missions. Upcoming flight campaigns will be presented, including opportunities to demonstrate secure command and control, data intensive hyperspectral imaging, quantum link characterization, 4k High Definition (HD) video streaming and internetworked space-ground-aero relay operations. These experiments will pave the way for future missions which will depend upon interoperability across disparate government and privately owned networks, involve contention with uncertain and dynamic timing, and require agility to autonomously configure optimal parameters across networks of ever-increasing size and complexity to ensure data delivery. https://www1.grc.nasa.gov/space/scan/acs/tech-studies/dtn/

Daniel Raible↗

DOE OSTI2019

Support for Reactor Operators in Case of Cyber-Security Threats (NEUP Final Report)

Increasing use of digital technology in nuclear power plants (NPPs) poses cyber-security as a crucial threat to public safety and to continuous energy production. Cyber-security risks are comprised of complex known and unknown interactions between various entities, system vulnerabilities, network protocols, human users and malicious attacks. There is little understanding or research geared towards plant operators’ response under cyber-security threats and operational procedures to cope with such threats. This is particularly critical when a cyber-security event masquerades as a safety incident or an evolving accident. Instead of leading operators to the remediation of the accident, the masked cyber event may lead them to circumvent the safety mechanisms of the plant. Given these challenges, the objective of this project is to develop a tool to characterize abnormal NPP events as “cyber” or “safety” incidents, and to further develop this tool as a real-time operator aid to assist in response to the incident. This NEUP Final Report summarizes the research efforts towards the above goals and the results in the following three aspects. First, a methodology for classifying abnormal NPP events as cyber-attacks or safety incidents was developed. This provides the basis for responding to potential cyber-attacks. In this methodology, the causal relationships between various variables (i.e., physical variables, network variables, and control variables) for a nuclear system under consideration are modeled using dynamic Bayesian networks. Based on observations of certain variables (i.e., the evidence), inference is performed to identify the state of hidden variables, which helps indicate the occurrence of cyber-attacks or safety incidents. The proposed methodology was applied to the full scope NPP simulator system at The Ohio State University as a case study. The result shows that the proposed methodology is capable of distinguishing between cyber-attacks and safety incidents. Second, a game-theoretic approach for responding to cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants was developed. This is the second major goal of the project, and the method is used to recommend optimal responses to reactor operators in the case of cyber-attacks. We consider two cases in this research. In the first case, the interaction between the defender (i.e., the reactor operator) and the attacker is modeled as a two-player, nonzero-sum, Markov game with an infinite time horizon. In the second case, we consider a semi-Markov game between the defender and the attacker within a finite time horizon. The model in the second case enables us to consider the time sensitive response of the defender. In each case, the method for deriving the Nash equilibrium is developed. The Nash Equilibrium of the game provides the valid prediction of both players’ actions because no single player can benefit from unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium policy if the other player adheres to his/hers, hence it provides the best response of the defender to cyber-attacks. The proposed method in each case is demonstrated through a simplified benchmark digital feedwater control system. Third, a prototype display is developed to integrate the above information. The prototype display depicts the communication information to the operator and incorporates the cyber-security tool developed by the team into the interface. It consists of the regular display in current control rooms, as well as a panel used to indicate the occurrence of cyber-attacks or safety events and a panel used to guide the operator’s response to detected cyber-attacks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing Cloud Cybersecurity: Prescriptive Controls for Operational Technology

This whitepaper provides strategic insights and recommendations into security cloud-based solutions for electric utilities, encompassing operational technology (OT), virtual power plants (VPP), distributed energy resources (DERs), applications, networks, and data storage as they transition to and leverage cloud infrastructure through managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). Principles derived from established frameworks serve as a foundation for best practices across cybersecurity projects and remove the constraints of settling on a single framework. For organizations that prefer not to integrate a specific framework altogether, elements of the proposed approach could be adopted or tailored to best fit defined requirements and expected functionalities. The Cirrus assessment, a utility cloud feasibility tool, and the roadmap it provides serve as a precursor to this paper, which seeks to be a valuable resource for defining next steps following cloud technology integration feasibility appraisal. With its comprehensive approach to adoption, the Cirrus framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for or deploying a utility cloud solution. The previously published whitepaper, “Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration,” details the guiding strategy, research, and deployment of cloud solutions within electric and interconnected grid systems. Before implementing the controls suggested in this document, it is recommended that stakeholders complete Cirrus's cloud integration assessment and pair the results with their unique cybersecurity controls to form a comprehensive cloud-based utility cybersecurity plan. The Cirrus outcome will consider a series of future architectures for the grid before and after the energy transition and evaluate the arguments for and against cloud applications for each electric and interconnected grid layer. This document is a companion to the original whitepaper, "Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration" to further identify and recommend security controls based on Cirrus’s cloud integration assessment output. The following whitepaper outlines the cybersecurity controls that secure cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector using the predefined categories identify, protect, detect, and respond and recover. The objective is to outline prescriptive security controls based on the type of architecture and data stored in the cloud. The focus includes dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premises Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration in this context is allocating responsibility for foundational cybersecurity aspects—having used Cirrus for the cloud integration assessment. The ensuing controls detailed herein also represent a checklist of controls necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and strategic foresight in a safe and responsible manner.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

A comprehensive guide to CAN IDS data and introduction of the ROAD dataset

Although ubiquitous in modern vehicles, Controller Area Networks (CANs) lack basic security properties and are easily exploitable. A rapidly growing field of CAN security research has emerged that seeks to detect intrusions or anomalies on CANs. Producing vehicular CAN data with a variety of intrusions is a difficult task for most researchers as it requires expensive assets and deep expertise. To illuminate this task, we introduce the first comprehensive guide to the existing open CAN intrusion detection system (IDS) datasets. We categorize attacks on CANs including fabrication (adding frames, e.g., flooding or targeting and ID), suspension (removing an ID’s frames), and masquerade attacks (spoofed frames sent in lieu of suspended ones). We provide a quality analysis of each dataset; an enumeration of each datasets’ attacks, benefits, and drawbacks; categorization as real vs. simulated CAN data and real vs. simulated attacks; whether the data is raw CAN data or signal-translated; number of vehicles/CANs; quantity in terms of time; and finally a suggested use case of each dataset. State-of-the-art public CAN IDS datasets are limited to real fabrication (simple message injection) attacks and simulated attacks often in synthetic data, lacking fidelity. In general, the physical effects of attacks on the vehicle are not verified in the available datasets. Only one dataset provides signal-translated data but is missing a corresponding “raw” binary version. This issue pigeon-holes CAN IDS research into testing on limited and often inappropriate data (usually with attacks that are too easily detectable to truly test the method). The scarcity of appropriate data has stymied comparability and reproducibility of results for researchers. As our primary contribution, we present the Real ORNL Automotive Dynamometer (ROAD) CAN IDS dataset, consisting of over 3.5 hours of one vehicle’s CAN data. ROAD contains ambient data recorded during a diverse set of activities, and attacks of increasing stealth with multiple variants and instances of real (i.e. non-simulated) fuzzing, fabrication, unique advanced attacks, and simulated masquerade attacks. To facilitate a benchmark for CAN IDS methods that require signal-translated inputs, we also provide the signal time series format for many of the CAN captures. Our contributions aim to facilitate appropriate benchmarking and needed comparability in the CAN IDS research field.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Toward digital design at the exascale: An overview of project ICECap

High performance computing has entered the Exascale Age. Capable of performing over 1018 floating point operations per second, exascale computers, such as El Capitan, the National Nuclear Security Administration's first, have the potential to revolutionize the detailed in-depth study of highly complex science and engineering systems. However, in addition to these kind of whole machine “hero” simulations, exascale systems could also enable new paradigms in digital design by making petascale hero runs routine. Currently, untenable problems in complex system design, optimization, model exploration, and scientific discovery could all become possible. Motivated by the challenge of uncovering the next generation of robust high-yield inertial confinement fusion (ICF) designs, project ICECap (Inertial Confinement on El Capitan) attempts to integrate multiple advances in machine learning (ML), scientific workflows, high performance computing, GPU-acceleration, and numerical optimization to prototype such a future. Built on a general framework, ICECap is exploring how these technologies could broadly accelerate scientific discovery on El Capitan. In addition to our requirements, system-level design, and challenges, we describe some of the key technologies in ICECap, including ML replacements for multiphysics packages, tools for human-machine teaming, and algorithms for multifidelity design optimization under uncertainty. As a test of our prototype pre-El Capitan system, we advance the state-of-the art for ICF hohlraum design by demonstrating the optimization of a 17-parameter National Ignition Facility experiment and show that our ML-assisted workflow makes design choices that are consistent with physics intuition, but in an automated, efficient, and mathematically rigorous fashion.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗