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Equipment specifications for an electrochemical fuel reprocessing plant

Electrochemical reprocessing is a technique used to chemically separate and dissolve the components of spent nuclear fuel, in order to produce new metal fuel. There are several different variations to electrochemical reprocessing. These variations are accounted for by both the production of different types of spent nuclear fuel, as well as different states and organizations doing research in the field. For this electrochemical reprocessing plant, the spent fuel will be in the metallurgical form, a product of fast breeder reactors, which are used in many nuclear power plants. The equipment line for this process is divided into two main categories, the fuel refining equipment and the fuel fabrication equipment. The fuel refining equipment is responsible for separating out the plutonium and uranium together, while getting rid of the minor transuranic elements and fission products. The fuel fabrication equipment will then convert this plutonium and uranium mixture into readily usable metal fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Successful Completion of the Largest Shipment of Russian Research Reactor High-Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Czech Republic to Russian Federation

On December 8, 2007, the largest shipment of high-enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel was successfully made from a Russian-designed nuclear research reactor in the Czech Republic to the Russian Federation. This accomplishment is the culmination of years of planning, negotiations, and hard work. The United States, Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been working together on the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program in support of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In February 2003, RRRFR Program representatives met with the Nuclear Research Institute in Rež, Czech Republic, and discussed the return of their high-enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation for reprocessing. Nearly 5 years later, the shipment was made. This paper discusses the planning, preparations, coordination, and cooperation required to make this important international shipment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Quantifying the passive gamma signal from spent nuclear fuel in support of determining the plutonium content in spent nuclear fuel with nondestructive assay

The objective of safeguarding nuclear material is to deter diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials by timely monitoring and detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel (SF), by means of nondestructive assay (NDA), in order to meet this goal. These motivations include the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguard nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from SF; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium in SF. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of 13 NDA techniques for characterizing Pu mass in spent fuel. This paper focuses on the development of a passive gamma measurement system in support the spent fuel assay system. Gamma ray detection for fresh nuclear fuel focuses on gamma ray emissions that directly coincide with the actinides of interest to the assay. For example, the 186-keV gamma ray is generally used for {sup 235}U assay and the 384-keV complex is generally used for assaying plutonium. In spent nuclear fuel, these signatures cannot be detected as the Compton continuum created from the fission products dominates the signal in this energy range. For SF, the measured gamma signatures from key fission products ({sup 134}Cs, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 154}Eu) are used to ascertain burnup, cooling time, and fissile content information. In this paper the Monte Carlo modeling set-up for a passive gamma spent fuel assay system will be described. The set-up of the system includes a germanium detector and an ion chamber and will be used to gain passive gamma information that will be integrated into a system for determining Pu in SF. The passive gamma signal will be determined from a library of {approx} 100 assemblies that have been created to examine the capability of all 13 NDA techniques. Presented in this paper is a description of the passive gamma monitoring instrument, explanation of the work completed thus far involving the source set up methodology and the design optimization process, details of key fission product ratios of interest, limitations and key strengths of the measurement technique, and considerations for integrating this technique with other NDA techniques in order to develop a complete spent fuel assay strategy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Initial Efforts Organizing WPNCS SG-8: Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks

The Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) under the guidance of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has over 20 years of experience addressing concerns related to static and transient configurations encountered within the nuclear fuel cycle: fuel fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, storage, and geological disposal. One of the cornerstone activities of the WPNCS is the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), which was established to identify a comprehensive set of criticality benchmark data, evaluate the data, including quantification of overall uncertainties; compile the data into a standardized format, perform sample calculations utilizing modern nuclear data sets and codes utilized in nuclear criticality safety, and formally document the work into a single source of verified benchmark data. Annually, members of the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) contribute evaluated benchmark data that undergoes comprehensive technical review prior to publication in the ICSBEP Handbook. In the years since the ICSBEP was established, there has been much work to prepare benchmark data to support validation activities in nuclear criticality safety. The 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook contains acceptable benchmark specifications for 5,053 critical, subcritical, or near-critical configurations in 582 benchmark evaluations. Modern benchmark development benefits from decades of experienced international participants, a well-established handbook format, supplementary guides to deal with uncertainty quantification, and a comprehensive review process based upon independent reviews from international experts. The ICSBEP Handbook also contains 838 configurations deemed unacceptable to support criticality safety efforts. They are recorded, with the reasoning for their rejection, to preserve the experimental data, prevent reevaluation of data that are incomplete or contain known errors, and/or to potentially allow future reevaluation of the experiment pending the identification of sufficient data to resolve identified inconsistencies and errors. Users of the ICSBEP Handbook today might notice that the rigor and quality of modern criticality safety benchmarks is much greater than those prepared within the initial decade of the project. Benchmarks with 1s uncertainties in k eff greater than 1% were traditionally rejected unless they were identified as unique experiment types that encompassed materials, fuels, or designs not available from other benchmark experiments. However, benchmarks developed using modern experimental techniques and practices typically have uncertainties on the order of a few tenths of a percent. There have been ongoing efforts to improve the overall quality of previously published benchmark evaluations. Seventy-eight evaluations, containing approximately 600 configurations, have been revised just within the past decade. An additional eleven benchmarks are under revision for updated release in the 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. If some of the historic benchmarks were resubmitted in their current form to the TRG today, they would be rejected due to lack of data, missing components in the uncertainty analysis, or incomplete benchmark model development. The use of historic criticality safety benchmarks that underestimate the total uncertainty, lack properly quantified biases, or provide inadequate benchmark specifications do not sufficiently support modern criticality safety and nuclear data efforts. Although the ICSBEP Handbook is recognized by regulating bodies to support criticality safety, users are required to justify their reasons to ignore historic benchmark data and include additional safety margins within their designs. Discussions were held at the WPNCS 23rd Annual Meeting in September 2019 regarding the aforementioned issues. The resultant decision was to establish Subgroup 8 (SG-8): Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks. The current activities of SG-8 are discussed herein.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The study of the crystalline phosphates of kosnarite type structure containing different alkali metals

The incorporation possibilities of different alkali elements into crystalline phosphates A{sub 1-x}A'{sub x}Hf{sub 2}(PO{sub 4}){sub 3} (A=Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs) were studied, the formation regions of kosnarite solid solutions were determined. Na{sub 0.5}K{sub 0.5}Hf{sub 2}(PO{sub 4}){sub 3} crystal structure was studied by powder X-ray diffraction, and the distribution of alkali metals in kosnarite structure was found out. The phosphate crystallizes in the space group R3c, with a=8.7295(1) A, c=23.2023(4) A, V=1531.24(4) A{sup 3}, Z=6; R{sub wp}=6.15, R{sub p}=4.43. The concentration region knowledge of the kosnarite phase existence and peculiarities of their phase formation in the A{sub 1-x}A'{sub x}M{sub 2}(PO{sub 4}){sub 3} (M=Ti, Zr, Hf) systems allow us to choose phosphate matrice compositions suitable for solidification of reprocessing wastes of spent U-Pu nuclear fuels. - Graphical abstract: The incorporation possibilities of different alkali elements into crystalline phosphates A{sub 1-x}A'{sub x}Hf{sub 2}(PO{sub 4}){sub 3} (A=Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs) were studied, the formation regions of kosnarite solid solutions were determined. Na{sub 0.5}K{sub 0.5}Hf{sub 2}(PO{sub 4}){sub 3} crystal structure was studied by powder X-ray diffraction, and the distribution of alkali metals in kosnarite structure was found out. The phosphate crystallizes in the space group R3c, with a=8.7295(1) A, c=23.2023(4) A, V=1531.24(4) A{sup 3}, Z=6; R{sub wp}=6.15, R{sub p}=4.43. The concentration region knowledge of the kosnarite phase existence and peculiarities of their phase formation in the A{sub 1-x}A'{sub x}M{sub 2}(PO{sub 4}){sub 3} (M=Ti, Zr, Hf) systems allow us to choose phosphate matrice compositions suitable for solidification of reprocessing wastes of spent U-Pu nuclear fuels.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Advanced reprocessing developments in Europe contribution of European projects ACSEPT and ACTINET-I3

Nuclear energy has more than ever to demonstrate that it can contribute safely and on a sustainable way to answer the international increase in energy needs. Actually, in addition to an increased safety of the reactors themselves, its acceptance is still closely associated to our capability to reduce the lifetime of the nuclear waste, to manage them safely and to propose options for a better use of the natural resources. Spent fuel reprocessing can help to reach these objectives. But this cannot be achieved only by optimizing industrial processes through engineering studies. It is of a primary importance to increase our fundamental knowledge in actinide sciences in order to build the future of nuclear energy on reliable and scientifically-founded results, and therefore meet the needs of the future fuel cycles in terms of fabrication and performance of fuels, reprocessing and waste management. At the European level, both the collaborative project ACSEPT and the Integrated Infrastructure Initiative ACTINET-I3 work together to improve our knowledge in actinides chemistry and therefore develop advanced separation processes. These tools are complementary and work in close connection on some specific issues such as the understanding of the selectivity of extracting organic ligands. By offering trans-national access to the main nuclear research facility in Europe, ACTINET-I3 aims at increasing the knowledge in actinide sciences by gathering all the expertise available in European nuclear research institutes or university and giving them the opportunity to come and work in hot-labs (ITU, Atalante...) or beamlines (ESFR, ANKA, PSI) ACSEPT is focused on the development of advanced separation processes, both aqueous and pyrochemical. Head-end steps, fuel re-fabrication, solvent treatment, waste management are also taken into account. In aqueous process development, the SANEX and innovative SANEX flowsheets demonstration were successfully achieved. Chemical systems were selected for GANEX and a hot-test under finalization thanks to an important collaboration between European teams. In pyrometallurgy, studies on actinide back-extraction from aluminium and exhaustive electrolysis allowed the validation of two flowsheets developed from more then 10 years in Europe. In addition, efforts were made to increase collaborations, mutualize and homogenise procedures and share good practices. A training and education program including seminars, workshops, brainstorming meeting but also student exchanges and support to post-doctorate fellowships was a key point for maintaining and increasing a high expertise level in actinide separation sciences in Europe. The second ACSEPT International workshop, organised as a specific session of the next Atalante 2012 International Conference, will conclude the ACSEPT project. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Epsilon Metal Summary Report Fiscal Year 2011

The Epsilon-metal (ε-metal) phase was selected in FY 2009 as a potential waste form to for immobilizing the noble metals found in the undissolved solids + aqueous stream, and the soluble Tc from ion-exchange process, each resulting from proposed aqueous reprocessing. ε-metal phase is observed in used nuclear fuel and the natural reactors of Oklobono in Gabon, where the long-term corrosion behavior was demonstrated. This makes ε-metal a very attractive waste form. Last fiscal year, ε-metal was successfully fabricated by combining the five-metals, Mo, Ru, Rh, Pd and Re (surrogate for Tc), into pellets followed by consolidation with an arc melter. The arc melter produced fully dense samples with the epsilon structure. However, some chemistry differences were observed in the microstructure that resulted in regions rich in Re and Mo, and others rich in Pd, while Ru and Rh remained fairly constant throughout. This year, thermal stability (air), and corrosion testing of the samples fabricated by arc melting were the main focus for experimental work. Thermal stability was measured with a differential scanning calorimeter - thermogravimetric analyzer, by both ramp heating as well as step heating. There is clear evidence during the ramp heating experiment of an exothermic event + a weight loss peak both beginning at ≈700°C. Step heating showed an oxidation event at ≈690°C with minimal weight gain that occurs just before the weight loss event at 700°C. The conclusion being that the e-metal begins to oxidize and then become volatile. These findings are useful for considering the effects of voloxidation process. Three different pellets were subjected to electrochemical testing to study the corrosion behavior of the epsilon-metal phase in various conditions, namely acidic, basic, saline, and inert. Test was done according to an interim procedure developed for the alloy metal waste form. First an open circuit potential was measured, followed by linear polarization sweeps. The linear polarization sweep range was the Tafel equation was fit to the linear polarization sweep data to determine the corrosion rate of each pellet in each test solution. The average calculated corrosion rates of the three pellets according to solution conditions were: -1.91 x 10 -4 mm/yr (0.001 M NaOH), -1.48 x 10 -3 mm/yr (0.01 M NaCl), -8.77 x 10 -4 mm/yr (0.001 M H 2 SO 4 ), -2.09 x 10 -3 mm/yr (0.001 M NaOH + 0.01 M NaCl), and -1.54 x 10 -3 mm/yr (0.001 M H 2 SO 4 + 0.01 M NaCl). Three single-pass flow through (SPFT) test were conducted at a flow rate of 10 ml/day, at 90°C, and pH of 2.5, 7.0, and 9.0 for up to 322 days. Results of the tests indicate that dissolution rates were 5 x 10 -4 g m -2 d -1 at pH 9.0, 1.2 x 10 -4 g m -2 d -1 at pH 7.0, and 2 x 10 -4 g m -2 d -1 at pH 2.5. The sample used for the pH 7.0 SPFT test contains extra Re compared to samples used for the other two SPFT test, which came from a single pellet. The corrosion data measured this year indicate that the ε-metal phase is chemically durable. The two chemically different phases, but structurally the same, behave differently during dissolution according to the microstructure changes observed in both the electrochemical and in SPFT test. Characterization of the test specimens after testing suggests that the dissolution is complex and involves oxidative dissolution followed by precipitation of both oxide and metallic phases. These data suggest that the dissolution in the electrochemical and SPFT tests is different; a process that needs further investigation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Site remediation techniques in India: a review

India is one of the developing countries operating site remediation techniques for the entire nuclear fuel cycle waste for the last three decades. In this paper we intend to provide an overview of remediation methods currently utilized at various hazardous waste sites in India, their advantages and disadvantages. Over the years the site remediation techniques have been well characterized and different processes for treatment, conditioning and disposal are being practiced. Remediation Methods categorized as biological, chemical or physical are summarized for contaminated soils and environmental waters. This paper covers the site remediation techniques implemented for treatment and conditioning of wastelands arising from the operation of nuclear power plant, research reactors and fuel reprocessing units. (authors)

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Status Report for Development of Advanced Process Monitoring Concepts for IAEA Safeguards Sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)

Process monitoring (PM) is used in international safeguards as an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). For large throughput nuclear facilities such as commercial spent fuel reprocessing plants, it is difficult to satisfy the lAEA's goal for detection probability using NMA alone. And, for an facilities, regardless of their throughput, PM can provide redundant verification for both NMA and containment and surveillance and can be used to detect abnormal plant operation through the use of IAEA's instrumentation and selected operator's process control instrumentation. Examples of PM include (1) continuity of knowledge of nuclear material flows and inventories by monitoring of tank solution levels in reprocessing plants, (2) load cell monitoring of cylinders in GCEPs, (3) thermal power monitoring of large research reactors to detect undeclared operation, and (4) providing data to enable frequent NMA-like evaluation (near-real-time-accounting), which involves a hybrid of NMA and PM, for many facility types. Sensors required for PM include for example sensors for measuring flow, volume, density, level, temperature, and other diverse sensors such as portal monitors, video cameras, motion detectors, and gamma and neutron detectors. Additionally, PM lends itself to remote and/or unattended monitoring which has the potential to reduce the IAEA inspection burden and intrusiveness to the operator.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ELECTROCHEMICALLY-MODULATED SEPARATIONS FOR DESTRUCTIVE AND NONDESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS FOR PROCESS MONITORING AND SAFEGUARDS MEASURMENTS

A timely, accurate, and precise analysis of uranium reprocessing streams is import for process monitoring and nuclear material accountability. For material accountancy, it is critical to detect both acute and chronic diversions of nuclear materials. Therefore, both on-line nondestructive (NDA) and destructive analysis (DA) approaches are desirable. Current methods for DA involve grab sampling and laboratory based column extractions that are costly, hazardous, and time consuming. Direct on-line gamma measurements of Pu, while desirable, are not possible due to contributions from other actinides and fission products. Electrochemically-modulated separation (EMS) is a straightforward, cost effective alternative technology being investigated at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for highly selective, slip-stream sampling of U or Pu from reprocessing streams. The EMS selectivity results from simultaneous surface and redox chemistry that allows the affinity of the electrode to be turned “on” or “off” under potential control. Once isolated, the accumulated Pu can be measured by gamma spectroscopy or retained in a small quantity (nanogram-milligram) to reduce radiological concerns and to facilitate transport to laboratory based mass spectrometry instrumentation. In this study, we investigate both destructive and nondestructive applications of EMS. First, nondestructive Pu gamma analysis is performed using dissolved BWR spent fuel. Reduction factors for actinide and fission products and initial estimates of measurement uncertainties were measured. The methodology for DA sampling will also be reported for both Pu and U.

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LEAD SLOWING DOWN SPECTROSCOPY FOR DIRECT Pu MASS MEASUREMENTS

The direct measurement of Pu in previously irradiated fuel assemblies is a recognized need in the international safeguards community. A suitable technology could support more timely and independent material control and accounting (MC&A) measurements at nuclear fuel storage areas, the head-end of reprocessing facilities, and at the product-end of recycled fuel fabrication. Lead slowing down spectroscopy (LSDS) may be a viable solution for directly measuring not only the mass of 239Pu in fuel assemblies, but also the masses of other fissile isotopes such as 235U and 241Pu. To assess the potential viability of LSDS, an LSDS spectrometer was modeled in MCNP5 and “virtual assays” of nominal PWR assemblies ranging from 0 to 60 GWd/MTU burnup were completed. Signal extraction methods, including the incorporation of nonlinear fitting to account for self-shielding effects in strong resonance regions, are described. Quantitative estimates of Pu uncertainty are given for simplistic and more realistic fuel isotopic inventories calculated using ORIGEN. A discussion of additional signal-perturbing effects that will be addressed in future work, and potential signal extraction approaches that could improve Pu mass uncertainties, are also discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Developing a Signature Based Safeguards Approach for the Electrorefiner and Salt Cleanup Unit Operations in Pyroprocessing Facilities

Traditional nuclear materials accounting does not work well for safeguards when applied to pyroprocessing. Alternate methods such as Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) are being investigated. The goal of SBS is real-time/near-real-time detection of anomalous events in the pyroprocessing facility as they could indicate loss of special nuclear material. In high-throughput reprocessing facilities, metric tons of separated material are processed that must be accounted for. Even with very low uncertainties of accountancy measurements (<0.1%) the uncertainty of the material balances is still greater than the desired level. Novel contributions of this work are as follows: (1) significant enhancement of SBS development for the salt cleanup process by creating a new gas sparging process model, selecting sensors to monitor normal operation, identifying safeguards-significant off-normal scenarios, and simulating those off-normal events and generating sensor output; (2) further enhancement of SBS development for the electrorefiner by simulating off-normal events caused by changes in salt concentration and identifying which conditions lead to Pu and Cm not tracking throughout the rest of the system; and (3) new contribution in applying statistical techniques to analyze the signatures gained from these two models to help draw real-time conclusions on anomalous events.

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Safeguarding Reactors and Spent Nuclear Fuel [Slides]

Highly enriched fuel contains large quantities of ²³⁵U; Burned fuel may contain large quantities of ²³⁹Pu; Reprocessing is the major threat (discussed at length later), but we need to ensure the amount of plutonium going to the reprocessing plant is what we believe it to be; All nuclear material needs to be accounted for (material accountancy); There may be a loss of continuity of knowledge in which case fuel needs to be measured to determine how much plutonium and uranium it contains.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Electrochemically-Modulated Separations for Material Accountability Measurements

The Safeguards community recognizes that an accurate and timely measurement of accountable material mass at the head-end of the facility is critical to a modern materials control and accountability program at fuel reprocessing plants. For material accountancy, it is critical to detect both acute and chronic diversions of nuclear materials. Therefore, both on-line nondestructive (NDA) and destructive analysis (DA) approaches are desirable. Current methods for DA involve grab sampling and laboratory based column extractions that are costly, hazardous, and time consuming. Direct on-line gamma measurements of Pu, while desirable, are not possible due to contributions from other actinide and fission products. A technology for simple, online separation of targeted materials would benefit both DA and NDA measurements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Degradation Model and Testing Protocol for Metallic Waste Forms

Metallic waste forms developed to immobilize high-level radioactive wastes generated in advanced (closed) fuel cycles are being evaluated as part of the US DOE Fuel Cycle Research and Development program. The electrometallurgical reprocessing of used metallic fuels to recover U and Pu generates two waste streams: salt waste comprised of electro-refiner salt contaminated with oxidized fission products and metallic waste comprised of activated cladding and metallic fission products that were not oxidized under the processing conditions. Metallic waste forms can be made by directly melting the cladding and fuel wastes with small amounts of trim metals to form a multiphase alloy material in which radionuclides and other waste constituents are immobilized within chemically durable intermetallic and iron-based solid solution phases. Some components of the waste streams serve as important constituents of phases comprising the waste form, such as Mo and Zr, which form Fe{sub 2}Mo and Fe{sub 2}Zr intermetallic phases. Other waste constituents are accommodated as substitutional contaminants, such as Tc within the Fe{sub 2}Mo intermetallic and U/TRU within the Fe{sub 2}Zr intermetallic. Sufficient amounts of these host phases must be available to accommodate all radionuclides in the waste stream. The compositional flexibility of the host phases to incorporate waste components is being utilized to formulate metal waste forms that will accommodate variations in waste streams compositions that will occur over long-term fuel reprocessing operations. Small amounts of trim metals can be added to tailor the phase assembly to match the waste stream composition and facilitate waste form processing. For example, additional Zr may be added during waste form production to ensure all U/TRU is sequestered in a durable Fe{sub 2}Zr host phase and trim Cr, Mo, and Ni can be added to supplement the amounts provided by the steel cladding to improve the durability of a metallic waste form. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Direct disposal of spent fuel: developing solutions tailored to Japan

With the past Government policy of 100% reprocessing in Japan now open to discussion, options for direct disposal of spent fuel (SF) are now being considered in Japan. The need to move rapidly ahead in developing spent fuel management concepts is closely related to the ongoing debate on the future of nuclear power in Japan and the desire to understand the true costs of the entire life cycle of different options. Different scenarios for future nuclear power - and associated decisions on extent of reprocessing - will give rise to quite different inventories of SF with different disposal challenges. Although much work has been carried out spent fuel disposal within other national programmes, the potential for mining the international knowledge base is limited by the boundary conditions for disposal in Japan. Indeed, with a volunteer approach to siting, no major salt deposits and few undisturbed sediments, high tectonic activity, relatively corrosive groundwater and no deserts, it is evident that a tailored solution is needed. Nevertheless, valuable lessons can be learned from projects carried out worldwide, if focus is placed on basic principles rather than implementation details. (authors)

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Probabilistic risk analysis toward cost-effective 3S (safety, safeguards, security) implementation

Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) has been introduced for several decades in safety and nuclear advanced countries have already used this methodology in their own regulatory systems. However, PRA has not been developed in safeguards and security so far because of inherent difficulties in intentional and malicious acts. In this paper, probabilistic proliferation and risk analysis based on random process is applied to hypothetical reprocessing process and physical protection system in nuclear reactor with the Markov model that was originally developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) in Generation IV International Framework (GIF). Through the challenge to quantify the security risk with a frequency in this model, integrated risk notion among 3S to pursue the cost-effective installation of those countermeasures is discussed in a heroic manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗