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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report Calendar Year 2011

The West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2011. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2011. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2011 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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Site Management Guide (Blue Book)

The U.S. Department of Energy (Department) Office of Legacy Management (LM), established in 2003, manages the Department’s postclosure responsibilities and ensures the future protection of human health and the environment. During World War II and the Cold War, the Federal government developed and operated a vast network of industrial facilities for the research, production, and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as other scientific and engineering research. These processes left a legacy of radioactive and chemical waste, environmental contamination, and hazardous facilities and materials at well over 100 sites. Since 1989, the Department has taken an aggressive accelerated cleanup approach to reduce risks and cut costs. At most Departmental sites undergoing cleanup, some residual hazards will remain at the time cleanup is completed due to financial and technical impracticality. However, the Department still has an obligation to protect human health and the environment after cleanup is completed. LM fulfills DOE’s postclosure obligation by providing long-term management of postcleanup sites which do not have continuing missions. LM is also responsible for sites under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Currently, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is responsible for site surveys and remediation at FUSRAP sites. Once remediation is completed, LM becomes responsible for long-term management. LM also has responsibility for uranium processing sites addressed by Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA). UMTRCA Title II sites are sites that were commercially owned and are regulated under a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license. For license termination, the owner must conduct an NRC-approved cleanup of any on-site radioactive waste remaining from former uranium ore-processing operations. The site owner must also provide full funding for inspections and, if necessary, ongoing maintenance. Once site cleanup is complete, LM accepts title to these sites on behalf of the United States and assumes long-term management.

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Large Plate Experiment of Chloride-induced Stress Corrosion Cracking in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canisters

This report is the comprehensive description of the completed experiment to evaluate the corrosion behavior of a large section of welded plate material harvested from the Sandia National Laboratories’ (SNL) full-size mockup of a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canister. The plate was subjected to conditions aggressive to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking for a total time of 2 years. The details of the establishment of this experiment, and the corrosion results are reported. This work is intended to inform aging management programs for SNF canisters under conditions of extended dry storage.

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Need for an Independent Monitoring of Nuclear Waste Repository: Lessons from WIPP Experience - 18130

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the only operating deep geological repository for the permanent disposal of defense transuranic (TRU) waste in the world. The facility recently resumed waste disposal operations after recovering from a February 2014 accident involving a radiological release from a waste container in the WIPP underground. WIPP had been a DOE success story, operating nearly 15 years with no significant incidents or accidents. Many factors contributed to this success, one of the most important being the overwhelming support exhibited by the local community and the local elected officials. One component of the broad public acceptance by the citizens of Southeast New Mexico has been the concept of independent, third party monitoring of environmental effluents at the site. Independent environmental monitoring ensures a role for the local community in ongoing evaluation of the safety and performance of the site. At WIPP this has been achieved through an independent environmental monitoring program operated by the Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center (CEMRC). The CEMRC has been conducting independent environmental monitoring activities on and around the WIPP site since 1991 and makes the results of monitoring activities available and easily accessible to members the general public. The public's free and open access to this data and their direct participation in the CEMRC's whole body counting program provides transparency, which is key to maintaining public trust and confidence. The circumstances following the 2014 radiological release event at WIPP reinforced the value of independent environmental monitoring in order to maintain the high level of transparency necessary for long term local acceptance and support for nuclear facilities. Following what was a minor radiological release event, there were understandably fearful reactions from a number of citizens residing in Carlsbad and the nearby communities of Hobbs, Loving, and Artesia. CEMRC's independent environmental monitoring program and their early public engagement proved invaluable in providing timely and accurate environmental data to local community leaders and members of the general public. The data, and open communication from CEMRC, helped reassure citizens in Carlsbad and the surrounding area that the release was extremely low and the extent was very limited. CEMRC further communicated that the probability of any environmental or health impacts from the release was extremely low. It is unlikely the local community would have placed the same level of trust in similar assurances of safety coming from DOE or other State and Federal regulators. The CEMRC's performance in the days following the release meant the local community had access to independent monitoring data and an independent voice in the dialogue with DOE and state officials that shaped the recovery and eventual re-opening of the WIPP facility. The WIPP radiological release event yielded a plethora of lessons learned that will frame the next phase of operational, oversight, and emergency planning surrounding the facility. In this presentation we will be discussing the value and viability of federally-funded, university-housed independent monitoring programs in maintaining trust of state officials and the local communities. (authors)

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Characterization of the Contaminated Soil Under the Hanford 324 Building B Cell, Washington, USA - 12182

The 324 Building on the Hanford site played a key role in radiochemical and metallurgical research programs conducted by DOE. The B hot cell in the 324 Building was the site of high-level waste vitrification research. During clean-out operations in November 2009, a tear was noted in the stainless steel liner on the floor of B Cell. Exposure rate readings taken at various locations in the soil about 0.5 meters below B Cell reached 8,900 Roentgen (R) per hour, confirming the existence of a significant soil contamination field. The source of the radioactive material was likely a 510 L spill from the Canister Fabrication Project, consisting of purified, concentrated Cs-137 and Sr-90 solutions totaling 48,000 TBq (1.3 MCi). MCNP modeling was used to estimate that the measured exposure rates were caused by 5,900 TBq (160 kCi) of Sr- 90 and Cs-137, although additional contamination was thought to exist deeper in the soil column. Two physical soil samples were obtained at different depths, which helped verify the contamination estimates. A detailed exposure rate survey inside B Cell was combined with additional MCNP modeling to estimate that an additional 1,700 TBq (460 kCi) is present just below the floor. Based on the results of the sampling campaign, it is likely that the radioactive material below B Cell is primarily consists of feed solutions from the FRG Canister Fabrication Project, and that it contains purified Sr-90 and Cs-137 with enough actinide carryover to make some of the soil transuranic. The close agreement between the Geoprobe calculations and the physical samples adds confidence that there are more than 3700 TBq (100,000 Ci) of Sr-90 and Cs-137 in the soil approximately 1 meter below the cell floor. The majority of the Cs-137 is contained in the first meter of soil, while significant Sr-90 contamination extends to 10 meters below the cell floor. It is also likely that an additional 15,000 TBq (400,000 Ci) of Cs-137 and Sr-90 activity is present directly below the floor of the cell, and that the residual activity inside the cell is only half of the previous estimates. However, the partitioning of activity between residuals in the cell and in the soil below the floor is much more uncertain than the activity calculations associated with the Geoprobe measurements. Taken together, the calculated soil activities represent about half of the spill associated with the FRG Canister Fabrication project. The remainder of the spill is believed to have remained in the cell, where the majority has been removed as part of cell cleanup activities. The magnitude of the soil contamination below 324 B Cell is sobering, and it represents one of the most challenging remediation activities in the DOE complex. Of course, safe remediation begins with a good understanding of the magnitude of the problem. As a result, additional modeling and cross-comparison efforts are planned for 2012. (authors)

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ROS-DOE: Leveraging Open-Source Robotics Software for the DOE-EM Mission? - 17181

In order to establish a common software framework for its robotic systems, the United States Department of Energy - Environmental Management (DOE-EM) is considering the possibility of extending the Robot Operating System (ROS) open source robotics software to address the varied, complex challenges facing DOE-EM. The effort, preliminarily called ROS-DOE, would enhance the reliability, robustness, security, and user friendliness of ROS to meet the requirements of the nuclear waste remediation mission, and those of DOE as a whole. As envisioned, the ROS DOE program would also support rapid progress to mature cross-cutting capabilities including supervised autonomy, inter-operability with off-the-shelf industrial equipment, and physics-based robot simulation (i.e., Gazebo). This paper provides background context about the current state of ROS software and its supporting community, surveys DOE-EM needs and requirements for robotic solutions, and analyzes the gaps between the current state of ROS and those needed for DOE-EM robotics. It then identifies new capabilities that are recommended for ROS-DOE and outlines software development practices that could be leveraged to blend the best of the open-source world with high-reliability software development practices. (authors)

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Performance Test and Validation Plan for the Neutron Slab Counter (Rev.1)

This Performance Testing and Validation Plan (PTVP) presents the technical basis for the use of the neutron slab counter (NSC) for quantitative nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of compressor volutes from the K-25/K-27 Buildings. This PTVP prescribes a set of measurements required to calibrate and demonstrate sufficiency of the NSC for its intended purpose of quantitative NDA measurements of compressor volutes. The measurements taken according to this plan will be documented in a Performance Test and Validation Report (PTVR). Analysis of the collected data will be performed and documented in a Performance Test and Validation Evaluation. If the performance objectives are met, a commissioning report will be prepared establishing the uses and limitations of the NSC for its intended purpose.

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An Information Template for Evaluating the Relative Priority of Remediation Projects that Pose a Risk to Receptors - 18674

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has one of the largest remediation tasks in the world, in terms of the number of sites, the complexity of individual sites, the number of remediation projects at individual sites, and the full range of stakeholders involved. The question of how to decide what projects to initiate, at any point of time and how to prioritize the deployment of resources for these tasks, occurs both within and among sites. The Consortium for Risk Evaluation developed a Risk-informed Prioritization Framework for Oak Ridge Reservation. Our goal was to develop a risk-informed methodology for prioritizing remediation projects for the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation that can be adapted to other remediation projects elsewhere. The heart of the framework is a template that includes information about each site necessary to make prioritization decisions. The information in the template describes the environment (hazard, pathway, consequences), the receptors (workers, public, ecological) and the risk management considerations (cost, risk reduction effectiveness, capacity, efficiency and sequencing). The questions in the template provide a wide range of information that managers and regulators need to make decisions, and that Tribes and the public need to evaluate the efficacy of remediation decisions. Completing the template will also help identify data gaps, model parameters needed, and the agencies or individuals responsible for obtaining the information. The information presented in the Template will be useful for regulators (DOE, Environmental Protection Agency, states, Tribes), managers and workers at the sites, trustees of natural resources, site neighbors, and the general public, but more importantly, provides an example of information needed to rate the priority of remediation projects. DOE, other federal and state trustees, and regulators were included in all phases of the development, including the scope, overseeing its development, and evaluation of projects. (authors)

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Semiannual VOC, Hydrogen, and Methane Data Summary Report for Reporting Period July 1, 2010 through December 31, 2010

This report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office and Washington TRU Solutions LLC (the Permittees) in accordance with Sections 4.6.2.2 and 4.6.5.2 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Number NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit). This report documents the Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) Monitoring Program and Hydrogen and Methane Monitoring Program results for the 6-month period of July 1, 2010 through December 31, 2010.

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Semiannual VOC, Hydrogen, and Methane Data Summary Report for Report for Reporting Period January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2011

This report is submitted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office and Washington TRU Solutions LLC (the Permittees) in accordance with Permit Part 4, Permit Conditions 4.6.2.2 and 4.6.5.2 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility, Permit Number NM4890139088-TSDF (Permit). This report documents the Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) Monitoring Program and Hydrogen and Methane Monitoring Program results for the 6-month period of January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2011.

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Semi-Annual Voc, Hydrogen, and Methane Data Summary Report for Reporting Period July 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011

This report is submitted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office and Washington TRU Solutions LLC (the Permittees) in accordance with Permit Part 4, Permit conditions 4.6.2.2 and 4.6.5.2 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit NM4890139088-TSDF (Permit). This report documents the Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) Monitoring Program and Hydrogen and Methane Monitoring Program results for the 6-month period of July 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011.

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011 Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011. Included are subsections that summarize the site's geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological setting and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site's environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016, Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016 (prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2017). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

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Improving Efficiency of DWPF Operations via Automating Process Calculations and Vitrifying High-Curie Feed- 24529

The Liquid Waste Organization (LWO) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) uses a “Power As One®” motto to process and dispose of radioactive waste. The Defense Waste and Processing Facility (DWPF) treats the high-level waste through a process of vitrification. The DWPF receives three incoming waste streams that are added to the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT): sludge, Monosodium Titanate/Sludge Solids (MST/SS), and Strip Effluent (SE). The liquid waste is mixed with pre-fabricated frit and treated with high temperatures in the melter prior to being poured into stainless steel canisters. The liquid cools to form solid glass within these canisters that are suitable for long-term storage and disposal. Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC), the SRS liquid waste contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, has implemented several facility improvements to further enhance the operations to support the Liquid Waste Operation (LWO) mission. Two of these operational enhancements include implementing the electronic Material Tracking Program Calculator (eMTPC)software and increasing the DWPF canister heat rate limit.

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Effects of Borate and Organics on U(VI) Solubility in WIPP Brine

This report provides an update to a previously issued report on the solubility of uranium (VI) at different borate concentrations and in the presence of organics. The solubility of uranium (VI) in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-relevant brine was determined to support ongoing WIPP recertification activities (CRA-2026). This research was performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory-Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) Actinide Chemistry and Repository Science Program (ACRSP).

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Repackaging of High Fissile TRU Waste at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center - 13240

Twenty-six drums of high fissile transuranic (TRU) waste from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) operations were declared waste in the mid-1980's and placed in storage with the legacy TRU waste inventory for future treatment and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Repackaging and treatment of the waste at the TRU Waste Packaging Center (TWPC) will require the installation of additional equipment and capabilities to address the hazards for handling and repackaging the waste compared to typical Contact Handled (CH) TRU waste that is processed at the TWPC, including potential hydrogen accumulation in legacy 6M/2R packaging configurations, potential presence of reactive plutonium hydrides, and significant low energy gamma radiation dose rates. All of the waste is anticipated to be repackaged at the TWPC and certified for disposal at WIPP. The waste is currently packaged in multiple layers of containers which presents additional challenges for repackaging activities due to the potential for the accumulation of hydrogen gas in the container headspace in quantities than could exceed the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL). The outer container for each waste package is a stainless steel 0.21 m{sup 3} (55-gal) drum which contains either a 0.04 m{sup 3} or 0.06 m{sup 3} (10-gal or 15-gal) 6M drum. The inner 2R container in each 6M drum is ∼12 cm (5 in) outside diameter x 30-36 cm (12-14 in) long and is considered to be a > 4 liter sealed container relative to TRU waste packaging criteria. Inside the 2R containers are multiple configurations of food pack cans, pipe nipples, and welded capsules. The waste contains significant quantities of high burn-up plutonium oxides and metals with a heavy weight percentage of higher atomic mass isotopes and the subsequent in-growth of significant quantities of americium. Significant low energy gamma radiation is expected to be present due to the americium in-growth. Radiation dose rates on inner containers are estimated to be 1-3 mSv/hr (100-300 mrem/hr) with an unshielded dose rate on the waste itself of over 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr). Additional equipment to be installed at the TWPC will include a new perma-con enclosure and a shielded/inert glovebox in the process building to repackage and stabilize the waste. All of the waste will be repackaged into Standard Pipe Overpacks. Most of the waste (21 of the 26 drums) is expected to be repackaged at the food-pack can level (i.e. the food-pack cans will not be opened). Five of the incoming waste containers are expected to be repackaged at the primary waste level. Three of the containers exceed the 200 gram Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) limit for the Standard Pipe Overpack. These three containers will be repackaged down to the primary waste level and divided into eight Standard Pipe Overpacks for shipment to WIPP. Two containers must be stabilized to eliminate any reactive plutonium hydrides that may be present. These containers will be opened in the inert, shielded glovebox, and the remaining corroded plutonium metal converted to a stable oxide form by using a 600 deg. C tube furnace with controlled oxygen feed in a helium carrier gas. The stabilized waste will then be packaged into two Standard Pipe Overpacks. Design and build out activities for the additional repackaging capabilities at the TWPC are scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2013 with repackaging, stabilization, and certification activities scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2014. Following repackaging and stabilization activities, the Standard Pipe Overpacks will be certified for disposal at WIPP utilizing Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) to verify the absence of prohibited items and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) to verify the isotopic content under the TWPC WIPP certification program implemented by the Central Characterization Project (CCP). (authors)

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The U.S. DOE-EM International Program - 17411

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) has a mission to complete the safe clean-up of the environmental legacy resulting from six decades of weapons production and energy research. This effort is recognized as one of the largest and most diverse and technically complex environmental clean-up operations in the world. The overall strategy to address this challenge includes several components, one of which involves leveraging the expertise within the International community, when applicable. The opportunities related to international collaborations are an important component of the DOE EM strategy for the clean-up mission, providing excellent forums for EM to stay beneficially engaged with the international community and our global partners. EM has been supporting the clean-up mission of the Department through international collaborations for almost 20 years. The EM International Program is sponsored by the DOE EM Office of the Chief of Staff (EM-2.1), which directly supports the DOE-EM Office of Assistant Secretary (EM-1), in coordination with the entire EM organization. The primary objective of the EM International Program is to provide benefit to the Department in successful completion of the EM clean-up mission, through establishing strategic approaches for specific international collaboration initiatives that are focused on appropriate strategic program goals. The EM International Program strategy to support the EM mission includes many facets, but they can generally be grouped into two primary areas. First, the EM International Program maintains, establishes, and/or participates in international agreements such that appropriate mechanisms are available for conducting international collaborations with foreign government organizations, educational institutions and private industry to leverage resources and link international experience and expertise, in support of the EM mission and compliant with US foreign policy. Second, through coordination with the EM Office of Technology Development (EM-3.2), the EM International Program leverages these agreements to identify mutually beneficial opportunities to evaluate, test, and adapt technologies, capabilities, and expertise for application to EM mission needs. These activities directly support goals within the current DOE Strategic Plan 2014 - 2018, issued in April 2014. Working with the Office of Technology Development, the EM International Program is developing a process for identifying and selecting collaborative international technology projects for Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17) that have high potential impact to the EM mission. The technical scope of these activities is expected to span the entire EM mission, including tank waste and nuclear materials management; groundwater and soil remediation; deactivation and decommissioning; and radioactive waste disposal operations. Depending on budget availability, these collaborative activities are expected to be awarded by mid-FY17. (authors)

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Advanced Nuclear Fuels and Materials Development and Philosophy of the DOE Advanced Fuels Campaign

The mission of the Advanced Fuels Campaign (AFC) is to perform Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD and D) activities for advanced fuel forms (including cladding) to enhance the performance and safety of the nation's current and future reactors; enhance proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel; effectively utilize nuclear energy resources; and address longer-term waste management challenges. This includes development of a state-of-the art Research and Development (R and D) infrastructure to support the use of a 'goal-oriented science-based approach.' AFC uses this approach to develop a fundamental understanding of fuel and cladding fabrication methods and performance under irradiation, enabling the pursuit of multiple fuel forms for future fuel cycle options. This approach includes fundamental experiments, theory, and advanced modeling and simulation. One of the most challenging aspects of AFC is the management, integration, and coordination of major R and D activities across multiple organizations. AFC interfaces and collaborates with other Fuel Cycle Technologies (FCT) campaigns, universities, industry, various DOE programs and laboratories, federal agencies (e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC]), and international organizations. Key challenges are the development of fuel technologies to enable major increases in fuel performance (safety, reliability, power and burnup) beyond current technologies, and development of characterization methods and predictive fuel performance models to enable more efficient development and licensing of advanced fuels. AFC is challenged with the research and development of fuels for two different reactor technology platforms, namely transmutation fuel for non-water cooled reactors and advanced fuel development for light water reactor (LWR) systems. This presentation will provide an overview of the Advanced Fuel Campaign activities including the near term activities in advanced nuclear fuel system research and development as well as highlighting general activities pursued to improve the study, modeling, and simulation of irradiated nuclear materials. (authors)

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