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Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 600-243 Petroleum-Contaminated Soil Bioremediation Pad, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-033

The 600-243 waste site consisted of a bioremediation pad for petroleum-contaminated soils resulting from the 1100 Area Underground Storage Tank (UST) upgrades in 1994. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

1100 Area Underground Storage Tank↗

Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-23, 100-B/C Area Surface Debris, Waste Site, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-027

The 100-B-23, 100-B/C Surface Debris, waste consisted of multiple locations of surface debris and chemical stains that were identified during an Orphan Site Evaluation of the 100-B/C Area. Evaluation of the collected information for the surface debris features yielded four generic waste groupings: asbestos-containing material, lead debris, oil and oil filters, and treated wood. Focused verification sampling was performed concurrently with remediation. Site remediation was accomplished by selective removal of the suspect hazardous items and potentially impacted soils. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

100-B-23 waste site↗

Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-18, 184-B Powerhouse Debris Pile, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-020

The 100-B-18 Powerhouse Debris Pile contained miscellaneous demolition waste from the decommissioning activities of the 184-B Powerhouse. The debris covered an area roughly 15 m by 30 m and included materials such as concrete blocks, mixed aggregate/concrete slabs, stone rubble, asphalt rubble, traces of tar/coal, broken fluorescent lights, brick chimney remnants, and rubber hoses. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

100-B-18 Powerhouse Debris Pile↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 2)

This document describes and implements the process to establish the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) or HalfPACT packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using one analytical unit which is a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors, a mass spectrometer (MS) and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample introduced to the GC is split and part goes to MS and the other part goes to TCD. The MS analyzes sample for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and the TCD analyzes for hydrogen and methane. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC).

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Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 2.1)

This document describes and implements the process to establish the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) or HalfPACT packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using one analytical unit which is a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors, a mass spectrometer (MS) and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample introduced to the GC is split and part goes to MS and the other part goes to TCD. The MS analyzes sample for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and the TCD analyzes for hydrogen and methane. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC).

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Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 3.1)

This document describes and implements the process to determine the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II), HalfPACT, or RH-TRU 72-B packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors: a mass spectrometer (MS), and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample analyzed in the GC is split and half is sent to the MS for volatile organic compound (VOC) analysis while the other half is sent to the TCD for hydrogen and methane analysis. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC) and the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RHTRAMPAC).

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Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 3.2)

This document describes and implements the process to establish the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) or HalfPACT packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using one analytical unit which is a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors, a mass spectrometer (MS) and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample introduced to the GC is split and part goes to MS and the other part goes to TCD. The MS analyzes sample for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and the TCD analyzes for hydrogen and methane. The requirements and technical bases for allowable flammable gas/VOC concentrations are described in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC).

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Environmental Cleanup of the Idaho National Laboratory Status Report

This paper describes the status of the cleanup of the U.S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory site (INL). On May 1, 2005 CH2M.WG Idaho, LLC (CWI) began its 7-year, $2.4 billion cleanup of the INL. When the work is completed, 3,406,871 liters (900,000 gallons) of sodium-bearing waste will have been treated; 15 high-level waste tanks will have been grouted and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)- closed; more than 200 facilities will have been demolished or disposed of, including three reactors, several spent fuel basins, and hot cells; thousands of containers of buried transuranic waste will have been retrieved; more than 8,000 cubic meters (10,464 cubic yards) of contact-handled transuranic waste and more than 500 cubic meters (654 cubic yards) of remote-handled transuranic waste will have been characterized, packaged, and shipped offsite; almost 200 release sites and voluntary consent order tank systems will have been remediated; and 3,178 units of spent fuel will have been moved from wet to dry storage. In 2007, CWI began the construction of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit that will treat the sodium-bearing waste for eventual disposal; removed and disposed the 112-ton Engineering Test Reactor vessel; demolished all significant radiological facilities at Test Area North; continued the exhumation of buried transuranic wastes from the Subsurface Disposal Area at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex; shipped the first of hundreds of containers of remote-handled transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant; disposed of thousands of cubic meters of low-level and low-level mixed radioactive wastes both onsite and offsite while meeting all regulatory cleanup objectives. (author)

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PUBLIC AND REGULATORY ACCEPTANCE OF BLENDING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE VS DILUTION

On April 21, 2009, the Energy Facilities Contractors Group (EFCOG) Waste Management Working Group (WMWG) provided a recommendation to the Department of Energy's Environmental Management program (DOE-EM) concerning supplemental guidance on blending methodologies to use to classify waste forms to determine if the waste form meets the definition of Transuranic (TRU) Waste or can be classified as Low-Level Waste (LLW). The guidance provides specific examples and methods to allow DOE and its Contractors to properly classify waste forms while reducing the generation of TRU wastes. TRU wastes are much more expensive to characterize at the generator's facilities, ship, and then dispose at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) than Low-Level Radioactive Waste's disposal. Also the reduction of handling and packaging of LLW is inherently less hazardous to the nuclear workforce. Therefore, it is important to perform the characterization properly, but in a manner that minimizes the generation of TRU wastes if at all possible. In fact, the generation of additional volumes of radioactive wastes under the ARRA programs, this recommendation should improve the cost effective implementation of DOE requirements while properly protecting human health and the environment. This paper will describe how the message of appropriate, less expensive, less hazardous blending of radioactive waste is the 'right' thing to do in many cases, but can be confused with inappropriate 'dilution' that is frowned upon by regulators and stakeholders in the public. A proposal will be made in this paper on how to communicate this very complex and confusing technical issue to regulatory bodies and interested stakeholders to gain understanding and approval of the concept. The results of application of the proposed communication method and attempt to change the regulatory requirements in this area will be discussed including efforts by DOE and the NRC on this very complex subject.

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Flanged Tritium Waste Containers: Background and Current Path to Disposal

The MLLW Flanged Tritium Waste Container (FTWC) Project has been operational since 2007 when, during an audit of the FTWC waste stream, it was determined that four FTWC containers contained lead in amounts greater than LDR treatment standards. From June to August of 2007, four FTWC containers were shipped to TA-54 for disposal as LLW from WETF. The contents of the FTWCs were characterized as high activity LLW and were thought to be in compliance with LANL's Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). During the packaging of these FTWC's, 36 intact squib valves (aka actuators), containing detonated squibs were included with the waste stream After being transported to TA-54 Area G, it was determined that the explosive used in some of the squibs was Normal Lead Styphnate (NLS). A recharacterization of the entire contents in the FTWC's was performed with the conclusion that the squib valves exhibited the RCRA toxic characteristic for Lead (D008), thus resulting in the contents of the FTWCs being reclassified as a Mixed LLW.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW TYPE A(F)RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

In a coordinated effort, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed the elimination of the Specification Packaging from 49 CFR 173.[1] In accordance with the Federal Register, issued on October 1, 2004, new fabrication of Specification Packages would no longer be authorized. In accordance with the NRC final rulemaking published January 26, 2004, Specification Packagings are mandated by law to be removed from service no later than October 1, 2008. This coordinated effort and resulting rulemaking initiated a planned phase out of Specification Type B and Type A fissile (F) material transportation packages within the Department of Energy (DOE) and its subcontractors. One of the Specification Packages affected by this regulatory change is the UN1A2 Specification Package, per DOT 49 CFR 173.417(a)(6). To maintain continuing shipments of DOE materials currently transported in UN1A2 Specification Package after the existing authorization expires, a replacement Type A(F) material packaging design is under development by the Savannah River National Laboratory. This paper presents a summary of the prototype design effort and testing of the new Type A(F) Package development for the DOE. This paper discusses the progress made in the development of a Type A Fissile Packaging to replace the expiring 49 CFR UN1A2 Specification Fissile Package. The Specification Package was mostly a single-use waste disposal container. The design requirements and authorized radioactive material contents of the UN1A2 Specification Package were defined in 49 CFR. A UN1A2 Specification Package was authorized to ship up to 350 grams of U-235 in any enrichment and in any non-pyrophoric form. The design was specified as a 55-gallon 1A2 drum overpack with a body constructed from 18 gauge steel with a 16 gauge drum lid. Drum closure was specified as a standard 12-gauge ring closure. The inner product container size was not specified but was listed as any container that met Specification 7A requirements per 49 CFR 178.350. Specification 7A containers were required to withstand Type A packaging tests required by 49CFR173.465 with compliance demonstrated through testing, analysis or similarity to other containers. The maximum weight of the 7A product container, the radioactive content, and any internal packaging was limited to 200 lbs. The total gross weight for the UN1A2 Specification Package was limited to 350 lbs. No additional restrictions were applied. Authorization for use did not require the UN1A2 Specification Package to be tested to the Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) required for performance based, Type A(F) packages certified by the NRC or DOE. The Type A(F) Packaging design discussed in this paper is required to be in compliance with the regulatory safety requirements defined in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR 71.41 through 71.47 and 10 CFR71.71. Sub-criticality of content must be maintained under the Hypothetical Accident Conditions specified under 10 CFR71.73. These federal regulations, and other applicable DOE Orders and Guides, govern design requirements for a Type A(F) package. Type A(F) packages with less than an A2 quantity of radioactive material are not required to have a leak testable boundary. With this exception a Type A(F) package design is subject to the same test requirements set forth for the design of a performance based Type B packaging.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Advanced Fuel Cycle Cost Basis – 2017 Edition

This report, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), provides a comprehensive set of cost data supporting a cost analysis for the relative economic comparison of options for use in the DOE Nuclear Technology Research and Development (NTRD) Program (previously the Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI)). The report describes the NTRD cost basis development process, reference information on NTRD cost modules, a procedure for estimating fuel cycle costs, economic evaluation guidelines, and a discussion on the integration of cost data into economic computer models. This report contains reference cost data for numerous fuel cycle cost modules (modules A-O) as well as cost modules for a number of reactor types (R modules). The fuel cycle cost modules were developed in the areas of natural uranium mining and milling, thorium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, depleted uranium disposition, fuel fabrication, interim spent fuel storage, reprocessing, waste conditioning, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packaging, long-term monitored retrievable storage, managed decay storage, recycled product storage, near surface disposal of low-level waste (LLW), geologic repository and other disposal concepts, and transportation processes for nuclear fuel, LLW, SNF, transuranic, and high-level waste. Since its inception, this report has been periodically updated. The last such internal document was published in August 2015 while the last external edition was published in December of 2009 as INL/EXT-07-12107 and is available on the Web at URL: www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/4536700.pdf. This current report (Sept 2017) is planned to be reviewed for external release, at which time it will replace the 2009 report as an external publication. This information is used in the ongoing evaluation of nuclear fuel cycles by the NE NTRD program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AVANTech's Advanced Polymer Solidification for Radioactive and Mixed Waste Stabilization: Case Studies - 18571

This presentation describes recent developments in polymer technology, as well as summarizes several applications and the history of process improvements that simplify the process and improve the efficiency for stabilizing low and intermediate level radioactive and mixed radioactive/hazardous wastes. Polymer technology has been used successfully since the early 1990's to solidify and stabilize radioactive and mixed hazardous/radioactive waste at United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE), US Department of Defense (DOD), United Kingdom government sites, and at commercial nuclear power plants. It is an effective, efficient, and economical means of preparing waste for storage and disposal. Recently, polymer solidification has been combined with other waste pretreatment technologies, such as evaporator concentrate drying, to further enhance volume reduction and packaging efficiency. This presentation reviews applications of the technology and identifies waste streams where polymers have advantages over cement, vitrification, and other stabilization processes. (authors)

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Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over-pack container, similar to the pipe component, called the criticality control over-pack, which will significantly enhance the efficiency of disposal. Hundreds of shipments of transuranic SNM, suitably packaged to meet WIPP waste acceptance criteria and with safeguards terminated have been successfully emplaced at WIPP (primarily from the Rocky Flats site clean-up) since WIPP opened. DOE expects that thousands more may eventually result from SNM consolidation efforts throughout the weapons complex. (authors)

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NUHOWS - Storage and Transportation of Irradiated Reactor Components in Large Packages - 13439

Most irradiated reactor components (hardware such as Control Rod Blades, Fuel Channels, Poison Curtains, etc.) generated at reactors previously required significant processing for size reduction due to the available transportation casks not being physically capable of containing unprocessed material. As of July 1, 2008, disposal for this typical waste class (B and C) became inaccessible (for the major part of the nation) due to the Barnwell, SC disposal facility being closed to all but its three compact states (CT, NJ and SC). Currently in the United States, most facilities are storing their irradiated hardware on-site in the spent fuel pools. Until recently with the opening of the Waste Control Specialists' Texas disposal facility, utilities faced the challenges of spent fuel pool space and capacity management. However, even with WCS's disposal availability, the site currently has annual Curie limitations for disposal, which will continue to promote interim on-site storage until such time as disposal is available. In response, Transnuclear Inc., (TN) an AREVA company, proceeded with designing a new large Radioactive Waste Container (RWC) that can be used to package irradiated hardware without the need for significant processing. The design features of the RWC allows for intermittent loadings of the hardware for better packaging efficiency, higher packaging density, space savings and reduced cost. This RWC is also compatible with TN's on-site modular vault storage system. Once completely loaded, the RWC can be transported to an on-site storage facility, an off-site storage facility and/or an available disposal facility. To accommodate the transportation, TN has designed a large transportation cask, the MP197HB. As the original design was for transporting fuel, it contains the necessary shielding to allow for the transport of unprocessed irradiated reactor components, while significantly reducing the amount of irradiated hardware shipments required with the use of the new RWC. This paper provides information on the unique design features of the RWC, storage module vaults, MP197HB Transportation Cask and cost saving benefits of using the large RWC for packaging, storage, transport and disposal. (authors)

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Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Flammable Gas Analysis (Rev. 4)

This document describes and implements the process to determine the concentration of flammable gas/volatile organic compounds (VOCs), hydrogen, and methane in a waste container intended for shipment in the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II), HalfPACT, TRUPACT-III, or RH-TRU72-B packagings. An aliquot of headspace gas (HSG) is sampled from a waste container and analyzed using a gas chromatograph (GC) with two detectors: a mass spectrometer (MS), and a thermal conductivity detector (TCD). The sample analyzed in the GC is split and half is sent to the MS for volatile organic compound (VOC) analysis while the other half is sent to the TCD for hydrogen and methane analysis.

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Processing and Disposition of Remote-Handled Transuranic Liquid Waste Generated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 16031

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) develops radiochemical processes for implementation in the US Department of Energy (DOE) production facilities and produces radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications. These activities result in the production of remote-handled liquid waste that is transuranic (TRU) and requires treatment for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Capabilities are needed to characterize, treat, package, and dispose of remote-handled liquid waste generated from research activities at ORNL. A project to implement these capabilities has been recently initiated, and activities are under way to support remote-handled liquid waste treatment at ORNL. Experimental data as well as model predictions are being used to support the conceptual design of the treatment facility. (authors)

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