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Development and Qualification of Advancements in Submersible Transfer Pump Performance and Life, and Implications for Advancing and Supporting Processing Options - 13343

From the 1950's through the 1990's, relatively inexpensive, 'off-the-shelf' type, vertical turbine pumps (VTP) were used to transfer Hanford waste. The technology of those pumps was rooted primarily in the mining and agricultural (irrigation) industries. HNF-3218, Double Shell Tank (DST) Transfer Pump History and Reliability Report, 1998, provides a summary of Hanford DST pump history to that date. Such pumps operated in the Hanford radioactive waste environment for an average of only 400 hours before failure. However, at that time, operating life was not a driving criteria within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, as the failure of transfer pumps represented a relatively low replacement and disposal cost. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issuance of the 'Debris Rule' in 1992, which mandated that mixed radioactive waste contaminated equipment be decontaminated to a 'low level waste' category prior to burial, elevated the significance of transfer pump reliability and decontamination capability as life-cycle cost criteria. Minimizing the frequency of transfer pump failures and design for decontamination became significantly important and served to drive the need toward specific, designed for application pumps to meet this challenge. To this end, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) and the supplier, Curtiss-Wright EMD (EMD), have recently collaborated on an intense program to further transfer pump technology and performance. (authors)

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Waste Chemistry Envelope for the Determination of Pitting Corrosion Susceptibility - 19554

Liquid radioactive wastes at the Hanford and Savannah River sites are stored in large underground carbon steel tanks. The high-level wastes are processed in several of the tanks and then transferred by piping to other site facilities for further processing before they are stabilized in a vitrified or grout waste form. Based on waste removal and processing schedules, many of the tanks, will be required to be in service for times exceeding the initial intended life (i.e., greater than 60 years). Until the waste is removed from storage, transferred, and processed, the materials and structures of the tanks must maintain a confinement function by providing a barrier to the environment and by maintaining acceptable structural stability during design basis events, which include loadings from both normal service and abnormal (e.g., earthquake) conditions. Administrative programs are in place to mitigate potential corrosion mechanisms and thereby maintain the structural and leak integrity functions of these waste tanks throughout their intended service life. Waste chemistry and temperature control are the means by which corrosion degradation of the waste tanks is minimized. Chemistry controls are based on in-situ coupon tests, waste tank experience, and laboratory testing. These requirements comprise the technical standards for corrosion control. The standards are utilized then as guidelines for operational procedures. The present waste chemistry controls for the Hanford DSTs were established in the 1980's in response to tank failures caused by stress corrosion cracking (SCC) at the DOE Savannah River Site (SRS). Portions of the SRS chemistry limits, which were developed at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) were coupled with corrosion testing results from Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL) and adopted for corrosion control of the double-shell tank (DST) waste at the Hanford Site. Since that time, the temperatures of the waste in the DSTs have decreased to less than 50 deg. C in most cases as the radioactive material has decayed. As a consequence, new chemistry controls were formulated for SCC in 2010. This testing however, did not address that potential for pitting in the supernatant and at the liquid-air interface. Indeed, initial tests indicated that the inhibitor requirements for SCC would be insufficient for the prevention of pitting. In addition to lower waste temperatures, future retrieval and process changes may impact the DST waste chemistry. Initial projections suggest that the waste chemistry of the DSTs may shift to a broader range of pH and higher aggressive anion concentrations (e.g., chloride, sulfate, etc.) than the wastes that are presently stored. Additionally, processes within the vitrification facility may result in streams that are returned to the tank farm for evaporation. These streams may also contain high concentrations of aggressive species. SRNL investigated the propensity for pitting of the carbon steel waste tanks at current and projected DST waste chemistries. A statistically designed series of tests provided a pitting factor that relates the ratio of the inhibitor species to the aggressive species and the probability of observing pitting. An acceptable pitting factor was determined and was utilized for the development of a new chemistry envelope. The new chemistry envelope was compared to the envelope that was established for SCC and was determined to be bounding. Validation of the new chemistry envelope was performed via model simulations and comparison with historical experimental results and approaches to establishing chemistry envelopes. The new chemistry envelope will eventually be part of an overall assessment of the condition of the tanks and any changes made to the overall structural integrity program for the Hanford DSTs. (authors)

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THE RETRIEVAL KNOWLEDGE CENTER EVALUATION OF LOW TANK LEVEL MIXING TECHNOLOGIES FOR DOE HIGH LEVEL WASTE TANK RETRIEVAL 10516

The Department of Energy (DOE) Complex has over two-hundred underground storage tanks containing over 80-million gallons of legacy waste from the production of nuclear weapons. The majority of the waste is located at four major sites across the nation and is planned for treatment over a period of almost forty years. The DOE Office of Technology Innovation & Development within the Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) sponsors technology research and development programs to support processing advancements and technology maturation designed to improve the costs and schedule for disposal of the waste and closure of the tanks. Within the waste processing focus area are numerous technical initiatives which included the development of a suite of waste removal technologies to address the need for proven equipment and techniques to remove high level radioactive wastes from the waste tanks that are now over fifty years old. In an effort to enhance the efficiency of waste retrieval operations, the DOE-EM Office of Technology Innovation & Development funded an effort to improve communications and information sharing between the DOE's major waste tank locations as it relates to retrieval. The task, dubbed the Retrieval Knowledge Center (RKC) was co-lead by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) with core team members representing the Oak Ridge and Idaho sites, as well as, site contractors responsible for waste tank operations. One of the greatest challenges to the processing and closure of many of the tanks is complete removal of all tank contents. Sizeable challenges exist for retrieving waste from High Level Waste (HLW) tanks; with complications that are not normally found with tank retrieval in commercial applications. Technologies currently in use for waste retrieval are generally adequate for bulk removal; however, removal of tank heels, the materials settled in the bottom of the tank, using the same technology have proven to be difficult. Through the RKC, DOE-EM funded an evaluation of adaptable commercial technologies that could assist with the removal of the tank heels. This paper will discuss the efforts and results of developing the RKC to improve communications and discussion of tank waste retrieval through a series of meetings designed to identify technical gaps in retrieval technologies at the DOE Hanford and Savannah River Sites. This paper will also describe the results of an evaluation of commercially available technologies for low level mixing as they might apply to HLW tank heel retrievals.

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Application of Robotics in Decommissioning and Decontamination - 12536

Decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities is a significant challenge worldwide and one which is growing in size as more plants reach the end of their operational lives. The strategy chosen for individual projects varies from the hands-on approach with significant manual intervention using traditional demolition equipment at one extreme to bespoke highly engineered robotic solutions at the other. The degree of manual intervention is limited by the hazards and risks involved, and in some plants are unacceptable. Robotic remote engineering is often viewed as more expensive and less reliable than manual approaches, with significant lead times and capital expenditure. However, advances in robotics and automation in other industries offer potential benefits for future decommissioning activities, with the high probability of reducing worker exposure and other safety risks as well as reducing the schedule and costs required to complete these activities. Some nuclear decommissioning tasks and facility environments are so hazardous that they can only be accomplished by exclusive use of robotic and remote intervention. Less hazardous tasks can be accomplished by manual intervention and the use of PPE. However, PPE greatly decreases worker productivity and still exposes the worker to both risk and dose making remote operation preferable to achieve ALARP. Before remote operations can be widely accepted and deployed, there are some economic and technological challenges that must be addressed. These challenges will require long term investment commitments in order for technology to be: - Specifically developed for nuclear applications; - At a sufficient TRL for practical deployment; - Readily available as a COTS. Tremendous opportunities exist to reduce cost and schedule and improve safety in D and D activities through the use of robotic and/or tele-operated systems. - Increasing the level of remote intervention reduces the risk and dose to an operator. Better environmental information identifies hazards, which can be assessed, managed and mitigated. - Tele-autonomous control in a congested unstructured environment is more reliable compared to a human operator. Advances in Human Machine Interfaces contribute to reliability and task optimization. Use of standardized dexterous manipulators and COTS, including standardized communication protocols reduces project time scales. - The technologies identified, if developed to a sufficient TRL would all contribute to cost reductions. Additionally, optimizing a project's position on a Remote Intervention Scale, a Bespoke Equipment Scale and a Tele-autonomy Scale would provide cost reductions from the start of a project. Of the technologies identified, tele-autonomy is arguably the most significant, because this would provide a fundamental positive change for robotic control in the nuclear industry. The challenge for technology developers is to develop versatile robotic technology that can be economically deployed to a wide range of future D and D projects and industrial sectors. The challenge for facility owners and project managers is to partner with the developers to provide accurate systems requirements and an open and receptive environment for testing and deployment. To facilitate this development and deployment effort, the NNL and DOE have initiated discussions to explore a collaborative R and D program that would accelerate development and support the optimum utilization of resources. (authors)

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Air Shipment of Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania to Russia

Romania successfully completed the world’s first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in Type B(U) casks under existing international laws and without shipment license special exceptions when the last Romanian highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel was transported to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This air shipment required the design, fabrication, and licensing of special 20 foot freight containers and cask tiedown supports to transport the eighteen TUK 19 shipping casks on a Russian commercial cargo aircraft. The new equipment was certified for transport by road, rail, water, and air to provide multi modal transport capabilities for shipping research reactor spent fuel. The equipment design, safety analyses, and fabrication were performed in the Russian Federation and transport licenses were issued by both the Russian and Romanian regulatory authorities. The spent fuel was transported by truck from the VVR S research reactor to the Bucharest airport, flown by commercial cargo aircraft to the airport at Yekaterinburg, Russia, and then transported by truck to the final destination in a secure nuclear facility at Chelyabinsk, Russia. This shipment of 23.7 kg of HEU was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), as part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in close cooperation with the Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and was managed in Romania by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). This paper describes the planning, shipment preparations, equipment design, and license approvals that resulted in the safe and secure air shipment of this spent nuclear fuel.

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Challenging Engineering Demographics and the READY Program - 18528

The mission of the Liquid Waste Organization at the Savannah River Site involves the safe storage of nuclear waste, closure of waste tanks, and immobilization of the waste into grout (low-level waste) or glass (high-level waste). With much of the mission left to complete and a significant percentage of the engineering organization eligible for retirement within the next 5 years, focus has been on recruiting and retaining new hires and early career engineers. Over the past two years, enhancements have been made to current programs and new programs have been created with the goal of improving the retention rate for engineering. These programs include the Reaching Engineers at the Development Years, the Early Career Professional Technology Exchange, the Shift Technical Engineer Pipeline, and Technical Staff Training. (authors)

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Optimization of LIBS Acquisition Parameters for Chemical Analysis on HLW Liquid Solution - 18291

Research programs are currently underway in the Joint CEA-AREVA Vitrification Laboratory (LCV) to develop and optimize Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for nuclear waste streams analyses. The laboratory has full scale prototypes with the advantage of working on simulated inactive solutions of fission products. LIBS is an elemental chemical analysis technology that uses a short laser pulse to create a micro-plasma on the sample surface. This analytical technique offers many advantages compared to other techniques. It includes a sample preparation-free measurement and an extremely fast measurement time, from a few seconds to a few minutes. This paper presents the LIBS technique available in the laboratory. The first LIBS analyzes results of liquid samples from the off-gas treatment unit integrated on the full scale vitrification process are also presented and discussed. These complex solutions contain suspended particles and up to 30 chemical elements. A vision of an online LIBS analysis cell is also proposed with the development and associated research steps. (authors)

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

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Management of Legacy Enriched Uranium and Transuranic Materials at ORNL - 19062

The DOE manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960's through the 1980's. These materials were made by irradiating targets in production reactors to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. ORNL uses these materials in DoE's center for production, storage, and distribution of transuranium isotopes (plutonium through californium) for the heavy-element research program and has used them as feedstock in the Calutron Electromagnetic Isotope Enrichment Facility, one of only two facilities in the world with capabilities to enrich radioisotopes in multigram quantities. Both the production reactors and enrichment facilities have been shut down, and many of these unique materials will not be produced again in the foreseeable future [1, 2]. As a result, ORNL has an inventory of radioisotopes that are being held for reuse because their potential intrinsic value to DOE, but many of these materials have no currently defined use. ORNL is undertaking an initiative to more actively manage these materials by reviewing the existing inventory to determine if the contents have programmatic use. Steps are being taken to process, repackage, and stage the materials for distribution to programmatic users or for waste disposal, primarily at WIPP. This paper describes the approach that ORNL has taken to determine whether the inventory of materials should be kept or disposed and the processes that are being used to manage or disposition the materials. (authors)

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Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Drummed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program (Rev. 3)

Each testing and analytical facility performing waste characterization activities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) participates in the Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) to comply with the Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WAC) (DOE/WIPP-02-3122), the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (DOE/CBFO-94-1012), and the Performance Demonstration Program Management Plan (DOE/CBFO-01-3107). The PDP serves as a quality control check for data generated in the characterization of waste destined for WIPP.

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US/EURATOM I-NERI 2019 Annual Review Assessing

This project addresses the important issue of validating the integrity of spent nuclear fuel storage for extended periods of time, followed by transportation. While it is believed that this fuel is safe in its current condition for long periods of time, confirmatory data and analyses need to be obtained to validate our understanding of used fuel degradation mechanisms that may impinge on the integrity of the fuel to withstand long term storage and transportation conditions. This is especially true for high burnup fuel (> 45 GWD/MTU) that is currently being discharged. The international community recognizes the importance of these issues. Moreover, several European countries now envisage to subject mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to extended storage and direct disposal. The institutes collaborating on this proposal all have active programs focused on resolving these very issues. Collaborating together provides a leverage of programs and funding that will benefit each program individually as well as the commercial nuclear industry, as a whole.

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2025

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2025. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of the DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, the evaluation of data collected in 2025 continued to indicate that WVDP activities posed no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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The potential environmental gains from recycling waste plastics: Simulation of transferring recycling and recovery technologies to Shenyang, China

Research highlights: {yields} Urban symbiosis creates compatibility of industrial development and waste management. {yields} Mechanical technology leads to more CO{sub 2} emission reduction. {yields} Energy recovery technology leads to more fossil fuel saving. {yields} Clean energy makes recycling technologies cleaner. {yields} Demand management is crucial for realizing potential environmental gains of recycling. - Abstract: With the increasing attention on developing a low-carbon economy, it is necessary to seek appropriate ways on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through innovative municipal solid waste management (MSWM), such as urban symbiosis. However, quantitative assessments on the environmental benefits of urban symbiosis, especially in developing countries, are limited because only a limited number of planned synergistic activities have been successful and it is difficult to acquire detailed inventory data from private companies. This paper modifies and applies a two-step simulation system and used it to assess the potential environmental benefits, including the reduction of GHG emissions and saving of fossil fuels, by employing various Japanese plastics recycling/energy-recovery technologies in Shenyang, China. The results showed that among various recycling/energy-recovery technologies, the mechanical waste plastics recycling technology, which produces concrete formwork boards (NF boards), has the greatest potential in terms of reducing GHG emissions (1.66 kg CO{sub 2}e/kg plastics), whereas the technology for the production of refuse plastic fuel (RPF) has the greatest potential on saving fossil fuel consumption (0.77 kgce/kg-plastics). Additional benefits can be gained by applying combined technologies that cascade the utilization of waste plastics. Moreover, the development of clean energy in conjunction with the promotion of new waste plastics recycling programs could contribute to additional reductions in GHG emissions and fossil fuel consumption.

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Annual Radioactive Waste Tank Inspection Program – 2017

The Department of Energy (DOE) requires that Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR), the Liquid Waste contractor, maintain a robust and timely Structural Integrity Program for waste tanks that are leak-tight and for waste tanks that have leaked or are suspect. These requirements are promulgated in DOE Manual 435.1-1, Section II.Q.(2). A key aspect of SRR’s implementation of these requirements is its annual tank inspection program.

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Shaker Table Test Plan

Currently, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is stored in onsite independent spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSIs), which is a dry storage facility, at 55 nuclear power plant sites. The majority of SNF in dry storage is in welded metal canisters (2,917 canisters at the end of 2019). The canisters are loaded for storage in storage overpacks (vertical casks or horizontal storage modules) and placed on outdoor concrete pads. Because the SNF will be stored at ISFSIs for an extended period of time, there is growing concern with regards to the behavior of the SNF within these dry storage systems during earthquakes. To address these concerns, the SFWST program is considering conducting an earthquake shaker table test. The goal of this test is to determine the strains and accelerations on fuel assembly hardware and cladding during earthquakes of different magnitudes to better quantify the potential damage an earthquake could inflict on spent nuclear fuel rods. The seismic integrity of the storage system has been addressed in the past by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is not the focus of this potential test. Instead the DOE would benefit from knowing the condition of the fuel cladding from storage, transportation, to disposal so that it can ascertain repository performance for the fuel and packaging in its final state. A seismic event is part of the possible loading events that the fuel could experience in its lifetime. This report proposes several earthquake shaker table tests with different degrees of complexity. Alternative 1 was defined in the FY20 work scope. Alternatives 2 and 3 were recently developed to take advantage of the NUHOMS 32PTH dry storage canister that may be available in FY21 for this test at a minimum cost to the project. The selection of the alternative(s) will depend on the available budget and the SFWST program priorities for the near future.

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Discovery of Contamination Spread at the Plutonium Finishing Plant during Demolition Activities

Between December 14 and December 18, 2017, contamination was detected outside of the Contamination Area (CA) at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) demolition zone, including around the PFP offices and on multiple vehicles located outside the radiological boundary. The consequences of this event were personnel exposure and potential radiological contamination leaving the Hanford Site. The scope of this causal analysis is focused at the events leading up to and including the contamination spread outside the PFP CA and development of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Specific methods to be used upon resumption of demolition activities are under development at the time that this report is approved and will be fully vetted by the DOE-RL and the DOE Expert Panel. It should also be noted that studies of radiological emissions from Hanford are part of the routine National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Compliance Monitoring (NESHAPS) Program and are not addressed in this report.

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Residual Stresses in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canisters with Cold Spray Coatings

This report describes the development of cold spray (CS) process and its application to provide on overlay coating of metal welds with a surface crack in a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage canister and thereby remediate the canister from further propagation of the crack. This work informs aging management programs for the SNF canisters.

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