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India's baseline plan for nuclear energy self-sufficiency.

India's nuclear energy strategy has traditionally strived for energy self-sufficiency, driven largely by necessity following trade restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) following India's 'peaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974. On September 6, 2008, the NSG agreed to create an exception opening nuclear trade with India, which may create opportunities for India to modify its baseline strategy. The purpose of this document is to describe India's 'baseline plan,' which was developed under constrained trade conditions, as a basis for understanding changes in India's path as a result of the opening of nuclear commerce. Note that this treatise is based upon publicly available information. No attempt is made to judge whether India can meet specified goals either in scope or schedule. In fact, the reader is warned a priori that India's delivery of stated goals has often fallen short or taken a significantly longer period to accomplish. It has been evident since the early days of nuclear power that India's natural resources would determine the direction of its civil nuclear power program. It's modest uranium but vast thorium reserves dictated that the country's primary objective would be thorium utilization. Estimates of India's natural deposits vary appreciably, but its uranium reserves are known to be extremely limited, totaling approximately 80,000 tons, on the order of 1% of the world's deposits; and nominally one-third of this ore is of very low uranium concentration. However, India's roughly 300,000 tons of thorium reserves account for approximately 30% of the world's total. Confronted with this reality, the future of India's nuclear power industry is strongly dependent on the development of a thorium-based nuclear fuel cycle as the only way to insure a stable, sustainable, and autonomous program. The path to India's nuclear energy self-sufficiency was first outlined in a seminal paper by Drs. H. J. Bhabha and N. B. Prasad presented at the Second United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1958. The paper described a three stage plan for a sustainable nuclear energy program consistent with India's limited uranium but abundant thorium natural resources. In the first stage, natural uranium would be used to fuel graphite or heavy water moderated reactors. Plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of these thermal reactors would drive fast reactors in the second stage that would contain thorium blankets for breeding uranium-233 (U-233). In the final stage, this U-233 would fuel thorium burning reactors that would breed and fission U-233 in situ. This three stage blueprint still reigns as the core of India's civil nuclear power program. India's progress in the development of nuclear power, however, has been impacted by its isolation from the international nuclear community for its development of nuclear weapons and consequent refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Initially, India was engaged in numerous cooperative research programs with foreign countries; for example, under the 'Atoms for Peace' program, India acquired the Cirus reactor, a 40 MWt research reactor from Canada moderated with heavy water from the United States. India was also actively engaged in negotiations for the NPT. But, on May 18, 1974, India conducted a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' at Pokharan using plutonium produced by the Cirus reactor, abruptly ending the era of international collaboration. India then refused to sign the NPT, which it viewed as discriminatory since it would be required to join as a non-nuclear weapons state. As a result of India's actions, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created in 1975 to establish guidelines 'to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. These nuclear export controls have forced India to be largely self-sufficient in all nuclear-related technologies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Preliminary Assessment

This Preliminary Assessment draft report will present the results of a literature search and preliminary assessment of the body of research, analysis methods, models and data deemed to be relevant to the Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment research. This report will provide: 1) a description of the problem space and the kinds of information pertinent to the problem space, 2) a discussion of key relevant or representative literature, 3) a discussion of models and modeling approaches judged to be potentially useful to the research, and 4) the next steps of this research that will be pursued based on this preliminary assessment. This draft report represents a technical deliverable for the NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling (SAM) program. Specifically this draft report is the Task 1 deliverable for project PL09-UtilSocial-PD06, Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment. This project investigates non-traditional use of social and cultural information to improve nuclear proliferation assessment, including nonproliferation assessment, proliferation resistance assessments, safeguards assessments and other related studies. These assessments often use and create technical information about the State’s posture towards proliferation, the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system to an undesired event, and the effectiveness of safeguards. This project will find and fuse social and technical information by explicitly considering the role of cultural, social and behavioral factors relevant to proliferation. The aim of this research is to describe and demonstrate if and how social science modeling has utility in proliferation assessment.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

FY 2008 Infrared Photonics Final Report

Through the duration of the NNSA Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and development (NA-22) ITAS lifecycle project, the Infrared Photonics research has been focused on developing integrated quantum cascade (QC) laser technology to enable next-generation remote sensing designs. Our team developed the concept of the integrated QC laser transmitter and originated and promoted the vision of mid-infrared (3–12 μm) wavelength photonics. Sustained NA-22 project funding produced the QC laser transmitter that is now deployed in follow-on projects. Our team produced nationally recognized cutting-edge research in the area of infrared transparent chalcogenide photonics. Three technical staff were recruited from outside PNNL and hired to support this research. This project also supported student research at the national laboratory, including high school, undergraduate, and graduate students. This provided a derivative benefit to NA-22, PNNL, and the educational institutions through training and mentoring next-generation students in science and technology. The student support was also the catalyst to develop research collaborations with two universities that are internationally recognized for their chalcogenide glass research.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program 2009 Report

The Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program (EMAC), funded through the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, monitors the ecosystem of the Nevada Test Site and ensures compliance with laws and regulations pertaining to NTS biota. This report summarizes the program’s activities conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC, during calendar year 2009. Program activities included (a) biological surveys at proposed construction sites, (b) desert tortoise compliance, (c) ecosystem mapping and data management, (d) sensitive plant species monitoring, (e) sensitive and protected/regulated animal monitoring, (f) habitat monitoring, (g) habitat restoration monitoring, and (h) monitoring of the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex. During 2009, all applicable laws, regulations, and permit requirements were met, enabling EMAC to achieve its intended goals and objectives.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Fuel cycle analysis of once-through nuclear systems.

Once-through fuel cycle systems are commercially used for the generation of nuclear power, with little exception. The bulk of these once-through systems have been water-cooled reactors (light-water and heavy water reactors, LWRs and HWRs). Some gas-cooled reactors are used in the United Kingdom. The commercial power systems that are exceptions use limited recycle (currently one recycle) of transuranic elements, primarily plutonium, as done in Europe and nearing deployment in Japan. For most of these once-through fuel cycles, the ultimate storage of the used (spent) nuclear fuel (UNF, SNF) will be in a geologic repository. Besides the commercial nuclear plants, new once-through concepts are being proposed for various objectives under international advanced nuclear fuel cycle studies and by industrial and venture capital groups. Some of the objectives for these systems include: (1) Long life core for remote use or foreign export and to support proliferation risk reduction goals - In these systems the intent is to achieve very long core-life with no refueling and limited or no access to the fuel. Most of these systems are fast spectrum systems and have been designed with the intent to improve plant economics, minimize nuclear waste, enhance system safety, and reduce proliferation risk. Some of these designs are being developed under Generation IV International Forum activities and have generally not used fuel blankets and have limited the fissile content of the fuel to less than 20% for the purpose on meeting international nonproliferation objectives. In general, the systems attempt to use transuranic elements (TRU) produced in current commercial nuclear power plants as this is seen as a way to minimize the amount of the problematic radio-nuclides that have to be stored in a repository. In this case, however, the reprocessing of the commercial LWR UNF to produce the initial fuel will be necessary. For this reason, some of the systems plan to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. Examples of systems in this class include the small modular reactors being considered internationally; e.g. 4S [Tsuboi 2009], Hyperion Power Module [Deal 2010], ARC-100 [Wade 2010], and SSTAR [Smith 2008]. (2) Systems for Resource Utilization - In recent years, interest has developed in the use of advanced nuclear designs for the effective utilization of fuel resources. Systems under this class have generally utilized the breed and burn concept in which fissile material is bred and used in situ in the reactor core. Due to the favorable breeding that is possible with fast neutrons, these systems have tended to be fast spectrum systems. In the once-through concepts (as opposed to the traditional multirecycle approach typically considered for fast reactors), an ignition (or starter) zone contains driver fuel which is fissile material. This zone is designed to last a long time period to allow the breeding of sufficient fissile material in the adjoining blanket zone. The blanket zone is initially made of fertile depleted uranium fuel. This zone could also be made of fertile thorium fuel or recovered uranium from fuel reprocessing or natural uranium. However, given the bulk of depleted uranium and the potentially large inventory of recovered uranium, it is unlikely that the use of thorium is required in the near term in the U.S. Following the breeding of plutonium or fissile U-233 in the blanket, this zone or assembly then carries a larger fraction of the power generation in the reactor. These systems tend to also have a long cycle length (or core life) and they could be with or without fuel shuffling. When fuel is shuffled, the incoming fuel is generally depleted uranium (or thorium) fuel. In any case, fuel is burned once and then discharged. Examples of systems in this class include the CANDLE concept [Sekimoto 2001], the traveling wave reactor (TWR) concept of TerraPower [Ellis 2010], the ultra-long life fast reactor (ULFR) by ANL [Kim 2010], and the BNL fast mixed spectrum reactor (FMSR) concept [Fisher 1979]. (3) Thermal systems for resource extension - These systems were primarily considered during the INFCE/NASAP evaluations [NASAP 1979] and include various LWR designs for increasing resource utilization (both uranium and thorium). This class would include the Radkowsky seed-blanket concept. Also included in this class are the thermal reactor systems being considered for deployment as small modular reactors, such as IRIS [Carelli 2004], mPower [mPower], and NuScale [NuScale] that are all water cooled reactors. The purpose of this work is to provide relevant systems and fuel cycle information for some of these once-through fuel cycle systems. In this report, the intent is on providing information on most of the systems from open sources and from scoping studies recently done within the program. As there is insufficient fuel cycle information on the first class of systems, they are not discussed in this report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Enhancing a Facility-Level Model for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of a Nuclear Enegry System

The Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment project (PL09-UtilSocial) investigates the use of social and cultural information to improve nuclear proliferation assessments, including nonproliferation assessments, Proliferation Resistance (PR) assessments, safeguards assessments, and other related studies. These assessments often use and create technical information about a host State and its posture towards proliferation, the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system (NES) to an undesired event, and the effectiveness of safeguards. This objective of this project is to find and integrate social and technical information by explicitly considering the role of cultural, social, and behavioral factors relevant to proliferation; and to describe and demonstrate if and how social science modeling has utility in proliferation assessment. This report describes a modeling approach and how it might be used to support a location-specific assessment of the PR assessment of a particular NES. The report demonstrates the use of social modeling to enhance an existing assessment process that relies on primarily technical factors. This effort builds on a literature review and preliminary assessment performed as the first stage of the project and compiled in PNNL-18438. [ T his report describes an effort to answer questions about whether it is possible to incorporate social modeling into a PR assessment in such a way that we can determine the effects of social factors on a primarily technical assessment. This report provides: 1. background information about relevant social factors literature; 2. background information about a particular PR assessment approach relevant to this particular demonstration; 3. a discussion of social modeling undertaken to find and characterize social factors that are relevant to the PR assessment of a nuclear facility in a specific location; 4. description of an enhancement concept that integrates social factors into an existing, technically based nuclear facility assessment; 5. a discussion of a way to engage with the owners of the PR assessment methodology to assess and improve the enhancement concept; 6. a discussion of implementation of the proposed approach, including a discussion of functionality and potential users; and 7. conclusions from the research. This report represents technical deliverables for the NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling program. Specifically this report is the Task 2 and 3 deliverables for project PL09-UtilSocial.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Women as a Force Multiplier for Bringing Nuclear Forensic Capabilities to the International Stage

In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Effects of geophysical extra-terrestrial and terrestrial physical stimuli on living organisms - Effects of gravity fields on living organisms

The biologic effects of greatly reduced gravity resulting from space flight are examined. Aspects of U.S. space biology during the period from 1960 to 1972 are discussed, giving attention to the Discoverer satellites, the Gemini series, the OV1-4 satellite, the biosatellite project, the orbiting frog otolith experiment, and the Apollo program. Other studies considered are related to the effects of galactic particles on nonproliferating cells, a recoverable tissue culture experiment, cell cycle maintenance in human lung cells, and effects of space flight on circadian rhythms. Viking will land on the planet Mars in 1975 in search for life forms.

Saunders, R. J. F.↗

Second International Airborne Remote Sensing Conference and Exhibition

The conference provided four days of displays and scientific presentations on applications, technology, a science of sub-orbital data gathering and analysis. The twelve displayed aircraft equipped with sophisticated instrumentation represented a wide range of environmental and reconnaissance missions,including marine pollution control, fire detection, Open Skies Treaty verification, thermal mapping, hydrographical measurements, military research, ecological and agricultural observations, geophysical research, atmospheric and meterological observations, and aerial photography. The U.S. Air Force and the On-Site Inspection Agency displayed the new Open Skies Treaty verification Boeing OC 135B that promotes international monitoring of military forces and activities. SRl's Jetstream uses foliage and ground penetrating SAR for forest inventories, toxic waste delineation, and concealed target and buried unexploded ordnance detection. Earth Search Sciences's Gulfstream 1 with prototype miniaturized airborne hyperspectral imaging equipment specializes in accurate mineral differentiation, low-cost hydrocarbon exploration, and nonproliferation applications. John E. Chance and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers displayed the Bell 2 helicopter with SHOALS that performs hydrographic surveying of navigation projects, coastal environment assessment, and nautical charting surveys. Bechtel Nevada and U.S. DOE displayed both the Beech King AIR B-200 platform equipped to provide first response to nuclear accidents and routine environmental surveillance, and the MBB BO-105 helicopter used in spectral analysis for environmental assessment and military appraisal. NASA Ames Research Center's high-altitude Lockheed ER-2 assists in earth resources monitoring research in atmospheric chemistry, oceanography, and electronic sensors; ozone and greenhouse studies and satellite calibration and data validation. Ames also showcased the Learjet 24 Airborne Observatory that completed missions in Venus cloud cover analysis, Quadantid meteor shower studies, extra-solar far infrared ionic structure lines measurement, Cape Kennedy launch support, and studies in air pollution, The Products and Services Exhibit showcased new sensor and image processing technologies, aircraft data collection services, unmanned vehicle technology, platform equipment, turn-key services, software a workstations, GPS services, publications, and processing and integration systems by 58 exhibitors. The participation of aircraft users and crews provided unique dialogue between those who plan data collection a operate the remote sensing technology, and those who supply the data processing and integration equipment. Research results using hyperspectral imagery, radar and optical sensors, lidar, digital aerial photography, a integrated systems were presented. Major research and development programs and campaigns we reviewed, including CNR's LARA Project and European Space Agency's 1991-1995 Airborne Campaign. The pre-conference short courses addressed airborne video, photogrammetry, hyperspectral data analysis, digital orthophotography, imagery and GIS integration, IFSAR, GPS, and spectrometer calibration.

Source record↗

Fact Sheet: National Space Policy

For over three decades, the United States has led the world in the exploration and use of outer space. Our achievements in space have inspired a generation of Americans and people throughout the world. We will maintain this leadership role by supporting a strong, stable, and balanced national space program that serves our goals in national security, foreign policy, economic growth, environmental stewardship, and scientific and technical excellence. Access to and use of space are central for preserving peace and protecting US national security as well as civil and commercial interests. The United States will pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in national and international space activities and work with other nations to ensure the continued exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The goals of the US space program are to: (a) Enhance knowledge of the Earth, the solar system, and the universe through human and robotic exploration; (b) Strengthen and maintain the national security of the United States; (c) Enhance the economic competitiveness and scientific and technical capabilities of the United States; (d) Encourage State, local, and private sector investment in, and use of, space technologies; (e) Promote international cooperation to further US domestic, national security, and foreign policies. The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. "Peaceful purposes" allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space. The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights. The US Government will maintain and coordinate separate national security and civil space systems where differing needs dictate. All actions undertaken by agencies and departments in implementing the national space policy shall be consistent with US law, regulations, national security requirements, foreign policy, international obligations, and nonproliferation policy. The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is the principal forum for resolving issues related to national space policy. As appropriate, the NSTC and NSC will co-chair policy process. This policy will be implemented within the overall resource and policy guidance provided by the President.

Source record↗

Fission Reactor Inadvertent Reentry: A Report to the Nuclear Power & Propulsion Technical Discipline Team

The Nuclear Power and Propulsion Technical Discipline Team has directed an effort to consider possible improvements to the launch approval process as it relates to fission reactors. To that end, Reference 1 described possible general design criteria and risk criteria for fission reactors. At the time that Reference 1 was completed, it was felt that additional examination of reentry issues was warranted. This paper presents the next step in that examination, which is to accurately describe and frame the problem and suggest safety criteria that might apply to inadvertent reentry. The report includes a discussion of the issues associated with different types of inadvertent reentry, the possible consequences of those events, a review of previous work in the area, security and nonproliferation issues, and options for safety requirements that might be considered. Note that safety requirements can have significant mission implications, e.g., no operation below a certain orbit.

Camp, Allen↗

Developing the capabilities to make strategic export controls effective.

The International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) of the U.S. Department of Energy has been focused for over 10 years on engaging partner countries to strengthen global efforts to prevent proliferation. This paper summarizes some of the key lessons learned regarding the development of the capabilities needed to make strategic export controls truly effective.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Independent Verification of Research Reactor Operation (Analysis of the Georgian IRT-M Reactor by the Isotope Ratio Method)

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) develops technologies to aid in implementing international nuclear safeguards. The Isotope Ratio Method (IRM) was successfully developed in 2005 – 2007 by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Republic of Georgia’s Andronikashvili Institute of Physics as a generic technology to verify the declared operation of water-moderated research reactors, independent of spent fuel inventory. IRM estimates the energy produced over the operating lifetime of a fission reactor by measuring the ratios of the isotopes of trace impurity elements in non-fuel reactor components.The Isotope Ratio Method is a technique for estimating the energy produced over the operating lifetime of a fission reactor by measuring the ratios of the isotopes of impurity elements in non-fuel reactor components.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Developments in Assisting Countries in Implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) began assisting selected non-nuclear weapon states in planning and preparing for implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol (AP). Since then, the AP international implementation program has contributed to the substantial progress made by Vietnam, Thailand, Iraq, and Malaysia in preparing for entry-into-force of the AP. An overall engagement plan has been developed with components designed to train government AP implementing agencies, inform policy makers, conduct outreach to industry and universities, make AP reporting software available and useful, and plan a detailed approach for implementing the declaration and complementary access provisions of the AP. DOE recently began collaborating with Indonesia, which has already entered the AP into force, requiring a second method of engagement somewhat different from that taken with countries that have not entered the AP into force. The AP international implementation program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program, is working more closely with DOE’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program to ensure countries are aware of and prepared to implement the export/import provisions of the AP. As the AP implementation program matures and helps move countries closer to entry-into-force or improved AP implementation, it is identifying characteristics of a country’s “end-state” that indicate that DOE assistance is no longer required. The U.S. AP Implementation Act and Senate Resolution of Ratification require the Administration to report annually to Congress on measures taken to achieve the adoption of the AP in non-nuclear weapon states. DOE’s AP international implementation program is a significant part of these measures. This paper describes recent developments to increase the scope and effectiveness of the program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Workshop introduction

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has three subprograms that directly reduce the nuclear/radiological threat; Convert (Highly Enriched Uranium), Protect (Facilities), and Remove (Materials). The primary mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) falls under the 'Remove' subset. The purpose of this workshop is to provide a venue for joint-technical collaboration between the OSRP and the Nuclear Radiation Safety Service (NRSS). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative and the Soviet equivalent both promoted the spread of the paradoxical (peaceful and harmful) properties of the atom. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has been rightly dedicated to fissile materials and the threat they pose. Continued emphasis on radioactive materials must also be encouraged. An unquantifiable threat still exists in the prolific quantity of sealed radioactive sources (sources) spread worldwide. It does not appear that the momentum of the evolution in the numerous beneficial applications of radioactive sources will subside in the near future. Numerous expert studies have demonstrated the potentially devastating economic and psychological impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or emitting device. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the material to the technical knowledge needed to develop and use it, is straightforward. There are many documented accounts worldwide of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. The burden of securing sealed sources often falls upon the source owner, who may not have a disposal pathway once the source reaches the end of its useful life. This disposal problem is exacerbated by some source owners not having the resources to safely and compliantly store them. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) data suggests that, in the US alone, there are tens of thousands of high-activity (IAEA Category I and II) sources in thousands of devices; and there are many more tens of thousands of smaller sources scattered among thousands of other NRC licensees. As a result of the ubiquitous nature and undeterminable number of current and legacy sources, even in developed countries they can be abandoned, disposed of in a haphazard manner, lost, stolen, and/or otherwise fallout of regulatory control. Supply and demand of sources, being market based, is more or less fluid. Normative security of radioactive sources exists, but varies in each country, and is loosely implemented through non-legally binding recommendations and standards provided by International Atomic Energy Agency technical documents and cooperation and through bilateral efforts such as this workshop where we share best-practices with one another. Much of the reason for the difficulty in securing sealed sources rests in the enormous need for their beneficial applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Alternative technologies to replace high-risk sources continue to be explored, but very few of these alternative solutions have reached the development stage for common usage and distribution. The beneficial uses of sources must be allowed to continue; however, to minimize the potential for their misuse, current controls and regulating mechanisms must be constantly evaluated to ensure the benefits gained outweigh potential risks. From a global perspective, an evaluation and modification of requirements over the entire life cycle of sources from their manufacture to their final disposition is required. The proper removal and disposal of vulnerable disused or orphan sources is essential to maintaining a safe operating environment. One of our goals in this workshop is to share our methodologies for recovering sources and learn how they differ or are similar to the challenges faced in recovering, storing, and disposing of sources in the Republic of Georgia . The suggestions we will make are flexible in allowing for the imperfect situations and capabilities we have all encountered in source recovery efforts. We have designed a table-top exercise specifically to address your concerns about the prevention and mitigation of contaminated facilities, soil, containers, and sources. Our discussion begins with an overview and video of the OSRP along with a brief on our projects ongoing international cooperation and activities. A presentation will be given by the NRSS illustrating the successes and challenges of source management in Georgia. A brief overview will be given of selected significant cases of the intentional misuse of sources. This will be followed by two comprehensive discussions focusing on the decontamination from the facility perspective down to the issues of container and source leakage. The second day will begin with the abovementioned table-top exercise on contamination control. On the third day, a second presentation from the NRSS will open up the session.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Feasibility study on using fast calorimetry technique to measure a mass attribute as part of a treaty verification regime

The attribute measurement technique provides a method for determining whether or not an item containing special nuclear material (SNM) possesses attributes that fall within an agreed upon range of values. One potential attribute is whether the mass of an SNM item is larger than some threshold value that has been negotiated as part of a nonproliferation treaty. While the historical focus on measuring mass attributes has been on using neutron measurements, calorimetry measurements may be a viable alternative for measuring mass attributes for plutonium-bearing items. Traditionally, calorimetry measurements have provided a highly precise and accurate determination of the thermal power that is being generated by an item. In order to achieve this high level of precision and accuracy, the item must reach thermal equilibrium inside the calorimeter prior to determining the thermal power of the item. Because the approach to thermal equilibrium is exponential in nature, a large portion of the time spent approaching equilibrium is spent with the measurement being within {approx}10% of its final equilibrium value inside the calorimeter. Since a mass attribute measurement only needs to positively determine if the mass of a given SNM item is greater than a threshold value, performing a short calorimetry measurement to determine how the system is approaching thermal equilibrium may provide sufficient information to determine if an item has a larger mass than the agreed upon threshold. In previous research into a fast calorimetry attribute technique, a two-dimensional heat flow model of a calorimeter was used to investigate the possibility of determining a mass attribute for plutonium-bearing items using this technique. While the results of this study looked favorable for developing a fast calorimetry attribute technique, additional work was needed to determine the accuracy of the model used to make the calculations. In this paper, the results from the current work investigating the fast calorimetry attribute technique will be presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Cooperative global security programs modeling & simulation.

The national laboratories global security programs implement sustainable technical solutions for cooperative nonproliferation, arms control, and physical security systems worldwide. To help in the development and execution of these programs, a wide range of analytical tools are used to model, for example, synthetic tactical environments for assessing infrastructure protection initiatives and tactics, systematic approaches for prioritizing nuclear and biological threat reduction opportunities worldwide, and nuclear fuel cycle enrichment and spent fuel management for nuclear power countries. This presentation will describe how these models are used in analyses to support the Obama Administration's agenda and bilateral/multinational treaties, and ultimately, to reduce weapons of mass destruction and terrorism threats through international technical cooperation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

U.S. national security through global technical engagement presentation to composite group A : homeland and international operations.

This talk will discuss Sandia's Global Security Program focused on reducing proliferation and terrorism threats to U.S. national security through global technical engagement. Elements include nuclear and radiological risks, biological and chemical risks, and multi-threat risk reduction. Also, recent work addressing the need to better integrate nonproliferation, arms control, counterterrorism, and nuclear deterrent objectives will be discussed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗