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At least 685 records · Page 38

First Annual Report on Development of Microwave Resonant Cavity Transducer for Fluid Flow Sensing: Development of Sensor Performance Model of Microwave Cavity Flow Meter for Advanced Reactor High Temperature Fluids

We are investigating a microwave cavity-based transducer for in-core high-temperature fluid flow sensing in molten salt cooled reactors (MSCR) and sodium fast reactors (SFR). This sensor is a hollow metallic cylindrical cavity, which can be fabricated from stainless steel, and as such is expected to be resilient to radiation, high temperature and corrosive environment of MSCR and SFR. The principle of sensing consists of making one wall of the cylindrical cavity flexible enough so that dynamic pressure, which is proportional to fluid velocity, will cause membrane deflection. Membrane deflection causes cavity volume change, which leads to a shift in the resonant frequency. Feasibility of the sensor was initially investigated with analytical derivations and with COMSOL RF Module computer simulations of resonant frequency spectral shift due to uniform load. We also investigated the mechanical integrity of the flowmeter’s membrane through analytical modelling and COMSOL Structural Mechanics Module computer simulations. Both the analytic model and COMSOL model showed that maximum stresses on the plate, which are at the radial boundary of the plate, are three orders of magnitude smaller than the material’s yield strength and ultimate tensile strength. This indicates that the sensor is at a low risk of mechanical failure. Using results from models, we have developed an initial design for a microwave K-band sensor. A cylindrical resonator prototype was fabricated from brass for the initial tests. The external dimensions of the cavity are matched to the flange of a standard WR-42 waveguide. Microwave field is coupled into the resonant cavity through a subwavelength-size aperture. A test article was developed consisting of a piping Tee with a bulkhead WR-42 microwave waveguide installed in a leak-proof assembly. A microwave waveguide circulator was installed in the setup to suppress the effect of reflections at the cavity entrance by increasing the isolation between the input and the output port. Preliminary spectral characterization of cavity spectral response was performed with a portable PXIe chassis microwave VNA with a custom GUI. Preliminary dry tests of the transducer response were conducted with a set of calibrated weights. Transducer frequency shift was shown to be monotonically increasing with increasing pressure. The next steps will involve investigation of the transducer performance for water flow sensing.

42 ENGINEERING↗

SRC seal testing

Small venthole drilled in semisealed silicon-controlled rectifier (SCR) cavity eliminates entrapped helium. Although these devices show slightly greater leak than those before lead installation, it is now possible to distinguish device with good hermetic seal from defective one.

Miller, E. D.↗

Feasibility of Using Additive Manufacturing to Produce Axial Flow Hydropower Turbine Housing, Runner, and Draft Tube

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) worked with AMJET Turbine Systems, LLC (ATS), to demonstrate additive manufacturing of components for low head hydro turbine/generator applications. Several different types of additive manufacturing systems were used. Components were finished and assembled for testing in a turbine. However, one of the processes, Big Area Additive Manufacturing (BAAM),produced components that did not adequately perform due to persistent leaks that were caused by porosity in the parts produced. Therefore, the BAAM system was eliminated from contention. Vacuum infusion of rein into the parts eventually solved the porosity problem.Components were installed in anATS-8 turbine to be tested on the Keokuk Dam for operationally testing the unit.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Optimization of Layer Densities for Spacecraft Multilayered Insulation Systems

Numerous tests of various multilayer insulation systems have indicated that there are optimal densities for these systems. However, the only method of calculating this optimal density was by a complex physics based algorithm developed by McIntosh. In the 1970's much data were collected on the performance of these insulation systems with many different variables analyzed. All formulas generated included number of layers and layer density as geometric variables in solving for the heat flux, none of them was in a differentiable form for a single geometric variable. It was recently discovered that by converting the equations from heat flux to thermal conductivity using Fourier's Law, the equations became functions of layer density, temperatures, and material properties only. The thickness and number of layers of the blanket were merged into a layer density. These equations were then differentiated with respect to layer density. By setting the first derivative equal to zero, and solving for the layer density, the critical layer density was determined. Taking a second derivative showed that the critical layer density is a minimum in the function and thus the optimum density for minimal heat leak, this is confirmed by plotting the original function. This method was checked and validated using test data from the Multipurpose Hydrogen Testbed which was designed using McIntosh's algorithm.

Johnson, W. L.↗

Experimental Investigation of Jet-Induced Mixing of a Large Liquid Hydrogen Storage Tank

Experiments have been conducted to investigate the effect of fluid mixing on the depressurization of a large liquid hydrogen storage tank. The test tank is approximately ellipsoidal, having a volume of 4.89 m(exp 3) and an average wall heat flux of 4.2 W/m(exp 2) due to external heat input. A mixer unit was installed near the bottom of the tank to generate an upward directed axial jet flow normal to the liquid-vapor interface. Mixing tests were initiated after achieving thermally stratified conditions in the tank either by the introduction of hydrogen gas into the tank or by self-pressurization due to ambient heat leak through the tank wall. The subcooled liquid jet directed towards the liquid-vapor interface by the mixer induced vapor condensation and caused a reduction in tank pressure. Tests were conducted at two jet submergence depths for jet Reynolds numbers from 80,000 to 495,000 and Richardson numbers from 0.014 to 0.52. Results show that the rate of tank pressure change is controlled by the competing effects of subcooled jet flow and the free convection boundary layer flow due to external tank wall heating. It is shown that existing correlations for mixing time and vapor condensation rate based on small scale tanks may not be applicable to large scale liquid hydrogen systems.

Lin, C. S.↗

DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW TYPE A(F)RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

In a coordinated effort, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed the elimination of the Specification Packaging from 49 CFR 173.[1] In accordance with the Federal Register, issued on October 1, 2004, new fabrication of Specification Packages would no longer be authorized. In accordance with the NRC final rulemaking published January 26, 2004, Specification Packagings are mandated by law to be removed from service no later than October 1, 2008. This coordinated effort and resulting rulemaking initiated a planned phase out of Specification Type B and Type A fissile (F) material transportation packages within the Department of Energy (DOE) and its subcontractors. One of the Specification Packages affected by this regulatory change is the UN1A2 Specification Package, per DOT 49 CFR 173.417(a)(6). To maintain continuing shipments of DOE materials currently transported in UN1A2 Specification Package after the existing authorization expires, a replacement Type A(F) material packaging design is under development by the Savannah River National Laboratory. This paper presents a summary of the prototype design effort and testing of the new Type A(F) Package development for the DOE. This paper discusses the progress made in the development of a Type A Fissile Packaging to replace the expiring 49 CFR UN1A2 Specification Fissile Package. The Specification Package was mostly a single-use waste disposal container. The design requirements and authorized radioactive material contents of the UN1A2 Specification Package were defined in 49 CFR. A UN1A2 Specification Package was authorized to ship up to 350 grams of U-235 in any enrichment and in any non-pyrophoric form. The design was specified as a 55-gallon 1A2 drum overpack with a body constructed from 18 gauge steel with a 16 gauge drum lid. Drum closure was specified as a standard 12-gauge ring closure. The inner product container size was not specified but was listed as any container that met Specification 7A requirements per 49 CFR 178.350. Specification 7A containers were required to withstand Type A packaging tests required by 49CFR173.465 with compliance demonstrated through testing, analysis or similarity to other containers. The maximum weight of the 7A product container, the radioactive content, and any internal packaging was limited to 200 lbs. The total gross weight for the UN1A2 Specification Package was limited to 350 lbs. No additional restrictions were applied. Authorization for use did not require the UN1A2 Specification Package to be tested to the Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) required for performance based, Type A(F) packages certified by the NRC or DOE. The Type A(F) Packaging design discussed in this paper is required to be in compliance with the regulatory safety requirements defined in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR 71.41 through 71.47 and 10 CFR71.71. Sub-criticality of content must be maintained under the Hypothetical Accident Conditions specified under 10 CFR71.73. These federal regulations, and other applicable DOE Orders and Guides, govern design requirements for a Type A(F) package. Type A(F) packages with less than an A2 quantity of radioactive material are not required to have a leak testable boundary. With this exception a Type A(F) package design is subject to the same test requirements set forth for the design of a performance based Type B packaging.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Geochemical detection of carbon dioxide in dilute aquifers

Carbon storage in deep saline reservoirs has the potential to lower the amount of CO{sub 2} emitted to the atmosphere and to mitigate global warming. Leakage back to the atmosphere through abandoned wells and along faults would reduce the efficiency of carbon storage, possibly leading to health and ecological hazards at the ground surface, and possibly impacting water quality of near-surface dilute aquifers. We use static equilibrium and reactive transport simulations to test the hypothesis that perturbations in water chemistry associated with a CO{sub 2} gas leak into dilute groundwater are important measures for the potential release of CO{sub 2} to the atmosphere. Simulation parameters are constrained by groundwater chemistry, flow, and lithology from the High Plains aquifer. The High Plains aquifer is used to represent a typical sedimentary aquifer overlying a deep CO{sub 2} storage reservoir. Specifically, we address the relationships between CO{sub 2} flux, groundwater flow, detection time and distance. The CO{sub 2} flux ranges from 10{sup 3} to 2 x 10{sup 6} t/yr (0.63 to 1250 t/m{sup 2}/yr) to assess chemical perturbations resulting from relatively small leaks that may compromise long-term storage, water quality, and surface ecology, and larger leaks characteristic of short-term well failure.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

A Fully Redundant On-Line Mass Spectrometer System Used to Monitor Cryogenic Fuel Leaks on the Space Shuttle

This paper presents an on-line mass spectrometer designed to monitor for cryogenic leaks on the Space Shuttle. The topics include: 1) Hazardous Gas Detection Lab; 2) LASRE Test Support; 3) Background; 4) Location of Systems; 5) Sample Lines for Gas Detection; 6) Problems with Current Systems; 7) Requirements for New System (Nitrogen and Helium Background); and 8) HGDS 2000. This paper is in viewgraph form.

Griffin, T. P.↗

Development of a Hydrazine/Nitrogen Dioxide Fiber Optic Sensor

Bromothymol Blue (BT)/Bromocresol Green (BG) mixture (1/1) in hydrogel (l/l), produces a blue-green indicator for HZ and/or NO2. The stability over a two months period of this BT/BG (1/1) indicator solution was tested and no evidence of performance deterioration was detected. A dual HZ/NO2 prototype sensor utilizing an acid-base indicator was previously constructed. A monitor and control circuit are also designed, built d tested during the course of this project. The circuit is controlled with Motorola MC68HC II microcontroller evaluation board to monitor the voltage level out of the photodetector. Low-pass filter and amplifier are used to interface the sensor's small voltage with the microcontroller's AD input. The sensor, interface circuit and the microcontroller board are then all placed in one unit and powered with a single power supply. The unit is then tested several times and the response was consistent and proved the feasibility of dual "J@ leak detection. Other sensor types, suitable for silica glass fiber, smaller in size, more rugged and suitable for use on board of the Space Shuttle and missile canisters, are then proposed.

Andrawis, Alfred S.↗

Implementation of Statistical Process Control: Evaluating the Mechanical Performance of a Candidate Silicone Elastomer Docking Seal

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has been developing a novel docking system to meet the requirements of future exploration missions to low-Earth orbit and beyond. A dynamic gas pressure seal is located at the main interface between the active and passive mating components of the new docking system. This seal is designed to operate in the harsh space environment, but is also to perform within strict loading requirements while maintaining an acceptable level of leak rate. In this study, a candidate silicone elastomer seal was designed, and multiple subscale test articles were manufactured for evaluation purposes. The force required to fully compress each test article at room temperature was quantified and found to be below the maximum allowable load for the docking system. However, a significant amount of scatter was observed in the test results. Due to the stochastic nature of the mechanical performance of this candidate docking seal, a statistical process control technique was implemented to isolate unusual compression behavior from typical mechanical performance. The results of this statistical analysis indicated a lack of process control, suggesting a variation in the manufacturing phase of the process. Further investigation revealed that changes in the manufacturing molding process had occurred which may have influenced the mechanical performance of the seal. This knowledge improves the chance of this and future space seals to satisfy or exceed design specifications.

docking seal↗

Hydraulic fracturing experiments at 1500 m depth in a deep mine: Highlights from the kISMET project

In support of the U.S. DOE SubTER Crosscut initiative, we established a field test facility in a deep mine and designed and carried out in situ hydraulic fracturing experiments relevant to enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) in crystalline rock to characterize the stress field, understand the effects of rock fabric on fracturing, and gain experience in monitoring using geophysical methods. The project also included pre- and post-fracturing simulation and analysis, and laboratory measurements and experiments. The kISMET (permeability (k) and Induced Seismicity Management for Energy Technologies) site was established in the West Access Drift of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) 4757 ft (1450 m) below ground (on the 4850 ft level (4850L)) in phyllite of the Precambrian Poorman Formation. We drilled and continuously cored five near-vertical boreholes in a line on 3 m (10 ft) spacing, deviating the two outermost boreholes slightly to create a five-spot pattern around the test borehole centered in the test volume 40 m below the drift invert (floor) at a total depth of ~1490 m (4890 ft). Laboratory measurements of core from the center test borehole showed P-wave velocity heterogeneity along each core indicating strong, fine-scale (~1 cm or smaller) changes in the mechanical properties of the rock. Field measurements of the stress field by hydraulic fracturing showed that the minimum horizontal stress at the kISMET site averages 21.7 MPa (3146 psi) trending approximately N-S (356 degrees azimuth) and plunging slightly NNW at 12°. The vertical and horizontal maximum stresses are similar in magnitude at 42-44 MPa (6090-6380 psi) for the depths of testing, which averaged approximately 1530 m (5030 ft). Hydraulic fractures were remarkably uniform suggesting core-scale and larger rock fabric did not play a role in controlling fracture orientation. Analytical solutions suggest that the fracture radius of the large fracture (stimulation test) was more than 6 m (20 ft), depending on the unknown amount of leak-off.

Oldenburg, C↗

Distributed Optical Fiber Sensor Systems: Application to Natural Gas Pipeline Monitoring

Distributed fiber optic sensing is a cutting-edge technology that has found extensive applications in the monitoring of pipelines. Considering the low backscattering level of standard single-mode fiber as fiber under test, a Rayleigh enhanced optical fiber embedded within the tight-buffered cable is demonstrated in field testing. We analyzed the increased backscattering fiber cable's vibration performance to the conventional single-mode telecom fiber using a custom-built Φ-OTDR interrogator system. Thereafter, using a 4-inch steel pipeline with a flow rate of 5, 10, 15, and 20 ft/s and a fixed pressure level of 1000 psi, we field-tested the sensor system for monitoring natural gas pipeline acoustic vibrations. We also field tested Brillouin optical time domain analysis (BOTDA) system for pipeline hoop strain monitoring under various pressure conditions. The pilot-scale testing results presented in this study suggested that pipeline operators can accurately perform flow monitoring, leak detection, and pressure monitoring for pipeline integrity monitoring.

Lalam, Nageswara↗

Cooling Performance Testing of Attaway's Negative Pressure CDU

Attaway is a recently installed High-Performance Computing (HPC) machine at Sandia National Labs that is 70% water-cooled and 30% air-cooled. This machine, supplied by Penguin Computing, uses a novel new cooling system from Chilldyne that operates in a vacuum, preventing water leaks. If water-cooling is to fail, fans inside of each node will ramp up to do 100% of the cooling on Attaway. Various tests were completed on Attaway to determine the robustness of its cooling system as well as its ability to respond to sudden changes in states. These changes include an immediate change from an idle compute load to full load (Linpack) as well as running Linpack without any water cooling from Attaway's CDUs. It was discovered that Attaway could respond to sudden compute load changes very well, never throttling any nodes. When Linpack was run without water cooling, the system was able to operate for a short time before throttling happened.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Intermediate-Scale Laboratory Experiments of Subsurface Flow and Transport Resulting from Tank Leaks

Washington River Protection Solutions contracted with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to conduct laboratory experiments and supporting numerical simulations to improve the understanding of water flow and contaminant transport in the subsurface between waste tanks and ancillary facilities at Waste Management Area C. The work scope included two separate sets of experiments: • Small flow cell experiments to investigate the occurrence of potential unstable fingering resulting from leaks and the limitations of the STOMP (Subsurface Transport Over Multiple Phases) simulator to predict flow patterns and solute transport behavior under these conditions. Unstable infiltration may, under certain conditions, create vertically elongated fingers potentially transporting contaminants rapidly through the unsaturated zone to groundwater. The types of leak that may create deeply penetrating fingers include slow release, long duration leaks in relatively permeable porous media. Such leaks may have occurred below waste tanks at the Hanford Site. • Large flow experiments to investigate the behavior of two types of tank leaks in a simple layered system mimicking the Waste Management Area C. The investigated leaks include a relatively large leak with a short duration from a tank and a long duration leak with a relatively small leakage rate from a cascade line. The main objective of the small flow cell experiments was to test the ability of the numerical simulator STOMP to predict overall plume behavior and arrival times of conservative tracers in two different porous media for a relatively large range in injection rates. The large flow cell experiments were conducted to visualize flow and transport from short duration, fast leak and from long duration, slow leak scenarios.

contaminant transport↗

Development and testing of dry chemicals in advanced extinguishing systems for jet engine nacelle fires

The effectiveness of dry chemical in extinguishing and delaying reignition of fires resulting from hydrocarbon fuel leaking onto heated surfaces such as can occur in jet engine nacelles is studied. The commercial fire extinguishant dry chemical tried are sodium and potassium bicarbonate, carbonate, chloride, carbamate (Monnex), metal halogen, and metal hydroxycarbonate compounds. Synthetic and preparative procedures for new materials developed, a new concept of fire control by dry chemical agents, descriptions of experiment assemblages to test dry chemical fire extinguishant efficiencies in controlling fuel fires initiated by hot surfaces, comparative testing data for more than 25 chemical systems in a 'static' assemblage with no air flow across the heated surface, and similar comparative data for more than ten compounds in a dynamic system with air flows up to 350 ft/sec are presented.

Altman, R. L.↗

Development and testing of hermetic, laser-ignited pyrotechnic and explosive components

During the last decade there has been increasing interest in the use of lasers in place of electrical systems to ignite various pyrotechnic and explosive materials. The principal driving force for this work was the requirement for safer energetic components which would be insensitive to electrostatic and electromagnetic radiation. In the last few years this research has accelerated since the basic concepts have proven viable. At the present time it is appropriate to shift the research emphasis in laser initiation from the scientific arena--whether it can be done--to the engineering realm--how it can be put into actual practice in the field. Laser initiation research and development at EG&G Mound was in three principal areas: (1) laser/energetic material interactions; (2) development of novel processing techniques for fabricating hermetic (helium leak rate of less than 1 x 10(exp -8) cu cm/s) laser components; and (3) evaluation and testing of laser-ignited components. Research in these three areas has resulted in the development of high quality, hermetic, laser initiated components. Examples are presented which demonstrate the practicality of fabricating hermetic, laser initiated explosive or pyrotechnic components that can be used in the next generation of ignitors, actuators, and detonators.

Kramer, Daniel P.↗