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A stilbene–strontium iodide based radioxenon detection system for monitoring nuclear explosions

Atmospheric measurement of noble gases has been extensively used for monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon explosions for many years. The ratios of four xenon isotopes of interest ( 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) help in discriminating regular reactor operations from nuclear tests. A new coincidence-based detection system using stilbene and strontium iodide [SrI 2 (Eu)] for electron and photon detection respectively was developed at Oregon State University to address some of the challenges of the radioxenon systems deployed in the field such as memory effect, and poor energy resolution. Silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) were used for sensing optical photons from all scintillation media. Real-time coincidence identification was achieved using the eight-channel digital pulse processor. The detection system was evaluated using lab check sources and Oregon State TRIGA reactor irradiated radioxenon samples. A 48-hour background coincidence spectrum was collected yielding a coincidence count rate and background rejection rate of 0.0174 ± 0.0003 counts per second (cps) and 98.9% respectively. The minimum detectable concentration (MDC) of the system was evaluated to be 0.11 ± 0.01, 0.13 ± 0.02, 0.20 ± 0.02, and 0.73 ± 0.08 for 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe respectively. The memory effect of the detection system was found to be 0.069 ± 0.015%, which is almost a 70-fold reduction compared to traditional plastic scintillators. Here, the detection elements, custom-designed electronics, and the detector response to radioxenon are detailed in this work.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Pre-Shot Simulations of Near-Field and Far-Field Ground Motion for the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Explosions at the Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site: SPE3

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is designed to improve ground motion prediction capabilities for underground nuclear testing through the development of new physics-based models together with validation via new chemical explosion data. The SPE shots consist of different size and depth chemical explosions in a granite borehole at the Climax Stock on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The third shot in the series (SPE3) will be the same size (1000 kg TNT equivalent) and depth (45 m canister centroid) as the previous shot (SPE2). The main purpose of the SPE3 is to investigate the effects of the damage zone caused by the SPE2 chemical explosion on the SPE3 explosion, keeping all other parameters (e.g. size, depth, explosive type) the same. This SPE3 pre-shot report addresses progress made in simulation of the expected wavefield in the both the near- and the far-field. In this report we consider the far-field to be where seismic wave motion can be characterized by elastic or visco-elastic approximations, in contrast to the near-field where other, often non-linear effects, play a major role. The current simulations build on previous work from the SPE1 and SPE2 shots. The simulations are intended to highlight differences between SPE2 and SPE3 using a variety to approximations intended to mimic the expected effect of the damage zone. The simplest physics of damage zone effects suggest changes in the source region material properties (density, velocity), and in the yield strength (coupling) of the rock, should both impact the far-field signal. We can illustrate this in a simplistic way for P-waves in Figure A using the empirical Mueller-Muphy (1971) far-field explosion model (MM). First if the SPE2 explosion-induced damage reduces velocities and densities without affecting the yield strength or coupling, then by energy conservation the amplitudes for SPE 3 would increase as shown in the top of Figure A. Similarly if the explosion induced damage increased density (say by compacting pore space) the amplitude would decrease. This impedance effect, where the product of the density, wave-velocity, and ground-velocity squared is conserved, is well known. The second and harder effect to quantify, are changes in the energy coupling or yield strength. In the simple MM model this is represented by the coupling factor between cavity radius and yield. If we assume the granite was slightly weakened by SPE2 such that the cavity radius increases slightly then the overall amplitudes of SPE3 decrease relative to SPE2 as shown in the bottom of Figure A. In reality both effects, may exist due to the damage zone, and furthermore we know they are interrelated in complex ways. For S-waves we expect even more complex effects due to motion on joints and faults. For this reason we are developing physics-based near field simulation models coupled to far-field propagation codes to predict the overall effects of changes in the source emplacement region on observed signals. Near-field simulations have been performed using the Eulerian code (GEODYN). An ensemble model, calibrated to match records from past large-scale nuclear events is used. Both 2D axisymmetric (no faults) and fully three-dimensional GEODYN calculations (with /without faults) were conducted in which the damage zones sustained by SPE2 are retained as the initial condition for the SPE3 calculations. The results indicate that the waveform peak amplitudes are slightly decayed since the ensemble model includes no softening mechanism. The pulse widths are reduced, indicating the energy is dissipated more by the damage zone as expected. The dominant motions calculated in all the scenarios are spherically symmetric and non-spherical components are small as seen for the SPE2 calculations. The arrival time of the SPE3 waveform at the boreholes is shorter than SPE2 due to compaction during the previous explosion. As shown in the SPE 1 and 2 observations shear waves are generated, indicating the potential contributions from the induced motion on distributed joints. The effects of joints are evaluated using the Lagrangian hydrocode (GEODYN-L), which was benchmarked against the GEODYN calculations for the ensemble model. A new granite model calibrated for samples from the SPE site is used. The new model includes effects of poroelasticity and water saturation and may be scaled allowing application to both small and large scales. Parametric tests were performed to evaluate the effect of joints within the granite and the results demonstrate that in situ joints introduce anisotropy and significant tangential motions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Gas transport across the low-permeability containment zone of an underground nuclear explosion

Understanding the nature of gas transport from an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) is required for evaluating the ability to detect and interpret either on-site or atmospheric signatures of noble gas radionuclides resulting from the event. We performed a pressure and chemical tracer monitoring experiment at the site of an underground nuclear test that occurred in a tunnel in Nevada to evaluate the possible modes of gas transport to the surface. The site represents a very well-contained, low gaspermeability end member for past UNEs at the Nevada National Security Site. However, there is very strong evidence that gases detected at the surface during a period of low atmospheric pressure resulted from fractures of extremely small aperture that are essentially invisible. Our analyses also suggest that gases would have easily migrated to the top of the high-permeability collapse zone following the detonation minimizing the final distance required for migration along these narrow fractures to the surface. This indicates that on-site detection of gases emanating from such low-permeability sites is feasible while standoff detection of atmospheric plumes may also be possible at local distances for sufficiently high fracture densities. Finally, our results show that gas leakage into the atmosphere also occurred directly from the tunnel portal and should be monitored in future tunnel gas sampling experiments for the purpose of better understanding relative contributions to detection of radioxenon releases via both fracture network and tunnel transport.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

IDC Reengineering Phase 2 Project Scope

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) operates the International Data Centre (IDC) to support treaty verification activities by Member States. The IDC collects, stores, processes, and distributes data from seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations. A significant component of the IDC is the seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound (SHI) processing system. The IDC has recognized the need to reengineer the SHI processing system and has defined a three-phase reengineering effort. IDC Reengineering Phase 1 (RP1) started in 2011 with the goal to significantly modernize SHI automatic and interactive data processing software, focusing on enhancements to individual components of the system. Reengineering Phase 2 (RP2), started in 2014, addresses the task of specifying a unified architecture for all SHI software, across processing stages, to pave the way for further software development and sustainment in the future. A key objective of RP2 is an architecture sufficient to provide a basis for a cost estimate for the development or enhancement of the software components and subsystems. This report provides a brief description of the scope of the IDC Reengineering Phase 2 project. It describes the goals and objectives of reengineering, the system definition, and the technical scope of the system.This report expands upon the “Scope for IDC Reengineering Phase 2”, July 2014, ECS-DIS-WGB-43-PTS-MATERIAL-12-ADD-1, produced by the IDC.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

127 Xe quantification method development and intercomparison exercise

Monitoring of the atmosphere for fission products ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) is performed by various laboratories to detect nuclear explosions. Quantification of 127 Xe is not routinely performed by laboratories measuring atmospheric radioxenon because it is not a fission product. 127 Xe was recently detected by a ground-based beta-gamma air monitoring system. When measured using beta-gamma coincidence detector systems, such as those in use on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 127 Xe can interfere with the quantification of fission product radioxenon due to overlap of the 127 Xe beta-gamma coincidence signatures with those of fission product radioxenon. Here, this work demonstrates quantification of 127 Xe at different laboratories with different measurement techniques. Production and purification of 127 Xe was performed by neutron activation of enriched 126 Xe. The purified 127 Xe was then split between laboratories, and detection and quantification methods were developed. At Idaho National Laboratory, a quantification method involving high purity germanium detectors was devised that included self-attenuation correction. At AWE, a beta-gamma coincidence counting method, as used in support of the IMS, was modified to enable the measurement and analysis of the 127 Xe samples. Corrections were made for self-attenuation, which showed a strong xenon volume dependency, for some coincidence signatures. The gas sample activity concentration was used as the comparison metric and it showed excellent agreement between the methods.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Simulating Regional Groundwater Flow in the Vicinity of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada - 16104

The Death Valley Regional Groundwater Flow System (DVRFS) occupies an area of about 70,000 km{sup 2} in south-central Nevada and southeastern California. Interest in this system stems from the need to (1) understand the groundwater flow paths and travel times associated with potential migration of radioactive material from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) where underground nuclear testing was conducted from 1956 to 1992; (2) characterize the groundwater system in the vicinity of the proposed high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev.; and (3) address a variety of potential effects from NNSS activities on users down gradient from the NNSS and Yucca Mountain. A single groundwater flow model of the DVRFS has been developed that integrates data and results of two previous regional-scale models and supports Department of Energy (DOE) programs at the NNSS. The numerical model was constrained by organizing hydrogeologic data and interpretations in three-dimensional (3D) geographic information systems and constructing a digital three-dimensional (3D) hydrogeologic framework model (HFM) to represent 27 hydrogeologic units (HGUs) and major structures in the DVRFS region. The 3D hydrogeologic data sets were discretized to 1,500 meters (m) grid cell resolution for input arrays required for the model. The DVRFS was simulated using the USGS 3D groundwater-flow modeling code MODFLOW-2000. Two examples showing how the DVRFS regional model is used by the DOE as part of waste management activities at the NNSS: (1) use of the regional model to provide the boundary conditions for site-scale models, and (2) use of the regional model to assess changes in hydraulic gradient and flow paths in the regional flow system resulting from changes in pumping in various areas of interest. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

False alarms and the IMS infrasound network: Understanding the factors influencing the creation of false events

The International Monitoring System (IMS) infrasound network has been designed to acquire the necessary data to detect and locate explosions in the atmosphere with a yield equivalent to 1 kiloton of TNT anywhere on Earth. A major associated challenge is the task of automatically processing data from all IMS infrasound stations to identify possible nuclear tests for subsequent review by analysts. This paper is the first attempt to quantify the false alarm rate (FAR) of the IMS network, and in particular to assess how the FAR is affected by the numbers and distributions of detections at each infrasound station. To ensure that the results are sufficiently general, and not dependent entirely on one detection algorithm, the assessment is based on two detection algorithms that can be thought of as end members in their approach to the trade-off between missed detections and false alarms. The results show that the FAR for events formed at only two arrays is extremely high (ranging from 10’s to 100’s of false events per day across the IMS network, depending on the detector tuning). It is further shown that the FAR for events formed at three or more IMS arrays is driven by ocean-generated waves (microbaroms), despite efforts within both detection algorithms for avoiding these signals, indicating that further research into this issue is merited. Overall, the results highlight the challenge of processing data from a globally sparse network of stations to detect and form events. On the basis of these results, it is shown that further work on understanding signal and noise characteristics is needed before attempting to automatically form events detected at only two arrays on the global network. In particular, more work is required to reduce false alarms caused by the detection of microbarom signals.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Simulation of Seismic Waves from Underground Explosions in Geologic Media: FY2009 Progress Report

This report summarizes work done after one year on project LL09-Sim-NDD-02 entitled 'Exploratory Research: Advanced Simulation of Low Yield Underground Nuclear Explosions To Improve Seismic Yield Estimation and Source Identification'. Work on this effort proceeded in two thrusts: (1) parametric studies of underground explosion generated motions with GEODYN; and (2) coupling of GEODYN to WPP. GEODYN is a code for modeling hydrodynamic (shock-wave) motions in a wide variety of materials, including earth materials. WPP is an anelastic finite difference code for modeling seismic motions. The sensitivity of seismic motions to emplacement conditions was investigated with a series of parametric studies of low-yield (0.2-4 kiloton) chemical high-explosive shots at a range of burial depths in four canonical geologic media (granite, limestone, tuff and alluvium). Results indicate that the material has a strong impact on the seismic motions consistent with previous reports. Motions computed with GEODYN in realistically complex material models are very consistent with reported motions from nuclear tests by Perret and Bass (1975). The amplitude, frequency content and cavity size resulting from explosions are all strongly sensitive to the material strength. Explosions in high-strength (granite) resulted in the highest amplitude, shortest duration pulse and smallest cavities, whereas explosions in low-strength material (alluvium) resulted in the lowest amplitudes, longest duration pulse and larger cavities. The corner frequencies of P-wave motions at take-off angles corresponding to propagation to teleseismic distances show corresponding behavior, with high-strength materials having the highest corner frequency and low-strength materials having low corner frequency. Gravity has an important effect on the cavity size and outgoing motions due work done against lithostatic stress. In fact without gravity the cavity radius and elastic motions are largely insensitive to depth of burial. We investigated the effects of depth of burial for a given yield and material model in the presence of gravity and found that the cavity radius is slightly smaller for deeper shots and the resulting motions have shorter duration and higher corner frequency compared to shallower shots. On the second thrust, progress has been made on one-way coupling of GEODYN to WPP. Early in the project we demonstrated this capability from one-dimensional (1D) GEODYN calculations. We have now completed the capability to pass motions computed in 2D or 3D with GEODYN to WPP and propagated (in 3D) to large distances.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Radionuclide Screening Analysis and Transport Parameters for Pahute Mesa Detonations, Nevada National Security Site

A “screening analysis” is implemented at Pahute Mesa (PM), Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), to determine subsets of the 43 radionuclides listed in the radionuclide inventory of Finnegan et al. (2016) that are of relevance or potential relevance to the hydrologic source term (HST) for assessment of radionuclide transport in groundwater. Consideration is added to how levels of contamination are defined and whether any other radionuclides not in the inventory are relevant to the HST. A model is developed to estimate a range of possible source concentrations in groundwater that account for uncertainty in partitioning into melt glass and sorption into surrounding rock of the exchange zone for the 82 PM underground nuclear tests detonated in vertical shafts. The model also accounts for the varied hydrogeochemical settings. Transport parameters needed for the screening model calculations are developed from databases for hydrogeologic units, chemistry, mineralogy, fracture spacing, fracture aperture, fracture openness, matrix porosity, bulk density, saturation, and alteration. Of key importance is consideration of diagenetic zonation of the mineralogy related to hydrothermal alteration. The screening analysis compares model results with available groundwater radiochemistry data. Consistency between screening model results and available data helps validate the model for application to all 43 radionuclides, most of which have no measurements or only non-detect measurements of concentration in groundwater. The screening analysis determines that ten radionuclides – tritium, Sr-90, I-129, Cs-137, U-232, U-233, U-234, U-238, and the total of Pu-239 and Pu-240 are relevant to the HST. Determination of relevance is primarily based on data and/or model results indicating source concentration exceeding a maximum contaminant level (MCL) out to 100 years since the time of detonation. U-238 is relevant to assessment of contamination relative to MCLs for uranium and gross alpha particle activity. Five other radionuclides – C-14, Cl-36, Tc-99, Np-237, and Pu-238 – are determined potentially relevant to the HST based on a 0.1 MCL threshold. The screening analysis recommends additional attention to the natural daughter radionuclides of the uranium series (U-238) and thorium series (Th-232) decay chains, particularly Ra-226 and Ra-228, that were not included the inventory.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Seismicity Monitoring in North-Central New Mexico by the Los Alamos Seismic Network

The initial seismic stations of the Los Alamos Seismic Network (LASN) were installed in 1973, as a part of research on monitoring of nuclear testing. The extent of the network rapidly expanded by the late 1970s. By the middle 1980s, spatial coverage of the network was drastically reduced, due to a loss of funding. Since then, however, it has been possible to expand the coverage of the network with additional stations and to slowly upgrade network equipment to match contemporary instrument standards. These improvements will make it possible to keep recording the network’s data and to initiate real-time exchange of data with other institutions to improve earthquake monitoring throughout New Mexico and neighboring states. During more than 40 yr of operation, the network has provided a slow but steady increase in the volume of earthquake seismograms available to study seismicity and tectonics in north-central New Mexico. The current network covers an area from the Valles Caldera on the west, to within the Rio Grande rift on the east. LASN has yielded locations for about 900 earthquakes in north-central New Mexico between 1973 and 2013 (the most recent locations available). Epicenters of these have a complex pattern, with some that can be attributed to the deformation of the rift, though most are spread in areas west of the rift. A lack of seismicity in and near the Valles Caldera reinforces an earlier observation, based on far fewer earthquakes, which first called attention to this paucity of seismicity and attributed it to ductile deformation resulting from elevated crustal temperatures.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Station set residual : event classification using historical distribution of observing stations.

Analysts working at the International Data Centre in support of treaty monitoring through the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization spend a significant amount of time reviewing hypothesized seismic events produced by an automatic processing system. When reviewing these events to determine their legitimacy, analysts take a variety of approaches that rely heavily on training and past experience. One method used by analysts to gauge the validity of an event involves examining the set of stations involved in the detection of an event. In particular, leveraging past experience, an analyst can say that an event located in a certain part of the world is expected to be detected by Stations A, B, and C. Implicit in this statement is that such an event would usually not be detected by Stations X, Y, or Z. For some well understood parts of the world, the absence of one or more 'expected' stations - or the presence of one or more 'unexpected' stations - is correlated with a hypothesized event's legitimacy and to its survival to the event bulletin. The primary objective of this research is to formalize and quantify the difference between the observed set of stations detecting some hypothesized event, versus the expected set of stations historically associated with detecting similar nearby events close in magnitude. This Station Set Residual can be quantified in many ways, some of which are correlated with the analysts determination of whether or not the event is valid. We propose that this Station Set Residual score can be used to screen out certain classes of 'false' events produced by automatic processing with a high degree of confidence, reducing the analyst burden. Moreover, we propose that the visualization of the historically expected distribution of detecting stations can be immediately useful as an analyst aid during their review process.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Comparison of source-location algorithms for atmospheric samplers

Numerous algorithms have been developed to determine the source characteristics for an atmospheric release, e.g., (Bieringer et al., 2017). This study compares three models that have been applied to the data collected by the International Monitoring System operated by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission to estimate source event parameters. Each model uses a different approach to estimate the parameters. A deterministic model uses a possible source region (PSR) approach (Ringbom et al., 2014) that is based on the correlation between predicted and measured sample values. An unnamed model developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (herein called BAYEST) uses a Bayesian formulation (Eslinger et al., 2019; Eslinger et al., 2020; Eslinger and Schrom, 2016). The FREAR model uses a different Bayesian formulation (De Meutter and Hoffman, 2020; De Meutter et al., 2021; Pieter De Meutter, 2021). The performance of the three source-location models is evaluated with 100 synthetic release cases for the single xenon isotope, 133 Xe. The release cases resulted in detections in a fictitious network with 120 noble gas samplers. All three source-location models use the same sampling data. The two Bayesian models yield more accurate location estimates than the deterministic PSR model, with FREAR having slightly better location performance than BAYEST. Samplers with collection periods of 3, 6, 8, 12, and 24-h were used. Results from BAYEST show that location accuracy improves with each reduction in sample collection length. The BAYEST model is slightly better for estimating the start time of the release. The PSR model has about the same spread in start times as the FREAR model, but the PSR results have a better average start time. The Bayesian source-location algorithms give more accurate results than the PSR approach, and provide release magnitude estimates, while the base PSR model does not estimate the release magnitude. This investigation demonstrates that a reasonably dense sampling grid will sometimes yield poor location and time estimates regardless of the model. The poor estimates generally coincide with cases where there is a much larger distance between the release point and the first detecting sampler than the average sampler spacing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Application for a Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Asbestiform Low-Level Solid Waste Disposal Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is located approximately 105 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) is the federal lands management authority for the NNSS and National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NNSS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NNSS is posted with signs along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NNSS. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) is the location of the permitted facility for the Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS). The Area 5 RWMS is located near the eastern edge of the NNSS (Figure 1), approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of Mercury, Nevada. The Area 5 RWMS is used for the disposal of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste. Many areas surrounding the RWMS have been used in conducting nuclear tests. The site will be used for the disposal of regulated Asbestiform Low-Level Waste (ALLW), small quantities of low-level radioactive hydrocarbon-burdened (LLHB) media and debris, LLW, LLW that contains Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, and small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids, or waste that is regulated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or state-of-generation hazardous waste regulations, will not be accepted for disposal at the site. Waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that will be accepted at the disposal site is regulated asbestos-containing materials (RACM) and PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water. The term asbestiform is used throughout this document to describe RACM. The disposal site will be used as a depository of permissible waste generated both on site and off site. All generators designated by NNSA/NSO will be eligible to dispose regulated ALLW at the Asbestiform Low-Level Waste Disposal Site in accordance with the DOE/NV-325, Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC, current revision). Approval will be given by NNSA/NSO to generators that have successfully demonstrated through process knowledge (PK) and/or sampling and analysis that the waste is low-level, contains asbestiform material, or contains PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, or small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste and does not contain prohibited waste materials. Each waste stream will be approved through the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP), which ensures that the waste meets acceptance requirements outlined in the NNSSWAC.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Exploring the limits of waveform correlation event detection as applied to three earthquake aftershock sequences.

Swarms of earthquakes and/or aftershock sequences can dramatically increase the level of seismicity in a region for a period of time lasting from days to months, depending on the swarm or sequence. Such occurrences can provide a large amount of useful information to seismologists. For those who monitor seismic events for possible nuclear explosions, however, these swarms/sequences are a nuisance. In an explosion monitoring system, each event must be treated as a possible nuclear test until it can be proven, to a high degree of confidence, not to be. Seismic events recorded by the same station with highly correlated waveforms almost certainly have a similar location and source type, so clusters of events within a swarm can quickly be identified as earthquakes. We have developed a number of tools that can be used to exploit the high degree of waveform similarity expected to be associated with swarms/sequences. Dendro Tool measures correlations between known events. The Waveform Correlation Detector is intended to act as a detector, finding events in raw data which correlate with known events. The Self Scanner is used to find all correlated segments within a raw data steam and does not require an event library. All three techniques together provide an opportunity to study the similarities of events in an aftershock sequence in different ways. To comprehensively characterize the benefits and limits of waveform correlation techniques, we studied 3 aftershock sequences, using our 3 tools, at multiple stations. We explored the effects of station distance and event magnitudes on correlation results. Lastly, we show the reduction in detection threshold and analyst workload offered by waveform correlation techniques compared to STA/LTA based detection. We analyzed 4 days of data from each aftershock sequence using all three methods. Most known events clustered in a similar manner across the toolsets. Up to 25% of catalogued events were found to be a member of a cluster. In addition, the Waveform Correlation Detector and Self Scanner identified significant numbers of new events that were not in either the EDR or regional catalogs, showing a lowering of the detection threshold. We extended our analysis to study the effect of distance on correlation results by applying the analysis tools to multiple stations along a transect of nearly constant azimuth when possible. We expected the number of events found via correlation would drop off as roughly 1/r2, where r is the distance from mainshock to station. However, we found that regional geological conditions influenced the performance of a given station more than distance. For example, for one sequence we clustered 25% of events at the nearest station to the mainshock (34 km), while our performance dropped to 2% at a station 550 km distant. However, we matched our best performance (25% clustering) at a station 198 km distant.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

CTBT infrasound network performance to detect the 2013 Russian fireball event

The explosive fragmentation of the 2013 Chelyabinsk meteorite generated a large airburst with an equivalent yield of 500 kT TNT. It is the most energetic event recorded by the infrasound component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty-International Monitoring System (CTBT-IMS), globally detected by 20 out of 42 operational stations. This study performs a station-by-station estimation of the IMS detection capability to explain infrasound detections and nondetections from short to long distances, using the Chelyabinsk meteorite as global reference event. Investigated parameters influencing the detection capability are the directivity of the line source signal, the ducting of acoustic energy, and the individual noise conditions at each station. Findings include a clear detection preference for stations perpendicular to the meteorite trajectory, even over large distances. Only a weak influence of stratospheric ducting is observed for this low-frequency case. As a result, a strong dependence on the diurnal variability of background noise levels at each station is observed, favoring nocturnal detections.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Updates to the Regional Seismic Travel Time (RSTT) Model: 1. Tomography

Abstract A function of global monitoring of nuclear explosions is the development of Earth models for predicting seismic travel times for more accurate calculation of event locations. Most monitoring agencies rely on fast, distance-dependent one-dimensional (1D) Earth models to calculate seismic event locations quickly and in near real-time. RSTT (Regional Seismic Travel Time) is a seismic velocity model and computer software package that captures the major effects of three-dimensional crust and upper mantle structure on regional seismic travel times, while still allowing for fast prediction speed (milliseconds). We describe updates to the RSTT model using a refined data set of regional phases (i.e., Pn, Pg, Sn, Lg) using the Bayesloc relative relocation algorithm. The tomographic inversion shown here acts to refine the previous RSTT public model ( rstt201404um ) and displays significant features related to areas of global tectonic complexity as well as further reduction in arrival residual values. Validation of the updated RSTT model demonstrates significant reduction in median epicenter mislocation (15.3 km) using all regional phases compared to the iasp91 1D model (22.1 km) as well as to the current station correction approach used at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization International Data Centre (18.9 km).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Updates to the Regional Seismic Travel Time (RSTT) Model: 2. Path-dependent Travel-time Uncertainty

Abstract The regional seismic travel time (RSTT) model and software were developed to improve travel-time prediction accuracy by accounting for three-dimensional crust and upper mantle structure. Travel-time uncertainty estimates are used in the process of associating seismic phases to events and to accurately calculate location uncertainty bounds (i.e. event location error ellipses). We improve on the current distance-dependent uncertainty parameterization for RSTT using a random effects model to estimate slowness (inverse velocity) uncertainty as a mean squared error for each model parameter. The random effects model separates the error between observed slowness and model predicted slowness into bias and random components. The path-specific travel-time uncertainty is calculated by integrating these mean squared errors along a seismic-phase ray path. We demonstrate that event location error ellipses computed for a 90% coverage ellipse metric (used by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization International Data Centre (IDC)), and using the path-specific travel-time uncertainty approach, are more representative (median 82.5% ellipse percentage) of true location error than error ellipses computed using distance-dependent travel-time uncertainties (median 70.1%). We also demonstrate measurable improvement in location uncertainties using the RSTT method compared to the current station correction approach used at the IDC (median 74.3% coverage ellipse).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Impact of environmental backgrounds on atmospheric monitoring of nuclear explosions

Radionuclide monitoring for nuclear explosions includes measuring radioactive aerosol and noble gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has made such measurements for decades, revealing much about how atmospheric radioactivity impacts the sensitivity of the network. For example, civilian emissions of radioiodine make a substantial regional impact, but a minor global impact, while civilian radioxenon emissions create major regional and complex global impacts. This example statement is strongly influenced by the minimum signal level anticipated to be interesting. The original design of the IMS anticipated relatively large signal levels, and the accomplished IMS network substantially meets or exceeds the sensitivity needed to detect those signal levels. Much lower signal levels can be motivated, which could require reconsideration of station sensitivity. Using measured and simulated background concentrations, various possible desired signal levels, and an innovative anomaly threshold, maps of sensitivity and a station ranking are developed for current and future stations. These provide a strong motivation for additional experimentation to learn about sources and the potential plusses of new technology.

Eslinger, Paul W.↗