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At least 649 records · Page 36

Hearing Conservation Self-Study #12350

Occupational hearing loss is one of the most common work-related illnesses in the United States (US). From 22 to 30 million US workers are exposed to hazardous noise levels at work, and 25% of these workers will develop permanent hearing loss. Hearing loss from noise is slow and painless, and you can have a disability before you notice it. This course presents the hazards associated with workplace noise, the purpose and elements of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Hearing Conservation Program (HCP), and controls that are available to reduce your exposure to hazardous levels of noise.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

US Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi – 2016 Evaluations

Although it is clear that the accident signatures from each unit at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) [Daiichi] differ, much is not known about the end-state of core materials within these units. Some of this uncertainty can be attributed to a lack of information related to cooling system operation and cooling water injection. There is also uncertainty in our understanding of phenomena affecting: a) in-vessel core damage progression during severe accidents in boiling water reactors (BWRs), and b) accident progression after vessel failure (ex-vessel progression) for BWRs and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). These uncertainties arise due to limited full scale prototypic data. Similar to what occurred after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, these Daiichi units offer the international community a means to reduce such uncertainties by obtaining prototypic data from multiple full-scale BWR severe accidents. Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document reports recent results from the US Forensics Effort to use information obtained by TEPCO to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This Forensics Effort, which is sponsored by the Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Light Water Reactor (LWR) Sustainability Program, consists of a group of US experts in LWR safety and plant operations that have identified examination needs and are evaluating TEPCO information from Daiichi that address these needs. Examples presented in this report demonstrate that significant safety insights are being obtained in the areas of component performance, fission product release and transport, debris end-state location, and combustible gas generation and transport. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights are being used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Furthermore, reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi will improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations and inform future D&D activities by improving the capability for characterizing potential hazards to workers involved with cleanup activities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

2005 ACGIH Lifting TLV: Employee-Friendly Presentation and Guidance for Professional Judgment

The American Council of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) Lifting Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) provide a tool to reduce incidence of low back and shoulder injuries. However, application of the TLV is too complicated for floor-level workers and relies on professional judgment to assess commonly encountered tasks. This paper presents an Employee-Friendly Simplified Format of the TLV that has been adapted from Table 1 of the Lifting TLV presented in the 2005 TLVs and BEIs Based on the Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents & Biological Exposure Indices. This simplified format can be employed by floor-level workers to self-assess lifting tasks. The Ergonomics Project Team also provides research-based guidance for applying professional judgment consistent with standard industry practice: Extended Work Shifts – Reduce weight by 20% for shifts lasting 8 to 12 hours; Constrained Lower Body Posture – Reduce weight by 25% when lifting in such postures; Infrequently Performed Lifts – Lift up to 15 lbs. ≤3 lifts per hour within the zones marked “No safe limit for repetitive lifting” in the TLVs Table 1; Asymmetry beyond 30° – Reduce weight by 10 lbs. for lifts with up to 60° asymmetry from sagittal plane.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

New research discovery may mean less radioactive contamination, safer nuclear power plants

Murph has now made another nanoparticle breakthrough that could benefit various work environments such as nuclear power plants. Murph and her team have created nanoparticle treated stainless steel filters that are capable to capturing radioactive vapor materials. Just like air filters capture dust and dirt, these filters are capable of capturing large amounts of radioactive vapors. The new research may one day mean that nuclear power plant workers, and other workers in related fields, will have a safer working environment.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Technical Report for Calculations of Atmospheric Dispersion at Onsite Locations for Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities

The Department of Energy (DOE) has performed an evaluation of the technical bases for the default value for the atmospheric dispersion parameter χ/Q. This parameter appears in the calculation of radiological dose at the onsite receptor location (co-located worker at 100 meters) in safety analysis of DOE nuclear facilities. The results of the calculation are then used to determine whether safety significant engineered controls should be established to prevent and/or mitigate the event causing the release of hazardous material. An evaluation of methods for calculation of the dispersion of potential chemical releases for the purpose of estimating the chemical exposure at the co-located worker location was also performed. DOE’s evaluation consisted of: (a) a review of the regulatory basis for the default χ/Q dispersion parameter; (b) an analysis of this parameter’s sensitivity to various factors that affect the dispersion of radioactive material; and (c) performance of additional independent calculations to assess the appropriate use of the default χ/Q value.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi-2017 Evaluations

Although the accident signatures from each unit at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) [Daiichi] differ, much is not known about the end-state of core materials within these units. Some of this uncertainty can be attributed to a lack of information related to cooling system operation and cooling water injection. There is also uncertainty in our understanding of phenomena affecting: a) in-vessel core damage progression during severe accidents in boiling water reactors (BWRs), and b) accident progression after vessel failure (ex-vessel progression) for BWRs and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). These uncertainties arise due to limited full scale prototypic data. Similar to what occurred after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, these Daiichi units offer the international community a means to reduce such uncertainties by obtaining prototypic data from multiple full-scale BWR severe accidents. Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document, which has been updated to include FY2017 information, summarizes results from U.S. efforts to use information obtained by TEPCO Holdings to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Light Water Reactor (LWR) Sustainability Program, consists of a group of U.S. experts in LWR safety and plant operations that have identified examination needs and are evaluating TEPCO Holdings information from Daiichi that address these needs. Each year, annual reports include examples demonstrating that significant safety insights are being obtained in the areas of component performance, fission product release and transport, debris end-state location, and combustible gas generation and transport. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights are being used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Furthermore, reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi will improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations and inform future D&D activities by improving the capability for characterizing potential hazards to workers involved with cleanup activities. Highlights in this FY2017 report include new insights with respect to the forces required to produce the observed Daiichi Unit 1 (1F1) shield plug endstate, the observed leakage from 1F1 components, and the amount of combustible gas generation required to produce the observed explosions in Daiichi Units 3 and 4 (1F3 and 1F4). This report contains an appendix with a list of examination needs that was updated after U.S. experts reviewed recently obtained information from examinations at Daiichi. Additional details for higher priority, near-term, examination activities are also provided. This report also includes an appendix with a description of an updated website that has been reformatted to better assist U.S. experts by providing information in an archived retrievable location, as well as an appendix summarizing U.S. Forensics activities to host the TMI-2 Knowledge Transfer and Relevance to Fukushima Meeting that was held in Idaho Falls, ID, on October 10-14, 2016.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

On-Board Sensor Diagnostics for Catalytic Converters Final Report CRADA No. TC-0882-94

The auto industry is one of the largest and most important sectors of the U;S. economy. At the time of the CRADA, the Big Three U.S. auto makers (Chrysler, Ford and GM) alone employed··608,000 workers·in this country and marketed some eight million new cars and trucks worth approximately $200 billion in sales revenues. When the impact of part suppliers, steel, aluminum, and electronics producers were included, the effect of a downturn in U.S. car manufacturing had a nationwide impact on jobs and the economy. For example, U.S. auto makers used 1/7 of all U.S. steel production and 1/6 of all U.S. aluminum production. Transplant Japanese factories cannot be expected to compensate for reductions by U.S. auto makers; in fact, transplants resulted in a net loss of U.S. jobs. In 1991, the Big Three U.S. auto makers sold 8.8 million new cars and trucks with over 620,000 employees while the Big Three Japanese firms (Toyota, Nissan, and Honda) sold 2.4 million new cars and trucks with only 37,000 U.S. employees. It was estimated that the Japanese­ owned, U.S.-located, auto assembly facilities enjoyed an $8-$9 an hour labor cost advantage over the U.S. Big Three by building new plants in rural areas and hiring young workers with smaller health care and pension needs. Most of the parts in the 2.4 million cars and trucks sold by Japanese auto makers come directly from Japan and the engineering activities were mostly performed in Japan before U.S. assembly began. The effect of these issues was reflected in the U.S. Japan trade imbalance; about two-thirds of Japan's trade surplus was attributable to autos and auto parts.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

The Development of Heavy-Ion Acceleratiors as Drivers for Inertially Confined Fusion

This document is a compilation of material assembled for use as a reference in establishing a major R & D effort aimed at applying the technology of large-scale particle accelerators to the problem of providing a driver suitable for commercial power production from inertially confined fusion. In addition to work by the author, it contains several sections contributed by other workers in the field of Heavy Ion Fusion. Chapter 3 on the interaction of high-energy heavy ions with matter was contributed by Roger Bangerter. Chapter 4 by Lloyd Smith contains a description of the types of accelerators which have been considered, their advantages and limitations, and a summary of the status of relevant accelerator theory. The appendices contain descriptions of complete accelerator driver systems contributed by the staffs at Argonne, Brookhaven and Berkeley. Draft copies of the report were distributed to members of review committees and other works in the field of inertial fusion. It is being printed at this time in response to the need for a source book for new workers in HIF. Although the author's home institution is SLAC, the report is being published as an LBL document because the work has been supported through the Accelerator and Fusion Research Division of LBL.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Evaluation of Impacts from Radiological Air Emissions for the HALEU Environmental Assessment

This report contains an evaluation of radiological impacts to members of the public and collocated workers from potential air emissions resulting from production of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This work considers impacts from presumed normal operations for the two alternatives outlined in Environmental Assessment for Use of DOE-Owned HALEU Stored at INL (DOE-EA 2018). Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of potential radionuclide emissions are substantially less than applicable standards for both alternatives considered. Maximum estimated soil concentrations from the emissions were also determined to be less than conservative EPA risk-based screening levels. Because impacts are based on maximum, unabated/unmitigated potential emissions and other conservative or bounding assumptions, it is highly unlikely the alternatives evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evaluation of Impacts from Radiological Air Emissions for the HALEU Environmental Assessment

This report contains an evaluation of radiological impacts to members of the public and collocated workers from potential air emissions resulting from production of High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuel at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This work considers impacts from presumed normal operations for the two alternatives outlined in Environmental Assessment for Use of DOE-Owned HALEU Stored at INL (DOE-EA 2018). Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of potential radionuclide emissions are substantially less than applicable standards for both alternatives considered. Maximum estimated soil concentrations from the emissions were also determined to be less than conservative EPA risk-based screening levels. Potential contamination of groundwater from air emissions depositing on soil and migrating to the aquifer was also considered and resulting doses were well below regulatory limits. Because all impacts are based on maximum, unabated/unmitigated potential emissions and other conservative or bounding assumptions, it is highly unlikely the alternatives evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proof Testing of Small-Scale HE Press Shielding

High explosives pressing activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory have played a critical role in meeting the core missions of the lab since its early days. Small scale pressing (25 grams of energetic material or less) constitutes a significant portion of current production and much of this occurs as an attended operation. Workers that are present during HE pressing operations are to be protected from blast and fragment dangers associated with the potential violent reaction of the energetic material being pressed. Safety is paramount in all HE operations, and the ongoing evolution of analysis and mitigation of hazards contributes strongly to the development of adequate protections for personnel. Attended pressing operations satisfying Class 1 Level Protection criteria, until recently, have been allowed for small scale pressing activities on the basis of an undocumented design of shielding enclosures used at LANL. Recent review of the shield design has determined the necessity of proof testing an adequate enclosure and thoroughly documenting the test results and fabrication specifications. This will provide a basis for continuing attended operations and guidance for future design iterations. The results of the testing described in this report provide sufficient assurance that the new shield design is adequate to protect attendant workers against injury from direct blast and fragments resulting from full detonation of the maximum allowable mass of explosives (less than 25 grams) confined in a uniaxial pressing configuration typical for Los Alamos National Laboratory.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Wind Energy Workforce in the United States: Training, Hiring, and Future Needs

Researchers received 247 completed interviews from wind industry employers and 50 completed interviews from representatives from educational institutions with wind energy courses, to better understand the wind industry workforce, hiring needs, and educational pathways . The interviews revealed that 68% of wind industry firms interviewed had difficulty hiring across most occupations. Twenty-five percent of firms searched outside of the United States to find candidates with appropriate skills and experience, which some employers consider lacking, among domestic candidates. At the same time, interview results showed that people who graduate from wind energy educational programs often do not enter the wind industry upon graduation - the majority find employment outside of the wind industry. In addition, some educational and training institutions with wind or renewable energy-specific programs reported difficulty filling courses. This difficulty of employers finding well qualified workers while wind and renewable energy graduates report difficulty finding jobs in the wind industry is the wind energy workforce gap. Narrowing this workforce gap - decreasing hiring difficulty while increasing graduates' ability to find jobs in the wind industry - could reduce recruiting costs, better satisfy employer needs, and grow the domestic wind workforce. Narrowing the gap would simultaneously help educational institutions more efficiently fill classrooms and communicate wind-industry career options to potential students. Twenty-five percent of firms searched outside of the United States to find candidates with appropriate skills and experience, which some employers consider lacking, among domestic candidates. At the same time, interview results showed that people who graduate from wind energy educational programs often do not enter the wind industry upon graduation - the majority find employment outside of the wind industry. In addition, some educational and training institutions with wind or renewable energy-specific programs reported difficulty filling courses. This difficulty of employers finding well qualified workers while wind and renewable energy graduates report difficulty finding jobs in the wind industry is the wind energy workforce gap. Narrowing this workforce gap - decreasing hiring difficulty while increasing graduates' ability to find jobs in the wind industry - could reduce recruiting costs, better satisfy employer needs, and grow the domestic wind workforce. Narrowing the gap would simultaneously help educational institutions more efficiently fill classrooms and communicate wind-industry career options to potential students.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Mercury Dispersion Modeling and Purge Ventilation Stack Height Determination for Tank 42H

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Atmospheric Technologies Group performed atmospheric dispersion modeling and analysis of mercury emissions from the H-Tank Farm - Tank 42 ventilation system exhaust to evaluate potential worker exposures to mercury vapor. This analysis was used to establish a minimum stack height at which ambient mercury concentration would not exceed any worker exposure limit. The American Meteorological Society/Environmental Protection Agency Regulatory Model (AERMOD) was used as the dispersion modeling tool for this analysis. Results indicate that the default 10-foot stack results in ground level concentrations that significantly exceed exposure standards for the mercury discharge scenarios evaluated. For a discharge of 25 mg/m 3 , a 50-foot stack was necessary to raise the exhaust plume centerline from Tank 42H to a height that prevents mercury exposure problems for elevated receptors on buildings near the tank. If the discharge concentration is decreased to 10 mg/m 3 , the minimum stack height required to comply with exposure limits is of 40 feet.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Large Area Airborne Contamination Monitoring

Current D&D operations at Hanford have demonstrated a flaw in the current state of the art capability of defining airborne contamination boundaries. Airborne particulate emissions of Pu-239 from CM2H operations on the Hanford Pu Finishing Plant were detected well beyond areas controlled for airborne plutonium, putting numerous workers at risk for radiological assimilations. Forty-two Hanford workers had positive bioassay results for plutonium uptake. Work areas determined to be free of airborne contamination as measured by state-of-the-art continuous alpha monitoring (CAM) systems were later discovered not to be. Airborne contamination was scattered to a such degree that CAM systems were surveying insufficient volumes of air to accurately predict where respiratory protection was required. A $\$ 19,000$ state of the art portable CAM system used at both Hanford and at SRS screens air for alpha activity at the rate of 1 CFM. This research project will explore the feasibility of using commercially available air purifying systems to screen significantly larger volumes of air for airborne actinide contamination. Commercial household HEPA based air purifying units screen large volumes of air, a simple $\$ 300$ unit being looked at for this study could screen a volume of air that would require over 300 of the $\$ 19,000$ CAMs. The goal of the project was to determine the feasibility of building a detection system capable of screening the air purifiers pre-filters and HEPA filters for any actinide bearing hot particles that have been captured. The simplest technologies available to Field-Radiological-Protection personnel are hand-held alpha field survey meters. With the size and the corrugated structure of these HEPA filters, hand screening is not practical. This project researched alternatives capable of automating this function. Two potential technologies were examined. One technology evaluated was the measurement of xray emissions from the actinides, taking advantage of the higher emission rates of the L x-rays compared to the gamma emissions of isotopes such as Pu-238 or Pu-239. High resolution to low resolution systems were evaluated. Branching ratio data on the actinides in the literature is incomplete, and a study was initiated to measure branching ratios of the various L emissions of a number of the plutonium isotopes. A Monte Carlo simulation was also run to calculate the effect the attenuating HEPA media would have on x-ray measurements on spectrometers centered in each quadrant above the surface of the HEPA. The second technology evaluated was measuring the light from a scintillating media applied to the surface of the HEPA filter using a ThorLabs Scientific-Grade Digital Camera Model 8051M. A light tight enclosure capable of holding the 2’x2’x1” HEPA filter was fabricated. Numerous scintillation media were evaluated for both the sensitivity and for resolution of measuring alpha activity. Figure 1 shows images of a 4”x4” section of HEPA filter with a 3 x 3 grid of Pu-238 contamination loaded inside the crevices of the HEPA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Mercury Dispersion Modeling and Purge Ventilation Stack Height Determination for SDUs

The SRNL Atmospheric Technologies Group performed an analysis to determine the minimum stack height necessary to avoid exceedance of the ACGIH (American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists) 15-minute Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL) and 8-hour Time Weighted Average (TWA) ambient standards for worst case hazardous chemical emissions from the Z-Area Mega SDUs. The American Meteorological Society/Environmental Protection Agency Regulatory Model (AERMOD) was used as the dispersion modeling tool for this analysis. Receptors were placed to represent the breathing level concentrations that workers might have, placed 6-ft above the working surface (ground or SDU tank surface). Based on the analysis conducted, the minimum SDU exhaust release height to avoid exceeding STEL and TWA is 6 feet above the SDU roof level for flow rates between 300 and 1200 cfm. The configuration of Mega SDUs, while large structures, do not produce an aerodynamic wake that impacts the stack releases and causes exceedances to the worker exposure limits.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tonopah Test Range Air Monitoring: CY2018 Meteorological, Radiological, and Wind Transported Particulate Observations

In 1963, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]), implemented Operation Roller Coaster on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and an adjacent area of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range). This operation resulted in radionuclide-contaminated soils at the Double Tracks site and Clean Slate I, II, and III sites. This report documents observations made during ongoing monitoring of radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions at stations installed adjacent to the Clean Slate sites and at the TTR Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Range Operations Center (ROC). The primary objective of the monitoring effort is to support the DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) in the safe remediation of the environmental legacy of nuclear device development and testing by determining if wind blowing across the Clean Slate sites is transporting particles of radionuclide-contaminated soil beyond the physical and administrative boundaries of the sites, and to provide information for designing long-term monitoring of the sites. The monitoring program in 2018 included five stations. Station 400, located within TTR Area 3 and near the ROC, monitors conditions near the local workforce center. Stations 401 and 403 are located on the northern and southeastern perimeter fence lines, respectively, of the Clean Slate III site. Stations 404 and 405 are along the northern and eastern boundary fence, respectively, at Clean Slate II. The stations are generally downwind of the contaminated areas during either northwesterly or southerly winds, which are the predominant wind directions. The stations—which are similar in design to the Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations operating at locations surrounding the Nevada National Security Site and TTR—include meteorological instruments and continuous-flow, low-volume air samplers. Three pressurized ionization chambers for measuring gamma energy are in use at Stations 400, 401, and 403. Saltation sensors and saltation traps are deployed at the stations adjacent to the Clean Slate sites. Detailed meteorological data are recorded on data loggers, with periodic uploads via a satellite system to the Western Regional Climate Center (WRCC) at Desert Research Institute (DRI), to monitor instrument and site conditions. Air filter samples are collected every two weeks and the deposits in the saltation traps are collected when a sufficient sample mass for analysis has accumulated (generally a six- to eight-month interval). Monitoring at TTR in calendar year (CY) 2018 provided surveillance of both ambient conditions, and ground disturbance associated with remediation activities at Clean Slate II and III. The first half of CY2018 data from Stations 404 and 405 at Clean Slate II were collected during remediation activities at that site, and data collected during the final third of the year at Stations 401 and 403 at Clean Slate III coincided with remediation work at the site. Ambient conditions prevailed at Station 400 throughout the year. Dust transport by suspension and saltation is strongly dependent on wind speed. Concentrations of PM 10 (particulate matter of aerodynamic diameter ≤10 micrometers [μm], a size fraction of small particles that are suspended in the air and can be easily inhaled) remain low until winds exceed approximately 32 kilometers per hour (km/hr) (20 miles per hour [mph]). Saltation particle counts also increase above the same general threshold wind speed. Wind speeds in excess of 32 km/hr (20 mph) occur less than three percent of the time at the sites. Ground disturbing remediation activities were carried out at Clean Slate II from October 31, 2017, until July 26, 2018. Station 404 is located closest to the remediation area and is downwind of the area when winds are from the south. By late November, analysis of dust from the air sampler at Station 404 registered increases in plutonium-239+240 ( 239+240 Pu) concentrations. Peak plutonium concentrations, accompanied by elevated gross alpha concentrations and the detection of americium-241 ( 241 Am) by gamma spectroscopy, occurred between March and May 2018. During spring and early summer of 2018, elevated radionuclide concentrations were also measured in dust collected from the air sampler at Station 405, which is more than twice the distance from the remediation activity as Station 404. A minor but sustained increase in gross alpha concentration of suspended dust collected at Stations 400, 401, and 403 was also observed starting in May 2018 and continuing into August. Stations 401 and 403 are approximately 4.8 to 6.4 km (three to four miles) from Clean Slate II and Station 400 is approximately 13 km (eight miles) from that site. The radionuclide content of material that saltated into the passive Big Spring Number Eight (BSNE) traps during the Clean Slate II remediation period increased in both the traps facing toward and away from the fenced contamination area at Station 404, with the largest increases in concentration (almost five times the previous 239+240 Pu concentration) observed in the traps facing the fenced area. The radionuclide concentration in material in the trap facing away from the fence more than doubled from that measured in 2017. A similar increase was observed for the saltation trap facing away from the fenced area at Station 405, although no increase was observed for material captured in the trap facing the fenced area. Particles ranging in size from 50 to 500 µm generally move by saltation processes and are not expected to significantly contribute to dose for someone breathing in the standard respiratory zone for adult humans (1.5 to 1.7 m [4.9 to 5.6 ft] above ground level) because they are too large to be entrained in the air as suspended dust. Remediation activities at Clean Slate III began on September 5, 2018, and continued until a brief hiatus started on December 20, 2018. Although Station 401 is much closer to the remediation area than Station 403, the first increase in gross alpha and 239+240 Pu concentrations was noted in dust from filters collected at Station 403 in early November 2018. The highest radionuclide concentrations of 2018 at the Clean Slate III stations were recorded in air samples taken from Stations 401 and 403 in late December 2018 and these concentrations were comparable between the two station locations. Gamma rate data measured by the PICs was slightly higher than the annual average at Stations 401 and 403 after remediation activities began, but no single measurement was outside of the range observed in 2018 prior to remediation activities. No increase in radionuclide concentration was observed for the Clean Slate III remediation time period on air filters collected from the other stations. Radiological monitoring at Station 400—which is located at the ROC, and therefore the closest regularly staffed work location to the Clean Slate sites—recorded a higher mean gross alpha activity from dust collected on air sampler filters than in previous years. The individual biweekly air filters yielded measurements of gross alpha that were at or below the mean plus one standard deviation measured in CY2017, except for the period from April 25, 2018, through September 12, 2018. Nonetheless, gamma spectroscopy of all air filters from Station 400 identified only naturally occurring radionuclides, with no detection of americium-241 ( 241 Am) (which is used as an indicator of plutonium-241[ 241 Pu]). Alpha spectroscopy of selected air filters collected at Station 400 did not detect plutonium-238 ( 238 Pu) or 239+240 Pu above the analytical detection limit. Gross beta and gamma exposure rate data were comparable to data from regional CEMP stations. No saltation traps are deployed at Station 400. Considering the ambient monitoring periods during CY2018, the monitoring stations adjacent to the Clean Slate sites recorded above-background 238 Pu and 239+240 Pu concentrations (SNL, 1998; Turner et al., 2003) in samples collected by passive saltation traps and on selected air filters. These observations were consistent with previous years and indicated that radionuclide movement occurred under ambient conditions by processes of both saltation and suspension. The presence of radionuclides in all saltation traps, both upwind and downwind of the fenced contamination areas, was consistent with previous radiological survey results (EG&G, 1979) that show lower concentration radiologically contaminated material dispersed outside the fenced area. Although 239+240 Pu concentrations in the air filter samples were sometimes orders of magnitude higher than background, the concentrations were below risk-based action levels defined for an industrial area worker scenario (U.S. DOE, 2014). The interception of airborne dust with above-background radionuclide concentrations demonstrates that dispersal processes are continuing. Strong winds are the driver for both suspension and saltation of dust and soil. The recorded wind speed and PM10 during remediation activities at Clean Slate II and III identified discrete wind events lasting approximately five to eight hours each, which accounted for the greatest PM 10 concentrations at the monitoring stations. These events captured the effect of winds from the northwest and from the south. The observed differences in dust loading and radionuclide concentrations for the monitoring stations when they were either upwind or downwind of the contamination area identify the remediation area as a source of plutonium contaminated dust. The increase in concentration of radionuclides in airborne dust during the remediation activities, compared with measurements under previous ambient conditions (mean 239+240 Pu concentrations during remediation activities are approximately nine to 40 times higher compared to pre-remediation concentrations, depending on monitoring station), highlights the impact of land disturbance on wind-borne contaminant transport from the Clean Slate test areas. The meteorological and particulate matter monitoring indicated that conditions for wind-borne contaminant movement exist at the Clean Slate sites, and that transport of radionuclide-contaminated soil by both suspension and saltation occurred under ambient conditions and accelerated when the sites were disturbed. The 239+240 Pu alpha spectroscopy results indicated that airborne concentrations during remediation activities ranged from 2 × 10-16 to 380 × 10-16 µCi/ml. These results can be compared to the derived air concentration limit for 239 Pu of 6 × 10-11 µCi/ml for occupational workers contained in Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection. Even though the air sampling results document an increase in concentration during remediation activities, the observed concentrations are less than 0.06 percent of the occupational limit. The Corrective Action Unit (CAU) closure strategy uses a risk-based approach, whereby acceptable contaminant concentrations are determined as a function of anticipated human exposure.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

FY2019 Performance Assessment Annual Review for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

FY2019 Performance Assessment Annual Review for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗