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Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid‐support functions, which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. Here, the authors investigate the impact to the cyber‐physical power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary. The findings show that each grid‐support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The physical impact from cyber actions was analysed in cases of DER providing distribution system voltage regulation and transmission system support. Finally, recommendations are presented for minimising the risk using engineered parameter limits and segmenting the control network to minimise common‐mode vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Comparison of Distributive Consensus Algorithms for AnomalyDetection on the Power-Grid

As an increasing number of devices in the power-grid rely on high-precision clocks to measure electrical properties and time stamp data, GPS receivers have become a vulnerability on the power-grid. GPS spoofing attacks, in which a fake signal is transmitted, can cause sensor measurement errors that can misinform protective equipment and grid operators for both the transmission and distribution grid. The technology being developed to secure precision clocks in the transmission grid are not appropriate for the distribution grid. Thus, there is a need to developed anomaly detection algorithms that are suitable for the hardware available on the distribution grid. Traditionally, a distributed detection framework is comprised of spatially distributed nodes which acquire observations about a quantity of interest and sends the data to the fusion center, where a global decision is made. Instead the distribution grid has low-power devices, such as smart inverters and microPMUs, that could be used to perform highly parallelized calculations. Having on node calculations is beneficial since it is more network and computation efficient, as the more calculations can be performed where the data is being captured instead of communicating across a slow network to a centralized fusion center. Instead, we could employ an alternate peer-to-peer type of information exchange on the distribution grid that can still reach a global decision. A decentralized approach to anomaly detection makes efficient use of the computational and network bandwidth that exists, and it also lacks the single point of failure of a centralized approach. Thus, a decentralized local information exchange and/or inference is preferred. Lastly, the unreliability of the distribution grid network connections and potential noise or error in the measurements must be considered. In order to produce an effective detection tool, a Byzantine-fault tolerant and asynchronous algorithm must be developed. Thus, the first phase of our project is to develop a distributed, decentralized, asynchronous, Byzantine-fault tolerant, collaborative autonomy-based anomaly detection algorithm to collectively analyze clusters of data for signs of a malicious attack.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Update on Nuclear Energy Projects and Plans in Ukraine (Meeting Report)

Following the 1986 disastrous accident at Chernobyl, gaining independence following the fall of the former Soviet Union, two revolutions, and on-going Russian intervention, Ukrainea is seeking to expand its use of commercial nuclear energy and to further reduce its dependence on Russia for energy. Nuclear energy in Ukraine has made a significant contribution toward achieving sustainable development and social goals. Ukraine is very vulnerable to the effects of climate change and nuclear is a cornerstone of the country’s effort to combat the effects. With broad support from the U.S. government, Ukraine is cooperating with the U.S. on fresh nuclear fuel supply, civilian nuclear security, outage optimization, spent fuel storage, and future nuclear technology. And is looking to tap U.S. expertise on plant management, and electric grid operations and expansion. NEIc hosted this virtual event to provide an update on nuclear energy projects and plans in Ukraine. Featured speakers included Yaroslav Demchenkov, Deputy Minister of Energy, Taras Kachka, Deputy Minister – Trade Representative, Petro Kotin, CEO, Energoatom,d and Ann K. Ganzer, Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Dept. of State. Maria Korsnick, NEI CEO, moderated the discussion. About forty individuals attended representing the Ukraine and U.S. governments, and U.S. suppliers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cybersecurity Initiative

Recent cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, and inadvertent exposure of nuclear plant systems to cyber-exploits underscore the need for plant operators to adopt and deploy cyber-security defense solutions made for industrial control systems. Of increasing concern is the fact that international cyber hackers are beginning to target critical infrastructure, and because these more modern controls systems depend on advanced use of digital systems, they are more vulnerable than ever before to cyber-attacks. Traditional cyber defense strategies and products that have been available for decades are tailored for use on IT or corporate networks but can cause interruptions and catastrophic damage when deployed on industrial control system networks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program to provide private companies pursuing innovative nuclear energy technologies with access to the technical support necessary to move toward commercialization. One of these GAIN small business vouchers was awarded to Dragos, Inc. to enable collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the Dragos Platform on a production nuclear reactor test bed, hence laying the path for future commercial adoption. The vision was to provide a guide for industrial operators on implementing an industrial monitoring solution and to show how these solutions can be deployed without causing safety and reliability issues. This report documents the results of the collaboration between ORNL and Dragos, Inc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cyber Friendly Fire: Research Challenges for Security Informatics

This paper addresses cognitive implications and research needs surrounding the problem of cyber friendly fire (FF). We define cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintention-ally harms the mission effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. Just as with combat friendly fire, maintaining situation awareness (SA) is paramount to avoiding cyber FF incidents. Cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system’s topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system and its nodes, the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive and offensive countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. Mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF— including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches—are discussed.

cyber friendly fire↗

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Standards for Photovoltaic Operations

Solar energy plays an important role in securing a more resilient, cyber-secure electrical grid in Pennsylvania. Solar's ability to be widely "distributed" on residential and large roofs, marginal lands, and many other locations across Pennsylvania - as opposed to being centralized - offers a strong option for addressing the myriad of potential disruptions that can occur to the grid's infrastructure. And when combined with energy storage, local energy needs can be met immediately without having to wait on the delivery of an off-site fuel source. As more and more distributed solar electricity generation is brought online, researchers, technology developers, solar developers and grid operators are paying close attention to the potential for solar to enhance grid cybersecurity. Although nobody may know when, where, or how the next cyberattack will take place, there are security measures, technical solutions, and management practices that are being implemented across the industry to protect against network control issues and grid operations. Everyone participating in the solar value chain stands to gain from a coordinated, iterative approach to protect against cyber vulnerabilities and build deeper resilience into the architecture of our grid.

cybersecurity↗

Securing the Modern Grid: Federal Investments, Digitization, and Supply Chain Strategy

Across the United States (U.S.) grid expansion and modernization is underway, paving the way for accelerated load growth and intelligent resource management. Digitization of the grid is supported by several state and federal programs, providing support for utilities installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), AI-powered analytics systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to transform the grid from a one-way power delivery system into an intelligent, responsive network that will enable faster load growth and power expansion of data centers for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digital transformation of America's grid presents opportunity for increased efficiency and resiliency but also introduces new digital risks that require careful management. Digital equipment often contains several vulnerabilities such as unencrypted communication protocols, and persistent remote access capabilities that could be exploited to manipulate device settings, coordinate service disruptions, or inject false data into grid operations. These digital risks become particularly important as the grid must rapidly scale to support AI-driven data centers, which the administration has identified as essential for maintaining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. These vulnerabilities are compounded by supply chain realities: Chinese manufacturers currently produce 70-90% of essential grid components including inverters, batteries, and control systems, with the U.S. lacking domestic manufacturing capacity for critical assets like extra-high voltage transformers. Recent federal legislation has established Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions to address these risks, requiring projects to achieve escalating thresholds of non-FEOC content to receive tax credits while utilities work to expand sourcing channels for their supply chains and strengthen security measures. These restrictions arrive precisely when utilities face unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by the rapid growth in data centers, creating a considerable challenge: rapidly expanding infrastructure while navigating complex compliance requirements while lacking viable alternatives for many critical components. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and its partners have developed practical approaches to help utilities navigate these intersecting challenges as they leverage federal investment to strengthen and grow the grid. These solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles that build resilience directly into systems, the Cirrus tool for secure cloud migration, and enhanced procurement guidance that embeds security requirements throughout equipment lifecycles. Federal initiatives, such as the Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) project, provide direct support to utilities implementing these approaches while facilitating knowledge sharing across the industry. While these tools and frameworks cannot eliminate all risks inherent in foreign supply chain dependencies, they offer pragmatic pathways for strengthening security posture without sacrificing the deployment momentum essential to meeting surging electricity demand. Ultimately, securing America's digital energy infrastructure demands dedicated coordination across multiple fronts: building domestic supply chains, implementing robust digital assurance practices, and maintaining the aggressive modernization timeline necessary for reliability, resilience, and energy independence.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Bridging Climate Change Resilience and Mitigation in the Electricity Sector Through Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: Emerging Climate Change and Development Topics for Energy Sector Transformation

Reliable, safe, and secure electricity is essential for economic and social development and a necessary input for many sectors of the economy. However, electricity generation and associated processes make up a significant portion of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contributing to climate change. Furthermore, electricity systems are vulnerable to climate change impacts - both short-term events and changes over the longer term. This vulnerability presents both near-term and chronic challenges in providing reliable, affordable, equitable, and sustainable energy services. Within this context, developing countries face a number of challenges in the energy sector, including the need to reliably meet growing electricity demand, lessen dependence on imported fuels, expand energy access, and improve stressed infrastructure for fuel supply and electricity transmission. Energy efficiency (EE) and renewable energy (RE) technical solutions described in this paper can bridge action across climate change mitigation and resilience through reducing GHG emissions and supporting electric power sector adaptation to increasing climate risk. Integrated planning approaches, also highlighted in this paper, play an integral role in bringing together mitigation and resilience action under broader frameworks. Through supporting EE and RE deployment and integrated planning approaches, unique to specific national and local circumstances, countries can design and implement policies, strategies, and sectoral plans that unite development priorities, climate change mitigation, and resilience.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Industrial Control System Risk

Risk is integrated into all business processes, and leaders work to limit risk to as low as reasonable within their systems. Within Industrial Control System networks, risk is especially challenging due to the second- and third-order effects that an attack can incur. We present a new equation for risk and analyze its appropriateness in determining risk through Monte Carlo methods. We believe that this new equation has merit in allowing leadership to more quickly access and mitigate risk based off factors within the decision maker’s control, understanding how capable an attacker may be, how much impact an attack would have on the system, and how intensely an attacker may want to cause damage to the system. These variables will allow a leader to provide strategic vision to the business that he/she leads.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Deploying Adversarial Attacks in Super-Resolution Models

Reliable super-resolution methods are crucial for applications like remote sensing, grid resilience and disaster impact analysis, and standoff biometrics. These methods infuse additional high-frequency information into reconstructions, allowing for better contextualization and image intelligence. However, super-resolution models can also introduce hallucinations or other unseen vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an adversary. This is further compounded by the prominence of deep learning in these models, as models are often blindly applied on out-of-distribution images. In this work, we implement adversarial attacks in common open-source super-resolution models and examine their impact on reconstructions and downstream classification tasks. We find that an adversarially trained super-resolution model can produce high-quality reconstructions that degrade downstream classifications. Moreover, these attacks do not require access to low-resolution imagery or class labels at inference time. These results demonstrate the vulnerability of super-resolution methods to malicious actors and motivates the development of a detector for super-resolution adversarial attacks. Further exploration of adversarial attacks in this domain is required to ensure trustworthiness and robustness of super-resolution models for national security applications.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Unsupervised Detection of SOC Spoofing in OCPP 2.0.1 EV Charging Communication Protocol Using One-Class SVM

The electric vehicles (EVs) market keeps growing globally; thus, it is critical to secure the EV charging communication protocols in order to guarantee reliable and fair charging operations among the customers. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 2.0.1 supports the communication between the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) and Charging Station Management Systems (CSMSs); therefore, it becomes vulnerable to several types of attacks, which aim to jeopardize smart charging, billing, and energy management. Specifically, OCPP 2.0.1 allows the self-reporting of the State of Charge (SOC) values, which makes it vulnerable to spoofing-based cyberattacks, which target manipulating the scheduling priorities, distorting the load forecasts, and extending the charging sessions in an unfair manner. In this paper, we try to address this type of attack by providing a comprehensive analysis of the SOC spoofing attacks and introducing a novel unsupervised detection framework based on the One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) algorithm. Specifically, two types of attack scenarios are analyzed (i.e., priority manipulation and session extension) by deriving engineered features that capture the nonlinear relationships under normal charging behavior. Detailed simulation-based results are derived by utilizing the DESL-EPFL Level 3 EV charging dataset. Our results demonstrate high F1-score and recall in identifying spoofed SOC values and that the proposed OCSVM model demonstrates superior performance compared to alternative clustering and deep-learning based detectors.

EV charging↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Impact of Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability on Microgrids and Building-Tied Systems

Microgrids are an emerging alternative as an energy backup system for critical electric loads and have improved performance compared to the traditional architecture where a single emergency diesel generator is tied to an individual building. Both architectures are dependent on the reliability of their individual generators and a quantitative and realistic comparison of the overall system reliability of the two architectures is lacking. Using recently published work on emergency diesel generator finite reliability, a quantitative methodology is presented to compare the reliability of a microgrid architecture based on centralized emergency diesel generators to the traditional approach of generators tied to individual buildings. Three system reliability performance metrics are calculated as a function of outage duration: (1) probability to meet 100% of the critical load; (2) expected fraction of lost load; and (3) probability to meet the highest priority critical loads. It is shown that stand-alone building-tied emergency diesel generators systems, even when two emergency diesel generators are used per building, cannot provide the reliability required to sustain critical loads for a grid outage lasting multiple days. Due to their network configuration and ability to share load, diesel generator-based microgrid configurations are estimated to have = 93% probability of powering all buildings for a 2-week outage there the individual building-tied emergency diesel generator architecture has a =20% probability. Microgrids do present other susceptibilities that are site specific and should be considered including vulnerabilities associated with the on-campus distribution system and cybersecurity.

backup power↗

A cognitive and economic decision theory for examining cyber defense strategies.

Cyber attacks pose a major threat to modern organizations. Little is known about the social aspects of decision making among organizations that face cyber threats, nor do we have empirically-grounded models of the dynamics of cooperative behavior among vulnerable organizations. The effectiveness of cyber defense can likely be enhanced if information and resources are shared among organizations that face similar threats. Three models were created to begin to understand the cognitive and social aspects of cyber cooperation. The first simulated a cooperative cyber security program between two organizations. The second focused on a cyber security training program in which participants interact (and potentially cooperate) to solve problems. The third built upon the first two models and simulates cooperation between organizations in an information-sharing program.

Bier, Asmeret Brooke↗

Editorial: Water supply sustainability and challenges in Asian megadeltas under global change

Globally, riverine deltas comprise barely 1% of land area, but they support the livelihoods of more than 500 million people (Moorhouse et al., 2021). The Asian megadeltas (e.g., Indus, Bengal, Mekong, Red River, and Yangtze) and their riverine floodplains are the most dynamic economic and environmental systems in the world. These low-lying coastal landforms support surface water bodies and highly productive aquifer systems. However, water resources of the Asian megadeltas are extremely vulnerable to geogenic (e.g., arsenic) and anthropogenic (e.g., bacteria) contamination, increased water salinisation from rising sea levels (Figure 1), and chemicals (e.g., fertilizers, pesticides) from land-use practices (Mukherjee et al., 2024) – all of which are threatening the sustainability of water supply and food security in the region. This Research Topic collection features five original articles that explore water chemistry including arsenic and bacteriological contamination, water salinisation, water-energy-food nexus in irrigated agriculture, and groundwater depletion resulting from irrigation, rapid urbanization, and climate change. Although the Research Topic collection does not include case studies from all the Asian Megadeltas shown in Figure 1, the relevance of multi-hazard driven water risks to all deltaic and river floodplain environments around the world is well-illustrated.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Security enrichment of optical image cryptosystem based on superposition technique using fractional Hartley and gyrator transform domains deploying equal modulus decomposition

In this paper, a symmetric cryptosystem has been suggested to increase security of double random phase encoding using superposition technique in fractional Hartley transform (FrHT) and gyrator transform (GT) domains. It uses structured phase mask (SPM) and hybrid mask (HM) deploying equal modulus decomposition (EMD). Related to original phase truncated Fourier transform (PTFT) based cryptosystem, the security of encoding and decoding is upgraded by using the superposition technique. With the usage of SPM we can increase the key space while encoding and can also overcome the axis alignment difficulty. Decoding is just the reversal of the encoding method. The proposed scheme has robustness against common attacks like: noise and occlusion attacks. With the help of numerical simulation results we also show that our cryptosystem is vulnerable to various attacks. Performance of the suggested method is calculated in terms of Mean Square Error (MSE) between original and decoded image and also the sensitivity of the SPM parameters and rotational angles of GT is investigated. The competence of the suggested method includes analysis on EMD, histogram and correlation coefficient. The suggested cryptosystem is also open to the occlusion attack and noise attack to analyze its performance and evenness.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Provably secure time distribution for the electric grid

We demonstrate a quantum time distribution (QTD) method that combines the precision of optical timing techniques with the integrity of quantum key distribution (QKD). Critical infrastructure is dependent on microprocessor- and programmable logic-based monitoring and control systems. The distribution of timing information across the electric grid is accomplished by GPS signals which are known to be vulnerable to spoofing. We demonstrate a method for synchronizing remote clocks based on the arrival time of photons in a modifed QKD system. This has the advantage that the signal can be veried by examining the quantum states of the photons similar to QKD.

Smith, IV, Amos M↗