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National Plan for the Disposal of Existing and Future TRU Wastes - 18616

Now that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has re-opened, after being down for three years due to an accident the DOE National TRU Program has re-developed a plan for the disposal of existing and future TRU wastes. The National TRU Waste Management Plan (NTWMP) is an integrated plan to address the needs of DOE sites across the DOE Weapons Complex that create and store TRU waste, and is centered on the capability of WIPP to receive and dispose of TRU waste. The WIPP capability is planned as a weekly shipping rate and is defined by emplacement and receipt rate capabilities since WIPP is not permitted for long-term storage. And, shipping rates may be constrained by new WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) and future plans for repository configurations and disposal package capabilities over the next 30 years. Since WIPP is the only disposal system available to the DOE for TRU waste disposal, DOE has a newly projected life-cycle need for WIPP to remain open and available up to 2050. It is projected that the need for WIPP will continue up to the year 2050 for the disposition of the remaining legacy TRU inventories and for the disposal of TRU waste continuing to be generated at DOE's National Laboratories. In addition, there are several other potential new waste streams in which WIPP is being considered an alternative solution for their disposition. The NTWMP has been updated to reflect the short-term and long-term plans for TRU waste disposal at WIPP. The short-term plan is used by DOE for budget projection and integration purposes to facilitate and inform budget planning, both in DOE's Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organizations. Most legacy TRU waste (generated in the past and stored at DOE sites today) is owned and managed by EM. And, EM submits integrated budget requests for DOE sites, including the integration of resources for TRU waste management. NNSA and DOE's Office of Science (OS) funds TRU waste management as part of their mission funding and NNSA should eventually be the primary user of the WIPP resources as EM's legacy TRU waste is cleaned-up. Prior to the unexpected shutdown of WIPP in 2014, there was a small back-log of waste certified for WIPP disposal and shipments of TRU waste to WIPP were 'just-in-time' as waste was certified. After three years of WIPP being down, DOE sites have built significant back-logs of TRU waste to be certified for WIPP. That back-log built up to over 25,000 containers of TRU waste during that three-year period (Table 1). The backlog included both Contact-Handled (CH) TRU waste and Remote-Handled (RH) TRU waste, and even though WIPP re-opened in April of 2017, it is only open for TRU waste containers that can be stacked on disposal room floors. Plans for changing RH waste disposal packages and methods are in-the-works, but are not yet mature enough for significant planning. In addition, the WIPP underground facilities are now partially contaminated with radioactive particulate, which significantly reduces the WIPP operational efficiencies as compared to 2014. With a large back-log of waste ready for WIPP disposal and limited throughput for WIPP disposal rates, the focus of the NTWMP is to prioritize the selection of TRU wastes from the various sites based on WIPP waste emplacement rates and shipping rates to WIPP. Some TRU waste sites have a significant need to be top priority for shipments to WIPP, and that must be balanced with the need for all TRU waste sites to have some shipments to deplete their back-log of TRU wastes. Storage and management of TRU waste is very costly for DOE and many of those resources could be used to optimize the overall disposition of TRU waste and save DOE significant funding. In addition, the plan will show the possible transition of TRU Waste Management from primarily being an EM function to being an NNSA function in the coming years. As legacy TRU waste inventories are removed, and as NNSA mission-related TRU waste inventories are produced, DOE will be faced with deciding where the primary responsibility for TRU waste management should reside. (author)

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Appendix C: Recharge

This appendix provides estimates of recharge rates for the soil and vegetation conditions in and around the single-shell tank (SST) waste management areas (WMAs). The purpose is to combine published data with recent information to provide the most current recharge estimates. Recharge rates were estimated for areas that remain natural and undisturbed, areas where the vegetation has been disturbed, areas where both the vegetation and the soil have been disturbed, and areas that are engineered (e.g., surface barrier). Methods used include lysimetry, tracers, and simuations. This appendix summarizes the information in the recharge data package for the SST Waste Management Areas), which builds upon previous reports on the Hanford vadose zone data and Integrated Disposal Facility recharge with information available after those reports were published, including field measurements and simulations using weather data through 2006.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

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Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory

This report provides information on the inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States located at Nuclear Power Reactor (NPR) and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) sites, as well as SNF and reprocessing waste located at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and other research and development (R&D) centers as of the end of calendar year 2024. Actual quantitative values for current inventories are provided along with inventory forecasts derived from examining different future nuclear power generation scenarios, based on information available and assumptions made at the time the scenarios were developed. The report also includes select information on the characteristics associated with the wastes examined (e.g., type, packaging, heat generation rate, decay curves).

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Adaptation of Commercially Available Robots for Conditioning and Packaging ILW at Sellafield - 18282

The Legacy Ponds and Silos at Sellafield site contain some of the most hazardous Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) in the UK. As part of a multi-billion pound decommissioning programme, this waste will be retrieved and transported across the site for conditioning and packaging in the Box Encapsulation Plant (BEP). Current plans are to commence plant active commissioning in 2022, which will represent a major milestone in the UK nuclear decommissioning programme. Within the plant, skips of waste will be transferred from the shielded transport package into standard 3 cubic metre ILW containers. Waste from the Pile Fuel Storage Pond and First Generation Magnox Storage Pond will be immobilised in cementitious grout before being transferred to an adjacent store. Waste from the Magnox Swarf Storage Silo will not be immobilised in grout, but will be packaged, providing multi-barrier containment. During the concept design, the project team selected commercially available robots as the most viable technology for carrying out the numerous dexterous and repetitive tasks involved in characterising, conditioning and packaging the waste within the shielded 'hot' cells. Significant technical challenges had to be overcome during the design to adapt a commercially available robot for use within a high radiation / high contamination environment, where human access is not safe even for short periods of time. These challenges included: - Designing robot assemblies that could be retrofitted into the existing cell structure that was constructed as part of an earlier project but never completed; - Designing robot assemblies that could be recovered to their 'transport' position without requiring manual intervention; - Designing robot assemblies that could be remotely removed and replaced with new ones if they failed part way through the plant operational life; - Designing through-wall service and power connections that allow maintenance and recovery; - Designing control systems and human-machine interfaces that enable both manual and automated operation of the robot, whilst avoiding collisions with the in-cell cranes and other in cell furniture; - Assessing the radiation tolerance of all items. Bespoke computer simulations and full-scale development trials have been carried out, using non-active test materials, in order to demonstrate the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) required by Sellafield Limited (SL) at each stage of the project [1]. The results of these trials have been recorded in both video and written form so that they can form part of the project's Knowledge Management database. Detailed designs and specifications for the robot assemblies have been updated to incorporate the recommendations from the development trials. Procurement and manufacture of robot assemblies has already commenced to deliver two waste handling robots, two waste container lidding / swabbing robots and associated critical spares. (authors)

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Advanced Fuel Cycle Cost Basis

This report, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), provides a comprehensive set of cost data supporting a cost analysis for the relative economic comparison of options for use in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Program. The report describes the AFCI cost basis development process, reference information on AFCI cost modules, a procedure for estimating fuel cycle costs, economic evaluation guidelines, and a discussion on the integration of cost data into economic computer models. This report contains reference cost data for 25 cost modules—23 fuel cycle cost modules and 2 reactor modules. The cost modules were developed in the areas of natural uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, depleted uranium disposition, fuel fabrication, interim spent fuel storage, reprocessing, waste conditioning, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packaging, long-term monitored retrievable storage, near surface disposal of low-level waste (LLW), geologic repository and other disposal concepts, and transportation processes for nuclear fuel, LLW, SNF, transuranic, and high-level waste.

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A framework and calculator for evaluating the impacts of shelf life extension and other food loss and waste reduction technologies

Optimization of the food supply chain (FSC) depends on reducing food waste, especially at the consumer stage, where a substantial portion of food is not eaten, but instead disposed of via landfill, incineration, or in-sink disposals. One key strategy is to increase the time that consumers have before food goes bad or expires. This study developed a framework to assess the efficacy of shelf-life extension (SLE) technologies for mitigating food loss and waste (FLW), such as packaging improvements. The impact flows through the entire FSC, reducing FLW, energy use, and other inputs at each stage. The framework and resulting calculator can be used to evaluate the impact of FLW reduction at any stage for any food commodity. As shown by two SLE cases, the calculator is valuable for policy-makers, government entities, and professionals, specifically those in marketing, business development, and capital projects teams, to comprehensively evaluate the impacts of FLW reduction technologies and practices. The framework and calculator are sensitive to the shape of the consumption curve, the fraction of inedible waste, and the current shelf life. The calculator was used to assess the impacts of the United States goal of reducing food waste by consumers through various SLE lengths. It was found that uptake of several near-ready-to-deploy SLE technologies would reduce annual food production demand by about 10–19 MMT and supply chain energy consumption by 240–410 PJ in the United States.

Food loss and waste (FLW)↗

The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project: Optimizing use of This National Asset to Treat Challenging Radioactive Waste From Other Department of Energy Sites - 16064

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) is a world-class radioactive waste treatment facility with a highly experienced and innovative workforce located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The AMWTP's state-of-the-art capabilities include a 62-ton super-compactor, remote cutting and sorting, macro-encapsulation systems, assay units, drum repackaging, waste characterization, and payload assembly and loading. Since operations began in 2003, the facility has been the largest shipper for contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). It has successfully processed over 56,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) of CH TRU waste and mixed low-level waste (MLLW) from the Idaho Site and approximately 700 m{sup 3} of CH TRU waste from 15 other DOE sites. While the AMWTP is nearing successful completion of its Idaho mission, other DOE environmental cleanup sites will require safe and proven capabilities to treat, package, characterize, and certify legacy radioactive waste inventories well into the next decade. In addition, DOE's national security, nuclear energy, and science programs need sustainable treatment capabilities to support ongoing and new missions. The AMWTP could continue to serve a vital role beyond its current Idaho mission to help address these larger DOE needs. To this end and in recognition that AMWTP's current priority is to complete the processing and removal of Idaho waste, DOE's Office of Environmental Management has initiated strategic planning to assess the feasibility of continued AMWTP operations to treat challenging radioactive waste from other generator sites consistent with existing regulatory agreements. This paper describes AMWTP's unique capabilities and identifies potential benefits, opportunities, and possible solutions to packaging and transportation challenges to fully use AMWTP as a national asset. A panel discussion of subject matter experts with audience participation would help to inform DOE's strategic planning on how best to use this national asset into the future. (authors)

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Decommissioning and Demolition of a Redundant UK Research Facility at AWE Aldermaston - 12453

The redundant two-storey brick built research facility on the AWE Site at Aldermaston, UK is in the closing stages of decommissioning and demolition. The facility was used for a variety of purposes up to 1995 predominately involving the use of alpha-emitting isotopes. The two main areas of alpha-based contamination have been decommissioned with the removal of hot -boxes and fume cupboards on the ground floor and HEPA filter units and ventilation equipment on the first floor. Many of these activities were undertaken using both airline fed suits, (supplied via a free standing mobile unit), and full face respirators. Asbestos materials were located and cleared from the first floor by specialist contractor. All sections of active drain running from the building to the site active effluent disposal system were removed early in the program using established techniques with specialist monitoring equipment used to provide confidence in the data required for disposal of the decommissioning debris. In particular a dedicated High Resolution Gamma Spectrometer (radioactive materials scanning unit) was utilized to categorise waste drums and wrapped packages. The building has been decommissioned and the monitoring and sampling of the structure was completed in November 2011 - the results demonstrating that the building was clear of contamination in accordance with UK clearance and exemption requirements. The demolition plan was developed and implemented in December with site excavation of foundations and site clearance currently ongoing in preparation for final site backfill activities and project close. A number of useful lessons have been learnt during the operations and are set out at the rear of the main text. (authors)

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Waste PET Chemical Processing to Terephthalic Amides and Their Effect on Asphalt Performance

The large amount of waste generated from polyethylene terephthalate (PET) packaging materials that have reached the end of life is creating a waste management issue that cannot be handled by mechanical recycling alone. Thus, it is imperative that alternate routes to recover and reuse these materials be pursued. A chemical recycling approach of mixed PET was demonstrated here that provides a mechanism by which PET waste can be efficiently recovered and repurposed to value-added products. The approach utilizes aminolysis of PET with a variety of amine nucleophiles, generating a small library of phthalimides with unique structures. In order to probe the high value of these products, the phthalimides were added to road-grade asphalt binder at 5 wt% and the resulting composite was evaluated. Specifically, rutting and fatigue characteristics as well as thermomechanical and creep performance were characterized and found to be improved by the inclusion of these additives by as much as 18%. In this work, additives made from deconstructed PET wastes were shown to improve the performance properties of asphalt at a variety of environmental conditions. These improvements would reduce the cost of road maintenance and provide a high-value market for waste PET. It is important to note that the asphalt binder utilized in this work was a commercial product already optimized for road conditions, not the raw bitumen; perhaps higher performance metrics could be obtained with virgin bitumen.

Recycling, Asphalt↗

Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory

This report provides information on the inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States located at Nuclear Power Reactor (NPR) and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) sites, as well as SNF and reprocessing waste located at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and other research and development (R&D) centers. Actual or estimated quantitative values for current inventories are provided along with inventory forecasts derived from examining different future nuclear power generation scenarios. The report also includes select information on the characteristics associated with the wastes examined (e.g., type, packaging, heat generation rate, decay curves).

Peters, Shan↗

Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory: Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition

This report provides information on the inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States located at Nuclear Power Reactor (NPR) and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) sites, as well as SNF and reprocessing waste located at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and other research and development (R&D) centers as of the end of calendar year 2021. Actual or estimated quantitative values for current inventories are provided along with inventory forecasts derived from examining different future nuclear power generation scenarios, based on information available and assumptions made at the time the scenarios were developed in the spring of 2022. The report also includes select information on the characteristics associated with the wastes examined (e.g., type, packaging, heat generation rate, decay curves).

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Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 128-F-2, 100-F Burning Pit Waste Site, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-031

The 128-F-2 waste site consisted of multiple burn and debris filled pits located directly east of the 107-F Retention Basin and approximately 30.5 m east of the northeast corner of the 100-F Area perimeter road that runs along the riverbank. The burn pits were used for incinerating nonradioactive, combustible materials from 1945 to 1965. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

100-F Burning Pit↗

Dismantling of Loop-Type Channel Equipment of MR Reactor in NRC 'Kurchatov Institute' - 13040

In 2009 the project of decommissioning of MR and RTF reactors was developed and approved by the Expert Authority of the Russian Federation (Gosexpertiza). The main objective of the decommissioning works identified in this project: - complete dismantling of reactor equipment and systems; - decontamination of reactor premises and site in accordance with the established sanitary and hygienic standards. At the preparatory stage (2008-2010) of the project the following works were executed: loop-type channels' dismantling in the storage pool; experimental fuel assemblies' removal from spent fuel repositories in the central hall; spent fuel assembly removal from the liquid-metal-cooled loop-type channel of the reactor core and its placement into the SNF repository; and reconstruction of engineering support systems to the extent necessary for reactor decommissioning. The project assumes three main phases of dismantling and decontamination: - dismantling of equipment/pipelines of cooling circuits and loop-type channels, and auxiliary reactor equipment (2011-2012); - dismantling of equipment in underground reactor premises and of both MR and RTF in-vessel devices (2013-2014); - decontamination of reactor premises; rehabilitation of the reactor site; final radiation survey of reactor premises, loop-type channels and site; and issuance of the regulatory authorities' de-registration statement (2015). In 2011 the decommissioning license for the two reactors was received and direct MR decommissioning activities started. MR primary pipelines and loop-type facilities situated in the underground reactor hall were dismantled. Works were also launched to dismantle the loop-type channels' equipment in underground reactor premises; reactor buildings were reconstructed to allow removal of dismantled equipment; and the MR/RTF decommissioning sequence was identified. In autumn 2011 - spring 2012 results of dismantling activities performed are: - equipment from underground rooms (No. 66, 66A, 66B, 72, 64, 63) - as well as from water and gas loop corridors - was dismantled, with the total radwaste weight of 53 tons and the total removed activity of 5,0 x 10{sup 10} Bq; - loop-type channel equipment from underground reactor hall premises was dismantled; - 93 loop-type channels were characterized, chopped and removed, with radwaste of 2.6 x 10{sup 13} Bq ({sup 60}Co) and 1.5 x 10{sup 13} Bq ({sup 137}Cs) total activity removed from the reactor pool, fragmented and packaged. Some of this waste was placed into the high-level waste (HLW) repository of the Center. Dismantling works were executed with application of remotely operated mechanisms, which promoted decrease of radiation impact on the personnel. The average individual dose for the personnel was 1.9 mSv/year in 2011, and the collective dose is estimated as 0.0605 man x Sv/year. (authors)

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Geology

This chapter summarizes the geology of the single-shell tank (SST) farms in the context of the region’s geologic history. This chapter is based on the information in the geology data package for the SST waste management areas and SST RFI Appendix E, which builds upon previous reports on the tank farm geology and Integrated Disposal Facility geology with information available after those reports were published.

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Controlling Beryllium Contaminated Material And Equipment For The Building 9201-5 Legacy Material Disposition Project

This position paper addresses the management of beryllium contamination on legacy waste. The goal of the beryllium management program is to protect human health and the environment by preventing the release of beryllium through controlling surface contamination. Studies have shown by controlling beryllium surface contamination, potential airborne contamination is reduced or eliminated. Although there are areas in Building 9201-5 that are contaminated with radioactive materials and mercury, only beryllium contamination is addressed in this management plan. The overall goal of this initiative is the compliant packaging and disposal of beryllium waste from the 9201-5 Legacy Material Removal (LMR) Project to ensure that beryllium surface contamination and any potential airborne release of beryllium is controlled to levels as low as practicable in accordance with 10 CFR 850.25.

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Modelling informally collected quantities of bulky waste and reusable items in Austria

Highlights: • Informal collectors from Hungary collect bulky waste and reusable items in Austria. • Two methodologies were applied to estimate the informally collected quantities. • Both approaches lead to an estimation of roughly 100,000 t p.a. informally collected. • The formal Austrian system collects 72 kg/cap/yr of bulky waste, WEE & scrap metal. • Informal collection amounts to approx. 12 kg/cap/yr. - Abstract: Disparities in earnings between Western and Eastern European countries are the reason for a well-established informal sector actively involved in collection and transboundary shipment activities from Austria to Hungary. The preferred objects are reusable items and wastes within the categories bulky waste, WEEE and metals, intended to be sold on flea markets. Despite leading to a loss of recyclable resources for Austrian waste management, these informal activities may contribute to the extension of the lifetime of certain goods when they are reused in Hungary; nevertheless they are discussed rather controversially. The aim of this paper is to provide objective data on the quantities informally collected and transhipped. The unique activities of informal collectors required the development and implementation of a new set of methodologies. The concept of triangulation was used to verify results obtained by field visits, interviews and a traffic counting campaign. Both approaches lead to an estimation of approx. 100,000 t per year of reusable items informally collected in Austria. This means that in addition to the approx. 72 kg/cap/yr formally collected bulky waste, bulky waste wood, household scrap (excluding packaging) and WEEE, up to a further 12 kg/cap/yr might, in the case that informal collection is abandoned, end up as waste or in the second-hand sector.

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Assessment of Quality Assurance Measures for Radioactive Material Transport Packages not Requiring Competent Authority Design Approval - 13282

The majority of transports of radioactive materials are carried out in packages which don't need a package design approval by a competent authority. Low-active radioactive materials are transported in such packages e.g. in the medical and pharmaceutical industry and in the nuclear industry as well. Decommissioning of NPP's leads to a strong demand for packages to transport low and middle active radioactive waste. According to IAEA regulations the 'non-competent authority approved package types' are the Excepted Packages and the Industrial Packages of Type IP-1, IP-2 and IP-3 and packages of Type A. For these types of packages an assessment by the competent authority is required for the quality assurance measures for the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection (IAEA SSR 6, Chap. 306). In general a compliance audit of the manufacturer of the packaging is required during this assessment procedure. Their regulatory level in the IAEA regulations is not comparable with the 'regulatory density' for packages requiring competent authority package design approval. Practices in different countries lead to different approaches within the assessment of the quality assurance measures in the management system as well as in the quality assurance program of a special package design. To use the package or packaging in a safe manner and in compliance with the regulations a management system for each phase of the life of the package or packaging is necessary. The relevant IAEA-SSR6 chap. 801 requires documentary verification by the consignor concerning package compliance with the requirements. (authors)

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