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Activities in support of continuing the service of nuclear power plant concrete structures

In general, nuclear power plant concrete structure s performance has been very good; however, aging of concrete structures occurs with the passage of time that can potentially result in degradation if is effects are not controlled. Safety-related nuclear power plant concrete structures are described. In-service inspection and testing requirements in the U.S. are summarized. The interaction of the license renewal process and concrete structures is noted. A summary of operating experience related to aging of nuclear power plant concrete structures is provided. Several candidate areas are identified where additional research would be beneficial for aging management of nuclear power plant concrete structures. Finally, an update on recent activities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory related to aging management of nuclear power plant concrete structures is provided.

aging↗

An arc control and protection system for the JET lower hybrid antenna based on an imaging system

Arcs are the potentially most dangerous events related to Lower Hybrid (LH) antenna operation. If left uncontrolled they can produce damage and cause plasma disruption by impurity influx. To address this issue an arc real time control and protection imaging system for the Joint European Torus (JET) LH antenna has been implemented. The LH system is one of the additional heating systems at JET. It comprises 24 microwave generators (klystrons, operating at 3.7 GHz) providing up to 5 MW of heating and current drive to the JET plasma. This is done through an antenna composed of an array of waveguides facing the plasma. The protection system presented here is based primarily on an imaging arc detection and real time control system. It has adapted the ITER like wall hotspot protection system using an identical CCD camera and real time image processing unit. A filter has been installed to avoid saturation and spurious system triggers caused by ionization light. The antenna is divided in 24 Regions Of Interest (ROIs) each one corresponding to one klystron. If an arc precursor is detected in a ROI, power is reduced locally with subsequent potential damage and plasma disruption avoided. The power is subsequently reinstated if, during a defined interval of time, arcing is confirmed not to be present by image analysis. This system was successfully commissioned during the restart phase and beginning of the 2013 scientific campaign. Since its installation and commissioning, arcs and related phenomena have been prevented. In this contribution we briefly describe the camera, image processing, and real time control systems. Most importantly, we demonstrate that an LH antenna arc protection system based on CCD camera imaging systems works. Examples of both controlled and uncontrolled LH arc events and their consequences are shown.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improving Operational Efficiency, Compliance and Community Perception with Real-time Data - 19260

The nuclear and medical radiation industry has always faced a significant burden in effectively balancing exposure and productivity. Maintenance operations and development of new techniques require significant staffing resources to monitor and review personnel exposures and changes in operational radiation levels. Currently utilised monitoring technology and review techniques remain unchanged since the 1950's, relying upon mostly analogue instrumentation and paper reporting. After utilising isolated-area monitoring during a reactor decommissioning project it became apparent that current systems created false assurance as the units continually failed without warning due to 'dirty' power. These instrument failures could have easily led to an unnecessary exposure while operators continued to assume they were being safely monitored. This paper is a philosophical discussion on how current shortcomings could be addressed, security increased, and exposure risks minimised, by utilising real-time monitoring and automated reporting. The community and media expectations of reported data and nuclear monitoring systems continue to be coloured by sensational technology seen in movies and emerging technology available through smart homes and smart cities initiatives. For the general public to be more engaged with real radiation levels and effects, the nuclear industry needs to more effectively communicate safe levels. Organisations can have regain control of exposure levels discussions through the controlled release of background and expected exposure level data. An increase in real world monitoring data communicated in a controlled and more effective way will aid in the general public accepting, and being educated about, the minimal increase above natural background levels of the nuclear industry and other radiation facilities. This is particularly as Australia is in the process of implementing its Nuclear Waste Facility, with community acceptance the number one inhibitor of being able to move forward. Storage, mobile assets, and processing all present unique management, security, exposure, and telemetry challenges for a facility operations manager. Active monitoring and automated review of the monitoring data can alert operators to any unexpected events before any resultant increases in radiation levels cause an unplanned exposure to operators or the environment. Integration of radiation monitoring data with global positioning telemetry enables better organisational awareness of mobile asset location and early detection of any potential shifting and reduction in shielding integrity of sources and encapsulated waste during transport. Additionally, the real-time monitoring can be set-up to enhance an organisations' or nation's security capabilities. For instance, the real time monitor will send an automated alert in the case of an unexpected movement of a source through a monitored facility or for an unscheduled movement of a monitored vehicle. There are further benefits to be gained in control, ALARA principles and effluent management by increasing real-time monitoring capabilities through the stages of the waste cycle. Increasing operational effectiveness while delivering operational cost savings sounds like an attractive proposition. With increased access to operational area radiation data comes drastically improved real-time management of exposures for new, and experimental practices. Increased live data can be utilised to identify optimum practices for reducing operational and environmental exposures or releases. This increased operational data effectively comes with the added benefit of a reduction in the required health physics personnel resources for general operations. By reducing exposure and the detachment of required health physics resources from routine operations, there is greater availability for these resources to support maintenance operations and project-based work. The review of this increased data will create internal capability to identify low-- and high-risk activities, resulting in the ability to reduce the number of highly skilled workers in an industry where the availability of this talent is declining. During my time as the Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security Manager at a research facility, I implemented a real-time monitoring system. The system identified a secondary risk that had previously been unidentified and posed a higher exposure and security risk than the radiation practice being monitored. What stops industry from implementing technology that encourages agile work practices, while minimising security risks and personnel exposure? (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Korean Localization Program for Performance Verification Test of APR1400's RCP

The Korean government together with the Korean nuclear society completed the development of technologies for the design, manufacturing, and performance verification test of the APR1400's Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) as one of the national programs for the localization of deficient nuclear technology. The RCP localization program was driven by KAERI, which was responsible for the development of the performance verification and evaluation technology, and by DOOSAN heavy industrial company, which was in charge of the design and manufacturing of the RCP. The test facility for the localized APR1400's RCP was constructed at the KAERI site at the end of 2012. The thermal hydraulic and electric capability of the RCP test facility (RCPTF) covers up to 18.5 MPa, 343 deg. C, 11.7 m{sup 3}/s, and 14.0 MW for the design pressure, temperature, flow rate, and maximum electric power, respectively. In 2013, a commissioning test was performed to verify its designed capability, followed by several modifications in the RCPTF including signal processing and control logic to enhance the verification and evaluation capability of the RCP performance. After finishing the commissioning and modification of the RCPTF, a type test for the new-type of RCP was performed successfully. In 2014 and 2015, eight production tests for the localized RCPs, which will be installed in a commercial nuclear power plant in Korea, were successfully completed. As a final stage of the localization program of the RCP, KAERI will perform a seal LOCA test to verify the leakage characteristics and produce experimental data on the localized seal assembly for a safety analysis during a station black out (SBO) condition. In this summary, several technical issues developed through a series of research processes for a performance verification test of the localized RCP are described.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Stratgies for Diversity Usage to Mitigate Postulated Common Cause Failure Vulnerabilities

This paper describes an approach to establish effective mitigating strategies that can resolve potential common-cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities in instrumentation and control systems at nuclear power plants. A particular objective in the development of these strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria, is to address the unique characteristics of digital technology that can contribute to CCF concerns. The research approach employed to establish diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on diversity usage and experience from nuclear power and non-nuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of common practices, and assessment of the nature of CCFs and compensating diversity attributes. The resulting diversity strategies address considerations such as the effect of technology choices, the nature of CCF vulnerabilities, and the prospective impact of each diversity type. In particular, the impact of each attribute and criterion on the purpose, process, product, and performance aspects of diverse systems are considered.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Vattenfall Decommissioning Planning in Sweden - 17544

A rapid decrease in the power prices in the Nordic market for the last three years has drastically reduced the profitability of the nuclear power plants in Sweden. This has resulted in a very quick re-evaluation of the optimal life-term of the older generation, from the 1970's, nuclear units in Sweden. Hence, it was decided last year to shut-down the Vattenfall Ringhals-1 BWR and the Ringhals-2 PWR by 2020 and 2019, respectively, for financial reasons. Before that decision, the planning had been to operate the units until 50 years life-time, i.e. 2024 and 2025. This decision resulted in a prompt start of the planning for decommissioning of the two units. The planning started with a project, called AVANS, to ensure that the overall planning and to-be-developed organisations had well defined requirements and a common platform. Another project, STURE, was started to ensure the continued operation and in some case movement of common site functions to the two younger units on the Ringhals site, i.e. the PWRs Ringhals-3 and Ringhals-4. This project also has the responsibility to optimise operation of Ringhals-1 and Ringhals-2 to EOL and the subsequent removal of the nuclear fuel from the units after necessary cool-down. A third project started is the actual decommissioning project, TYKO, benefiting from experience gained and staff involved in still ongoing decommissioning of a legacy materials reactor, i.e. the Studsvik R2/R2-0 reactor. The planning and experience to date for the three projects will be presented in the paper, as well as lessons-learned and future plans, including some critical items identified wrt dismantling and site function transfer. Half of the nuclear units in Sweden, six units, and one legacy power reactor, will be starting decommissioning within the next few years. Impacts on the back-end system; the financial situation, with respect to the state-controlled financial funding; and the supplier market are discussed in the paper. Furthermore, the planning process and the planned management of the interfaces between the involved organisations is described. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Stereotactic Ablative Radiation Therapy for Subcentimeter Lung Tumors: Clinical, Dosimetric, and Image Guidance Considerations

Purpose: Use of stereotactic ablative radiation therapy (SABR) for subcentimeter lung tumors is controversial. We report our outcomes for tumors with diameter ≤1 cm and their visibility on cone beam computed tomography (CBCT) scans and retrospectively evaluate the planned dose using a deterministic dose calculation algorithm (Acuros XB [AXB]). Methods and Materials: We identified subcentimeter tumors from our institutional SABR database. Tumor size was remeasured on an artifact-free phase of the planning 4-dimensional (4D)-CT. Clinical plan doses were generated using either a pencil beam convolution or an anisotropic analytic algorithm (AAA). All AAA plans were recalculated using AXB, and differences among D95 and mean dose for internal target volume (ITV) and planning target volume (PTV) on the average intensity CT dataset, as well as for gross tumor volume (GTV) on the end respiratory phases were reported. For all AAA patients, CBCT scans acquired during each treatment fraction were evaluated for target visibility. Progression-free and overall survival rates were calculated using the Kaplan-Meier method. Results: Thirty-five patients with 37 subcentimeter tumors were eligible for analysis. For the 22 AAA plans recalculated using AXB, Mean D95 ± SD values were 2.2 ± 4.4% (ITV) and 2.5 ± 4.8% (PTV) lower using AXB; whereas mean doses were 2.9 ± 4.9% (ITV) and 3.7 ± 5.1% (PTV) lower. Calculated AXB doses were significantly lower in one patient (difference in mean ITV and PTV doses, as well as in mean ITV and PTV D95 ranged from 22%-24%). However, the end respiratory phase GTV received at least 95% of the prescription dose. Review of 92 CBCT scans from all AAA patients revealed that the tumor was visualized in 82 images, and its position could be inferred in other images. The 2-year local progression-free survival was 100%. Conclusions: Patients with subcentimeter lung tumors are good candidates for SABR, given the dosimetry, ability to localize tumors with image guidance, and excellent local control.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

The overview in safety review of human factors engineering and control room design in chinese AP1000 nuclear power plant - 174

The first AP1000 nuclear power plant is constructed in Sanmen county in Zhejiang Province in China, which has creative and distinctive design characteristics. Human factors engineering disciplines are applied to the design of the AP1000. In addition to the elements of the program review model(including human factors engineering program management, operating experience review, functional requirements analysis and allocation, task analysis, staffing, integration of human reliability analysis with human factors engineering, human system interface design, procedure development, training program development, human system interface verification and validation, design implementation, human performance monitoring),the minimum inventory of controls, displays, and alarms present in the main control room and at the remote shutdown workstation. These contents mentioned above are reviewed according to standards, rules and regulations. This article introduces review process, and several important issues during the reviewing are described in detail. These issues include many elements, such as operating experience review, task analysis, human system interface design, verification and validation,and so on. This paper emphasizes on the main control room design(including environment and layout). Background noise in the actual main control room may exceed too much to design value. Another important issue is about main control room habitability systems(VES) changes to satisfy post-actuation performance requirements in AP1000 design change proposal. All the wall panel displays will be closed in this design change proposal. Review process and proposal are described in the paper. Since the AP1000 unit in China is the first constructed all over the world, verification and validation are especially important and necessary. The plan of verification and validation, the results summary report of verification and validation, the report of human engineering discrepancies are focus attention. Verification and validation in human factors engineering include HSI task support verification, HFE design verification and integrated system validation. This paper introduces the review process of verification and validation, the issues found in verification and validation. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Design and implementation of safety channels for the Idaho State University AGN-201m research reactor control console - 216

The purpose of the work described in this paper is to design, implement, and install new safety channels for the control console of the Idaho State University (ISU) AGN-201m Research Reactor. These channels will replace the current vacuum-tube driven system, which has been in operation for over 50 years at the ISU nuclear engineering laboratory. Due to the aging issues associated with this technology an entirely new control console is needed. There are 3 safety channels which serve as the monitors and safety systems for adequately shutting down the reactor should any limits be broken. These 3 safety channels work harmoniously with other systems within the new control console to ensure appropriate operation of the reactor. The safety channel replacements are composed of three complementary signal processing systems whose circuits monitor the operating parameters of the reactor. The key reactor information is shown on several independent meters corresponding to each of the three safety channels. Finally, the reactor trip points are set to correspond with the standards promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to ensure safe operation of the ISU AGN-201m Research Reactor. The interconnections between each of these systems ensure that if any Channel fails or otherwise breaks a limit the entire system will initiate a scram and the reactor will become adequately sub-critical. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Porous Chromatographic Materials as Substrates for Preparing Synthetic Nuclear Explosion Debris Particles

In this study, we investigated several porous chromatographic materials as synthetic substrates for preparing surrogate nuclear explosion debris particles. The resulting synthetic debris materials are of interest for use in developing analytical methods. Eighteen metals, including some of forensic interest, were loaded onto materials by immersing them in metal solutions (556 mg/L of each metal) to fill the pores, applying gentle heat (110°C) to drive off water, and then treating them at high temperatures (up to 800°C) in air to form less soluble metal species. High-boiling-point metals were uniformly loaded on spherical controlled-pore glass to emulate early fallout, whereas low-boiling-point metals were loaded on core-shell silica to represent coated particles formed later in the nuclear fallout-formation process. Analytical studies were applied to characterize solubility, material balance, and formation of recalcitrant species. Dissolution experiments indicated loading was 1.5 to 3 times higher than expected from the pore volume alone, a result attributed to surface coating. Analysis of load solutions before and after filling the material pores revealed that most metals were passively loaded; that is, solutions filled the pores without active metal discrimination. However, niobium and tin concentrations were lower in solutions after pore filling, and were found in elevated concentrations in the final products, indicating some metals were selectively loaded. High-temperature treatments caused reduced solubility of several metal species, and loss of some metals (rhenium and tellurium) because volatile species were formed. Sample preparation reproducibility was high (the inter-batch relative standard deviation was 7.8%, and the intra-batch relative standard deviation was 0.84%) indicating that this material is suitable for use as a working standard for analytical methods development. We anticipate future standardized radionuclide-loaded materials will find use in radioanalytical methods development and/or serve as a starting material for the synthesis of more complex forms of nuclear explosion debris (e.g., Trinitite).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A method to select human-system interfaces for nuclear power plants

The new generation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) will likely make use of state-of-the-art technologies in many areas of the plant. The analysis, design, and selection of advanced human–system interfaces (HSIs) constitute an important part of power plant engineering. Designers need to consider the new capabilities afforded by these technologies in the context of current regulations and new operational concepts, which is why they need a more rigorous method by which to plan the introduction of advanced HSIs in NPP work areas. Much of current human factors research stops at the user interface and fails to provide a definitive process for integration of end user devices with instrumentation and control (I&C) and operational concepts. The current lack of a clear definition of HSI technology, including the process for integration, makes characterization and implementation of new and advanced HSIs difficult. This paper describes how new design concepts in the nuclear industry can be analyzed and how HSI technologies associated with new industrial processes might be considered. Furthermore, it also describes a basis for an understanding of human as well as technology characteristics that could be incorporated into a prioritization scheme for technology selection and deployment plans.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Sensor Fusion: Comprehensive Real-Time, On-Line Monitoring for Process Control via Visible, Near-Infrared, and Raman Spectroscopy

On-line monitoring based on optical spectroscopy provides unprecedented insight into the chemical composition of process streams or batches. Amplifying this approach through utilizing multiple forms of optical spectroscopy in sensor fusion can greatly expand the number and type of chemical species that can be identified and quantified. This is demonstrated herein, on the analysis of used nuclear fuel recycling streams: highly complex processes with multiple target and interfering analytes. The optical techniques of visible absorbance, near infrared absorbance, and Raman spectroscopy were combined to quantify plutonium (III, IV, VI), uranium (IV, VI), neptunium (IV, V, VI), and nitric acid. Chemometric modeling was used to quantify analytes in process streams in real-time and results were successfully used to enable immediate process control and generation of a product stream at a set composition ratio. This represents a significant step forward in the ability to monitor and control complex chemical processes occurring in harsh chemical environments.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Characterization of high level nuclear waste glass samples following extended melter idling

The Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) melter was recently idled with glass remaining in the melt pool and riser for approximately three months. This situation presented a unique opportunity to collect and analyze glass samples since outages of this duration are uncommon. The objective of this study was to obtain insight into the potential for crystal formation in the glass resulting from an extended idling period. The results will be used to support development of a crystal-tolerant approach for operation of the high-level waste melter at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Two glass pour stream samples were collected from DWPF when the melter was restarted after idling for three months. The samples did not contain crystallization that was detectible by X-ray diffraction. Electron microscopy identified occasional spinel and noble metal crystals of no practical significance. Occasional platinum particles were observed by microscopy as an artifact of the sample collection method. Reduction/oxidation measurements showed that the pour stream glasses were fully oxidized, which was expected after the extended idling period. Chemical analysis of the pour stream glasses revealed slight differences in the concentrations of some oxides relative to analyses of the melter feed composition prior to the idling period. While these differences may be within the analytical error of the laboratories, the trends indicate that there may have been some amount of volatility associated with some of the glass components, and that there may have been interaction of the glass with the refractory components of the melter. These changes in composition, although small, can be attributed to the idling of the melter for an extended period. The changes in glass composition resulted in a 70-100 °C increase in the predicted spinel liquidus temperature (TL) for the pour stream glass samples relative to the analysis of the melter feed prior to the outage. This indicates that the potential for spinel crystallization increased as a result of idling for an extended period. However, the predicted TL of the pour stream glasses remained 150-200 °C below the mean melt pool temperature of about 1125 °C during the idling period. Given the change in predicted TL over the three month outage, the results indicate that it is important to have a thorough understanding of spinel crystallization within the melter for WTP to operate with a volume percent crystallization constraint. This knowledge will enable process control routines to be developed that avoid bulk crystallization in the melter and allow for recovery from off-normal events. The current WTP crystal-tolerant glass program will develop an improved understanding of spinel crystallization in the WTP melter to allow for operation at maximum waste loading in glass composition systems limited by predictions of spinel crystallization.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Methods and apparatuses for the development of microstructured nuclear fuels

Microstructured nuclear fuel adapted for nuclear power system use includes fissile material structures of micrometer-scale dimension dispersed in a matrix material. In one method of production, fissile material particles are processed in a chemical vapor deposition (CVD) fluidized-bed reactor including a gas inlet for providing controlled gas flow into a particle coating chamber, a lower bed hot zone region to contain powder, and an upper bed region to enable powder expansion. At least one pneumatic or electric vibrator is operationally coupled to the particle coating chamber for causing vibration of the particle coater to promote uniform powder coating within the particle coater during fuel processing. An exhaust associated with the particle coating chamber and can provide a port for placement and removal of particles and powder. During use of the fuel in a nuclear power reactor, fission products escape from the fissile material structures and come to rest in the matrix material. After a period of use in a nuclear power reactor and subsequent cooling, separation of the fissile material from the matrix containing the embedded fission products will provide an efficient partitioning of the bulk of the fissile material from the fission products. The fissile material can be reused by incorporating it into new microstructured fuel. The fission products and matrix material can be incorporated into a waste form for disposal or processed to separate valuable components from the fission products mixture.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Support for Advanced Fuel Fabrication MC&A Approaches

This report summarizes the key activities of the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program’s safeguards training work package for FY25. The work focused on two main areas: domestic safeguards training and the development of new technologies for nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC). A key development during this FY was the delivery of NMAC statistics for US Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements refresher course. The course objective was to assist industry in meeting the MC&A program requirements for fuel cycle facilities; this training focused on front-end bulk fuel cycle processes. At the same time, a report was prepared on the research output of an effort that focused on the benefits of commercial fuel debundling for NMAC and waste management. The MPACT team evaluated various technologies and proposed a fuel debundling detector that integrates gamma spectroscopy and neutron detection as the most practical solution. The scope of activities under this work package for FY26 focuses on developing a fundamental nuclear material control plan, also known as MC&A plan, for tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities. This plan will address the various NMAC requirements for facilities that handle Category II.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Predicting structural material degradation in advanced nuclear reactors with ion irradiation

Swelling associated with the formation and growth of cavities is among the most damaging of radiation-induced degradation modes for structural materials in advanced nuclear reactor concepts. Ion irradiation has emerged as the only practical option to rapidly assess swelling in candidate materials. For decades, researchers have tried to simulate the harsh environment in a nuclear reactor in the laboratory at an accelerated rate. Here we present the first case in which swelling in a candidate alloy irradiated ~ 2 years in a nuclear reactor was replicated using dual ion irradiation in ~ 1 day with precise control over damage rate, helium injection rate, and temperature and utilize physical models to predict the effects of radiation in reactors. The capability to predict and replicate the complex processes surrounding cavity nucleation and growth across many decades of radiation dose rate highlights the potential of accelerated radiation damage experiments. More importantly, it demonstrates the capability to predict the swelling evolution and the possibility to predict other features of the irradiated microstructure evolution that control material property degradation required to accelerate the development of new, radiation-tolerant materials.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗