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At least 703 records · Page 39

Measuring Critical Fuel Properties for Simulations to Accelerate Fuel Qualification

NREL's sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) research in the area of fuel properties and end use is focused on accelerating SAF development and deployment. This will be achieved by close collaboration with BETO program researchers on fuel property measurement and development of structure-property relationships. Additionally, fuel properties measured at often extreme engine operating conditions will be measured, and will be used as inputs to exascale ready simulations of aviation combustion turbines to reveal impacts of properties on turbine operation. This research will potentially lead to a widening of the allowable fuel property range for SAF, expanding SAF production process options and production volumes.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Human Interfaces and Management of Information (HIMI) Challenges for “In-time” Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS)

The envisioned transformation of the National Airspace System to integrate an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS)to assure safety in Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)brings unprecedented challenges to the design of human interfaces and management of safety information. Safety in design and operational safety assurance are critical factors for how humans will interact with increasingly autonomous systems. The IASMS Concept of Operations builds from traditional commercial operator safety management and scales in complexity to AAM. The transformative changes in future aviation systems pose potential new critical safety risks with novel types of aircraft and other vehicles having different performance capabilities, flying in increasingly complex airspace, and using adaptive contingencies to manage normal and non-normal operations. These changes compel development of new and emerging capabilities that enable innovative ways for humans to interact with data and manage information. In-creasing complexity of AAM corresponds with use of predictive modeling, data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence to effectively address known hazards and emergent risks. The roles of humans will dynamically evolve in increments with this technological and operational evolution. The interfaces for how humans will interact with increasingly complex and assured systems designed to operate autonomously and how information will need to be presented are important challenges to be resolved.

Lawrence J Prinzel↗

On the use of the systems approach to certify advanced aviation technologies

The field of human factors is as varied and diverse as the human subject itself. But one of its most important applications is the facilitation of safety and efficiency in a particular working environment through the implementation of paradigms known about humans and their working relationship with machines and systems. During the period since World War II (which is often viewed as the birth of Human Factors) no area has been the subject of more human factors research than aviation. And in no time during that epoch is the influence of human factors more important, nor more imperative than it is today. As technology driven designs have been finding their way into the national airspace system (NAS), there has been growing concern within the aviation industry itself, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the general public for a means by which to certify complex systems and the advanced aviation technologies that will be responsible for transporting, directing, and maintaining our airborne travel. While it is widely agreed human factors certification is desirable, the philosophy that will underlie the approach is debatable. There are, in general, two different approaches to certification: (1) the top-down or systems approach; and, (2) the bottom-up or monadical approach. The top-down approach is characterized by the underlying assumption that certification can be best achieved by looking at the system as a whole, understanding its objectives and operating environment, then examining the constituent parts. In an aircraft cockpit, this would be accomplished by first examining what the aircraft is supposed to be (e.g., fighter, general aviation, passenger), identifying its operating environment (IFR, VMC, combat, etc.) and looking at the entire working system which includes the hardware, software, liveware and their interactions; then, evaluative measures can be applied to the subsystems (e.g., individual instruments, CRT displays, controls). The bottom-up approach is founded on the philosophy that the whole can be best served by first examining it constituent elements. This approach would perform the above certification completely antithetically, by looking at the individual parts and certifying good human factors applications to those parts under the basic assumption that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts.

Wise, Mark A.↗

Digital Flight: A New Cooperative Operating Mode to Complement VFR and IFR

Digital Flight is a proposed new operating mode for all airspace users, complementing and adding to the existing operating modes of visual and instrument flight rules (VFR and IFR) and providing for cooperative integration in controlled airspace. Under new regulations (Digital Flight Rules, DFR) that set requirements for its sustained use, qualified operators employ Digital Flight to enhance their airspace access and operational flexibility in all visibility conditions and eventually all airspace classes without requiring segregation from incumbent operations. Enabled by connected digital information and technologies, Digital Flight operators employ cooperative practices and self-separation to ensure flight path safety in lieu of visual procedures or receiving separation services from Air Traffic Control. Its distributed structure and automated functions enable traffic densities and operational tempos not achievable with the existing operating modes. Various ongoing and emerging industry initiatives for enabling new entrants (e.g., unmanned aircraft systems, urban air taxis) and enhanced use of underserved airspace (e.g., ultra-high altitude), are pursuing various alternative operating modes with significant similarities, creating a unique and time-limited opportunity for harmonization and convergence. Digital Flight is proposed to serve that harmonizing role, creating a common new paradigm for airspace operations. Such convergence would not only bring together these emerging market segments but will also bolster the existing operators with access to this new operating mode and its advantages. Digital Flight provides an opportunity to focus regulatory development and benefit the aviation industry. This paper describes Digital Flight in sufficient detail to initiate community engagement and deliberation on a common new operating mode. It describes the essential elements, principal capabilities, and operational integration of DFR in shared airspace. It describes the value proposition from multiple perspectives and presents initial thoughts on the path forward.

Digital flight↗

Flight Test of a Head-Worn Display as an Equivalent-HUD for Terminal Operations

Research, development, test, and evaluation of flight deck interface technologies is being conducted by NASA to proactively identify, develop, and mature tools, methods, and technologies for improving overall aircraft safety of new and legacy vehicles operating in the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Under NASA's Aviation Safety Program, one specific area of research is the use of small Head-Worn Displays (HWDs) as a potential equivalent display to a Head-up Display (HUD). Title 14 of the US CFR 91.175 describes a possible operational credit which can be obtained with airplane equipage of a HUD or an "equivalent"' display combined with Enhanced Vision (EV). A successful HWD implementation may provide the same safety and operational benefits as current HUD-equipped aircraft but for significantly more aircraft in which HUD installation is neither practical nor possible. A flight test was conducted to evaluate if the HWD, coupled with a head-tracker, can provide an equivalent display to a HUD. Approach and taxi testing was performed on-board NASA's experimental King Air aircraft in various visual conditions. Preliminary quantitative results indicate the HWD tested provided equivalent HUD performance, however operational issues were uncovered. The HWD showed significant potential as all of the pilots liked the increased situation awareness attributable to the HWD's unique capability of unlimited field-of-regard.

Shelton, K. J.↗

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cockpit Technology for Prevention of General Aviation Runway Incursions

General aviation accounted for 74 percent of runway incursions but only 57 percent of the operations during the four-year period from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through FY2004. Elements of the NASA Runway Incursion Prevention System were adapted and tested for general aviation aircraft. Sixteen General Aviation pilots, of varying levels of certification and amount of experience, participated in a piloted simulation study to evaluate the system for prevention of general aviation runway incursions compared to existing moving map displays. Pilots flew numerous complex, high workload approaches under varying weather and visibility conditions. A rare-event runway incursion scenario was presented, unbeknownst to the pilots, which represented a typical runway incursion situation. The results validated the efficacy and safety need for a runway incursion prevention system for general aviation aircraft.

Prinzel, Lawrence J., III↗

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

Development of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Vehicles for Ease of Operation

To date the air transportation system has been developed with the in-cremental introduction of new technology and with highly experienced air transport pilots and air traffic controllers overseeing flight operations. Thus, we currently have one of the safest commercial aviation systems in the world. General Aviation (GA) in the United States, however, has not always followed the same cautious and monitored approach to implementation; consequently, the GA safety record does not meet the high standards of commercial aviation. Recently, a new system known as Urban Air Mobility (UAM), is attracting considerable interest and investment from industry and government agencies. UAM refers to a system of passenger and small-cargo air transportation vehicles within an urban area with the goal of reducing the number of times we need to use our cars, thus improving urban traffic by moving people and cargo from crowded single pas-senger vehicles on our roads to personal and on-demand air vehicles. These UAM vehicles will be small and based on electric, Vertical-Take-Off-and-Landing (eV-TOL) systems. A significant component of UAM is offloading of flight-man-agement responsibilities from human pilots to newly-developed autonomy. Cur-rently, over 100 UAM vehicles are either in development or production. Most, if not all, have a goal of fully autonomous vehicle operations, but fully autonomous flying vehicles are not expected in the near future. Therefore, we are de-veloping concepts for UAM vehicles that will be easy to fly and/or manage by operators with minimal pilot training. In this paper we will discuss our human-automation teaming approach to develop an easy-to-operate VTOL aircraft, and some of the fly-by-wire technology needed to stabilize the vehicle so that a sim-ple ecological mental model of the flying task can be implemented. We will discuss the requirements for a stability augmentation system that must be developed to support our simple pilot input model, and also present design guidelines and requirements based on a pilot input and management model. Finally, our ap-proach to vehicle development will involve considerable operator testing and evaluation: improving pilot model, inceptors, displays and also work on a plan for how a UAM vehicle can be integrated with terminal area air traffic control airspace with minimal impact on controller workload.

UAM↗

Dynamic Weather Routes: Two Years of Operational Testing at American Airlines

The Dynamic Weather Routes (DWR) tool continuously analyzes active flights in en-route airspace and finds simple route corrections to achieve more time- and fuel-efficient routes around convective weather. A strong partnership between NASA, American Airlines (AA), and the Federal Aviation Administration has enabled testing of DWR in real-world air traffic operations. NASA and AA have been conducting a trial of DWR at AA’s Integrated Operations Center in Fort Worth, Texas since July 2012. This paper describes test results based on AA’s use of DWR for their flights in and around Fort Worth Center (ZFW). Results indicate an actual savings of 3,290 flying minutes for 526 AA revenue flights from January 2013 through September 2014. Of these, 48 flights each indicate a savings of 15 minutes or more. Potential savings for all flights in ZFW airspace, corrected for savings flights achieve today through normal pilot requests and controller clearances, is about 100,000 flying minutes for 15,000 flights in 2013. Results indicate that AA flights with DWR in use realize about 20 percent more savings than non-AA flights. A weather forecast analysis examines the extent to which DWR routes rated acceptable by AA users remain clear of downstream weather. A sector congestion analysis indicates congestion could be reduced 19-38 percent if all flights fly DWR routes rather than nominal weather-avoidance routes.

Trajectory Automation↗

Common Methodology for Efficient Airspace Operations

Topics include: a) Developing a common methodology to model and avoid disturbances affecting airspace. b) Integrated contrails and emission models to a national level airspace simulation. c) Developed capability to visualize, evaluate technology and alternate operational concepts and provide inputs for policy-analysis tools to reduce the impact of aviation on the environment. d) Collaborating with Volpe Research Center, NOAA and DLR to leverage expertise and tools in aircraft emissions and weather/climate modeling. Airspace operations is a trade-off balancing safety, capacity, efficiency and environmental considerations. Ideal flight: Unimpeded wind optimal route with optimal climb and descent. Operations degraded due to reduction in airport and airspace capacity caused by inefficient procedures and disturbances.

Sridhar, Banavar↗

A Predictive GNSS Performance Monitor for Autonomous Air Vehicles in Urban Environments

The emergence and development of advanced technologies and vehicle types has created a growing demand for the introduction of new forms of flight operations. These new and increasingly complex operational paradigms such as Advanced and Urban Air Mobility (AAM/UAM) present regulatory authorities and the aviation community with several design and implementation challenges – particularly for highly autonomous vehicles. An overarching and daunting task is finding methods to integrate these emerging operations without compromising safety or disrupting traditional airspace operations. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. This paper focus on the development and testing of a prognostic service aimed at estimating the quality of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) performance for an autonomous aircraft in complex environments. The intent of this function is to proactively reduce a flight operations risk of exposure to states that may induce poor or unacceptable navigation system performance by factoring in estimates of GNSS quality into pre-flight and/or in-flight route planning. Methodologies for producing quality estimates are specified and results are provided for selected simulation and flight test cases.

GNSS↗

Real-Time Integrity Monitoring of Stored Geo-Spatial Data Using Forward-Looking Remote Sensing Technology

Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS) and Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) provide pilots with displays of stored geo-spatial data (e.g. terrain, obstacles, and/or features). As comprehensive validation is impractical, these databases typically have no quantifiable level of integrity. This lack of a quantifiable integrity level is one of the constraints that has limited certification and operational approval of TAWS/SVS to "advisory-only" systems for civil aviation. Previous work demonstrated the feasibility of using a real-time monitor to bound database integrity by using downward-looking remote sensing technology (i.e. radar altimeters). This paper describes an extension of the integrity monitor concept to include a forward-looking sensor to cover additional classes of terrain database faults and to reduce the exposure time associated with integrity threats. An operational concept is presented that combines established feature extraction techniques with a statistical assessment of similarity measures between the sensed and stored features using principles from classical detection theory. Finally, an implementation is presented that uses existing commercial-off-the-shelf weather radar sensor technology.

Young, Steven D.↗

Simulation Evaluations of an Autonomous Urban Air Mobility Network Management and Separation Service

This paper presents an initial implementation of an autonomous Urban Air Mobility network management and aircraft separation service for urban airspace that does 1) departure and arrival scheduling across the network, 2) continuous trajectory management to ensure safe separation between aircraft, and 3) seamless integration with traditional operations. The highly-autonomous AutoResolver algorithm developed for traditional aviation was extended to provide these capabilities. An evaluation of this initial implementation was conducted in fast-time simulations using a dense, two-hour traffic scenario with Urban Air Mobility aircraft flying between a network of 20 vertiports in the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex. When the spatial separation was reduced from 0:3nmi to 0:1nmi, the total de- lay decreased by 7:3%; when the temporal separation was reduced from 60s to 45s, the total delay decreased by 28:4%. The total number of conflict resolutions decreased by 26% and 17%, respectively. Furthermore, when a scheduling horizon greater than the duration of UAM flights was used (50min), most conflicts were resolved pre-departure producing ground delay. By comparison, when a shorter scheduling horizon was used (8min), most conflicts were resolved post-departure generating airborne delay. For all scheduling and separation constraints tested, AutoResolver prevented loss of separation from occurring. Urban Air Mobility operations have the ability to revolutionize how people and goods are transported and this paper presents initial research focusing on the high levels of autonomy required for an airspace system capable of scaling to handle significantly higher densities of aircraft.

Bosson, Christabelle S.↗

Evolution of National Airspace System Protection for Space Shuttle Launch and Landing

The breakup of the Space Shuttle Columbia on 1 February 2003 during the entry phase of the STS-107mission occurred above a significant number of aircraft operating in the National Airspace System (NAS).Although no aircraft were struck by falling debris, the incident led the Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to seek cooperative ways to betterprotect aircraft operating in the NAS during Space Shuttle launch and landing operations. Applicationswere developed and improved by both the FAA and NASA to provide pre-operation and near real-timegroundtracks and debris footprints to enable Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) to vector aircraft away from thedebris field in the event of a Space Shuttle breakup. Real-time coordination processes were also developedto provide the FAA data and insight into ongoing Space Shuttle operations in order to protect the NAS.The processes and procedures developed for Space Shuttle operations are extensible and applicable tofuture NASA and commercial spacecraft.

Doyle W Hensley↗

An Analysis of Barriers Preventing the Widespread Adoption of Predictive and Prescriptive Maintenance in Aviation

The aviation industry has long recognized the potential benefits of predictive maintenance, a maintenance strategy that leverages sensor and operational data to predict the future degradation of components. Prescriptive maintenance takes this a step further and considers the entire aviation ecosystem to schedule maintenance actions optimally. With the ability to reduce maintenance costs by up to 30%, as reported by the Department of Energy, these maintenance strategies have been identified to be an important investment to reduce a airline costs. However, despite great interest and technological advances in areas such as diagnostics, prognostics, sensing, computation, and machine learning, the adoption of predictive and prescriptive maintenance has not been widely applied in aviation. To shed light on this issue, we conducted an analysis of the barriers preventing or limiting the adoption of predictive and prescriptive maintenance in aviation. Through discussions with subject matter experts across industry, academia, standards bodies, and government, we identified five key challenges: complexity of prediction; validation, safety assurance, and regulatory challenges; cost of adoption; difficulty in quantifying impact and informing decisions; and data availability, quality, and ownership challenges. This study provides a detailed overview of these barriers and areas where stakeholders could invest to overcome them, aiming to support the scaled adoption of predictive and prescriptive maintenance in aviation.

Christopher Teubert↗

High Density Vertiplex: Scalable Autonomous Operations Prototype Assessment Simulation

Urban Air Mobility (UAM) is a rapidly growing topic within the field of aviation because of the impact a refined ecosystem and uncrewed aerial vehicles could have on modern society, such as urban air mobility, cargo, and emergency transport. Before the UAM concept can be actualized, research is needed to understand how to integrate these new classes of vehicles and operations into the National Airspace System. One under-researched but critical piece of infrastructure required for UAM operations is Vertiport operations. Vertiports are the envisioned takeoff and landing locations for these uncrewed aerial vehicles. To accommodate the high use of the vertiport, new technologies and roles will be required for optimal use. At NASA, the High Density Vertiplex sub-project targets research into vertiports. The High Density Vertiplex team created an Urban Air Mobility ecosystem to test and evaluate different concepts and tools used to support higher density operations at vertiports. Part of the test and evaluation included the Prototype Assessment Operations simulation of highdensity operations around a vertiport to study vertiport management and vertiport operations. The research team also evaluated how the prototype Urban Air Mobility ecosystem supported fleet managers, ground control station operators, and vertiport managers in execution of nominal and off-nominal high-density operations. Results from this simulation provided insight regarding UAM ecosystem research and development and vertiport automation systems.

Small Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (sUAS)↗

ARM-Related Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and Tethered Balloon System (TBS) Operational Requirements and Approval

This procedure addresses the requirements and process for obtaining approval for Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and Tethered Balloon System (TBS) operations at DOE Office of Science (SC) Atmospheric Radiation Measurement user facility observatories (ARM sites), ARM-supported training flights, atmospheric instrument development flights, and campaigns at non-ARM sites. ARM sites include both ARM observatories and ARM mobile facility deployments. The protection of people, property, and the environment during UAS and TBS operations is the foundation of executing a successful mission using UAS or TBS. This procedure is designed to facilitate safe mission execution. It does not address obtaining approval for ARM-supported research, which is approved through the ARM Field Campaign (AFC) or Engineering Evaluation (EE) processes. Approval of UAS and TBS operations is a prerequisite for final approval of an AFC or EE by the Infrastructure Management Board (IMB) and may be conducted in parallel with preparation and submittal of the AFC or EE proposal to the IMB. This procedure addresses UAS and TBS requirements; mission planning; documentation; maintenance; risk assessment; airworthiness determination; operation approval; training and qualification requirements and responsibilities for UAS remote pilots; TBS operators; visual observers; maintenance technicians; and A&P mechanics. It also addresses the responsibilities of ARM site managers, the Office of Science Aviation Safety Manager, principal investigators, requesting organizations, and Range Safety Officers. This procedure is derived from DOE O 440.2C, Aviation Management and Safety, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Regulations (FARs), 14 CFR 107, and 14 CFR 101. It contains two sections: Section 3.0 addresses UAS operations; Section 4.0 addresses TBS operations.

unmanned aerial systems, tethered balloon systems,↗