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At least 649 records · Page 36

Smart Infrared Inspection System Field Operational Test (Final Report)

The Smart InfraRed Inspection System (SIRIS) is a tool designed to assist inspectors in determining which vehicles passing through the SIRIS system are in need of further inspection by measuring the thermal data from the wheel components. As a vehicle enters the system, infrared cameras on the road measure temperatures of the brakes, tires, and wheel bearings on both wheel ends of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) in motion. This thermal data is then presented to enforcement personal inside of the inspection station on a user friendly interface. Vehicles that are suspected to have a violation are automatically alerted to the enforcement staff. The main goal of the SIRIS field operational test (FOT) was to collect data to evaluate the performance of the prototype system and determine the viability of such a system being used for commercial motor vehicle enforcement. From March 2010 to September 2010, ORNL facilitated the SIRIS FOT at the Greene County Inspection Station (IS) in Greeneville, Tennessee. During the course of the FOT, 413 CMVs were given a North American Standard (NAS) Level-1 inspection. Of those 413 CMVs, 384 were subjected to a SIRIS screening. A total of 36 (9.38%) of the vehicles were flagged by SIRIS as having one or more thermal issues; with brakes issues making up 33 (91.67%) of those. Of the 36 vehicles flagged as having thermal issues, 31 (86.11%) were found to have a violation and 30 (83.33%) of those vehicles were placed out-of-service (OOS). Overall the enforcement personnel who have used SIRIS for screening purposes have had positive feedback on the potential of SIRIS. With improvements in detection algorithms and stability, the system will be beneficial to the CMV enforcement community and increase overall trooper productivity by accurately identifying a higher percentage of CMVs to be placed OOS with minimal error. No future evaluation of SIRIS has been deemed necessary and specifications for a production system will soon be drafted.

brake system↗

CoCoMANS Ocean App [Slides]

Thermohaline circulation is that part of ocean circulation which is driven by density gradients. It is widely believed that changes in the ocean thermohaline circulation on the 10 to 100 year time scale can instigate rapid climate change. Scientists world wide are currently using simulation tools based on semi-implicit and split methods that are first-order in time. From a numerical error perspective, the quality of such simulations is suspect. As a result of numerical stability issues resulting from semi-implicit and split methods they are forced to use low resolution grids; ie high resolution grids will require prohibitive numbers of timesteps. Having the ability to perform such simulation with reduced splitting errors, using high resolution grids, and using second-order accurate time integration methods will be a quantum leap forward in predictive ocean simulation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 105 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 105 is a geographical grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with atmospheric nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 105, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site - Whitney • 02-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site T-2A • 02-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T-2B • 02-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site T-2 • 02-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Turk These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 30, 2012, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 105. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with all CAU 105 CASs are from atmospheric nuclear testing activities. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 105 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose at sample locations to the dose-based final action level. The total effective dose will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; DOE, Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted after the plan is approved.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Quantifying advective and nonstationary effects on eddy fluxes in the AmeriFlux network

Our goal was to study the flows within and above of a forested area and assess the degree to which horizontal subcanopy motions transport significant amounts of CO 2 . This process can explain why ecosystem respiration appears to be underestimated on calm nights. It is essential to understand the physical and biological mechanisms that determine relevant processes that occur on these suspect nights.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Phase II Characterization Survey of the USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10), Military Sealift Fleet Support Command, Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia (Final Report)

In March 2011, the USNS Bridge was deployed off northeastern Honshu, Japan with the carrier USS Ronald Reagan to assist with relief efforts after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. During that time, the Bridge was exposed to air-borne radioactive materials leaking from the damaged Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The proximity of the Bridge to the air-borne impacted area resulted in the contamination of the ship’s air-handling systems and the associated components, as well as potential contamination of other ship surfaces due to either direct intake/deposition or inadvertent spread from crew/operational activities. Preliminary surveys in the weeks after the event confirmed low-level contamination within the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) ductwork and systems, and engine and other auxiliary air intake systems. Some partial decontamination was performed at that time. In response to the airborne contamination event, Military Sealift Fleet Support Command (MSFSC) contracted Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), under provisions of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) contract, to assess the radiological condition of the Bridge. Phase I identified contamination within the CPS filters, ventilation systems, miscellaneous equipment, and other suspect locations that could not accessed at that time (ORAU 2011b). Because the Bridge was underway during the characterization, all the potentially impacted systems/spaces could not be investigated. As a result, MSFSC contracted with ORAU to perform Phase II of the characterization, specifically to survey systems/spaces previously inaccessible. During Phase II of the characterization, the ship was in port to perform routine maintenance operations, allowing access to the previously inaccessible systems/spaces.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Multipole error data analysis for RHIC low-energy operations

In FY10, RHIC operated with gold beams at three different energies below its regular injection energy, namely at $\sqrt{s}$ = 5 GeV, 7.7 GeV, and 11.5 GeV. While beam lifetimes of about 10 minutes were achieved at 11.5 GeV and 7.7 GeV, leading to stable collider operation, beam lifetimes during tests at $\sqrt{s}$ = 5 GeV were only of the order of several seconds. Though space charge effects are a major concern in low energy operations due to the $1/\gamma^2$ scaling of the space charge force, these can effectively be ruled out as the main cause of this abysmal performance because of the tiny bunch intensities of approximately $10^8$ Au/bunch, compared to $10^9$ Au/bunch at the two higher energies. During these 5 GeV tests, large betatron tune spreads were observed, but the extremely short beam lifetime prevented chromaticity measurements. Instead, chromaticities were scanned over a range of 40 units, but to no effect. It was therefore suspected at that time that the large tune spread was caused by higher-order multipole errors in the RHIC magnets.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Feedback Control of an Azimuthal Oscillation in the E x B Discharge of Hall Thrusters

Feedback control of a low-frequency azimuthal wave known as a "rotating spoke" in the ExB discharge of a cylindrical Hall thruster was demonstrated. The rotating spoke is an m=1 azimuthal variation in density, electron temperature, and potential that rotates at about 10% of the local E x B electron rotation speed. It causes increased electron transport across the magnetic field and is suspected to be an ionization wave. Feedback control of this wave required special consideration because, although it causes a rotating azimuthal variation in the current density to the anode, it does not show up as a signal in the total thruster discharge current. Therefore, an extra source of information was needed to track the oscillation, which was addressed by using a special anode that was split azimuthally into four segments. The current to each segment oscillates as the rotating spoke passes over it, and feedback is accomplished by resistors connected in series with each anode segment which cause the voltage on a segment to decrease in proportion to the current through that segment. The feedback resulted in the disappearance of a coherent azimuthal wave and a decrease in the time-averaged total discharge current by up to 13.2%.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED WATERS. Activities at DILUTED WATERS included vehicle-based survey, in situ measurements with high-purity germanium (HPGe) and hand-held LaBr 3 systems, soil sampling with a variety of tools, and laboratory gamma spectrometric analysis of those samples. A further benefit of the measurement campaign was to gain familiarity with the many logistical aspects of performing radiological field work at NNSS ahead of the PRex. Many practical lessons concerning the proper methodologies and logistics of using the surveying and sampling equipment were noted. These Lessons Learned are compiled together in Appendix A. The vehicle-based survey was successful in that it found a previously unknown hotspot (determined to be 232 Th) while it demonstrated that a better method for keeping a serpentine track without staking was needed. Some of the soil sampling equipment was found to be impractical for the application, though core sampling would not be the correct way to take soil samples for a fresh vent deposit (as opposed to an old site like DILUTED WATERS). Due to the site’s age, 137 Cs was the only fission radioisotope identified, though others were searched for. While not enough samples were taken and analyzed to definitively link the 137 Cs to DILUTED WATERS as opposed to other NNSS activities, results were consistent with the historical DILUTED WATERS plume. MDAs were compared for soil sampling and in situ measurements.

CTBT↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 571: Area 9 Yucca Flat Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

CAU 571 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 571, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 09-23-03, Atmospheric Test Site S-9F • 09-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site T9-C • 09-23-12, Atmospheric Test Site S-9E • 09-23-13, Atmospheric Test Site T-9D • 09-45-01, Windrows Crater These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the investigation report. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on March 6, 2013, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (now the Nevada Field Office). The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 571. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with CAU 571 CASs are from nuclear testing activities. The DQO process resulted in an assumption that total effective dose (TED) within a default contamination boundary exceeds the final action level (FAL) and requires corrective action. The presence and nature of contamination outside the default contamination boundaries at CAU 571 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the TED at sample locations to the dose-based FAL. The TED will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Chemical contamination will be evaluated by comparing soil sample results to the FAL. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 567: Miscellaneous Soil Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, with ROTC 1 Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 567 is located in Areas 1, 3, 5, 20, and 25 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 567 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 567, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 01-23-03, Atmospheric Test Site T-1 • 03-23-25, Seaweed E Contamination Area • 05-23-07, A5b RMA • 20-23-08, Colby Mud Spill • 25-23-23, J-11 Soil RMA These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the investigation report. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on May 6, 2013, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 567. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with CAU 567 releases are nuclear test operations and other NNSS operations. The DQO process resulted in an assumption that total effective dose (TED) within a default contamination boundary at Atmospheric Test Site T-1 exceeds the final action level (FAL) and requires corrective action. The presence and nature of contamination outside the default contamination boundary at Atmospheric Test Site T-1 and all other CAU 567 CASs will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the TED at sample locations to the dose-based FAL. The TED will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Large-scale Manufacturing of Nanoparticulate-based Lubrication Additives for Improved Energy Efficiency and Reduced Emissions

This project was funded under the Department of Energy (DOE) Lab Call on Nanomanufacturing for Energy Efficiency and was directed toward the development of novel boron-based nanocolloidal lubrication additives for improving the friction and wear performance of machine components in a wide range of industrial and transportation applications. Argonne's research team concentrated on the scientific and technical aspects of the project, using a range of state-of-the art analytical and tribological test facilities. Argonne has extensive past experience and expertise in working with boron-based solid and liquid lubrication additives, and has intellectual property ownership of several. There were two industrial collaborators in this project: Ashland Oil (represented by its Valvoline subsidiary) and Primet Precision Materials, Inc. (a leading nanomaterials company). There was also a sub-contract with the University of Arkansas. The major objectives of the project were to develop novel boron-based nanocolloidal lubrication additives and to optimize and verify their performance under boundary-lubricated sliding conditions. The project also tackled problems related to colloidal dispersion, larger-scale manufacturing and blending of nano-additives with base carrier oils. Other important issues dealt with in the project were determination of the optimum size and concentration of the particles and compatibility with various base fluids and/or additives. Boron-based particulate additives considered in this project included boric acid (H 3 BO 3 ), hexagonal boron nitride (h-BN), boron oxide, and borax. As part of this project, we also explored a hybrid MoS 2 + boric acid formulation approach for more effective lubrication and reported the results. The major motivation behind this work was to reduce energy losses related to friction and wear in a wide spectrum of mechanical systems and thereby reduce our dependence on imported oil. Growing concern over greenhouse gas emissions was also a major reason. The transportation sector alone consumes about 13 million barrels of crude oil per day (nearly 60% of which is imported) and is responsible for about 30% of the CO 2 emission. When we consider manufacturing and other energy-intensive industrial processes, the amount of petroleum being consumed due to friction and wear reaches more than 20 million barrels per day (from official energy statistics, U.S. Energy Information Administration). Frequent remanufacturing and/or replacement of worn parts due to friction-, wear-, and scuffing-related degradations also consume significant amounts of energy and give rise to additional CO 2 emission. Overall, the total annual cost of friction- and wear-related energy and material losses is estimated to be rather significant (i.e., as much as 5% of the gross national products of highly industrialized nations). It is projected that more than half of the total friction- and wear-related energy losses can be recovered by developing and implementing advanced friction and wear control technologies. In transportation vehicles alone, 10% to 15% of the fuel energy is spent to overcome friction. If we can cut down the friction- and wear-related energy losses by half, then we can potentially save up to 1.5 million barrels of petroleum per day. Also, less friction and wear would mean less energy consumption as well as less carbon emissions and hazardous byproducts being generated and released to the environment. New and more robust anti-friction and -wear control technologies may thus have a significant positive impact on improving the efficiency and environmental cleanliness of the current legacy fleet and future transportation systems. Effective control of friction in other industrial sectors such as manufacturing, power generation, mining and oil exploration, and agricultural and earthmoving machinery may bring more energy savings. Therefore, this project was timely and responsive to the energy and environmental objectives of DOE and our nation. In this project, most of the boron-based materials with known and potential anti-friction and -wear properties have been manufactured as colloidal additives and tested for their effectiveness in controlling friction and wear. Unlike other anti-friction and -wear additives, which consist of zinc, molybdenum, sulfur, phosphorus, and even chlorine, lubricious boron compounds considered in this project are made of boron, oxygen, nitrogen, and hydrogen, which are more environmentally benign. Among others, boric acid is a natural mineral (known in mineralogy as "sassolite"). Based on our earlier exploratory research, it was found to offer the best overall prospect in terms of performance improvements, environmental friendliness, and ease of manufacturing and, hence, cost effectiveness. Hexagonal boron nitride and borax also offered good prospects for improving the tribological properties of lubricated sliding surfaces. Boron oxide particles were found to be rather hard and somewhat abrasive and, hence, were not considered beyond the initial screening studies. In our bench-top tribological evaluation, we also demonstrated that those additives which worked well with engine oils could work equally well with very common gear oils. When added at appropriate concentrations, such gear oils were found to provide significant resistance to micropitting and scuffing failures in bench-top tribological test systems. Their traction coefficients were also reduced substantially and their scuffing limits were improved considerably. Such impressive tribological behavior of boron-based additives may have been due to their high chemical affinities to interact with sliding contact surfaces and to form slick and protective boundary films. Indeed, our surface studies have confirmed that most of the boron-based nanoparticulate additives prepared in our project possess a strong tendency to form a boron-rich boundary film on sliding contact surfaces. It is believed that the formation of such slick and highly durable boundary films is perhaps one of the fundamental reasons for their superior anti-friction, -wear, and -scuffing performance. Boron-based additives developed under this project have shown potential to reduce or replace the uses of environmentally unsafe sulfur- and phosphorus-bearing anti-wear and friction additives, such as zinc dialkyl dithiophosphate (ZDDP) and molybdenum dialkyl dithiocarbamate (MoDTC), in current lubricating oils. Because ZDDP and MoDTC were suspected of adversely impacting the performance of after-treatment catalysts in current engines, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other regulatory agencies are demanding that the concentrations of these catalysts in current oils be curtailed drastically. The boron-based nano-additives developed in this project may help reduce the use of ZDDP and MoDTC additives and, hence, help ease the poisoning effects on after-treatment catalysts. When used as lubricity additives, these boron additives can chemically interact with sliding or contacting surfaces and form a protective and slick boundary film, which can, in turn, help reduce friction and wear and increase resistance to scuffing. In the cases of traditional anti-friction and -wear additives mentioned, such protective boundary films result from phosphorus, sulfur, and other elements in the additive package, and again they have been under increased scrutiny in recent years, mainly because of their adverse effects on after-treatment devices. Overall, the boron-based nano-additive technology of this project was shown to hold promise for a broad range of industrial and transportation applications where lower friction and higher resistance to wear and scuffing are needed. Due to more stringent operating conditions of modern machinery, rolling, rotating, and sliding components have been failing to meet the projected lifetimes, mainly because of failures related to mechanical wear, corrosion, and scuffing. The novel boron-based additive technology developed under this project may help such machine components to function reliably by cutting down the friction and wear losses and by increasing resistance to scuffing.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

PINS Variance study

The INL’s Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy System (PINS) non-intrusively identifies the chemical fill of munitions and sealed containers. PINS is used routinely by the U.S. Army, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and foreign military units to determine the contents of munitions and other containers suspected to contain explosives, smoke-generating chemicals, and chemical warfare agents such as mustard and nerve gas. The objects assayed with PINS range from softball-sized M139 chemical bomblets to 200 gallon DOT 500X ton containers. INL had previously examined the feasibility of using a similar system for the identification of explosives, and based on this proof-of-principle test, the development of a dedicated system for the identification of explosives in the presence of special nuclear material for emergency responders was started in 2011. INL tested prototype PINS on explosives and mock explosives with kilogram quantities of highly-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium in 2011. In 2012 INL concentrated on making the system more sensitive to identifying explosives, particularly in the detection of the nitrogen content of explosives. This past year INL has been concentrating its efforts in studying the variance in the spectra, in particular the variance in the elemental ratios that are used to identify individual explosives.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 568: Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

CAU 568 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 568, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 03-23-17, S-3I Contamination Area; (2) 03-23-19, T-3U Contamination Area; (3) 03-23-20, Otero Contamination Area; (4) 03-23-22, Platypus Contamination Area; (5) 03-23-23, San Juan Contamination Area; and (6) 03-23-26, Shrew/Wolverine Contamination Area. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the investigation report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Gas analysis for LANL weapons surveillance

Gas analysis is performed at LANL as one part of weapons surveillance conducted to identify stockpile aging concerns and to predict the lifetime of weapon components and materials. These analyses include gas dissolved in and evolved from polymeric materials. Radiolysis and thermal decomposition of polymers are examples of processes which lead to gas production. These are accessed using canister aging studies with gas analysis typically performed using gas chromatography and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. More recently we have developed methods to measure dissolved gases in polymeric materials suspect in the failure of potting materials. This talk provides a brief overview of recent work.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Visual Sample Plan Version 7.0 User's Guide

User's guide for VSP 7.0 This user's guide describes Visual Sample Plan (VSP) Version 7.0 and provides instructions for using the software. VSP selects the appropriate number and location of environmental samples to ensure that the results of statistical tests performed to provide input to risk decisions have the required confidence and performance. VSP Version 7.0 provides sample-size equations or algorithms needed by specific statistical tests appropriate for specific environmental sampling objectives. It also provides data quality assessment and statistical analysis functions to support evaluation of the data and determine whether the data support decisions regarding sites suspected of contamination. The easy-to-use program is highly visual and graphic. VSP runs on personal computers with Microsoft Windows operating systems (XP, Vista, Windows 7, and Windows 8). Designed primarily for project managers and users without expertise in statistics, VSP is applicable to two- and three-dimensional populations to be sampled (e.g., rooms and buildings, surface soil, a defined layer of subsurface soil, water bodies, and other similar applications) for studies of environmental quality. VSP is also applicable for designing sampling plans for assessing chem/rad/bio threat and hazard identification within rooms and buildings, and for designing geophysical surveys for unexploded ordnance (UXO) identification.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Basic Physics of Tokamak Transport (Final Technical Report)

The goal of this grant has been to study the basic physics of various sources of anomalous transport in tokamaks. Anomalous transport in tokamaks continues to be one of the major problems in magnetic fusion research. As a tokamak is not a physics device by design, direct experimental observation and identification of the instabilities responsible for transport, as well as physics studies of the transport in tokamaks, have been difficult and of limited value. It is noted that direct experimental observation, identification and physics study of microinstabilities including ITG, ETG, and trapped electron/ion modes in tokamaks has been very difficult and nearly impossible. The primary reasons are co-existence of many instabilities, their broadband fluctuation spectra, lack of flexibility for parameter scans and absence of good local diagnostics. This has motivated us to study the suspected tokamak instabilities and their transport consequences in a simpler, steady state Columbia Linear Machine (CLM) with collisionless plasma and the flexibility of wide parameter variations. Earlier work as part of this grant was focused on both ITG turbulence, widely believed to be a primary source of ion thermal transport in tokamaks, and the effects of isotope scaling on transport levels. Prior work from our research team has produced and definitively identified both the slab and toroidal branches of this instability and determined the physics criteria for their existence. All the experimentally observed linear physics corroborate well with theoretical predictions. However, one of the large areas of research dealt with turbulent transport results that indicate some significant differences between our experimental results and most theoretical predictions.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 573 is located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 573 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with non-nuclear experiments and nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 573, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 05-23-02, GMX Alpha Contaminated Area • 05-45-01, Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗