Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Waste Packaging”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 649 records · Page 36

Unsaturated alluvium disposal modelling with improved geological realism

This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package funded by the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD). The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several potential host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit and other tools as needed. The specific GDSA goal addressed in this report is reference case development, simulation, and analysis for the unsaturated alluvium (UZ), one of the four potential host-rocks considered by the GDSA. Further, we aim to exercise the simulation tools and methodologies under development by GDSA for PA modelling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Strength Measurements of Archive K Basin Sludge Using a Soil Penetrometer

Spent fuel radioactive sludge present in the K East and K West spent nuclear fuel storage basins now resides in the KW Basin in six large underwater engineered containers. The sludge will be dispositioned in two phases under the Sludge Treatment Project: (1) hydraulic retrieval into sludge transport and storage containers (STSCs) and transport to interim storage in Central Plateau and (2) retrieval from the STSCs, treatment, and packaging for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. In the years the STSCs are stored, sludge strength is expected to increase through chemical reaction, intergrowth of sludge crystals, and compaction and dewatering by settling. Increased sludge strength can impact the type and operation of the retrieval equipment needed prior to final sludge treatment and packaging. It is important to determine whether water jetting, planned for sludge retrieval from STSCs, will be effective. Shear strength is a property known to correlate with the effectiveness of water jetting. Accordingly, the unconfined compressive strengths (UCS) of archive K Basin sludge samples and sludge blends were measured using a pocket penetrometer modified for hot cell use. Based on known correlations, UCS values can be converted to shear strengths. Twenty-six sludge samples, stored in hot cells for a number of years since last being disturbed, were identified as potential candidates for UCS measurement and valid UCS measurements were made for twelve, each of which was found as moist or water-immersed solids at least 1/2-inch deep. Ten of the twelve samples were relatively weak, having consistencies described as 'very soft' to 'soft'. Two of the twelve samples, KE Pit and KC-4 P250, were strong with 'very stiff' and 'stiff' consistencies described, respectively, as 'can be indented by a thumb nail' or 'can be indented by thumb'. Both of these sludge samples are composites collected from KE Basin floor and Weasel Pit locations. Despite both strong sludges having relatively high iron concentrations, attribution of their high strengths to this factor could not be made with confidence as other measured sludge samples, also from the KE Basin floor and of high iron concentration, were relatively weak. The observed UCS and shear strengths for the two strong sludges were greater than observed in any prior testing of K Basin sludge except for sludge processed at 185 C under hydrothermal conditions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Inadvertent Disposal of Chromium Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), a waste generator approved to ship waste to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), made 49 waste shipments in the period 2009 to 2015 that were subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. One of the 49 shipments contained bottles of liquid blowback solution and was returned to NFS for disposition. The remaining 48 shipments consisted of a total of 93 disposal packages of chromium-containing waste that were disposed in seven low-level waste (LLW) cells at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An integrated equipment for massive segmentation and packaging of control Rod Guide Tubes - 15161

Over time, some utilities have decided to undergo safety upgrades that include replacement of some ageing components like control rod guide tubes (GT's). GT's are safety related components because they control the path of the control rods into and out of the core. These components are usually stored underwater in interim storage pools to decay their radioactivity. When the interim storage facility reaches saturation, treatment and final disposal of the retired Guide Tubes needs to be performed. Based on more than 30 years of experience and lessons learned in the development of segmentation and packaging technologies for nuclear components, Westinghouse has designed, commissioned and will operate a dedicated system for cutting and packaging retired GT's from 900 MW plants, currently stored in a EDF maintenance facility located in the south of France. The first main technical challenge was the waste volume optimization. Two separate waste streams had to be considered for coping with the highly irradiated portion of the GT's (lower part) and the very low level waste sections (upper part). The segmentation plan has been designed to minimize the waste volume of the highly irradiated waste and therefore develop a process which could be adapted to the container size specified by EDF. Metallic baskets have been designed to optimize the packaging and storage density in the containers. All cutting techniques previously used by Westinghouse in similar applications were assessed and underwater mechanical cutting with a band saw was selected as the preferred method. A turning stand positions the GT in front of the band saw. When the cut is completed, the remnant GT is inserted into the next turning stand for the next cut. Each cell of the turning stand positions the GT at the pre-defined cutting height. An integrated water filtration system is used to ensure good visibility during the cutting operations and to minimize water volume and limit the final liquid effluents. The whole process of GT insertion, cutting, packaging and waste conditioning is carried out in a hot cell and controlled remotely. The operator can therefore follow the packaging plan accurately and safely by using a four axis pick and place unit, while keeping personal radiation exposure low. This innovative process allows cutting and packaging large quantities of GT's in a safe and efficient manner. The pilot project covers the segmentation of 93 GT's but it can be further used for cutting larger quantities of retired GT's resulting from the upcoming GT replacement campaigns. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pressure Build-Up During the Fire Test in Type B(U) Packages Containing Water - 13280

The safety assessment of packages for the transport of radioactive materials with content containing liquids requires special consideration. The main focus is on water as supplementary liquid content in Type B(U) packages. A typical content of a Type B(U) package is ion exchange resin, waste of a nuclear power plant, which is not dried, normally only drained. Besides the saturated ion exchange resin, a small amount of free water can be included in these contents. Compared to the safety assessment of packages with dry content, attention must be paid to some more specific issues. An overview of these issues is provided. The physical and chemical compatibility of the content itself and the content compatibility with the packages materials must be demonstrated for the assessment. Regarding the mechanical resistance the package has to withstand the forces resulting from the freezing liquid. The most interesting point, however, is the pressure build-up inside the package due to vaporization. This could for example be caused by radiolysis of the liquid and must be taken into account for the storage period. If the package is stressed by the total inner pressure, this pressure leads to mechanical loads to the package body, the lid and the lid bolts. Thus, the pressure is the driving force on the gasket system regarding the activity release and a possible loss of tightness. The total pressure in any calculation is the sum of partial pressures of different gases which can be caused by different effects. The pressure build-up inside the package caused by the regulatory thermal test (30 min at 800 deg. C), as part of the cumulative test scenario under accident conditions of transport is discussed primarily. To determine the pressure, the temperature distribution in the content must be calculated for the whole period from beginning of the thermal test until cooling-down. In this case, while calculating the temperature distribution, conduction and radiation as well as evaporation and condensation during the associated process of transport have to be considered. This paper discusses limiting amounts of water inside the cask which could lead to unacceptable pressure and takes into account saturated steam as well as overheated steam. However, the difficulties of assessing casks containing wet content will be discussed. From the authority assessment point of view, drying of the content could be an effective way to avoid the above described pressure build-up and the associated difficulties for the safety assessment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-26:13, 108-F Drain Pipelines, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-011

The 100-F-26:13 waste site is the network of process sewer pipelines that received effluent from the 108-F Biological Laboratory and discharged it to the 188-F Ash Disposal Area (126-F-1 waste site). The pipelines included one 0.15-m (6-in.)-, two 0.2-m (8-in.)-, and one 0.31-m (12-in.)-diameter vitrified clay pipe segments encased in concrete. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

100-F-26:13↗

Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 331 Life Sciences Laboratory Drain Field Septic System, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-020

The 331 Life Sciences Laboratory Drain Field (LSLDF) septic system waste site consists of a diversion chamber, two septic tanks, a distribution box, and a drain field. This septic system was designed to receive sanitary waste water, from animal studies conducted in the 331-A and 331-B Buildings, for discharge into the soil column. However, field observations and testing suggest the 331 LSLDF septic system did not receive any discharges. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of the 331 LSLDF waste site to No Action. This site does not have a deep zone or other condition that would warrant an institutional control in accordance with the 300-FF-2 ROD under the industrial land use scenario.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 600-243 Petroleum-Contaminated Soil Bioremediation Pad, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-033

The 600-243 waste site consisted of a bioremediation pad for petroleum-contaminated soils resulting from the 1100 Area Underground Storage Tank (UST) upgrades in 1994. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

1100 Area Underground Storage Tank↗

Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-23, 100-B/C Area Surface Debris, Waste Site, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-027

The 100-B-23, 100-B/C Surface Debris, waste consisted of multiple locations of surface debris and chemical stains that were identified during an Orphan Site Evaluation of the 100-B/C Area. Evaluation of the collected information for the surface debris features yielded four generic waste groupings: asbestos-containing material, lead debris, oil and oil filters, and treated wood. Focused verification sampling was performed concurrently with remediation. Site remediation was accomplished by selective removal of the suspect hazardous items and potentially impacted soils. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

100-B-23 waste site↗

Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-18, 184-B Powerhouse Debris Pile, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-020

The 100-B-18 Powerhouse Debris Pile contained miscellaneous demolition waste from the decommissioning activities of the 184-B Powerhouse. The debris covered an area roughly 15 m by 30 m and included materials such as concrete blocks, mixed aggregate/concrete slabs, stone rubble, asphalt rubble, traces of tar/coal, broken fluorescent lights, brick chimney remnants, and rubber hoses. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

100-B-18 Powerhouse Debris Pile↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 2)

This document describes and implements the process to establish the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) or HalfPACT packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using one analytical unit which is a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors, a mass spectrometer (MS) and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample introduced to the GC is split and part goes to MS and the other part goes to TCD. The MS analyzes sample for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and the TCD analyzes for hydrogen and methane. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 2.1)

This document describes and implements the process to establish the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) or HalfPACT packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using one analytical unit which is a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors, a mass spectrometer (MS) and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample introduced to the GC is split and part goes to MS and the other part goes to TCD. The MS analyzes sample for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and the TCD analyzes for hydrogen and methane. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 3.1)

This document describes and implements the process to determine the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II), HalfPACT, or RH-TRU 72-B packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors: a mass spectrometer (MS), and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample analyzed in the GC is split and half is sent to the MS for volatile organic compound (VOC) analysis while the other half is sent to the TCD for hydrogen and methane analysis. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC) and the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RHTRAMPAC).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 3.2)

This document describes and implements the process to establish the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) or HalfPACT packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using one analytical unit which is a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors, a mass spectrometer (MS) and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample introduced to the GC is split and part goes to MS and the other part goes to TCD. The MS analyzes sample for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and the TCD analyzes for hydrogen and methane. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Cleanup of the Idaho National Laboratory Status Report

This paper describes the status of the cleanup of the U.S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory site (INL). On May 1, 2005 CH2M.WG Idaho, LLC (CWI) began its 7-year, $2.4 billion cleanup of the INL. When the work is completed, 3,406,871 liters (900,000 gallons) of sodium-bearing waste will have been treated; 15 high-level waste tanks will have been grouted and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)- closed; more than 200 facilities will have been demolished or disposed of, including three reactors, several spent fuel basins, and hot cells; thousands of containers of buried transuranic waste will have been retrieved; more than 8,000 cubic meters (10,464 cubic yards) of contact-handled transuranic waste and more than 500 cubic meters (654 cubic yards) of remote-handled transuranic waste will have been characterized, packaged, and shipped offsite; almost 200 release sites and voluntary consent order tank systems will have been remediated; and 3,178 units of spent fuel will have been moved from wet to dry storage. In 2007, CWI began the construction of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit that will treat the sodium-bearing waste for eventual disposal; removed and disposed the 112-ton Engineering Test Reactor vessel; demolished all significant radiological facilities at Test Area North; continued the exhumation of buried transuranic wastes from the Subsurface Disposal Area at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex; shipped the first of hundreds of containers of remote-handled transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant; disposed of thousands of cubic meters of low-level and low-level mixed radioactive wastes both onsite and offsite while meeting all regulatory cleanup objectives. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

PUBLIC AND REGULATORY ACCEPTANCE OF BLENDING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE VS DILUTION

On April 21, 2009, the Energy Facilities Contractors Group (EFCOG) Waste Management Working Group (WMWG) provided a recommendation to the Department of Energy's Environmental Management program (DOE-EM) concerning supplemental guidance on blending methodologies to use to classify waste forms to determine if the waste form meets the definition of Transuranic (TRU) Waste or can be classified as Low-Level Waste (LLW). The guidance provides specific examples and methods to allow DOE and its Contractors to properly classify waste forms while reducing the generation of TRU wastes. TRU wastes are much more expensive to characterize at the generator's facilities, ship, and then dispose at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) than Low-Level Radioactive Waste's disposal. Also the reduction of handling and packaging of LLW is inherently less hazardous to the nuclear workforce. Therefore, it is important to perform the characterization properly, but in a manner that minimizes the generation of TRU wastes if at all possible. In fact, the generation of additional volumes of radioactive wastes under the ARRA programs, this recommendation should improve the cost effective implementation of DOE requirements while properly protecting human health and the environment. This paper will describe how the message of appropriate, less expensive, less hazardous blending of radioactive waste is the 'right' thing to do in many cases, but can be confused with inappropriate 'dilution' that is frowned upon by regulators and stakeholders in the public. A proposal will be made in this paper on how to communicate this very complex and confusing technical issue to regulatory bodies and interested stakeholders to gain understanding and approval of the concept. The results of application of the proposed communication method and attempt to change the regulatory requirements in this area will be discussed including efforts by DOE and the NRC on this very complex subject.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Flanged Tritium Waste Containers: Background and Current Path to Disposal

The MLLW Flanged Tritium Waste Container (FTWC) Project has been operational since 2007 when, during an audit of the FTWC waste stream, it was determined that four FTWC containers contained lead in amounts greater than LDR treatment standards. From June to August of 2007, four FTWC containers were shipped to TA-54 for disposal as LLW from WETF. The contents of the FTWCs were characterized as high activity LLW and were thought to be in compliance with LANL's Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). During the packaging of these FTWC's, 36 intact squib valves (aka actuators), containing detonated squibs were included with the waste stream After being transported to TA-54 Area G, it was determined that the explosive used in some of the squibs was Normal Lead Styphnate (NLS). A recharacterization of the entire contents in the FTWC's was performed with the conclusion that the squib valves exhibited the RCRA toxic characteristic for Lead (D008), thus resulting in the contents of the FTWCs being reclassified as a Mixed LLW.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗