Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “nuclear reprocessing”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 703 records · Page 39

Gas Retention and Release from Nuclear Legacy Waste - 16449

The retention of gas within corroded magnox sludge waste at Sellafield, UK and secondary reprocessing waste at Hanford, USA has significant economic and safety implications for decommissioning various nuclear legacy buildings, including the magnox swarf storage silos and first generation magnox storage pond. A series of laboratory scale gas retention tests within magnesium hydroxide soft sediments have revealed a 4-51 Pa yield stress range where consolidated beds could retain sufficient gas to become buoyant with respect to a water supernatant. Density inversion could lead to a Rayleigh-Taylor style instability which could result in an upward transfer of radioactive material from the consolidated bed. The applicable yield stress range suggests that such rollover events may occur in weaker sediment than previously hypothesized, based on current understanding of the fluidization and stable channel mechanisms for gas release from weak and very strong sediments respectively. X-ray computed tomography images of gas retained by 7 Pa yield stress soft sediment reveal both a stable foam layer at the top of the bed and regions dense with micro-bubbles which could provide pathways for gas transport through the bed. Extension of these pathways, hidden below the surface of the sediment, to the container walls and the foam layer could represent a novel mechanism for gas release from intermediate strength sediments of <100 Pa yield stress. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Plutonium and Cerium Perrhenate/Pertechnetate Coordination Polymers and Frameworks

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) contains transuranic and lanthanide species, which are sometimes recovered and repurposed. One particularly problematic fission product, 99 TcO 4 – , hampers this recovery via coextraction with high valence metals, perhaps by complexation during aqueous reprocessing of SNF. There is limited molecular-level knowledge concerning the coordination chemistry between TcO 4 – or its well-known surrogate ReO 4 – and transuranic/lanthanide species. In the current study, we investigated the coordination of ReO 4 – /TcO 4 – with plutonium and cerium cations by structural and chemical characterization of a series of isolated extended solids. In this study, Ce represents both trivalent lanthanides and is considered a surrogate for Pu, respectively, in its common trivalent and tetravalent oxidation states. The structural elucidation of the seven isolated crystalline solids revealed that ReO 4 – /TcO 4 – directly connects to Pu IV , Pu VI O 2 2 + , Ce III , and Ce IV in the terminal and bridging coordination modes, leading to 1-, 2-, and 3-dimensional frameworks. For example, ReO 4 – coordination to Pu(IV) formed a 1D chain or 2D framework, isostructural with previously isolated Th(IV) compounds. However, Pu VI O 2 2 + alternating with ReO 4 – led to a unique 1D chain, different from the prior-reported U(VI)/Np(VI)-ReO 4 – /TcO 4 – structures. Coordination of ReO 4 – /TcO 4 – with Ce(III) promotes the assembly of 3D frameworks. Finally, attempted synthesis of a Ce(IV)-ReO 4 – compound resulted in a 2D framework with a mixed-valence Ce III/IV . The highly acidic reaction conditions supported the reduction of both Ce IV and Tc VII , challenging isolation of compounds featuring these species. Only one TcO 4 -containing structure was obtained in this study (Ce III –TcO 4 3D framework), vs the six total Ce/Pu-ReO 4 compounds. Furthermore, our three Pu-ReO 4 crystal structures are the first reported and translated to atomic-level information about Pu-TcO 4 coordination in nuclear fuel reprocessing scenarios, in addition to broadening our knowledge of bonding trends in the early, high-valence actinides.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Evaluation of the response of tritium-in-air instrumentation to HT in dry and humid conditions and to HTO vapor

Nuclear plant operators (power generation, decommissioning and reprocessing operations) are required to monitor releases of tritium species for regulatory compliance and radiation protection purposes. Tritium monitoring is performed using tritium-in-air gas monitoring instrumentation based either on flow-through ion chambers or proportional counting systems. Tritium-in-air monitors are typically calibrated in dry conditions but in service may operate at elevated levels of relative humidity. The NPL (National Physical Laboratory) radioactive gas-in-air calibration system has been used to study the effect of humidity on the response to tritium of two tritium-in-air ion chamber based monitors and one proportional counting system which uses a P10/air gas mixture. The response of these instruments to HTO vapour has also been evaluated. In each case, instrument responses were obtained for HT in dry conditions (relative humidity (RH) about 2%), HT in 45% RH, and finally HTO at 45% RH. Instrumentation response to HT in humid conditions has been found to slightly exceed that in dry conditions. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A two-dimensional, finite-difference model of the oxidation of a uranium carbide fuel pellet

The oxidation of spent uranium carbide fuel, a candidate fuel for Generation IV nuclear reactors, is an important process in its potential reprocessing cycle. However, the oxidation of uranium carbide in air is highly exothermic. A model has therefore been developed to predict the temperature rise, as well as other useful information such as reaction completion times, under different reaction conditions in order to help in deriving safe oxidation conditions. Finite difference-methods are used to model the heat and mass transfer processes occurring during the reaction in two dimensions and are coupled to kinetics found in the literature.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards Performance Modeling: Development of Advanced Safeguards by Design (SBD) Analyses Techniques for an Electrochemical Reprocessing Facility, and Comparison with past Similar Efforts for Aqueous Reprocessing (Interim Status Report for FY 2009)

Development of advanced "Safeguards by Design" analyses techniques for an electrochemical reprocessing (ECR) facility and comparison with past similar efforts for aqueous reprocessing (AQR) were initiated in fiscal year 09 in support of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Safeguards campaign. Although a safeguards design for reprocessing has many aspects, this study has identified two preeminent features worthy of early consideration in the design process: initial accountancy and the process holdup. Both of these safeguards measure have a significant impact on the ability to satisfy domestic and international safeguards requirements.

1.5.04.04↗

Deep Geologic Nuclear Waste Disposal - No New Taxes - 12469

To some, the perceived inability of the United States to dispose of high-level nuclear waste justifies a moratorium on expansion of nuclear power in this country. Instead, it is more an example of how science yields to social pressure, even on a subject as technical as nuclear waste. Most of the problems, however, stem from confusion on the part of the public and their elected officials, not from a lack of scientific knowledge. We know where to put nuclear waste, how to put it there, how much it will cost, and how well it will work. And it's all about the geology. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future has drafted a number of recommendations addressing nuclear energy and waste issues (BRC 2011) and three recommendations, in particular, have set the stage for a new strategy to dispose of high-level nuclear waste and to manage spent nuclear fuel in the United States: 1) interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, 2) resumption of the site selection process for a second repository, and 3) a quasi-government entity to execute the program and take control of the Nuclear Waste Fund in order to do so. The first two recommendations allow removal and storage of spent fuel from reactor sites to be used in the future, and allows permanent disposal of actual waste, while the third controls cost and administration. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NPWA 1982) provides the second repository different waste criteria, retrievability, and schedule, so massive salt returns as the candidate formation of choice. The cost (in 2007 dollars) of disposing of 83,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) high-level waste (HLW) is about $ 83 billion (b) in volcanic tuff, $ 29 b in massive salt, and $ 77 b in crystalline rock. Only in salt is the annual revenue stream from the Nuclear Waste Fund more than sufficient to accomplish this program without additional taxes or rate hikes. The cost is determined primarily by the suitability of the geologic formation, i.e., how well it performs on its own for millions of years with little engineering assistance from humans. It is critical that the states most affected by this issue (WA, SC, ID, TN, NM and perhaps others) develop an independent multi-state agreement in order for a successful program to move forward. Federal approval would follow. Unknown to most, the United States has a successful operating deep permanent geologic nuclear repository for high and low activity waste, called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Its success results from several factors, including an optimal geologic and physio-graphic setting, a strong scientific basis, early regional community support, frequent interactions among stakeholders at all stages of the process, long-term commitment from the upper management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) over several administrations, strong New Mexico State involvement and oversight, and constant environmental monitoring from before nuclear waste was first emplaced in the WIPP underground (in 1999) to the present. WIPP is located in the massive bedded salts of the Salado Formation, whose geological, physical, chemical, redox, thermal, and creep-closure properties make it an ideal formation for long-term disposal, long-term in this case being greater than 200 million years. These properties also mean minimal engineering requirements as the rock does most of the work of isolating the waste. WIPP has been operating for twelve years, and as of this writing, has disposed of over 80,000 m{sup 3} of nuclear weapons waste, called transuranic or TRU waste (>100 nCurie/g but <23 Curie/1000 cm{sup 3}) including some high activity waste from reprocessing of spent fuel from old weapons reactors. All nuclear waste of any type from any source can be disposed in this formation better, safer and cheaper than in any other geologic formation. At the same time, it is critical that we complete the Yucca Mountain license application review so as not to undermine the credibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the scientific community. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

The IAEA has established international safeguards standards for fissionable materials at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. It is, therefore, necessary to confirm proper operational performance to verify facilities operate under adequate safeguard-declared conditions. This verification can be achieved by employing monitoring equipment. Online real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams provides a unique capability to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Flowsheet monitoring technologies being developed at PNNL include three integrated systems: Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, spectroscopy-based monitor (UV-vis-NIR and Raman spectrometers), and Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). The MIP Monitor is designed to identify off-normal conditions in process streams using gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software. The spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and pre-concentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection. PNNL is preparing to test these multi-parametric technologies using different samples of dissolved spent fuel and aqueous and organic phases of the PUREX and UREX flowsheets. We will report our on-going efforts with specific focus given to quantifying sensitivity of the MIP Monitor and UV-Vis and Raman spectrometers to detect minor changes in major process variables.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear fuel irradiation testbed for nuclear security applications

The nuclear security community has long been interested in the identification and quantification of nuclear material signatures to understand a material’s provenance, use, and ultimate application. New forensics signatures and methods intended for non-traditional or advanced nuclear fuel applications require fuel irradiation experiments to demonstrate viability and validity. Integral fuel irradiations have historically required significant costs and long timelines to design, irradiate, and characterize. This paper describes how a recently developed nuclear fuel irradiation testbed can be used to provide a low cost, rapid turnaround, modular test environment for irradiation and evaluation of nuclear fuel specimens for nuclear security applications. The irradiation testbed houses six small ‘MiniFuel’ samples within hermetically sealed capsules inside targets that can be removed in between each ∼25-day operating cycle of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). As many as nine targets can be irradiated using a single irradiation position (reflector region) in HFIR, allowing for varying irradiation temperatures and burnups. A suite of hot cell capabilities have been established to perform post-irradiation examination for measuring performance (e.g., fuel swelling, fission gas release) and facilitating experiment disassembly for subsequent property measurements, microstructural analysis, or chemical assay. This new testbed allows fuel irradiations to be conducted on an accelerated timeframe to enable rapid proof of concept testing and to provide reference material for nuclear fuel security applications. Recent applications using this testbed include the testing of isotopic taggants in UO 2 fuel (intentional forensics), testing of U-10Mo fuel for down-conversion of highly enriched uranium–fueled reactors, and the production of irradiated UO 2 fuel material for signature analysis of its isotopic composition (plutonium, fission gases, etc.).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Separation of Plutonium from Irradiated Fuels and Targets

Spent nuclear fuel from power production reactors contains moderate amounts of transuranium (TRU) actinides and fission products in addition to the still slightly enriched uranium. Originally, nuclear technology was developed to chemically separate and recover fissionable plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel for military purposes. Military plutonium separations had essentially ceased by the mid-1990s. Reprocessing, however, can serve multiple purposes, and the relative importance has changed over time. In the 1960’s the vision of the introduction of plutonium-fueled fast-neutron breeder reactors drove the civilian separation of plutonium. More recently, reprocessing has been regarded as a means to facilitate the disposal of high-level nuclear waste, and thus requires development of radically different technical approaches. In the last decade or so, the principal reason for reprocessing has shifted to spent power reactor fuel being reprocessed (1) so that unused uranium and plutonium being recycled reduce the volume, gaining some 25% to 30% more energy from the original uranium in the process and thus contributing to energy security and (2) to reduce the volume and radioactivity of the waste by recovering all long-lived actinides and fission products followed by recycling them in fast reactors where they are transmuted to short-lived fission products; this reduces the volume to about 20%, reduces the long-term radioactivity level in the high-level waste, and complicates the possibility of the plutonium being diverted from civil use – thereby increasing the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle. In general, reprocessing schemes can be divided into two large categories: aqueous/hydrometallurgical systems, and pyrochemical/pyrometallurgical systems. Worldwide processing schemes are dominated by the aqueous (hydrometallurgical) systems. This document provides a historical review of both categories of reprocessing.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ELECTROCHEMICALLY-MODULATED SEPARATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASUREMENTS

A critical objective of materials accountability in safeguards is the accurate and timely analysis of fuel reprocessing streams to detect both abrupt and prolonged diversions of nuclear materials. For this reason both on-line nondestructive (NDA) and destructive analysis (DA) approaches are sought-after. Current methods for DA involve grab sampling and laboratory based column extractions that are costly, hazardous, and time consuming. While direct on-line gamma measurements of Pu are desirable, they are not possible due to contributions from other actinides and fission products. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are currently investigating electrochemically-modulated separation (EMS) as a straightforward, cost-effective technology for selective separation of Pu or U from aqueous reprocessing streams. The EMS selectivity is electrochemically controlled and results from the sorption of Pu4+ and U4+ redox states onto the anodized target electrode, allowing for selective accumulation of U or Pu from nitric acid streams to be turned “on” or “off.” It is envisioned that this technology can be utilized to isolate Pu for both NDA and DA analysis. For the NDA approach, rapid Pu analysis by gamma-ray spectroscopy could be performed after chemical clean-up of activation and fission products by EMS. Likewise, in the DA approach, EMS could be used to retain and concentrate the Pu in nanogram quantities on the electrode surface to be transported to the lab for analysis using high precision mass spectrometry. Due to the challenges associated with complex matrices, a systematic investigation of the redox-dependent accumulation of Pu using EMS was necessary, and results will be presented. Approaches to mitigate interelement effects using large surface area cells will also be discussed. The EMS chemistry and spectroscopy for Pu isolation and measurement will be presented, proof-of-principle measurements will be described, and the application of this approach for materials accountability will be discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Pyroprocessing Monitoring Technology Development at Idaho National Laboratory

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), with support from the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Technology Research and Development program, has been developing advanced instrumentation and approaches for enhancing the effectiveness of nuclear material control and accounting for future reprocessing facilities with particular emphasis on pyroprocessing. Advanced modeling capabilities augment new instrumentation development, predict material flows, integrate process monitoring data, and assess overall system effectiveness of the safeguards and security system. In this paper we provide a brief overview of the Safeguards and Security by Design approach being pursued under the program and details of advanced process monitoring instrumentation under development at the INL, which includes a triple bubbler system for on-line monitoring of level and density of molten salt, sensors for monitoring actinide concentrations in molten salt, and thermal-couple instrumentation for near real time determination of Pu content in U/TRU ingots. Laboratory and field testing data will be presented, as well as integration of these sensors into a concept for utilization of process monitoring information in concert with traditional nuclear material accountancy data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Early Regulatory Engagement for Successful Site Remediation: the UK Experience - 13173

The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is an independent safety, security and transport regulator of the UK nuclear industry. ONR regulates all civil nuclear reactor power stations, fuel manufacture, enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, most defence sites and installations that store and process legacy spent fuel and radioactive waste. The responsibility for funding and strategic direction of decommissioning and radioactive waste management of state owned legacy sites has rested solely with the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) since 2005. A key component of NDA's mandate was to encourage new strategic approaches and innovation to dealing with the UK's waste legacy and which deliver value-for-money to the UK taxpayer. ONR, as an agency of the Health and Safety Executive, is entirely independent of NDA and regulates all prescribed activities on NDA's sites. NDA's competition of site management and closure contracts has attracted significant international interest and the formation of consortia comprised of major British, US, French and Swedish organizations bidding for those contracts. The prominence of US organizations in each of those consortia reflects the scale and breadth of existing waste management and D and D projects in the US. This paper will articulate, in broad terms, the challenges faced by international organizations seeking to employ 'off-the-shelf' technology and D and D techniques, successfully employed elsewhere, into the UK regulatory context. The predominantly 'goal-setting' regulatory framework in the UK does not generally prescribe a minimum standard to which a licensee must adhere. The legal onus on licensees in the UK is to demonstrate, whatever technology is selected, that in its applications, risks are reduced 'So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable' or 'SFAIRP'. By the nature of its role, ONR adopts a conservative approach to regulation; however ONR also recognises that in the decommissioning (and ultimately the site closure) domain, it is often necessary to consider and support novel approaches to achieve the nationally desired end-state. Crucial to successful and compliant operation in this regulatory environment is early and sustained engagement of the contractor with the regulator. There must be a 'no-surprises' culture to engender regulatory confidence early in a project. The paper considers some of the challenges facing international prime and lower tier contractors when undertaking D and D contracts in the UK, and emphasizes the importance of constructive and transparent dialogue with all regulators to sustain confidence at all stages of a major decommissioning project. The paper will also articulate ONR's strategy to increase collaboration with the US Department of Energy in light of increasing UK-US synergy in the area of waste management and to benchmark respective regulatory approaches. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification

Burnup calculations are applied to determine the amount of krypton-85 that is produced during the irradiation of nuclear fuel. Since krypton-85 is most likely released into the atmosphere during reprocessing to separate plutonium, atmospheric transport modeling is used to calculate the worldwide distribution of krypton-85 concentrations stemming from emissions from declared reprocessing plants. Our results are the basis for scenarios in which emissions from clandestine reprocessing facilities have to be detected against various background levels. We conclude that today’s background imposes heavily on the ability to detect small and medium plutonium separation rates; only high separation rates of 1 SQ per week and higher have a chance to be detected with feasible outlay. A fixed network of monitoring stations seems too costly; instead the high number of samples that are required rather calls for mobile sampling procedures, where air samples are collected at random locations over the world and are analyzed in regional laboratories for their krypton-85 concentration. Furthermore, it is argued that krypton-85 emissions from declared reprocessing activities have to be significantly lowered to enable a worldwide verification of the absence of even smaller clandestine reprocessing. For each scenario the number of samples that have to be taken for probable detection is calculated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Sampling and Analysis Plan for Investigation of Undeclared Nuclear Activities - 20104

The nuclear-centered energy policy in South Korea is moving towards a nuclear-free era. It also facilitates an action or progress on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) launched a new R and D project which attempts to verify nuclear activities via analyzing environmental samples. Environmental samples possibly contain significant radiological information relevant to past undeclared activities. In order to precisely verify them, it is essential to provide 1) the concrete information of target facilities, 2) appropriate methodologies and procedures, and 3) well-suited instrumentation and equipment corresponding to sample signatures. It is also important to provide scientific reliability or validity in any process such as sample collection, handling, transportation and laboratory analysis. Therefore, the information of nuclear facilities (fuel fabrication plant, graphite moderated reactor, reprocessing plant) in North Korea are reviewed in order to determine parameters for appropriate sampling methods representing a facility's characteristics. Secondly, a sampling procedure for radioactive elements is being developed based on international and domestic standards such as ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials), KS (Korean industrial Standards), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) manuals. The procedure contains some specific information including sampling process, sampling tools, amount of sample, sample identification, and other related information. Developing the qualified national guidelines is most important since sampling and analyzing results can be used as evidences of nuclear activities. The guideline developed through this work will clearly define various methodologies such as document verification, sampling procedures, collection methods, sample storage criteria, chain of custody, and transportation conditions. The final objective of this work is to establish the infrastructure and regulatory framework for assessment of nuclear activities, and provide a national guideline for sampling and analysis. This will bring confidence in the results and play a critical role in complete denuclearization progress in South Korea. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards Envelope

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguard's optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Regulating Operational Safety at a Future Geological Disposal Facility in the UK - 18038

The United Kingdom (UK) has generated commercial nuclear energy for over 60 years; generating a significant and varied inventory of higher activity radioactive waste (HAW). In accordance with international practice, UK Government policy for long-term management of HAW is disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF). The nuclear materials comprising HAW include high level waste, intermediate level waste and some low level waste, not suitable for disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository. In addition, other nuclear materials may be reclassified as waste in the future and will require to be managed as HAW for disposal to a GDF; these include spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. The operator of a GDF will be required to obtain a nuclear site licence from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the nuclear safety and security regulator, in order to construct and operate the facility. In the period prior to submission of a licence application, ONR is working to develop its regulatory expectations and provide advice on its regulatory role with regards to a future GDF. ONR has developed regulatory guidance on operational safety, benchmarked against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) Safety Reference Levels for Disposal. This guidance draws upon ONR's current expectations for nuclear sites; including operational reactors, fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities, and reactors undergoing decommissioning; and incorporates relevant good practice drawn from international programmes for geological disposal and related industries (eg mining). In addition to the technical assessment guidance, ONR has developed guidance on the licensing process specific to a GDF; providing clarity for example on when a licence will be required. A review of the standard licence conditions applied to all nuclear sites concluded no significant amendment would be required for application to a GDF. Through its voluntary agreement with Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), the developer and future operator of a GDF in the UK, ONR exerts regulatory influence on the design and organisational development of the future licensee. As part of this scrutiny, ONR has assessed RWM's generic Disposal System Safety Case. Subjecting the generic design and safety case to regulatory review provides opportunity for early engagement to ensure the appropriate standards will be achieved. ONR will only grant the necessary regulatory permissions if RWM adequately demonstrates the GDF will be constructed, operated and closed safely. Future challenges faced by ONR with respect to a GDF include building and maintaining regulatory competence and confidence, and engaging effectively with the public as the UK begins its search for a suitable site to provide appropriate assurance that a GDF will be operated safely and securely. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Applicability of HBU Fuel Cask R and D Project to Al Clad Fuel Storage - 18558

Aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel (SNF) not destined to be reprocessed at Savannah River's H Canyon will eventually be moved from existing wet and dry storage facilities into standardized dry storage systems (e.g., Universal Canisters), ideally suited for disposal. With the current lack of disposal capacity in the U.S., placement of this SNF into dry storage requires plans for demonstrating to the regulator the safety of both the extended storage and the subsequent transportation to a future disposal facility of this SNF. For commercial SNF, concerns related to extended dry storage and subsequent transportation have been, and continue to be, addressed through several demonstration projects including, but not limited to, one for the lower burnup SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and one for the higher burnup SNF at Dominion's North Anna Power Station. Lessons learned from the more recent Orano led higher burnup demonstration project (HBU Demo Project) provides relevant information for advancing the concept of a 'smart cask' system for dry interim storage, which will allow for collection of data to support the safety demonstration for extended dry storage and subsequent transportation of the aluminum clad SNF. This 'smart cask' would eliminate the need for multiple demonstration projects that may have to be performed for different types of aluminum clad SNF designs and/or for potentially age distinguishing parameters, such as burnup or initial enrichment. This 'smart cask' would be developed and deployed by leveraging the HBU Demo Project's experience associated with modifying and deploying a TN-32B bolted carbon steel vertical storage cask system to monitor key parameters related to the criticality, structural, confinement, and thermal safety of the SNF and the canister system containing this SNF. This paper will focus on how the extensive design, licensing, and fabrication experience accumulated by the HBU Demo Project's cask system can be leveraged to support the design, licensing, and fabrication of a 'smart cask' system intended to support/confirm the interim dry storage, potential extended storage, and subsequent transportation of aluminum clad SNF, such as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) SNF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Decision Analysis Methods For the Analysis of Nuclear Terrorism Threats with Imperfect Information

Protection of commercial nuclear fuel cycles against adversary groups who may attempt to steal weapons-usable material is an issue of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The wide array of potential nuclear fuel cycle configurations and the security measures that could be deployed to protect them pose a daunting system design problem. In general, there are billions of potential design configurations. Moreover, the design choices are not independent – the effectiveness of one design feature or security measure can affect the desirability of other design choices. To explore this issue, we develop a mixed-integer optimization problem that solves a complex decision tree to allocate security resources across a commercial nuclear fuel cycle configuration. A nominal UREX+ reprocessing facility is used to demonstrate how the model allocates resources across a particular fuel cycle facility and shows how the problem can be scaled up to include other facilities and design features in the fuel cycle. In our model, the defender first chooses a set of safeguards to implement in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist theft from various unit operations in the reprocessing facility. The attacker observes the defender’s strategy choice and executes an attack to acquire material, including the possibility of declining to attack at all. The model considers the terrorist as an intelligent adversary with a set of attack strategies known to the defender. The strategic choices made by both the defender and attacker affect the probability of a successful attack by the terrorist and in turn affect the distribution of consequences to the defender. We use a decision tree to illustrate the interactions among costs, decisions, correlated uncertainties, and outcomes, and then show how to formulate the problem as a mixed-integer program with an equivalent solution. The novel features of our formulation include the following. First, as discussed above, we use a sequential game-theoretic formulation (a Stackelberg game). This formulation assumes the attacker can observe the defender’s actions before the attack is executed. Many previous game-theoretic studies have assumed attacker and defender act simultaneously without knowledge of the other’s strategy choice. We believe the sequential game formulation is more applicable for knowledgeable insider adversaries, the focus of this study. Second, we build on our previous work that has developed a methodology to reflect the correlation among probability distributions represented as discrete chance nodes in a decision tree. We illustrate how this methodology can be applied to two chance nodes in a decision tree that relate the quality of the materials that might be stolen or diverted by an adversary with the yield of a weapon that might be constructed from that material. In a decision tree, the dependence of the yield on the quality of the material could be modeled with conditional probabilities of the weapon yield given the quality of the materials obtained. For three outcome discretizations, this would require the assessment of nine conditional probabilities from domain experts as part of the model building effort. In contrast, our methodology will allow this same representation of the tree based on the assessment of the correlation between these two chance nodes by the experts, which we believe is a much easier and more reliable assessment task. The advantage of this approach increases as the number of dependent chance nodes grows in a decision tree representation of this problem. Third, we extend this approach to the approximation of the dependence between discrete binary events such as success or failure represented by binary chance nodes in a decision tree or in the special case of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) based on an event tree. This extension is a novel application in this domain, and uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine the appropriate conditional probabilities on the binary chance nodes when the number of correlated uncertainties is more than two. Fourth, we show how these decision trees or probability trees can be formulated and solved as equivalent integer programming (IP) problems. The advantages of the IP representation include the opportunity to use the computing power associated with powerful optimization solver algorithms available on high speed computers to solve very large versions of these trees, and the ability to include several such models of different facilities into a much larger IP with connecting constraints that represent budget restrictions, number of available inspection opportunities in a given time window, or other dependencies among these facilities. Policy makers can use the resulting model to inform their decisions about how to assess terrorism risk and to safeguard the commercial nuclear fuel cycle.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗