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At least 685 records · Page 38

Assistive Detect and Avoid Technology in Urban Air Mobility Environments

The use of Assistive Detect and Avoid (Assistive DAA or ADAA) technology in Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environments poses potential benefits as well as challenges. Assistive DAA refers to the leveraged use of DAA technology, originally developed to replace see-and-avoid capabilities for remotely piloted aircraft, in onboard-piloted aircraft to augment (rather than replace) pilots’ see-and-avoid abilities and thus enhance the safety and efficiency of visual flight operations. ADAA is anticipated to be especially safety-enhancing in airspace where traffic density is high or traditional air traffic services are limited, such as in future UAM environments. ADAA may also enable higher-tempo UAM operations than with only see-and-avoid capabilities, while still maintaining acceptable levels of safety. UAM concepts under development by the FAA, NASA, and industry focus on operations moving people and cargo in urban and suburban areas using innovative technologies, operations, and aircraft, including electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft. Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center, in collaboration with FAA researchers at the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ, have conducted a series of medium-fidelity, human-in-the-loop research simulations of potential future UAM operations and concepts in both Class C and Class B airspace environments. These simulations have included use of a Langley-developed ADAA research tool called DANTi, which enables configurable ADAA displays to be presented to pilots of simulated eVTOL aircraft participating in higher-density and higher-tempo UAM operations. Experience and observations made during testing of the NASA-developed DANTi ADAA capability in the UAM NFLITE simulation environment will be reported in this paper together with a discussion of airspace integration and regulatory topics.

Detect and Avoid↗

Four Problematic Methods in Reliability Analysis

Some basic methods used in reliability analysis are problematic because they produce incorrect and overoptimistic predictions. Initially gratifying forecasts are often invalidated by testing and operational experience. The problematic methods in reliability analysis include estimating the system failure rate as the sum of component failure rates, assuming that reliability growth continues indefinitely during testing, overestimating the benefits of redundancy, and using the fault tolerance count instead of a detailed reliability analysis. Reliability analysis can produce more optimism than accuracy. This bug may now be a feature. The optimistic bias inevitable in project planning should be corrected by realistic reliability analysis that reflects relevant experience. That the repeated poor performance of reliability analysis is found to be surprising suggests willful blindness. Rigorous methods and impartial critical review are necessary to improve reliability analysis.

Reliability analysis↗

Four Problematic Methods in Reliability Analysis

Some basic methods used in reliability analysis are problematic because they produce incorrect and overoptimistic predictions. Initially gratifying forecasts are often invalidated by testing and operational experience. The problematic methods in reliability analysis include estimating the system failure rate as the sum of component failure rates, assuming that reliability growth continues indefinitely during testing, overestimating the benefits of redundancy, and using the fault tolerance count instead of a detailed reliability analysis. Reliability analysis can produce more optimism than accuracy. This bug may now be a feature. The optimistic bias inevitable in project planning should be corrected by realistic reliability analysis that reflects relevant experience. That the repeated poor performance of reliability analysis is found to be surprising suggests willful blindness. Rigorous methods and impartial critical review are necessary to improve reliability analysis.

Reliability analysis↗

Updates to NASA’S Break-in-Prebreathe Flight Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during hypobaric ground testing at Johnson Space Center (JSC) identified a ~3 min break-in-prebreathe (BiP) late in the prebreathe (13 min prior to depressurization) as the leading credible cause for the DCS case. This occurred despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 min in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Breaks lasting longer than 10 min require a complete restart of the prebreathe protocol. The adequacy of NASA’s BiP rules was evaluated prior to resuming any hypobaric ground testing or International Space Station (ISS) extravehicular activity (EVA). Of particular interest to the authors was the timing of the BiP in relation to the overall prebreathe timeline. Although there exists no agreed-upon definition, a ‘late’ BiP means towards the end of the prebreathe period, and in particular, the last hour prior to depressurization. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) the type II DCS case report and findings from the investigation; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA); iv) relevant published literature; v) tissue gas loading model estimates; and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗

High-Throughput Custom Monitoring for the Mu2e TDAQ System

In this project we are studying the application of programmable network hardware to provide a custom monitoring capability for the Mu2e Trigger and Data Acquisition System (TDAQ) system. The goal of the Mu2e experiment is to search for a charged-lepton flavor violating processes where a negative muon converts into an electron in the field of an aluminum nucleus. This experiment is intended to improve by four orders of magnitude the search sensitivity reached so far. We have a working prototype of a system that provides high-throughput, custom monitoring for the Mu2e TDAQ system. The custom Mu2e network packet header format is parsed as it crosses the network switch. Parsing extracts bits that convey information about error states at read-out controllers (ROCs). This information is periodically relayed to the switch controller, which in turn alerts experiment operators.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Cryogenic testing of HL-LHC Q1/Q3 cryo-assemblies at Fermilab

Fermilab is conducting horizontal cryogenic testing of Q1/Q3 cryo-assemblies for the high-luminosity LHC upgrade (HL-LHC). Cryo-assemblies are installed on the upgraded Fermilab horizontal test stand previously used for testing the LHC inner triplet quadrupoles. The cryogenic process requirements of these tests include controlled cool-down and warm-up with a 100 K maximum temperature differential between the two ends of the cold mass, operation of a 1.3 bar, 1.9 K bath of subcooled superfluid helium during power testing and magnetic measurements, and operation at pressure up to 18 bar with full helium recovery after a quench. This paper presents the operational experience gained from the first tests as well as improvement for subsequent tests.

Rabehl, R. [Fermilab] (ORCID:0000000311130030)↗

The Impact of Cultural Values and Organizational Processes on Nuclear Security Operations

Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Glenn's Telescience Support Center Provided Around-the-Clock Operations Support for Space Experiments on the International Space Station

NASA Glenn Research Center s Telescience Support Center (TSC) allows researchers on Earth to operate experiments onboard the International Space Station (ISS) and the space shuttles. NASA s continuing investment in the required software, systems, and networks provides distributed ISS ground operations that enable payload developers and scientists to monitor and control their experiments from the Glenn TSC. The quality of scientific and engineering data is enhanced while the long-term operational costs of experiments are reduced because principal investigators and engineering teams can operate their payloads from their home institutions.

Malarik, Diane C.↗

National Aeronautics and Space Administration operations: Remote sensing experiments in the New York Bight, 7-17 April 1975

Results are given of remote sensing experiments conducted in the New York Bight between April 7-17, 1975, to evaluate the role of remote sensing technology to aid in monitoring ocean dumping. Remote sensors were flown on the C-54, U-2, and C-130 aircraft while the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration obtained concurrent in situ sea truth data using helicopters and surface platforms. The test site, aircraft platforms, experiments, and supporting sensors are described. The operation of each aircraft are discussed and aircraft flight lines, flight parameters, and data identification parameters are presented in figures and tables.

Usry, J. W.↗

Compendium of Information for Interpreting the Microgravity Environment of the Orbiter Spacecraft

Science experiments are routinely conducted on the NASA shuttle orbiter vehicles. Primarily, these experiments are operated on such missions to take advantage of the microgravity (low-level acceleration) environment conditions during on-orbit operations. Supporting accelerometer instruments are operated with the experiments to measure the microgravity acceleration environment in which the science experiments were operated. Tne Principal Investigator Microgravity Services (PIMS) Project at NASA Lewis Research Center interprets these microgravity acceleration data and prepares mission summary reports to aid the principal investigators of the scientific experiments in understanding the microgravity environment. Much of the information about the orbiter vehicle and the microgravity environment remains the same for each mission. Rather than repeat that information in each mission summary report, reference information is presented in this report to assist users in understanding the microgravity-acceleration data. The characteristics of the microgravity acceleration environment are first presented. The methods of measurement and common instruments used on orbiter missions are described. The coordinate systems utilized in the orbiter and accelerometers are described. Some of the orbiter attitudes utilized in microgravity related missions are illustrated. Methods of data processing are described and illustrated. The interpretation of the microgravity acceleration data is included with an explanation of common disturbance sources. Instructions to access some of the acceleration data and a description of the orbiter thrusters are explained in the appendixes. A microgravity environment bibliography is also included.

DeLombard, Richard↗

Flight Technical Error Analysis of the SATS Higher Volume Operations Simulation and Flight Experiments

This paper provides an analysis of Flight Technical Error (FTE) from recent SATS experiments, called the Higher Volume Operations (HVO) Simulation and Flight experiments, which NASA conducted to determine pilot acceptability of the HVO concept for normal operating conditions. Reported are FTE results from simulation and flight experiment data indicating the SATS HVO concept is viable and acceptable to low-time instrument rated pilots when compared with today s system (baseline). Described is the comparative FTE analysis of lateral, vertical, and airspeed deviations from the baseline and SATS HVO experimental flight procedures. Based on FTE analysis, all evaluation subjects, low-time instrument-rated pilots, flew the HVO procedures safely and proficiently in comparison to today s system. In all cases, the results of the flight experiment validated the results of the simulation experiment and confirm the utility of the simulation platform for comparative Human in the Loop (HITL) studies of SATS HVO and Baseline operations.

Williams, Daniel M.↗

The Nimbus-4 backscatter ultraviolet /BUV/ atmospheric ozone experiment Two years' operation.

Review of some of the procedures and results of the double monochromator and colinear photometer Nimbus-4 satellite experiment that measures ultraviolet terrestrial radiance, Lambert reflectivity of the lower boundary of the scattering atmosphere, and extraterrestrial solar irradiance. The experiment has produced nearly three years of almost continuous data which are being used to infer the high-level ozone distribution and total ozone on a global basis. The high-level ozone data have been verified by independent coincident rocket ozone soundings, and the total ozone values show good agreement with Dobson spectrophotometer determinations. An increase has been observed in equatorial radiance at 2550 A relative to 2900 A, which seems to indicate that the amount of ozone in the upper stratosphere is related to the eleven-year solar cycle.

Heath, D. F.↗

Apollo experience report: Communications used during recovery operations

Apollo program experience in recovery-support communications is reviewed, and the working relationships among NASA, the Department of Defense, and commercial communications facilities are discussed. The organization, facilities, philosophy, and funding of recovery-support communications are described. The relocation of two recovery control centers is discussed, as are the functions of primary and secondary recovery ships, aircraft, and relay satellities. The possibility of using ships of opportunity for recovery operations is considered. Finally, the means by which money, manpower, and resources have been saved and longlines leased are delineated.

Hoover, J. E.↗

Autonomous Sciencecraft Experiment (ASE) Test Operations in 2003

NASA has identified the development of an autonomously operating spacecraft as a necessity for an expanded program of missions exploring the Solar System. The Autonomous Sciencecraft Experiment (ASE) has been selected for flight demonstration by NASA s New Millennium Program (NMP) as part of the Space Technology 6 (ST6) mission. ASE is scheduled to fly on the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Techsat-21 constellation in 2006. Tech- Sat-21 consists of three satellites flying in a variable-geometry formation in Earth orbit. Each satellite is equipped with X-band Synthetic Aperture Radar, yielding high spatial resolution images (approx. 3 m) of the Earth s surface. The constellation will fly at an altitude of 550 km, in a 35.4 inclination circular orbit, yielding exact repeat-track observations every 13 days. Prior to full deployment, elements of the versatile ASE spacecraft command and control software, image formation software and science processing software will be utilized and tested on two very different platforms in 2003: AirSAR and EO-1 (described below). Advantages of Autonomous Operations: ASE will demonstrate advanced autonomous science data acquisition, processing, and product downlink prioritization, as well as autonomous spacecraft command and control, and fault detection. The advantages of spacecraft autonomy are to future missions include: (a) making the best use of reduced downlink; (b) the overcoming of communication delays through decisionmaking in situ, enabling fast reaction to dynamic events; (c) an increase of science content per byte of returned data; and (d) an avoidance of return of null (no-change/no feature) datasets: if there is no change detectable between two scenes of the same target, there is no need to return the second dataset.

Chien, S.↗