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660 records · Page 37

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Comment on “Review of experimental studies of secondary ice production” by Korolev and Leisner (2020)

Abstract. This is a comment on the review by Korolev and Leisner (2020, hereafter KL2020). The only two laboratory/field studies ever to measure the breakup in ice–ice collisions for in-cloud conditions were negatively criticised by KL2020, as were our subsequent theoretical and modelling studies informed by both studies. First, hypothetically, even without any further laboratory experiments, such theoretical and modelling studies would continue to be possible, based on classical mechanics and statistical physics. They are not sensitive to the accuracy of lab data for typical situations, partly because the nonlinear explosive growth of ice concentrations continues until some maximum concentration is reached. To a degree, the same final concentration is expected regardless of the fragment number per collision. Second, there is no evidence that both lab/field observational studies characterising fragmentation in ice–ice collisions are either mutually conflicting or erroneous such that they cannot be used to represent this breakup in numerical models, contrary to the review. The fact that the ice spheres of one experiment were hail sized (2 cm) is not a problem if a universal theoretical formulation, such as ours, with fundamental dependencies, is informed by it. Although both lab/field studies involved head-on collisions, rotational kinetic energy for all collisions generally is only a small fraction of the initial collision kinetic energy (CKE) anyway. Although both lab/field experiments involved fixed targets, that is not a problem since the fixing of the target is represented via CKE in any energy-based formulation such as ours. Finally, scaling analysis suggests that the breakup of ice during sublimation can make a significant contribution to ice enhancement in clouds, again contrary to the impression given by the review.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The DECam MAGIC Survey: Spectroscopic Follow-up of the Most Metal-poor Stars in the Distant Milky Way Halo *

In this work, we present high-resolution spectroscopic observations for six metal-poor stars with [Fe/H] < –3 (including one with [Fe/H] < –4), selected using narrowband Ca ii HK photometry from the DECam MAGIC Survey. The spectroscopic data confirm the accuracy of the photometric metallicities and allow for the determination of chemical abundances for 16 elements, from carbon to barium. The program stars have chemical abundances consistent with the [Fe/H] < –3 range. A kinematic/dynamical analysis suggests that all program stars belong to the distant Milky Way halo population (heliocentric distances 35 < d helio /kpc ≲ 55), including three with high-energy orbits that might have been associated with the Magellanic system and one, J0026−5445, having parameters consistent with being a member of the Sagittarius stream. The remaining two stars show kinematics consistent with the Gaia-Sausage/Enceladus dwarf galaxy merger. J0433−5548, with [Fe/H] = –4.12, is a carbon-enhanced ultra metal-poor star, with [C/Fe] = +1.73. This star is believed to be a bona fide second-generation star, and its chemical abundance pattern was compared with yields from metal-free supernova models. Results suggest that J0433−5548 could have been formed from a gas cloud enriched by a single supernova explosion from an ∼11 M ⊙ star in the early Universe. The successful identification of such objects demonstrates the reliability of photometric metallicity estimates, which can be used for target selection and statistical studies of faint targets in the Milky Way and its satellite population. These discoveries illustrate the power of measuring chemical abundances of metal-poor Milky Way halo stars to learn more about early galaxy formation and evolution.

CEMP stars↗

ASSESSMENT OF 90SR AND 137CS PENETRATION INTO REINFORCED CONCRETE (EXTENT OF 'DEEPENING') UNDER NATURAL ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS

When assessing the feasibility of remediation following the detonation of a radiological dispersion device or improvised nuclear device in a large city, several issues should be considered including the levels and characteristics of the radioactive contamination, the availability of resources required for decontamination, and the planned future use of the city's structures and buildings. Currently, little is known about radionuclide penetration into construction materials in an urban environment. Knowledge in this area would be useful when considering costs of a thorough decontamination of buildings, artificial structures, and roads in an affected urban environment. Pripyat, a city substantially contaminated by the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident in April 1986, may provide some answers. The main objective of this study was to assess the depth of {sup 90}Sr and {sup 137}Cs penetration into reinforced concrete structures in a highly contaminated urban environment under natural weather conditions. Thirteen reinforced concrete core samples were obtained from external surfaces of a contaminated building in Pripyat. The concrete cores were drilled to obtain sample layers of 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-20, 20-30, 30-40, and 40-50 mm. Both {sup 90}Sr and {sup 137}Cs were detected in the entire 0-50 mm profile of the reinforced cores sampled. In most of the cores, over 90% of the total {sup 137}Cs inventory and 70% of the total {sup 90}Sr inventory was found in the first 0-5 mm layer of the reinforced concrete. {sup 90}Sr had penetrated markedly deeper into the reinforced concrete structures than {sup 137}Cs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DIRECT OBSERVATIONAL EVIDENCE OF FILAMENT MATERIAL WITHIN INTERPLANETARY CORONAL MASS EJECTIONS

Coronal mass ejections (CMEs) are explosive events that escape the Sun's corona carrying solar material and energy into the heliosphere. The classic picture of a CME observed in the corona presents a 'three-part structure', including a bright front at the leading edge indicating dense plasma, a low-density cavity, the possible signature of an embedded magnetic flux rope, and the so-called core, a high-density region observed to be associated with an erupting filament. Although there are experimental analogs to the first two parts of the CME when observed in situ, there are only a handful of in situ observations of cold, filament-type plasma. This has been a source of major uncertainty and qualitative disagreement between remote and in situ observations of these ejecta. We present the first comprehensive and long-term survey of such low charge states observed by the Advanced Composition Explorer Solar Wind Ion Composition Spectrometer, using a novel data analysis process developed to identify ions with low ionic charge states. Using a very stringent set of observational signatures, we find that more than 4% of detected interplanetary CMEs have significant contributions of ions with low charge states. These time periods of low-charge ions often occur concurrent with some of the hottest ions, previously interpreted to be affected by flare heating during the CME initiation.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

A PIPS + SrI 2 (Eu) detector for atmospheric radioxenon monitoring

The PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is a prototype atmospheric radioxenon detection system designed at Oregon State University in support of international efforts towards monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon testing activities. This detector aims to address some shortcomings found in currently deployed beta–gamma atmospheric radioxenon detection systems, such as lackluster energy resolution and memory effect, by employing modern detection materials and readout. The system uses a PIPSBox, a silicon-based gas cell, for electron detection, and a pair of ultrabright, D-shaped SrI 2 (Eu) scintillators coupled to silicon photomultipliers for photon detection. A custom eight-channel digital pulse processor equipped with a field programmable gate-array (FPGA) identifies electron–photon coincidences between the volumes in near real-time. Gas samples of the four radioxenon isotopes of interest were independently measured with the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) detection system to determine energy resolution and efficiency. Application of FPGA-based coincidence discrimination in near real-time reduced the ambient background count rate by 95.85 ± 0.04%. Using parameters from the Xenon International gas processing unit and assuming a blank sample and zero memory effect the minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for the isotopes were calculated to be 0.12 ± 0.03, 0.27 ± 0.05, 0.15 ± 0.02, and 1.00 ± 0.08 mBq/m 3 air for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe, respectively. These MDC estimates compare well with other radioxenon detection systems employed in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and indicate that the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) sensitivity requirement of ≤ 1 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Analysis of measurements from an array of radioxenon samplers near to Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station

As part of a scientific research and development project, the radionuclide fingerprint of an operating advanced gas-cooled reactor 25 (AGR) has been studied across several facets (Goodwin et al., 2024). One part of this project was to deploy an array of 26 radioxenon samplers to the region for a period of around 1 year, to measure any radioxenon emissions from the reactors of the 27 Hartlepool nuclear power station at a range of tens of kilometres away. The array of 3 sensors was operational for around 12 28 months from March 2022 and detected many occurrences of isotopes of radioxenon. Here we provide a detailed analysis and 29 interpretation of the data and where possible, attribution of detections to a source or region. Whilst a key part of this work is to 30 measure any emissions of radioxenon from Hartlepool, this work presents one of the most comprehensive efforts to determine the 31 source of a great number of (mostly) 133Xe detections. A combination of different types of atmospheric dispersion modelling 32 techniques, including the use of stack monitoring data from nearby civil radioxenon-emitting nuclear facilities has enabled the 33 majority of detections to be attributed to one or more possible sources. Whilst emissions from Hartlepool have been detected on 34 the systems, the majority of detections are associated with a medical isotope production facility in Fleurus, Belgium (IRE).

Advanced gas-cooled reactor↗

A Tale of Two Rapidly Intensifying Supertyphoons: Hagibis (2019) and Haiyan (2013)

Devastating Japan in October 2019, Supertyphoon (STY) Hagibis was an important typhoon in the history of the Pacific. A striking feature of Hagibis was its explosive rapid intensification (RI). In 24 h, Hagibis intensified by 100 knots (kt; 1 kt ≈ 0.51 m s –1 ), making it one of the fastest-intensifying typhoons ever observed. After RI, Hagibis’s intensification stalled. Using the current typhoon intensity record holder, i.e., STY Haiyan (2013), as a benchmark, this work explores the intensity evolution differences of these two high-impact STYs. We found that the extremely high prestorm sea surface temperature reaching 30.5°C, deep/warm prestorm ocean heat content reaching 160 kJ cm –2 , fast forward storm motion of ~8 m s –1 , small during-storm ocean cooling effect of ~0.5°C, significant thunderstorm activity at its center, and rapid eyewall contraction were all important contributors to Hagibis’s impressive intensification. There was 36% more air–sea flux for Hagibis’s RI than for Haiyan’s. After its spectacular RI, Hagibis’s intensification stopped, despite favorable environments. Haiyan, by contrast, continued to intensify, reaching its record-breaking intensity of 170 kt. A key finding here is the multiple pathways that storm size affected the intensity evolution for both typhoons. After RI, Hagibis experienced a major size expansion, becoming the largest typhoon on record in the Pacific. This size enlargement, combined with a reduction in storm translational speed, induced stronger ocean cooling that reduced ocean flux and hindered intensification. Furthermore, the large storm size also contributed to slower eyewall replacement cycles (ERCs), which prolonged the negative impact of the ERC on intensification.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Validation of Methodology to Simulate Gamma Doses from Historical Weapons Tests

The United States tested nuclear weapons in the atmosphere (aboveground) from 1945 until 1963, when the nation became a signatory to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. During those tests, gamma doses were often measured within kilometers of the point of detonation. Additional gamma dose measurements were made in and around the location of any personnel conducting the test, possibly with personal dosimeters. These gamma dose measurements have been declassified to provide the personnel involved with an estimate of the total dose they received while involved with the aboveground testing program. Several years ago, interest in these gamma doses was renewed by organizations that would need to provide the public with dose estimates in the event of a radiological or nuclear weapon terrorist attack on the United States. This work provides an initial validation of the computational methods used to simulate dose from a radiological or nuclear weapon. This initial work will focus on dose from gamma rays. The sources of gamma rays from a nuclear weapon include prompt fission gammas, gammas generated via neutron interactions (capture, inelastic scattering, and activation), and gammas produced by the decay of fission products. All of these gamma ray sources for a nuclear weapon are also potential sources of gammas from a radiological weapon. However, the sources of gamma rays from a radiological weapon depend on the material present in the device, and prompt fission gammas will mostly come from spontaneous fission instead of induced fission. This paper focuses on validation using gamma ray dose measurements from nuclear detonations, which is adequate to validate the requisite transport methodologies, source term generation, and cross sections needed to model gamma doses delivered by most radiological weapons. The 1961 report on Operation Plumbbob provides an overview of how the total gamma dose delivered by a nuclear weapon is broken down by the different sources specified above. The prompt fission gamma rays contribute about 5% of the total gamma dose. The gamma rays produced by neutron interactions usually deliver the largest portion of the total gamma dose, which is typically between 55% and 85% of the total. The remainder of the total gamma ray dose is attributed to decay of fission products.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Nevada Test Site National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Calendar Year 2008

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is operated by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to under-ground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by winds) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF), an NTS support complex in the city of North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR, 2008a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility (e.g., the NTS) to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from other man-made sources such as medical treatments. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR, 2008a). At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide's concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2008, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.9 mrem/yr; well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six pseudo-critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61 (CFR, 2008a). Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 19 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the NTS boundary, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. Potential dose to the public from NLVF was also very low at 0.00006 mrem/yr; more than 160,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions, Calendar Year 2011

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. Radionuclides from the Fukushima nuclear power plant were detected at the NNSS in March 2011 and are discussed further in Section III. The NNSS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the EPA for use on the NNSS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide's concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2011, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NNSS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all air monitoring stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from less than 1% to a maximum of 12.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides about 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NNSS, dose to the public would be only a small fraction of the value measured on the NNSS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000024 mrem/yr, more than 400,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Stratospheric aerosol forcing for CMIP7 – Part 1: optical properties for pre-industrial, historical, and scenario simulations

Stratospheric aerosols, most of which originate from explosive volcanic sulfur emissions into the stratosphere, are a key natural driver of climate variability. They are thus a forcing provided by the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) Climate Forcings Task Team to climate modelling groups participating in phase 7 of CMIP. For the historical period, we provide two datasets covering 1750–2023: (i) a volcanic upper tropospheric-stratospheric sulfur emission dataset, documented in a companion paper; and (ii) a stratospheric sulfate aerosol optical property dataset, documented in this paper. For the satellite era (from 1979 onwards), stratospheric aerosol optical properties are derived from the Global Space-based Stratospheric Aerosol Climatology (GloSSAC) dataset. For the pre-satellite era (1750–1978), optical properties are derived from our volcanic SO 2 emission dataset using a new version of the reduced-complexity volcanic aerosol model Easy Volcanic Aerosol (Height) (EVA_H v2). A background, non-volcanic stratospheric aerosol climatology is derived from the 1998–2001 period with a trend over 1850–1978 accounting for increasing anthropogenic aerosols. A monthly stratospheric aerosol climatology is derived from the 1850–2021 average for both pre-industrial and scenario (future) simulations, with a 9-year ramp over 2022–2030 for scenario simulations to ensure a smooth transition from the historical period. CMIP7 simulations should use version 2.2.1 of our pre-industrial and historical datasets, and version 2.2.2 of our scenario dataset. Our methodology to produce historical aerosol optical properties significantly differs from CMIP6 for the pre-satellite era, and the resulting forcings in turn largely differ. In particular, the CMIP6 dataset was mostly based on the sparse and uncertain pyrheliometer record, which resulted in strongly underrepresented emissions from small-to-moderate magnitude eruptions. The resulting bias is addressed in CMIP7, which is entirely emission-derived in the pre-satellite era and uses more recent ice-core-based volcanic sulfur emission inventories than CMIP6. Our approach results in an overall larger volcanic aerosol forcing for CMIP7, with the 1850–2014 mean mid-visible global mean stratospheric aerosol optical depth (SAOD) in CMIP7 (0.0138) being 29 % higher than in CMIP6 (0.0107). The pre-industrial mean of the same variable is 26 % higher in CMIP7 (0.0135, derived from the historical 1850–2021) than CMIP6 (0.0107, derived from the historical 1850–2014 mean). Using a reduced-complexity climate model, we simulate a global mean surface temperature that is 0.07 °C colder for 1850–1900 when using the CMIP7 dataset instead of CMIP6, whereas 2000–2014 is 0.03 °C warmer in CMIP7. Our dataset also exhibits lower forcing for 1960–1980, resulting in temperatures 0.06 °C warmer when averaged over 1960–1990, a period for which CMIP6 climate models exhibit a cold bias. Given the large uncertainties characterizing the dataset, in particular for the pre-satellite era, we advise against treating the CMIP7 or CMIP6 dataset as uniquely superior for any specific year and highlight the need for further evaluation. We conclude the study by discussing sources of uncertainty for the dataset, future research avenues to improve it, as well as requirements to operationalize the production of the dataset, i.e. extend it and update it on an annual basis instead of every 5–7 years following CMIP cycles.

Aubry, Thomas J. [Univ. of Exeter, Devon (United K↗