Federated learning-based semantic segmentation for pixel-wise defect detection in additive manufacturing
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This work addresses how analysts of a high-valued system (e.g., nuclear reactor, aircraft turbine designs) can extract findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable scientific data for public dissemination to artificial intelligence and machine-learning (AI/ML) researchers in a manner that cannot be reverse-engineered, potentially compromising sensitive or proprietary information. State-of-the-art methods address this problem through data masking techniques, which allow access to a subset of the information while obfuscating private and potentially identifying information (e.g., personally identifying medical data). These methods are unsuitable for industrial engineering processes, where AI/ML tools need explicit access to all the data available to draw the best inference about the system to help optimize its performance and identify its vulnerabilities, etc. Our novel deceptive infusion of data paradigm provides a solution to this conundrum by developing a mathematical approach capable of concealing the identity of the system while providing full access to all the features employed by AI/ML tools to ensure their optimal performance.
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Federation is a popular concept in building distributed cyberinfrastructures, whereby computational resources are provided by multiple organizations through a unified portal, decreasing the complexity of moving data back and forth among multiple organizations. Federation has been used in bioinformatics only to a limited extent, namely, federation of datastores, e.g. SBGrid Consortium for structural biology and Gene Expression Omnibus (GEO) for functional genomics. Here, we posit that it is critical to federate both computational resources (CPU, GPU, FPGA, etc.) and datastores to support popular bioinformatics portals, with fast-increasing data volumes and increasing processing requirements. A prime example, and one that we discuss here, is in genomics and metagenomics. It is vital that the processing of the data be done without having to transport the data across large network distances. We exemplify our design and development through our experience with metagenomics-RAST (MG-RAST), the most popular metagenomics analysis pipeline. Currently, it is hosted completely at Argonne National Laboratory. Yet, through a recently started collaborative National Institutes of Health project, we are taking steps toward federating this infrastructure. Being a widely used resource, we have to move toward federation without disrupting 50 K annual users. Here, we describe the computational tools that will be useful for federating a bioinformatics infrastructure and the open research challenges that we see in federating such infrastructures. It is hoped that our manuscript can serve to spur greater federation of bioinformatics infrastructures by showing the steps involved, and thus, allow them to scale to support larger user bases.
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Solving optimal power flow (OPF) problems for large distribution networks incurs high computational complexity. We consider a large multi-phase distribution network of tree topology with a deep penetration of active devices. We divide the network into collaborating areas featuring subtree topology and subareas featuring subsubtree topology. We design a multilevel implementation of the primal-dual gradient algorithm to solve the voltage regulation OPF problems while preserving nodal voltage information and topological information within areas and subareas. Numerical results on a 4,521-node system verify that the proposed algorithm can significantly improve the computational speed without compromising any optimality.
Despite the best efforts of cyber security analysts, networked computing assets are routinely compromised, resulting in the loss of intellectual property, the disclosure of state secrets, and major financial damages. Anomaly detection methods are beneficial for detecting new types of attacks and abnormal network activity, but such algorithms can be difficult to understand and trust. Network operators and cyber analysts need fast and scalable tools to help identify suspicious behavior that bypasses automated security systems, but operators do not want another automated tool with algorithms they do not trust. Experts need tools to augment their own domain expertise and to provide a contextual understanding of suspicious behavior to help them make decisions. In this paper we present Situ, a visual analytics system for discovering suspicious behavior in streaming network data. Situ provides a scalable solution that combines anomaly detection with information visualization. The system's visualizations enable operators to identify and investigate the most anomalous events and IP addresses, and the tool provides context to help operators understand why they are anomalous. Finally, operators need tools that can be integrated into their workflow and with their existing tools. This paper describes the Situ platform and its deployment in an operational network setting. Furthermore, we discuss how operators are currently using the tool in a large organization's security operations center and present the results of expert reviews with professionals.
Understanding the issues surrounding public acceptance of homeland security systems is important for balancing security needs and potential civil liberties infringements. A psychometric survey was used to measure attitudes regarding homeland security systems. Psychometric rating data were obtained from 182 respondents on psychological attributes associated with 12 distinct types of homeland security systems. An inverse relationship was observed for the overall rating attributes of acceptability and risk of civil liberties infringement. Principal components analysis yielded a two factor solution, with the rating scale loading pattern suggesting factors of Perceived Effectiveness and Perceived Intrusiveness. These factors also showed an inverse relationship. The 12 different homeland security systems showed significantly different scores on the rating scales and PCA factors, which were used to rank the systems in terms of overall acceptability. Difference scores for the rating scales and PCA factors were used to compute a single acceptability value reflecting the relative weight of risks and benefits. Of the 12 systems studied, airport screening, canine detectors and radiation monitoring at borders were found to be relatively acceptable, i.e., the perceived benefits for homeland security outweighed the perceived risks to civil liberties. Students rated several systems as more effective than professionals, but the overall pattern of results for both types of subjects was similar. The data suggest that risk perception research and the psychometric paradigm are useful approaches for quantifying attitudes regarding homeland security systems and policies, and can be used to anticipate potentially significant public acceptance issues.
In this work, dynamic analysis techniques help programmers find the root cause of bugs in large-scale parallel applications.
The identification of the Stuxnet worm in 2010 provided a highly publicized example of a cyber attack that physically damaged an industrial control system. This raised public awareness about the possibility of similar attacks against other industrial targets—including critical infrastructure. Here, we use hypergames to analyze how strategic perturbations of sensor readings and calibrated parameters can be used to manipulate a system that employs optimal control. Hypergames form an extension of game theory that enables us to model strategic interactions where the players may have significantly different perceptions of the game(s) they are playing. Past work with hypergames has focused on relatively simple interactions consisting of a small set of discrete choices for each player. Here, we apply single-stage hypergames to larger systems with continuous variables. We find that manipulating constraints can be a more effective attacker strategy than manipulating objective function parameters. Moreover, the attacker need not change the underlying system to carry out a successful attack—it may be sufficient to deceive the defender controlling the system. It is possible to scale our approach up to even larger systems, but this will depend on the characteristics of the system in question, and we identify several characteristics that will make those systems amenable to hypergame analysis.
Face de-identification (or “masking”) algorithms have been developed in response to the prevalent use of video recordings in public places. Here, we evaluated the success of face identity masking for human perceivers and a deep convolutional neural network (DCNN). Eight de-identification algorithms were applied to videos of drivers’ faces, while they actively operated a motor vehicle. These masks were pre-selected to be applicable to low-quality video and to maintain coarse information about facial actions. Humans studied high-resolution images to learn driver identities and were tested on their recognition of active drivers in low-resolution videos. Faces in the videos were either unmasked or were masked by one of the eight algorithms. When participants were tested immediately after learning (Experiment 1), all masks reduced identification, with six of eight masks reducing identification to extremely poor performance. In a second experiment, two of the most effective masks were tested after a delay of 7 or 28 days. The delay did not further reduce identification of the masked faces. In all masked conditions, participants maintained stringent decision criteria, with low confidence in recognition, further indicating the effectiveness of the masks. Next, the DCNN performed an identity-matching task between high-resolution images and masked videos—a task analogous to that done by humans. The pattern of accuracy for the DCNN mirrored some, but not all, aspects of human performance, highlighting the need to test the effectiveness of identity masking for both humans and machines. The DCNN was also tested on its ability to match identity between masked and unmasked versions of the same video, based only on the face. DCNN performance for the eight masks offers insight into the nature of the information in faces that is coded in these networks.
Distinguishing malicious anomalous activities from unusual but benign activities is a fundamental challenge for cyber defenders. Prior studies have shown that statistical user behavior analysis yields accurate detections by learning behavior profiles from observed user activity. These unsupervised models are able to generalize to unseen types of attacks by detecting deviations from normal behavior, without knowledge of specific attack signatures. However, approaches proposed to date based on probabilistic matrix factorization are limited by the information conveyed in a two-dimensional space. Non-negative tensor factorization, on the other hand, is a powerful unsupervised machine learning method that naturally models multi-dimensional data, capturing complex and multi-faceted details of behavior profiles. Herein, our new unsupervised statistical anomaly detection methodology matches or surpasses state-of-the-art supervised learning baselines across several challenging and diverse cyber application areas, including detection of compromised user credentials, botnets, spam e-mails, and fraudulent credit card transactions.
There is a lack of scientific testing of commercially available malware detectors, especially those that boast accurate classification of never-before-seen (i.e., zero-day) files using machine learning (ML). Consequently, efficacy of malware detectors is opaque, inhibiting end users from making informed decisions and researchers from targeting gaps in current detectors. In this paper, we present a scientific evaluation of four prominent commercial malware detection tools to assist an organization with two primary questions: To what extent do ML-based tools accurately classify previously and never-before-seen files? Is purchasing a network-level malware detector worth the cost? To investigate, we tested each tool against 3,536 total files (2,554 or 72% malicious, 982 or 28% benign) of a variety of file types, including hundreds of malicious zero-days, polyglots, and APT-style files, delivered on multiple protocols. We present statistical results on detection time and accuracy, consider complementary analysis (using multiple tools together), and provide two novel applications of the recent cost-benefit evaluation procedure of Iannacone & Bridges. Although the ML-based tools are more effective at detecting zero-day files and executables, the signature-based tool might still be an overall better option. Both network-based tools provide substantial (simulated) savings when paired with either host tool, yet both show poor detection rates on protocols other than HTTP or SMTP. Our results show that all four tools have near-perfect precision but alarmingly low recall, especially on file types other than executables and office files—37% of malware, including all polyglot files, were undetected. Priorities for researchers and takeaways for end users are given. Code for future use of the cost model is provided.
Security of cyber-physical systems (CPS) continues to pose new challenges due to the tight integration and operational complexity of the cyber and physical components. To address these challenges, this article presents a domain-aware, optimization-based approach to determine an effective defense strategy for CPS in an automated fashion—by emulating a strategic adversary in the loop that exploits system vulnerabilities, interconnection of the CPS, and the dynamics of the physical components. Our approach builds on an adversarial decision-making model based on a Markov Decision Process (MDP) that determines the optimal cyber (discrete) and physical (continuous) attack actions over a CPS attack graph. The defense planning problem is modeled as a non-zero-sum game between the adversary and defender. We use a model-free reinforcement learning method to solve the adversary’s problem as a function of the defense strategy. We then employ Bayesian optimization (BO) to find an approximate best-response for the defender to harden the network against the resulting adversary policy. This process is iterated multiple times to improve the strategy for both players. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a ransomware-inspired graph with a smart building system as the physical process. Numerical studies show that our method converges to a Nash equilibrium for various defender-specific costs of network hardening.
Smart buildings, especially Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings (GEBs), suffer from cyber-attacks and physical faults due to the integration of a large number of sensors and controls, connected devices, and associated communication networks. This study demonstrated a real-time advanced building resilient platform, called CYber Defense and REsilient System (CYDRES), which is deployable for existing and emerging Building Automation Systems (BASs). CYDRES aims to empower GEBs with cyber-attack-immune capabilities through multi-layer prevention and adaptation mechanisms to monitor, detect, and respond to cyber-attacks and physical operational faults. CYDRES is demonstrated through real-time experiments in a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) testbed.
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are highly susceptible to malicious attacks due to their complex dynamics and interconnectivity. A comprehensive understanding of their vulnerabilities is essential for designing effective resilience measures. This paper presents a data-driven attack generative system for evaluating the vulnerability of CPS. The proposed approach formulates the vulnerability assessment problem as determining the feasibility of a specific attack set based on two boundary functions that represent the effectiveness and stealthiness of attacks. The attack generative model is trained using a custom loss function, with two universal approximators designed to learn the effectiveness and stealthiness functions simultaneously. Theoretical results for successful generation and asymptotic convergence of the resulting training algorithm are given. As a result, the proposed approach is evaluated via numerical simulation of an IEEE 14-bus system and gas pipeline systems, demonstrating its viability in learning how to attack nonlinear CPS and identify potential vulnerabilities.
The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.
This report explains the difference between whole-building energy usage data requests and other types of data requests utilities may receive. It outlines utility best practices for providing energy consumption information to building owners while respecting the confidentiality of utility customers.