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Evaluation of quantitative imaging methods for organ activity and residence time estimation using a population of phantoms having realistic variations in anatomy and uptake

Estimating organ residence times is an essential part of patient-specific dosimetry for radioimmunotherapy (RIT). Quantitative imaging methods for RIT are often evaluated using a single physical or simulated phantom but are intended to be applied clinically where there is variability in patient anatomy, biodistribution, and biokinetics. To provide a more relevant evaluation, the authors have thus developed a population of phantoms with realistic variations in these factors and applied it to the evaluation of quantitative imaging methods both to find the best method and to demonstrate the effects of these variations. Using whole body scans and SPECT/CT images, organ shapes and time-activity curves of 111In ibritumomab tiuxetan were measured in dosimetrically important organs in seven patients undergoing a high dose therapy regimen. Based on these measurements, we created a 3D NURBS-based cardiac-torso (NCAT)-based phantom population. SPECT and planar data at realistic count levels were then simulated using previously validated Monte Carlo simulation tools. The projections from the population were used to evaluate the accuracy and variation in accuracy of residence time estimation methods that used a time series of SPECT and planar scans. Quantitative SPECT (QSPECT) reconstruction methods were used that compensated for attenuation, scatter, and the collimator-detector response. Planar images were processed with a conventional (CPlanar) method that used geometric mean attenuation and triple-energy window scatter compensation and a quantitative planar (QPlanar) processing method that used model-based compensation for image degrading effects. Residence times were estimated from activity estimates made at each of five time points. The authors also evaluated hybrid methods that used CPlanar or QPlanar time-activity curves rescaled to the activity estimated from a single QSPECT image. The methods were evaluated in terms of mean relative error and standard deviation of the relative error in the residence time estimates taken over the phantom population. The mean errors in the residence time estimates over all the organs were <9.9% (pure QSPECT), <13.2% (pure QPLanar), <7.2% (hybrid QPlanar/QSPECT), <19.2% (hybrid CPlanar/QSPECT), and 7%-159% (pure CPlanar). The standard deviations of the errors for all the organs over all the phantoms were <9.9%, <11.9%, <10.8%, <22.0%, and <107.9% for the same methods, respectively. The processing methods differed both in terms of their average accuracy and the variation of the accuracy over the population of phantoms, thus demonstrating the importance of using a phantom population in evaluating quantitative imaging methods. Hybrid CPlanar/QSPECT provided improved accuracy compared to pure CPlanar and required the addition of only a single SPECT acquisition. The QPlanar or hybrid QPlanar/QSPECT methods had mean errors and standard deviations of errors that approached those of pure QSPECT while providing simplified image acquisition protocols, and thus may be more clinically practical.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Correlations between Texture Profile Analysis and Sensory Evaluation of Cured Largemouth Bass Meat (Micropterus salmoides)

Texture is an important factor in evaluating the quality of aquatic products. To evaluate the texture properties of cured large mouth bass, edible sodium chloride (0, 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0%) was smeared to the bass meat. Texture profile analysis (TPA) and sensory evaluation were performed to evaluate the quality of the cured samples, and the correlations of the indexes in the two methods were analyzed. Two principal components were obtained from the TPA indexes and sensory evaluation indexes, and the cumulative variance contribution rates were 73.87% and 72.99%, respectively. Results from the principal component analysis showed that the main indicators that affected the TPA were gumminess and springiness, while those that affected sensory evaluation were chewiness and adhesiveness. The TPA index and sensory evaluation could be effectively improved when the sodium chloride added to the bass meat was 1%. In the correlation analysis, sensory springiness was negatively correlated with TPA hardness ( P < 0.05 , r = −0.553) but positively correlated with TPA chewiness ( P < 0.05 , r = 0.596). After stepwise regression analysis, the prediction equation between the sensory springiness and TPA hardness was obtained as SSp=5.770−0.002Ha. These results provide a basis for predicting the quality of large mouth bass cured products.

Li, Meijin↗

Risk Evaluation for CO 2 Geosequestration in the Knox Supergroup, Illinois Basin (Final Report)

This report describes a process and provides seed information for identifying and evaluating risks pertinent to a hypothetical carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture and sequestration (CCS) project. In the envisioned project, the target sequestration reservoir rock is the Potosi Formation of the Knox Supergroup. The Potosi is identified as a potential target formation because (1) at least locally, it contains vuggy to cavernous layers that have very high porosity, and (2) it is present in areas where the deeper Mt. Simon Sandstone (a known potential reservoir unit) is absent or nonporous. The key report content is discussed in Section 3.3, which describes two lists of Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs) that should be considered during the design stage of such a project. These lists primarily highlight risk elements particular to the establishment of the Potosi as the target formation in general. The lists are consciously incomplete with respect to risk elements that would be relevant for essentially all CCS projects regardless of location or geology. In addition, other risk elements specific to a particular future project site would have to be identified. Sources for the FEPs and scenarios listed here include the iconic Quintessa FEPs list developed for the International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas (IEAGHG) Programme; previous risk evaluation projects executed by Schlumberger Carbon Services; and new input solicited from experts currently working on aspects of CCS in the Knox geology. The projects used as sources of risk information are primarily those that have targeted carbonate reservoir rocks similar in age, stratigraphy, and mineralogy to the Knox-Potosi. Risks of using the Potosi Formation as the target sequestration reservoir for a CCS project include uncertainties about the levels of porosity and permeability of that rock unit; the lateral consistency and continuity of those properties; and the ability of the project team to identify suitable (i.e., persistently porous and permeable) injection depths within the overall formation. Less direct implications include the vertical position of the Potosi within the rock column and the absence of a laterally extensive shale caprock immediately overlying the Potosi. Based on modeling work done partly in association with this risk report, risks that should also be evaluated include the ability of available methods to predict and track the development of a CO 2 plume as it migrates away from the injection point(s). The geologic and hydrodynamic uncertainties present risks that are compounded at the stage of acquiring necessary drilling and injection permits. It is anticipated that, in the future, a regional geologic study or CO 2 -emitter request may identify a small specific area as a prospective CCS project site. At that point, the FEPs lists provided in this report should be evaluated by experts for their relative levels of risk. A procedure for this evaluation is provided. The higher-risk FEPs should then be used to write project-specific scenarios that may themselves be evaluated for risk. Then, actions to reduce and to manage risk can be described and undertaken. The FEPs lists provided as Appendix 2 should not be considered complete, as potentially the most important risks are ones that have not yet been thought of. But these lists are intended to include the most important risk elements pertinent to a Potosi-target CCS project, and they provide a good starting point for diligent risk identification, evaluation, and management.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: Characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State staff, State Regional Group representatives, a Tribal representative, and a Federal Railroad Administration representative have participated in nine of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 13 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Report on an Assessment of the Application of EPP Results from the Strain Limit Evaluation Procedure to the Prediction of Cyclic Life Based on the SMT Methodology

The goal of the proposed integrated Elastic Perfectly-Plastic (EPP) and Simplified Model Test (SMT) methodology is to incorporate an SMT data based approach for creep-fatigue damage evaluation into the EPP methodology to avoid the separate evaluation of creep and fatigue damage and eliminate the requirement for stress classification in current methods; thus greatly simplifying evaluation of elevated temperature cyclic service. This methodology should minimize over-conservatism while properly accounting for localized defects and stress risers. To support the implementation of the proposed methodology and to verify the applicability of the code rules, analytical studies and evaluation of thermomechanical test results continued in FY17. This report presents the results of those studies. An EPP strain limits methodology assessment was based on recent two-bar thermal ratcheting test results on 316H stainless steel in the temperature range of 405 to 7050C. Strain range predictions from the EPP evaluation of the two-bar tests were also evaluated and compared with the experimental results. The role of sustained primary loading on cyclic life was assessed using the results of pressurized SMT data from tests on Alloy 617 at 9500C. A viscoplastic material model was used in an analytic simulation of two-bar tests to compare with EPP strain limits assessments using isochronous stress strain curves that are consistent with the viscoplastic material model. A finite element model of a prior 304H stainless steel Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) nozzle-to-sphere test was developed and used for an EPP strain limits and creep-fatigue code case damage evaluations. A theoretical treatment of a recurring issue with convergence criteria for plastic shakedown illustrated the role of computer machine precision in EPP calculations.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Zero-Emission Bus Evaluation Results: County Connection Battery Electric Buses

The U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Federal Transit Administration (FTA) supports the research, development, and demonstration of low- and zero-emission technology for transit buses. FTA funds research projects with a goal of facilitating commercialization of advanced technologies for transit buses that will increase efficiency and improve transit operations. DOT's Research, Development, and Technology Office (OST-R) also has an interest in zero-emission bus (ZEB) technology deployment and commercialization. OST-R is coordinating and collaborating with FTA on the evaluation process and results by providing funding to cover additional evaluations. FTA and OST-R are collaborating with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and DOE's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to conduct in-service evaluations of advanced technology buses developed under its programs. NREL uses a standard evaluation protocol for evaluating the advanced technologies deployed under the FTA programs. FTA seeks to provide results from new technologies being adopted by transit agencies. The eight evaluations selected to date include battery electric buses (BEBs) and fuel cell electric buses (FCEBs) from different manufacturers operating in fleets located in both cold and hot climates. The purpose of this report is to present the results from Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (County Connection) deployment of four BEBs in Concord, California. NREL's evaluation of the BEBs at County Connection was funded by OST-R.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Evaluation of Neutron Absorbers in the DOE Standardized SNF Canister

The goal of this evaluation was to evaluate different options for a neutron absorber in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standardized spent nuclear fuel (SNF) Canister. This was accomplished by taking the two most relevant criticality evaluations and replacing the advanced neutron absorber (ANA) basket material with borated stainless steel. This work was initiated, because alternative storage options for DOE SNF has become a priority for DOE. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is initiating activities to ensure the continued operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) by providing alternative and redundant storage options for spent ATR fuel. In addition, the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) has recently initiated studies to understand and improve the technical basis for long-term dry storage of aluminum clad SNF (e.g., ATR, High Flux Isotope Reactor [HFIR]) (Connolly 2018). While currently in the lab-scale phase, the next step involves validation and verification (V&V) of the lab-scale results. One method to perform V&V is to load aluminum-clad spent fuel in an instrumented DOE Standardized SNF Canister as a demonstration. In order to minimize the need for repackaging before disposal and to provide a representative environment in a demonstration, the fuel is planned to be loaded with an appropriate criticality control mechanism, such as neutron absorbing basket material. While ANA was originally selected as the basket material for ATR fuel in the Yucca Mountain Repository, it has never been produced on a large scale. Therefore, incorporating this material in the DOE Standardized SNF Canister as part of a near-term demonstration could be more challenging than moving forward with a commercially available material, such as borated stainless steel. Past evaluations eliminated borated stainless steel as a long-term neutron absorbing material, because it corroded too quickly and may not always remain in the waste package after degradation. This led to the invention and selection of ANA for use as the basket material in the DOE Standardized SNF Canister. After selecting ANA, new corrosion tests were performed on borated stainless steel using a different method for fabrication. This method of fabrication significantly improved the corrosion resistance properties of borated stainless steel, so much so that it out-performed ANA in corrosion testing. Researchers used the information obtained from these tests to select borated stainless steel as the neutron absorber in the Transportation, Aging, and Disposal Canister (TAD) designed for commercial SNF. This evaluation compares the criticality control of borated stainless steel to ANA. In every case and scenario, the calculated effective neutron multiplication factor (k eff ) using a borated stainless steel basket was lower than that using an ANA basket, though the borated stainless steel must be thicker due to corrosion effects over the regulatory time period. Although the borated stainless steel performed better than the ANA, it still required additional neutron-absorbing material, gadolinium shot, for the calculated k eff to fall below the upper critical limit of 0.93 in a few cases evaluated. More research using thicker baskets or inserts could be performed in an attempt to lower the k eff without the use of gadolinium shot. In addition, a reevaluation of the degraded ATR material used in the previous evaluations may prove that the original assumptions were over-conservative.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 14 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State representatives, State Regional Group representatives, Tribal representatives, and a Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in eleven of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 14 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Palisades, Pilgrim, Three Mile Island, Oyster Creek, Indian Point, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Including Chi-Nu 235 U PFNS Experimental Data into an ENDF/B-VIII.1 Release Candidate Evaluation

This report documents an evaluation of 235 U prompt fission neutron spectra (PFNS) that is a release candidate for the upcoming U.S. nuclear data library, ENDF/B-VIII.1. This evaluation differs from its predecessor, ENDF/B-VIII.0, mainly by the inclusion of 235 U PFNS measured by the Chi-Nu team of LANL and LLNL. This data set is the first one that covers the 235 U PFNS for continuous incident-neutron energies of 1⁻20 MeV and outgoing-neutron energies from 10 keV⁻10 MeV with high precision. Previous data sets were either measured in a limited energy range or with less precision. Hence, these new Chi-Nu data provide decisive information for the evaluation. The resulting evaluated data correspond well to the new experimental PFNS. The evaluated PFNS also produce average mean energies and 239 Pu/ 235 U PFNS in agreement with associated Chi-Nu data. If one uses the new evaluated data to predict the neutron multiplication factor, k eff , of selected ICSBEP critical assemblies, the differences of simulated values compared to those using ENDF/B-VIII.0 is modest (less than 55 pcm). This difference in k eff can be easily accommodated by changes in the 235 U average prompt fission neutron multiplicity that is currently being re-evaluated. In addition to that, the new PFNS predict on average 235 U LLNL pulsed-sphere neutron-leakage spectra better than ENDF/B-VIIII.0 PFNS.

235U↗

Producing ENDF/B-quality Evaluations of 239 Pu(n,f) and 235 U(n,f) Average Prompt Neutron Multiplicities using the CGMF Model

This report documents evaluations of the neutron-induced 239 Pu and 235 U average prompt neutron multiplicities, $\overline{v}_p$, using the CGMF model developed at LANL. These evaluations are not updates of existing ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data, but were both re-done from "scratch". That is, all experimental data were extracted from EXFOR, re-normalized to the newest nuclear data representing monitor observables, and detailed uncertainties were estimated from information in EXFOR as well as from templates of expected measurement uncertainties. We also included experimental data that were not yet available for ENDF/B-VIII.0, for instance, the data of Marini et al. for 239 Pu(n,f) $\overline{v}_p$ or the data of Khoklov et al. for 235 U(n,f) $\overline{v}_p$. Finally, we include the CGMF model; it computes $\overline{v}_p$ based on model parameters that at the same time calculate fission fragments as a function of mass, Y (A), the average total kinetic energy as a function of incident-neutron energy, $\langle TKE \rangle$(E inc ), etc. Such a detailed fission model that ties together many fission quantities has not been used to date for any $\overline{v}_p$ evaluation in ENDF/B. Here, we show that we can get evaluated 235 U(n,f) and 239 Pu $\overline{v}_p$ that not only correspond well to experimental $\overline{v}_p$, but that the associated evaluated model parameters also yield parameterizations of Y (A), $\langle TKE \rangle$(E inc ), etc., that correspond well to their respective experimental data. The new evaluated 239 Pu(n,f) $\overline{v}_p$ was also combined into a 239 Pu test file with the newest nuclear data for the 239 Pu prompt-fission neutron spectrum and fission cross sections. This new 239 Pu file performed reasonably well in predicting PU-MET-FAST assemblies, reaction rates in Jezebel and Flattop and three LLNL pulsed spheres. Due to that, the new 239 Pu(n,f) $\overline{v}_p$ evaluation presented here is being considered for ENDF/B-VIII.1. Hence, we can show here that CGMF is able to produce ENDF/B quality $\overline{v}_p$ nuclear data.

239Pu, 235U, Average Prompt-fission Neutron Multip↗

Consistent Evaluation of the Prompt-fission Neutron Spectrum and Multiplicity for n+ 235,238 U and n+ 239 Pu

This report was written to satisfy a FY20 NCSP milestone on 235,238 U and 239 Pu. The milestone requires to “finalize a report assessing our methodology to evaluate prompt-fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) and multiplicity consistently”. More specifically, we study whether the code CGMF can reproduce ENDF/B-VIII.0 evaluated PFNS and average prompt-fission neutron multiplicities, $\bar{v}$, for 235,238 U and 239 Pu using one joint parameter set per isotope. If CGMF is shown to be able to reasonably reproduce ENDF/B-VIII.0 within its model-parameter space, this code could be used for future consistent evaluations of PFNS and $\bar{v}$. To answer this question, we explore here the parameter space of CGMF and its impact on calculated values and whether they are close to evaluated and experimental data. We also list experimental data that would enter a future evaluation and statistics method that could be used to obtain evaluated data and covariances. We conclude that values of $\bar{v}$ calculated by CGMF are reasonably close to ENDF/B-VIII.0 data, while more work on modeling the PFNS is needed (parameter optimization and model improvements) to reliably use it for evaluations.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Consistent $\overline{ν}$ evaluation for minor Pu isotopes with CGMF

This report follows up on the evaluation work done in 2023 where we developed a procedure and performed the first consistent evaluation of the average prompt neutron multiplicity for minor Pu isotopes, including 238,240-242 Pu, using CGMF. Details on the necessary updates to the release version of CGMF, the experimental data and experimental uncertainty quantification that went into the evaluation, and this first evaluation effort are documented in and will not be repeated in this report. Instead, we discuss here the further investigations into the CGMF model space to improve the evaluation results from FY23. Additionally, we note that these evaluation results have been transformed into the ENDF format for mean values and covariances, and validation with critical assemblies has been performed; that work is documented elsewhere. In this short report, we discuss the updated evaluation efforts performed during FY24 in Sec. 2, show results from CGMF for other prompt fission observables in Sec. 3, and then briefly conclude in Sec. 4.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Evaluation of high-voltage, high-power, solid-state remote power controllers for amps

The Electrical Power Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center has a Power System Development Facility where various power circuit breadboards are tested and evaluated. This project relates to the evaluation of a particular remote power controller (RPC) energizing high power loads. The Facility equipment permits the thorough testing and evaluation of high-voltage, high-power solid-state remote power controllers. The purpose is to evaluate a Type E, 30 Ampere, 200 V dc remote power controller. Three phases of the RPC evaluation are presented. The RPC is evaluated within a low-voltage, low-power circuit to check its operational capability. The RPC is then evaluated while performing switch/circuit breaker functions within a 200 V dc, 30 Ampere power circuit. The final effort of the project relates to the recommended procedures for installing these RPC's into the existing Autonomously Managed Power System (AMPS) breadboard/test facility at MSFC.

Callis, Charles P.↗

Evaluation of NASA space grant consortia programs

The meaningful evaluation of the NASA Space Grant Consortium and Fellowship Programs must overcome unusual difficulties: (1) the program, in its infancy, is undergoing dynamic change; (2) the several state consortia and universities have widely divergent parochial goals that defy a uniform evaluative process; and (3) the pilot-sized consortium programs require that the evaluative process be economical in human costs less the process of evaluation comprise the effectiveness of the programs they are meant to assess. This paper represents an attempt to assess the context in which evaluation is to be conducted, the goals and limitations inherent to the evaluation, and to recommend appropriate guidelines for evaluation.

Eisenberg, Martin A.↗

Postflight hardware evaluation 360T025 (RSRM-25, STS-46)

The final report for the Clearfield disassembly evaluation and a continuation of the KSC postflight assessment for the 360T025 (STS-46) Redesign Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) flight set is presented. All observed hardware conditions were documented on PFOR's and are included in Appendices A through C. Appendices D and E contain the measurements and safety factor data for the nozzle and insulation components. Along with the KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report (TWR-60687), a summary of the 360T025 hardware evaluation is provided. The as-flown hardware configuration is documented in TWR-60470. Disassembly evaluation photograph numbers are logged in TWA-1986. The 360T025 flight set disassembly evaluations described were performed at the RSRM Refurbishment Facility in Clearfield, Utah. The final factory joint demate occurred on 16 Mar. 1993. Detailed evaluations were performed in accordance with the Clearfield PEEP, TWR-50051, Revision A. All observations were compared against limits that are also defined in the PEEP. These limits outline the criteria for categorizing the observations as acceptable, reportable, or critical. Hardware conditions that were unexpected and/or determined to be reportable or critical were evaluated by the applicable CPT and tracked through the PFAR system.

Morgan, Ferral↗

Postflight hardware evaluation (RSRM-29, STS-54)

This document is the final report for the Clearfield disassembly evaluation and a continuation of the KSC postflight assessment for the RSRM-29 flight set. All observed hardware conditions were documented on PFOR's and are included in Appendices A, B, and C. Appendices D and E contain the measurements and safety factor data for the nozzle and insulation components. This report, along with the KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report (TWR-64221), represents a summary of the RSRM-29 hardware evaluation. Disassembly evaluation photograph numbers are logged in TWA-1990. The RSRM-29 flight set disassembly evaluations described in this document were performed at the RSRM Refurbishment Facility in Clearfield, Utah. The final factory joint demate occurred on September 9, 1993. Detailed evaluations were performed in accordance with the Clearfield PEEP, TWR-50051, Revision A. All observations were compared against limits that are also defined in the PEEP. These limits outline the criteria for categorizing the observations as acceptable, reportable, or critical. Hardware conditions that were unexpected and/or determined to be reportable or critical were evaluated by the applicable CPT and tracked through the PFAR system.

Source record↗

Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) glove evaluation test protocol

One of the most critical components of a space suit is the gloves, yet gloves have traditionally presented significant design challenges. With continued efforts at glove development, a method for evaluating glove performance is needed. This paper presents a pressure-glove evaluation protocol. A description of this evaluation protocol, and its development is provided. The protocol allows comparison of one glove design to another, or any one design to bare-handed performance. Gloves for higher pressure suits may be evaluated at current and future design pressures to drive out differences in performance due to pressure effects. Using this protocol, gloves may be evaluated during design to drive out design problems and determine areas for improvement, or fully mature designs may be evaluated with respect to mission requirements. Several different test configurations are presented to handle these cases. This protocol was run on a prototype glove. The prototype was evaluated at two operating pressures and in the unpressurized state, with results compared to bare-handed performance. Results and analysis from this test series are provided, as is a description of the configuration used for this test.

Hinman-Sweeney, E. M.↗