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Power and Natural Gas Systems Interface Study
Power systems worldwide are becoming more reliant on energy from natural gas, wind, and solar, posing potential reliability and coordination challenges from the tighter coupling of these infrastructure systems. This paper proposes a framework for the market-based coordination of electricity and natural gas system operations. The proposed framework includes a power system model that accounts for flexibility in the commitment of power plants with short start-up and shut-down times, coupled with a dynamic gas model that simulates when gas cannot be delivered to generators. The capabilities of the framework are illustrated using real-world electric power and gas systems, including scenarios around wind and solar penetrations and the analysis of time-variant, “shaped flow” gas nominations. Our results indicate that coordination between power and gas systems improves total gas delivery and reduces out-of-merit order dispatch in the electricity system, and that shaped flows may reduce unserved gas in systems with high penetrations of wind and solar.
Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: An Approach for Understanding an Organization’s Unique Infrastructure Environment
The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure landscape in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure landscape as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space.
Enhancing Resilience of our Nation’s Critical Infrastructure
Due to the ever-changing risk environment that faces the Nation’s critical infrastructure, it is essential that a comprehensive, collaborative approach is taken to enhance the resilience of the infrastructure assets and systems that are relied upon by the American people. To address the gaps that exist in infrastructure resilience research and development, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) created the Resilience Optimization Center (IROC) to bring together multi-disciplinary subject matter experts internally across the laboratory, as well as from public and private entities, other national laboratories, and academia to address some of the Nation’s more challenging infrastructure problems. These experts are working to provide easier access to subject matter experts; providing feasible, optimized solutions that yield observable results; and creating collaborative teams that apply a cyber-physical-dependencies approach. Though a variety of research initiatives, IROC is striving to provide end-to-end solutions, bridging the gap between cyber and physical infrastructure through research, analysis, testing, and validation.
Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024
Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.