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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 649 records · Page 36
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

Addressing Software Security

Historically security within organizations was thought of as an IT function (web sites/servers, email, workstation patching, etc.) Threat landscape has evolved (Script Kiddies, Hackers, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), Nation States, etc.) Attack surface has expanded -Networks interconnected!! Some security posture factors Network Layer (Routers, Firewalls, etc.) Computer Network Defense (IPS/IDS, Sensors, Continuous Monitoring, etc.) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Software Security (COTS, FOSS, Custom, etc.)

software↗
NASA NTRS2015

The AgMIP Coordinated Global and Regional Assessments (CGRA) of Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture and Food Security

The Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) has been working since 2010 to construct a protocol-based framework enabling regional assessments (led by regional experts and modelers) that can provide consistent inputs to global economic and integrated assessment models. These global models can then relay important global-level information that drive regional decision-making and outcomes throughout an interconnected agricultural system. AgMIPs community of nearly 800 climate, crop, livestock, economics, and IT experts has improved the state-of-the-art through model intercomparisons, validation exercises, regional integrated assessments, and the launch of AgMIP programs on all six arable continents. AgMIP is now launching Coordinated Global and Regional Assessments (CGRA) of climate change impacts on agriculture and food security to link global and regional crop and economic models using a protocol-based framework. The CGRA protocols are being developed to utilize historical observations, climate projections, and RCPsSSPs from CMIP5 (and potentially CMIP6), and will examine stakeholder-driven agricultural development and adaptation scenarios to provide cutting-edge assessments of climate changes impact on agriculture and food security. These protocols will build on the foundation of established protocols from AgMIPs 30+ activities, and will emphasize the use of multiple models, scenarios, and scales to enable an accurate assessment of related uncertainties. The CGRA is also designed to provide the outputs necessary to feed into integrated assessment models (IAMs), nutrition and food security assessments, nitrogen and carbon cycle models, and additional impact-sector assessments (e.g., water resources, land-use, biomes, urban areas). This presentation will describe the current status of CGRA planning and initial prototype experiments to demonstrate key aspects of the protocols before wider implementation ahead of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.

models↗
NASA NTRS2016

Cyber Security for the Spaceport Command and Control System: Vulnerability Management and Compliance Analysis

With the rapid development of the Internet, the number of malicious threats to organizations is continually increasing. In June of 2015, the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had a data breach resulting in the compromise of millions of government employee records. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is not exempt from these attacks. Cyber security is becoming a critical facet to the discussion of moving forward with projects. The Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS) project at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) aims to develop the launch control system for the next generation launch vehicle in the coming decades. There are many ways to increase the security of the network it uses, from vulnerability management to ensuring operating system images are compliant with securely configured baselines recommended by the United States Government.

Cyber Security↗
DOE OSTI2011

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

Security Risks, Low-tech User Interfaces, and Implantable Medical Devices: A Case Study with Insulin Pump Infusion Systems

Portable implantable medical device systems are playing a larger role in modern health care. Increasing attention is now being given to the wireless control interface of these systems. Our position is that wireless security in portable implantable medical device systems is just a part of the overall system security, and increased attention is needed to address low-tech security issues.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

Los Alamos Shows Airport Security Technology at Work

Los Alamos scientists have advanced a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) technology that may provide a breakthrough for screening liquids at airport security. They've added low-power X-ray data to the mix, and as a result have unlocked a new detection technology. Funded in part by the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate, the new system is named MagRay. The goal is to quickly and accurately distinguish between liquids that visually appear identical. For example, what appears to be a bottle of white wine could potentially be nitromethane, a liquid that could be used to make an explosive. Both are clear liquids, one would be perfectly safe on a commercial aircraft, the other would be strictly prohibited. How to tell them apart quickly without error at an airport security area is the focus of Michelle Espy, Larry Schultz and their team. In this video, Espy and the MagRay team explain how the new technology works, how they've developed an easy operator interface, and what the next steps might be in transitioning this technology to the private sector.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Automatic Labeling for Entity Extraction in Cyber Security

Timely analysis of cyber-security information necessitates automated information extraction from unstructured text. While state-of-the-art extraction methods produce extremely accurate results, they require ample training data, which is generally unavailable for specialized applications, such as detecting security related entities; moreover, manual annotation of corpora is very costly and often not a viable solution. In response, we develop a very precise method to automatically label text from several data sources by leveraging related, domain-specific, structured data and provide public access to a corpus annotated with cyber-security entities. Next, we implement a Maximum Entropy Model trained with the average perceptron on a portion of our corpus (~750,000 words) and achieve near perfect precision, recall, and accuracy, with training times under 17 seconds.

Automatic Labeling↗
DOE OSTI2014

Homeland Security and Defense Applications

Homeland Security and Defense Applications personnel are the best in the world at detecting and locating dirty bombs, loose nukes, and other radiological sources. The site trains the Nation's emergency responders, who would be among the first to confront a radiological or nuclear emergency. Homeland Security and Defense Applications highly training personnel, characterize the threat environment, produce specialized radiological nuclear detection equipment, train personnel on the equipment and its uses, test and evaluate the equipment, and develop different kinds of high-tech equipment to defeat terrorists. In New York City for example, NNSS scientists assisted in characterizing the radiological nuclear environment after 9/11, and produced specialized radiological nuclear equipment to assist local officials in their Homeland Security efforts.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2015

Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or planning to implement, safety, security, and safeguards in their programs. The idea is to capture current knowledge and thinking on this topic and to identify common themes in organizations and management. It will also document the most commonly held ideas and perception (and misperceptions) of what it means to manage interfaces and take advantage of synergies for operating nuclear facilities and those that are building their infrastructures. It is desired that the results of this paper will inform the current discourse on this topic with some quantitative data and identify any general trends in understanding.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2015

RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection focuses on continued operation of the Mixed Waste Storage Unit at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), under the auspices of DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). Low-level mixed waste (LLMW) accepted at the NNSS contains both radioactive and hazardous material components as defined by various laws and regulations. The Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU) is located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). Existing facilities at the RWMC are used to store LLMW generated at or shipped to the NNSS prior to disposal at the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU). The document describes the MWSU, its general design, its operation, the materials it stores, and relevant health and safety regulations with which NNSS complies. The currently permitted MWSU has been operated since December 2010. Each of the four designated storage areas is RCRA-compliant for the storage of hazardous waste. This application represents a renewal request by DOE for the permitted MWSU. For security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This version of the application contains most but not all of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Nuclear Material Management Database Development at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nuclear Material Management & Storage (NMM&S) program at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) have the responsibility for the life-cycle management of accountable nuclear materials (NM) in accordance with Department of Energy (DOE) Order 410.2, “Management of Nuclear Materials” and for ensuring workers are protected from exposure to nuclear materials stored outside of an authorized shipping package under DOE Manual 441.1-1. To ensure these responsibilities were addressed in an effective, concise, and secure manner the development of NMM&S databases was undertaken. Using the existing database server structure and data acquired from the official Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) accounting program development of two separate applications, one for O 410.2 inventory requirements (NMIA) and one for M441, were begun in September 2015. The databases were deployed onto the production server in January 2017. The inventory database allows for entering NM characterization data, production of O 410.2 reports, and the ability to retain history files. The M441 database screens NM to determine if it is subject to the manual's requirements, ability to pull in unclassified RadCon materials, and provide reports as required by NMM&S, NM owners, and headquarters programs. These two databases provide NMM&S the ability to better ensure safe and secure packaging, storage, stabilization, consolidation, or disposition of NM and achieve life-cycle management goals.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Assessing the Benefits and Implementations of Secure Embedded Intelligence

This is a poster submission, so we do not have a formal abstract; however, we have included a couple of the main points of the poster. Motivation Current ICS/IIoT reference architectures are ill-suited to continue to meet industry demands. Architectures such as the Purdue Model and ISA-95 split cyber-physical systems into distinct levels; however, business needs and cybersecurity requirements constantly require cross-cutting solutions. Further, newly defined IIoT architectures are better suited for Industry 4.0 systems, but they leave out the feedback seen in Purdue and ISA-95. This underscores a need for new architectures, without which IT and OT boundaries will continue to grow. Secure embedded intelligence (SEI) should drive the creation of these new architectures. Secure Embedded Intelligence Advances in sensing, computation, and automated analysis have opened new possibilities for increased security, performance, and cost savings. SEI enables advanced technology to be utilized to drive new reference architectures to achieve these possibilities while integrating trust and risk.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2019

UAS Radiological Sensing – Nevada National Security Site

In the aftermath of a hazardous incident, there is limited information and almost no means to access the area safely. There is a need to quickly obtain accurate information regarding the extent and severity of the incident. One way to quickly assess the environment is by flying over the dangerous area with unmanned aerial systems followed by remotely operated ground vehicles. The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a repeatable environment to simulate operations for dangerous and dirty situations. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) has the advantages of fast deployment and low-altitude flying, which enhances sensitivity and wide-area coverage, eliminates radiation exposure health safety restrictions, and gives the ability to access highly hazardous or radioactive areas, etc. A UAS can be configured with the nuclear detecting sensor optimized to measure the radiation associated with the event. A multi-UAS has advantages over a single UAS, especially in time-critical tasks such as detecting nuclear radiation. UAS may be helpful in plume definition, ground deposition, moving source, and static or moving spills. Assessing any situation that is dangerous, in hazardous areas (dirty), needs to be repeated (dull), or unreachable (deep), is a candidate for an unmanned system. In addition, the NNSS is in a unique location to conduct isolated, secured, and controlled high-risk experiments. We attract international customers along with domestic agencies due to the unique environmental conditions that have evolved over the past 65 years. The NNSS employs a talented group of operational scientists and engineers with a long history of applied research in radiation/nuclear science. We often collaborate with other national laboratories and universities in addressing unique problems. The NNSS has conducted UAS missions for over 25 years and has established a UAS program to address the difficult challenges in using unmanned systems for national security missions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

AI-ENABLED MONITORING OPTIONS TOWARDS SECURE MICROREACTOR DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

Global nuclear energy deployment scenarios suggest favorable economics for smaller, more versatile, and self-contained reactor technologies. Recognizing their key features as integrated, autonomous and either semi-remotely operated or fully remotely operated systems, microreactors are expected to be deployed in large numbers servicing off/micro-grids, many in geographically remote locations. Integrated nature of these systems as well as ease of their transportation as complete units, simplified installation and relocation/decommissioning challenge traditional continuity-of-knowledge practices used for conventional light water reactors where refueling is done onsite at designated times only replacing portions of their cores and only after their full commissioning for operations including completion of their containment building with security and safeguards measures in place. This effort is exploring AI (artificial intelligence)-enabled monitoring options that would be design agnostic and would assure secure unit deployment and operations. The principle is to maintain situational awareness via real-time evaluations of simultaneous and remotely transmitted monitoring data capturing key safeguards attributes including such characteristics as temperature, radiation, vibrational signals (inter alia), and others. The key principle is to provide reliable and resilient security options while maintaining simplified and economical deployment. The paper will review feasible options for AI-enabled solutions for such evaluations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Giving Back: Collaborations with Others in Ecological Studies on the Nevada National Security Site - 13058

Formerly named the Nevada Test Site, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was the historical site for nuclear weapons testing from the 1950's to the early 1990's. The site was renamed in 2010 to reflect the diversity of nuclear, energy, and homeland security activities now conducted at the site. Biological and ecological programs and research have been conducted on the site for decades to address the impacts of radiation and to take advantage of the relatively undisturbed and isolated lands for gathering basic information on the occurrence and distribution of native plants and animals. Currently, the Office of the Assistant Manager for Environmental Management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) oversees the radiological biota monitoring and ecological compliance programs on the NNSS. The top priority of these programs are compliance with federal and state regulations. They focus on performing radiological dose assessments for the public who reside near the NNSS and for populations of plants and animals on the NNSS and in protecting important species and habitat from direct impacts of mission activities. The NNSS serves as an invaluable outdoor laboratory. The geographic and ecological diversity of the site offers researchers many opportunities to study human influences on ecosystems. NNSA/NSO has pursued collaborations with outside agencies and organizations to be able to conduct programs and studies that enhance radiological biota monitoring and ecosystem preservation when budgets are restrictive, as well as to provide valuable scientific information to the human health and natural resource communities at large. NNSA/NSO is using one current collaborative study to better assess the potential dose to the off-site public from the ingestion of game animals, the most realistic pathway for off-site public exposure at this time from radionuclide contamination on the NNSS. A second collaborative study is furthering desert tortoise conservation measures onsite. It is the goal of NNSA/NSO to continue to develop such collaborations in the sharing of resources, such as personnel, equipment, expertise, and NNSS land access, with outside entities to meet mutually beneficial goals cost effectively. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC, Excess Facility Disposition Program - 17289

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), the management and operating contractor for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo, Texas, has developed an integrated strategy to address badly deteriorating excess facilities presenting risks to people, the environment, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) mission. The comprehensive, integrated Excess Facilities Disposition Program (EFDP) incorporates NNSA scope for excess facility risk reduction, preparation of facilities to be transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for demolition, and demolition of non-process contaminated facilities. The Program has been developed using the NNSA Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations (NA-50) Program Management Plan as a guide. The Program has undertaken actions to address the most immediate risks associated with CNS excess facilities. At Y-12, new foam roofs have been installed on Buildings 9201-5 (Alpha 5), 9204-4 (Beta 4), and 9206 to minimize further facility degradation. Tanks and dikes outside of Alpha 5 and Beta 4 are also being disconnected, drained, and filled with concrete. In addition, Beta 4 will be getting a new electrical system as its Manhattan Project-era system will be replaced by a temporary 'construction power' setup that will provide as-needed electricity to the building that is safer, more reliable, and will ease demolition activities in the future. The EFDP is also focusing on the basement of Alpha 5 and is planning to remove the water from the aging facility's flooded basement, which in some areas contains up to 54 inches of water. The EFDP is also planning several efforts to remove excess materials from Alpha 5 and Beta 4, de-inventory the Alpha 5 Mercury House System and numerous transformers, and de-inventory Beta 4 hydraulic pumps and systems. Efforts are also underway to deactivate and decommission non-process-contaminated facilities at Y-12 and at Pantex. The EFDP has prioritized the performance of work to reduce risk while at the same time supporting the preparation of process-contaminated Y-12 facilities for transfer to EM. The Program aligns with the EM goal to have the NNSA scope completed in Alpha 5 and Beta 4 by the end of FY 2020, and Building 9206 completed by the end of FY 2024. These dates and project sequencing will support the Y-12-related DOE EM cleanup initiatives. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Safe and Secure Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19063

Radioactive sources offer many benefits in medicine, industry and education but the lack of appropriate long-term management when they eventually become disused has led to accidents, in some cases with serious consequences, and increased their vulnerability for use in a malicious act. This lack is evident in the absence of clearly defined policy and strategy, responsibilities and resources to meet those responsibilities for safe, secure and sustainable management of disused sources. The strengthening of national legislative and regulatory infrastructures globally has led to major improvements in the protection and control of radioactive sources. Nevertheless, in many countries, radioactive sources were in use before such infrastructures had been developed or adequately strengthened and were therefore not under regulatory control. The paper presents some aspects from Egyptian experience related to safe and secure measures for management of Cs-137, Ra-226 and Co-60 sealed sources. Data relating to the disused radioactive sealed sources, DSRS inventory as well as the arrangements made in order to prepare for conditioning of sources is presented. The efforts made by technical staff and radiation protection team for all arrangements and details such as conditioning set-up, working area, leakage test, certified stainless capsules, radiation protection measures and sources characterization in addition to all security measures for stored DSRS are also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Sustainable Security through International Source Repatriation - 19659

Ensuring that there is a viable pathway for characterizing, transporting, and disposing of disused radioactive sealed sources (sources) is essential to any end-of-life management strategy. The Off-Site Source Recovery Program, sponsored by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Radiological Security, provides permanent and sustained threat reduction through the secure removal and repatriation of disused sealed radioactive sources of United States origin at international locations. With over two decades of operations, the Off-Site Source Recovery Program has developed source removal processes and techniques to ensure the compliant, effective and timely disposition of the material. For device disassembly support, the program subcontracts vendors qualified and experienced in source extraction from devices. United States origin source repatriations provide for permanent threat reduction and reduce their overall global footprint. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗