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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 649 records · Page 36
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

The Need for Minor Actinide Production

The US Department of Energy (DOE) manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960s through the 1980s by irradiating targets in production reactors to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) used many of these materials as feedstock in the calutron Electromagnetic Isotope Enrichment Facility (EIEF), one of only two facilities in the world with capabilities to enrich radioisotopes in multigram quantities. Both the production reactors and enrichment facilities have been shut down, and many of these unique materials will never be produced again. ORNL maintains a major portion of the United States’ inventory of these materials and uses them in DOE’s center for production, storage, and distribution of transuranium isotopes (plutonium through californium) to the user community. The US inventory of enriched actinides is being depleted, and attempts for over a decade to obtain critical supplies from foreign sources have been unsuccessful. Significant strides have been made recently in the development of new and improved enrichment technologies to replace the previous electromagnetic separations techniques. This paper summarizes the US’s need for production of high-purity enriched actinides by national security, nuclear nonproliferation, and basic research programs.

Robinson, Sharon↗
DOE OSTI2013

Minor actinide separation: simplification of the DIAMEX-SANEX strategy by means of novel SANEX processes

The separation of An(III) from PUREX raffinate has previously been demonstrated by applying a DIAMEX process (i.e., co-extraction of An(III) and Ln(III) from HAR) followed by a SANEX process (i.e., selective extraction of An(III) from the DIAMEX product containing An(III) + Ln(III)). In line with process intensification issues, more compact processes have been developed: Recently, a 1c-SANEX process test was successfully performed, directly extracting An(III) from PUREX HAR. More recently, a new i-SANEX process was successfully tested. This process is based on the co-extraction of An(III) + Ln(III) into a TODGA solvent, followed by a selective back-extraction of An(III) by a water soluble complexing agent, in this case SO{sub 3}-Ph-BTP. In both cases, good recoveries were achieved, and very pure product solutions were obtained. However, both 1c-SANEX and i-SANEX used non-CHON chemicals. Nevertheless, these processes are a simplification to the DIAMEX + SANEX process as only one solvent is used. Finally, the new i-SANEX process is the most compact process. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Atalante research facility new mass limits in a unit containing plutonium and minor actinides - 14402

ATALANTE, located in Marcoule, is one of the main Nuclear Facilities of the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). This facility is mainly dedicated to research and development for nuclear energy related to the back end of the fuel cycle: spent fuel and final waste management. It is a large research complex housing chemistry and analytical laboratories and shielded cells (240 glove boxes and 11 shielded cells), equipped for basic studies through to demonstration experiments. Within the facility, one unit can contain plutonium and curium at the same time. In this case, nuclear criticality safety is achieved by exercising control over mass. A subcritical mass limit is defined for plutonium (280 g for {sup 239}Pu) and an exemption mass limit (3 g for {sup 245}Cm) is used for the actinide. In order to increase the maximum mass (in particular {sup 245}Cm) which can be handled in the unit, new mass control limits were studied, based on control over the sum of the mass ratio to the upper subcritical mass, noted m{sub lim}, for each nuclide (350 g for {sup 239}Pu; 34.8 g or 23 g for {sup 245}Cm) as shown in equation (1) below. m({sup 239}Pu)/ m{sub lim}({sup 239}Pu)+ m({sup 245}Cm)/m{sub lim}({sup 245}Cm)≤1 (1) To validate this criticality safety control method, a study was conducted to demonstrate that, for different masses of {sup 239}Pu and {sup 245}Cm meeting equation (1), the calculated effective multiplication factor is always lower than the effective multiplication factor corresponding to a sphere of 350 g of pure {sup 239}Pu, moderated, with 20 cm water reflection. The two pseudo fissile media are: - metallic plutonium (100% {sup 239}Pu, density 19.86), moderated with water, - metallic curium (100% {sup 245}Cm, density 13.566), moderated with water. The calculation model is a sphere of {sup 245}Cm metal positioned in a sphere of {sup 239}Pu metal, with optimum moderation for each fissile material, and a full water reflection (20 cm). The results show that, under certain conditions, the effective multiplication factor of the mixture can be higher than the effective multiplication factor of each pure fissile material when using the upper subcritical mass of 34.8 g for {sup 245}Cm. When using 23 g of {sup 245}Cm, the k{sub eff} of the mixture is always lower than the k{sub eff} of pure {sup 239}Pu. These calculations enable the safety documentation to be changed by introducing a new process operational procedure, based on equation (1). This change in procedure allows the operator to work with a larger quantity of curium in the unit. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗