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Application for a Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Asbestiform Low-Level Solid Waste Disposal Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is located approximately 105 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) is the federal lands management authority for the NNSS and National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NNSS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NNSS is posted with signs along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NNSS. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) is the location of the permitted facility for the Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS). The Area 5 RWMS is located near the eastern edge of the NNSS (Figure 1), approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of Mercury, Nevada. The Area 5 RWMS is used for the disposal of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste. Many areas surrounding the RWMS have been used in conducting nuclear tests. The site will be used for the disposal of regulated Asbestiform Low-Level Waste (ALLW), small quantities of low-level radioactive hydrocarbon-burdened (LLHB) media and debris, LLW, LLW that contains Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, and small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids, or waste that is regulated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or state-of-generation hazardous waste regulations, will not be accepted for disposal at the site. Waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that will be accepted at the disposal site is regulated asbestos-containing materials (RACM) and PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water. The term asbestiform is used throughout this document to describe RACM. The disposal site will be used as a depository of permissible waste generated both on site and off site. All generators designated by NNSA/NSO will be eligible to dispose regulated ALLW at the Asbestiform Low-Level Waste Disposal Site in accordance with the DOE/NV-325, Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC, current revision). Approval will be given by NNSA/NSO to generators that have successfully demonstrated through process knowledge (PK) and/or sampling and analysis that the waste is low-level, contains asbestiform material, or contains PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, or small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste and does not contain prohibited waste materials. Each waste stream will be approved through the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP), which ensures that the waste meets acceptance requirements outlined in the NNSSWAC.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

REPORT OF ON-SITE INSPECTION WORKSHOP-16

The central issue addressed by this workshop was the task of making the on-site inspection (OSI) part of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification system operationally ready at entry into force of the Treaty. It is recognized, and this was emphasized by the 2008 OSI Integrated Field Exercise (IFE), that it is not possible to develop every part of the OSI regime simultaneously. Therefore, it is necessary to prioritize the approach to OSI readiness. The reviews of the IFE have pointed to many elements of OSI readiness that still need development. The objective of this workshop was to provide priorities for the path forward for Working Group B to consider. Several critical areas have been identified that are related to the development of OSI readiness: (1) Technology development: Priorities are radionuclide and noble gas sampling and analysis, visual observation, multispectral/infrared imaging methods, active seismic methods and the recognition of the importance of signatures. (2) Organizational development: Priorities are health and safety, the Operations Support Centre, the Equipment Storage and Maintenance Facility, information technology data flow and communications. (3) Resources: The expertise to develop key parts of the OSI regime is not available within the current OSI Division staff. To develop these aspects of the regime will require more staff or supplements to the staff with cost-free experts or other means. Aspects of the system that could benefit from more staff include radionuclide and noble gas detection methods, data flow and communications, visual observation, multispectral/infrared methods and health and safety. As the path forward, participants of this workshop recognized a need to optimize the development of OSI priorities. The outcome of this workshop is to suggest for consideration an operational approach to OSI readiness that utilizes results of an evaluation of the relative effectiveness of OSI elements versus their relative maturity. By integrating such an assessment with considerations of integrated operational capabilities and the anticipated level of inspection team self-sufficiency and measurable milestone criteria, a set of priorities for OSI development can be developed. Once these priorities have been established, the Policy Making Organs can decide upon the milestones, strategic plan and action plan to serve as guidance for implementation by the Provisional Technical Secretariat. The suggested operational approach is as follows: (1) Assess the relative effectiveness (importance) of OSI elements versus their relative maturity; (2) Determine the anticipated level of self-sufficiency; (3) Define measurable milestone criteria; and (4) Result: Milestones for OSI readiness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Exploring the limits of waveform correlation event detection as applied to three earthquake aftershock sequences.

Swarms of earthquakes and/or aftershock sequences can dramatically increase the level of seismicity in a region for a period of time lasting from days to months, depending on the swarm or sequence. Such occurrences can provide a large amount of useful information to seismologists. For those who monitor seismic events for possible nuclear explosions, however, these swarms/sequences are a nuisance. In an explosion monitoring system, each event must be treated as a possible nuclear test until it can be proven, to a high degree of confidence, not to be. Seismic events recorded by the same station with highly correlated waveforms almost certainly have a similar location and source type, so clusters of events within a swarm can quickly be identified as earthquakes. We have developed a number of tools that can be used to exploit the high degree of waveform similarity expected to be associated with swarms/sequences. Dendro Tool measures correlations between known events. The Waveform Correlation Detector is intended to act as a detector, finding events in raw data which correlate with known events. The Self Scanner is used to find all correlated segments within a raw data steam and does not require an event library. All three techniques together provide an opportunity to study the similarities of events in an aftershock sequence in different ways. To comprehensively characterize the benefits and limits of waveform correlation techniques, we studied 3 aftershock sequences, using our 3 tools, at multiple stations. We explored the effects of station distance and event magnitudes on correlation results. Lastly, we show the reduction in detection threshold and analyst workload offered by waveform correlation techniques compared to STA/LTA based detection. We analyzed 4 days of data from each aftershock sequence using all three methods. Most known events clustered in a similar manner across the toolsets. Up to 25% of catalogued events were found to be a member of a cluster. In addition, the Waveform Correlation Detector and Self Scanner identified significant numbers of new events that were not in either the EDR or regional catalogs, showing a lowering of the detection threshold. We extended our analysis to study the effect of distance on correlation results by applying the analysis tools to multiple stations along a transect of nearly constant azimuth when possible. We expected the number of events found via correlation would drop off as roughly 1/r2, where r is the distance from mainshock to station. However, we found that regional geological conditions influenced the performance of a given station more than distance. For example, for one sequence we clustered 25% of events at the nearest station to the mainshock (34 km), while our performance dropped to 2% at a station 550 km distant. However, we matched our best performance (25% clustering) at a station 198 km distant.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

CTBT infrasound network performance to detect the 2013 Russian fireball event

The explosive fragmentation of the 2013 Chelyabinsk meteorite generated a large airburst with an equivalent yield of 500 kT TNT. It is the most energetic event recorded by the infrasound component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty-International Monitoring System (CTBT-IMS), globally detected by 20 out of 42 operational stations. This study performs a station-by-station estimation of the IMS detection capability to explain infrasound detections and nondetections from short to long distances, using the Chelyabinsk meteorite as global reference event. Investigated parameters influencing the detection capability are the directivity of the line source signal, the ducting of acoustic energy, and the individual noise conditions at each station. Findings include a clear detection preference for stations perpendicular to the meteorite trajectory, even over large distances. Only a weak influence of stratospheric ducting is observed for this low-frequency case. As a result, a strong dependence on the diurnal variability of background noise levels at each station is observed, favoring nocturnal detections.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Updates to the Regional Seismic Travel Time (RSTT) Model: 1. Tomography

Abstract A function of global monitoring of nuclear explosions is the development of Earth models for predicting seismic travel times for more accurate calculation of event locations. Most monitoring agencies rely on fast, distance-dependent one-dimensional (1D) Earth models to calculate seismic event locations quickly and in near real-time. RSTT (Regional Seismic Travel Time) is a seismic velocity model and computer software package that captures the major effects of three-dimensional crust and upper mantle structure on regional seismic travel times, while still allowing for fast prediction speed (milliseconds). We describe updates to the RSTT model using a refined data set of regional phases (i.e., Pn, Pg, Sn, Lg) using the Bayesloc relative relocation algorithm. The tomographic inversion shown here acts to refine the previous RSTT public model ( rstt201404um ) and displays significant features related to areas of global tectonic complexity as well as further reduction in arrival residual values. Validation of the updated RSTT model demonstrates significant reduction in median epicenter mislocation (15.3 km) using all regional phases compared to the iasp91 1D model (22.1 km) as well as to the current station correction approach used at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization International Data Centre (18.9 km).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Updates to the Regional Seismic Travel Time (RSTT) Model: 2. Path-dependent Travel-time Uncertainty

Abstract The regional seismic travel time (RSTT) model and software were developed to improve travel-time prediction accuracy by accounting for three-dimensional crust and upper mantle structure. Travel-time uncertainty estimates are used in the process of associating seismic phases to events and to accurately calculate location uncertainty bounds (i.e. event location error ellipses). We improve on the current distance-dependent uncertainty parameterization for RSTT using a random effects model to estimate slowness (inverse velocity) uncertainty as a mean squared error for each model parameter. The random effects model separates the error between observed slowness and model predicted slowness into bias and random components. The path-specific travel-time uncertainty is calculated by integrating these mean squared errors along a seismic-phase ray path. We demonstrate that event location error ellipses computed for a 90% coverage ellipse metric (used by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization International Data Centre (IDC)), and using the path-specific travel-time uncertainty approach, are more representative (median 82.5% ellipse percentage) of true location error than error ellipses computed using distance-dependent travel-time uncertainties (median 70.1%). We also demonstrate measurable improvement in location uncertainties using the RSTT method compared to the current station correction approach used at the IDC (median 74.3% coverage ellipse).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Impact of environmental backgrounds on atmospheric monitoring of nuclear explosions

Radionuclide monitoring for nuclear explosions includes measuring radioactive aerosol and noble gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has made such measurements for decades, revealing much about how atmospheric radioactivity impacts the sensitivity of the network. For example, civilian emissions of radioiodine make a substantial regional impact, but a minor global impact, while civilian radioxenon emissions create major regional and complex global impacts. This example statement is strongly influenced by the minimum signal level anticipated to be interesting. The original design of the IMS anticipated relatively large signal levels, and the accomplished IMS network substantially meets or exceeds the sensitivity needed to detect those signal levels. Much lower signal levels can be motivated, which could require reconsideration of station sensitivity. Using measured and simulated background concentrations, various possible desired signal levels, and an innovative anomaly threshold, maps of sensitivity and a station ranking are developed for current and future stations. These provide a strong motivation for additional experimentation to learn about sources and the potential plusses of new technology.

Eslinger, Paul W.↗

Comparison of Phoswich and ARSA-type detectors for Radioxenon Measurements

The monitoring of atmospheric radioxenon to ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has driven the development of improved detectors for measuring xenon, including the development of a phoswich detector. This detector uses only one PMT to detect beta-gamma coincidence, thus greatly reducing the bulk and electronics of the detector in comparison to the ARSA-type detector. In this experiment, 135Xe was produced through neutron activation and a phoswich detector was used to attain spectra from the gas. These results were compared to similar results from an ARSA-type beta-gamma coincidence spectrum. The spectral characteristics and resolution were compared for the coincidence and beta spectra. Using these metrics, the overall performance of the phoswich detector for beta-gamma coincidence of radioxenon was evaluated.

ARSA↗

Tracers for radiopharmaceutical production facilities

When radiopharmaceutical production facilities irradiate uranium targets for the production of radionuclides such as 99Mo, the emissions interfere with the global monitoring efforts conducted by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. While suppressing emissions from such facilities would be ideal, it is understood that radioxenon emissions may not be reduced to levels below detectable quantities. As a result, a study was conducted to investigate tracers that may be utilized for source identification upon measurement. Both radioactive and stable tracers were evaluated.

Biegalski, Steven R.↗

SDAT implementation for the analysis of radioxenon β–γ coincidence spectra

The Standard Deconvolution Analysis Tool (SDAT) was developed for analysis of radioxenon β-γ coincidence spectra measured as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) as defined in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The SDAT software analyzes each β-γ coincidence spectrum by fitting library vectors of each radionuclide of interest: 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe, and 135Xe. Detector background and radon are incorporated as optional components of the sample solution. Results are reported in mBq m-3. A new graphical user interface has been developed to facilitate ease of use and improve the data visualization. Automated energy vs. channel calibration algorithms were developed and implemented based on 137Cs β-γ coincidence spectra. Details on the user tool and testing are included.

Biegalski, S.↗

Engineering Upgrades to the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer for the CTBT International Monitoring System

The Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA) is an automated aerosol collection and analysis system designed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in the 1990’s and is deployed in several locations around the world as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) required under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The utility of such an automated system is the reduction of human intervention and the production of perfectly uniform results. However, maintainability and down time issues threaten this utility, even for systems with over 90% data availability. Engineering upgrades to the RASA are currently being pursued to address these issues, as well as Fukushima lessons learned. Current work includes a new automation control unit, and other potential improvements such as alternative detector cooling and sampling options are under review. This paper presents the current state of upgrades and improvements under investigation

Forrester, Joel B.↗

Construction of a Shallow Underground Low-background Detector for a CTBT Radionuclide Laboratory

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a verification component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and in addition to a series of radionuclide monitoring stations, contains sixteen radionuclide laboratories capable of verification of radionuclide station measurements. This paper presents an overview of a new commercially obtained low-background detector system for radionuclide aerosol measurements recently installed in a shallow (>30 meters water equivalent) underground clean-room facility at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Specifics such as low-background shielding materials, active shielding methods, and improvements in sensitivity to IMS isotopes will be covered.

Forrester, Joel B.↗

Parallel Radioisotope Collection and Analysis in Response to the Fukushima Release

Two independent air samplers were operated at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in parallel during the collection of samples from the Fukushima reactor releases. One system is an automated aerosol collection and analysis unit, while the other was a manual sampler of higher daily air volume. The samples collected each day showed excellent correlation in radionuclide activity, although some variations were seen. These variations illustrate the reproducibility of the air sample radionuclide measurements made by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty International Monitoring System (IMS) and show a simple way to acquire useful parallel samples for scientific purposes. In particular, a party wishing to have a “copy” of a sample acquired by the verification regime of the treaty could employ this method and have results similar to the IMS station at low cost and even higher sensitivity.

Atmospheric Aerosol Sampling↗

Development of a Low-Level Ar-37 Calibration Standard

Argon-37 is an important environmental signature of an underground nuclear explosion. Producing and quantifying low-level 37Ar standards is an important step in the development of sensitive field measurement instruments for use during an On-Site Inspection, a key provision of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This paper describes progress at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the development of a process to generate and quantify low-level 37Ar standard material, which can then be used to calibrate sensitive field systems at activities consistent with soil background levels. The 37Ar used for our work was generated using a laboratory-scale, high-energy neutron source to irradiate powdered samples of calcium carbonate. Small aliquots of 37Ar were then extracted from the head space of the irradiated samples. The specific activity of the head space samples, mixed with P10 (90% stable argon:10% methane by mole fraction) count gas, is then derived using the accepted Length-Compensated Internal-Source Proportional Counting method. Due to the low activity of the samples, a set of three Ultra-Low Background Proportional-Counters designed and fabricated at PNNL from radio-pure electroformed copper was used to make the measurements in PNNL’s shallow underground counting laboratory. Very low background levels (<10 counts/day) have been observed in the spectral region near the 37Ar emission feature at 2.8 keV. Two separate samples from the same irradiation were measured. The first sample was counted for 12 days beginning 28 days after irradiation, the second sample was counted for 24 days beginning 70 days after irradiation (the half-life of 37Ar is 35.0 days). Both sets of measurements were analyzed and yielded very similar results for the starting activity (~0.1 Bq) and activity concentration (0.15 mBq/ccSTP argon) after P10 count gas was added. A detailed uncertainty model was developed based on the ISO Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement. This paper presents a discussion of the measurement analysis, along with assumptions and uncertainty estimates.

Absolute radiation measurement↗

Pertechnetate (TcO4-) reduction by reactive ferrous iron forms in naturally anoxic, redox transition zone sediments from the Hanford Site, USA

Technetium is an important environmental contaminant introduced by the processing and disposal of irradiated nuclear fuel and atmospheric nuclear tests. Under oxic conditions technetium is soluble and exists as pertechnatate anion (TcO4-), while under anoxic conditions Tc is usually insoluble and exists as precipitated Tc(IV). Here we investigated abiotic Tc(VII) reduction in mineralogically heterogeneous, Fe(II)-containing sediments. The sediments were collected from a 55 m borehole that sampled a semi-confined aquifer at the Hanford Site, USA that contained a dramatic redox transition zone. One oxic facies (18.0-18.3 m) and five anoxic facies (18.3-18.6 m, 30.8-31.1 m, 39.0-39.3 m, 47.2-47.5 m and 51.5-51.8 m) were selected for this study. Chemical extractions, X-ray diffraction, electron microscopy, and Mössbauer spectroscopy were applied to characterize the Fe(II) mineral suite that included: Fe(II)-phyllosilicates, pyrite, magnetite and siderite. The Fe(II) mineral phase distribution differed between the sediments. Sediment suspensions were adjusted to the same 0.5 M HCl extracted Fe(II) concentration (0.6 mM) for Tc(VII) reduction experiments. Aqueous Fe was low in all sediment suspensions (<2 μM) and below the Fe(II)aq detection limit (10 μM). Technetium(VII) reduction occurred in all anoxic sediments at depths greater than 18.3 m and reaction time differed significantly between the sediments (8-219 d). Mössbauer analysis of the Tc-reacted, 30.8-31.1 m sediment confirmed that Tc(VII) was reduced by solid-phase Fe(II), with siderite and Fe(II)-containing phyllosilicates implicated as redox reactive phases. Technetium-XAS analysis demonstrated that Tc associated with sediments was in the Tc(IV) valence state and immobilized as clusters of a TcO2·nH2O-like phase. The speciation of redox product Tc(IV) was not affected by reduction rate or Fe(II) mineralogy.

Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory↗

Iodine effective diffusion coefficients through volcanic rock: Influence of iodine speciation and rock geochemistry

Accurate prediction of the subsurface transport of iodine species is important for the assessment of long-term nuclear waste repository performance, as well as monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, given that radioiodine decays into radioxenon. However, the transport of iodine through intact geologic media is not well understood, compromising our ability to assess risk associated with radioiodine migration. The current study's goal is to quantify the matrix diffusion of iodine species through saturated volcanic rock, with particular attention paid to the redox environment and potential speciation changes. Here, diffusion experiments were run for iodide through lithophysae-rich lava, lithophysae-poor lava, and welded tuff, whereas iodate diffusion was studied through welded tuff. Iodine transport was compared with a conservative tracer, HDO, and effective diffusion coefficients were calculated. Likely due to a combination of size and anion exclusion effects, iodine species diffused more slowly than the conservative tracer through all rock types tested. Furthermore, oxidation of iodide to iodate was observed in the lithophysae-poor lava, affecting transport. Results provide much needed data for subsurface transport models that predict radioiodine migration from underground sources, and indicate the pressing need for geochemical and redox interactions to be incorporated into these models.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Analysis of data from sensitive U.S. monitoring stations for the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear reactor accident

The March 11, 2011 9.0 magnitude undersea megathrust earthquake off the coast of Japan and subsequent tsunami waves triggered a major nuclear event at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station. At the time of the event, units 1, 2, and 3 were operating and units 4, 5, and 6 were in a shutdown condition for maintenance. Loss of cooling capacity to the plants along with structural damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami resulted in a breach of the nuclear fuel integrity and release of radioactive fission products to the environment. Fission products started to arrive in the United States via atmospheric transport on March 15, 2011 and peaked by March 23, 2011. Atmospheric activity concentrations of 131I reached levels of 3.0 * 10*2 Bqm*3 in Melbourne, FL. The noble gas 133Xe reached atmospheric activity concentrations in Ashland, KS of 17 Bqm*3. While these levels are not health concerns, they were well above the detection capability of the radionuclide monitoring systems within the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Biegalski, Steven R.↗